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Abstract
This thesis aims at analysing the inter—connection between trade 
and finance in the Bengal Presidency between 1793 and 1833 - a 
period of transition from monopoly to free trade and of rapid 
growth of the British Empire in India* The introduction explains 
the original contribution of the thesis* The first Chapter gives 
an account of the vicissitudes of trade and finance between 1785 
and 1793 which forced the Company to allow remittance of private 
fortunes through a definite portion of its tonnage* The second 
Chapter describes the breakdown of this arrangement under the 
impact of war in India and Europe* The private traders demanded 
cheaper freight, and Wellesley, pressed by military exigencies, 
allowed private trade in Indian ships to secure cheap capital 
from England and to scotch clandestine trade through the foreigners*
The old shipping interest defeated this plan* The third Chapter 
describes the effects of the Maratha War and stagnation of trade 
on the Company’s home finance which led to the abolition of its 
India monopoly* The fourth Chapter deals with the effects of 
free trade speculations and Hastings’s imperial and financial 
policies registered In the fall of exchange and exodus of 
capital* The fifth Chapter describes the financial policy which 
ended in a hectic indigo speculation, the Burma War which caused 
scarcity of capital, the trade depression which combined with 
them to destroy the agency haises inspite of Bentinck’s efforts 
and the abolition of the China monopoly* The conclusion analyses 
the effects of the British impact on the Indian economy* The 
thesis is based on manuscript official records of the Company, the 
private correspondence and papers of Dundas, Wellesley, David 
Scott, Bentinck, Ellenborough etc*, the Palmer Papers, the Bengal 
Comratyci^ Reports, the Bengal Financial Letters and Enclosures 
and the contemporary pamphlets, books, journals and vernacular 
newspapers*
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In tro du ctio n
This thesis deals with trade and finance in the Bengal Presidency 
between 1793 and 1833* Romesh Dutt’s Economic History of India 
under Early British Rule is the only major historical work in 
this field udiich covers the same period* Moved by the Indian 
middle class ethos at the end of the nineteenth century, breathing 
deeply of the Gladstonian liberalism in the air, Romesh Dutt 
looked at Indian history with a utilitarian’s and a free trader’s 
bias* He followed the old tradition of Mill and Wilson* Trade 
iduring the Company’s rule was to him an engine of destruction of the 
native industry; finance, a medium of drainage of the native wealth 
revenue policy, an insurmountable obstacle to agricultural improve­
ment and military and administrative expansion, an orgy of patronage 
resulting in the huge India debt* Economic transition did not 
appear to him as something evolving out of the complex interplay 
of changing economic and political forces* He saw them as 
unconnected strands and missed the inter-woven texture of growth*
Inland trade, industry, external trade and finance he dealt 
with separately - while they would have been intelligible only 
in the context of the inexorable expansion of an European 
frontier society in India, of the overwhelming challenge of an 
industrial economy to a domestic economy*
The writer of the thesis felt dissatisfied with this sort 
of institutional history which Is, in the last analysis, a plea 
and a programme for a certain class* Professor C*H* Philips’s 
East. India Company 1784-1854 suggested to him a possible clue 
to the development, of this period* It is not a work on economic 
history and it deals with commerce and finance incidentally* But 
it contains a pregnant suggestion - the interconnection between 
political expansion, trade and finance* It covers about the same 
period and has been the greatest possible help as it has given 
the intricate political background against which the economic 
forces had moved in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth 
centuries* By reducing the East India Company into component 
interests which dominated its policy at different stages and by 
analysing their relations with the Board of Control and, through 
it as well as the parliament, with the Government, he has revealed, 
what the institutionalists had missed - how policies were actually 
made at Leadenhall* It dispels the cobwebs of the Vftiig and the
Ill
free trader's bias from the true portrait of the East India Company.
Application of this suggestion to a particular period of 
Indian history was made easier by Dr* Holden Furber's brilliant 
study of John Company at T7ork between 1783 and 1792, the decade 
which precedes the forty years reveiwed in the present thesis*
With a ranartable wealth of evidence he has unravelled the inter-* 
connection between trade and finance in the late eighteenth century 
which led to the British expansion in India at the cost of all. 
other foreign Companies and, in that process, has drawn attention 
to the seminal role of the private British capitalist in India who, 
in the absence of facilities of remittance through direct trade 
with London, was more and more investing in that expansion*
It is the story of the relations between the Company's 
Government in the Bengal Presidency and the private British capitalist 
between 1793 and 1833 which forms the original contribution of this 
thesis* It aims at obtaining a conception of the interconnection 
between trade and finance, the imperial and the economic development 
during a period of fundamental transition from monopoly to free 
trade and from the British Empire in India to the British Empire 
of India* It brings into focus the inevitable contradictions 
between the dual aspects of the Company as a trading monopoly and 
as a Sovereign power* It analyses the different and often 
conflicting interests which were concealed under the common, appellation
of the private British capitalist (as Professor Philips has done 
with the Company itself) - the servants of the Company, the 
creditors of the Company, the free traders and the manufacturers*
It traces the chequered career of the agency houses which gave 
a unity to these interests - connecting them on the one hand to 
the capitalists whose money they invested in trade, plantation 
or Government loans (which financed the imperial expansion) and 
on the other to the British manufacturers whose capital they 
drew in the form of goods they sold and whose raw materials they 
supplied* It shows how the needs of the Company's Governments 
became Inextricably intertwined with the needs of the private 
British capitalists and how the dependence of the former on the 
latter proved to he the greatest weakness of the Company abroad 
as the alliance of the latter with the manufacturing interest 
proved fatal to its monopoly* Thus seen, the picture which 
seemed to be one of unmitigated conflict, appears also as one of 
co-operation*
It is best illustrated In the background of the Bengal 
Presidency which was the political as well as the financial and 
commercial base of the British power in Indiai The concept of the 
Bengal Presidency was a dynamic concept* It was always on the
move like the YIest In America - its frontiers were receding
further and further till, by 1833 it engulfed almost the whole 
of Northern India barring the Punjab# To the "original 
possessions" of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, acquired in 1765, Benares 
had been added by 1790# The Nawab of Oudh ceded the districts 
lying on the eastern,.southern and western boundaries of his Kingdcm 
in 1801# The Peshwa ceded Bundelkhnnd in 1802* Wellesley's 
Marat b$ War (1803-5) yielded Gut tack, Roygurh and districts in the 
Boab, situated In the east and west-ward of the Jumna, including 
Delhi and Agra* The Marquess of Hastings conquered (1817-19) from 
the Bhonsle - a large territory south and north of the Narmada, from 
the Find ails - Satlgor, Hutta, Bhopal etc*, from Sindhia - Ajmere 
and from Holkar - districts within and north of the Boondie Hills, 
lying south of Jaipur* The Burmese Government ceded in 1826 
Arracan, Tavoy, Mergui, Tennasserim, Assam, Manipur* Cachar and 
Jaintia*
The momentum of such an expansion over a period of thirty 
years would have been terrific even for a western nation* But this 
was not all* Over and above this Bengal was called upon to finance 
the ward of the other Presidencies, to bear the cost of defence 
against the French and their allies and to foot a substantial part 
of the bills of warlike expeditions to the Red Sea, the Eastern 
Islands (twice - once under Shore and the second time under Minto) 
and the French Islands# On the resources of Bengal, the best part of
which had been pennanently fixed, the repercussions of this 
expansion were disastrous* When the investment and the home 
charges were added to these well-nigh unbearable burdens, the 
Bengal Government had to rely or extraordinary resources the most 
important of which were loans from the private British capitalists 
who were mostly its servants or ex-servants*
This brought the Government in close connexion with the 
agency houses who were the representatives of these capitalists 
and were, like the Government, dependent on their capital in a 
narrow money-market * Either the Government or the agency houses 
would suffer ■ when the creditors diverted capital from one to the 
other as the conditions of trade and money-*narket dictated* The 
agency houses were injured when the Government increased interest 
rate or put obstacles before trade* The Government was injured 
when agency houses, due to stagnation in trade or failure of 
indigo speculations, were forced to sell their holdings of public 
Securities or stopped buying opium* The Government's financial 
policy, like funding of debt or reduction of interest, caused 
transfer of capital to England which reacted no less severely on the 
Government than on the agency houses* Its camnercial policy of 
charging high freight or banning India-built shipping or 
monopolising silk caused clandestine trade or a speculative 
rise of prices which hurt the Company no less than the private 
traders* The mutual interests of the Government and the agency
houses forced both to work out a modus vivendi. The servants of 
the Company, who were the creditors of both and had a stake in the 
survival of both, saw to that* The Government helped the agency 
hcuses with loans in times of trade depression and financial 
crisis or followed a cheap money policy; the agency houses helped 
the Government by contributing to its war-loans, accepting its 
discredited paper and facilitating its China remittance through the 
opium trade* They were both eager for import of capital from. 
EngLand which, by relieving the pressure on the money-market, would 
lessen the cost of Empire and trade*
Here the third important force ccmes in - the British 
^manufacturing interest. The agency houses and the manufacturers 
were also interdependent - the former for import of capital in the 
medium of British manufactures and the latter for the opening and 
development of the Indian market* The considerable commission the 
agency houses obtained from the manufacturers enabled them to 
suffer positive losses for years until the phenomenal improvement 
of technique and reduction of the cost of production since 1812* 
Their interests and, therefore, approach were common so far as the 
Company's monopoly was concerned* Manufactures, if unsold in 
India, could not be pushed into the East Indies or the China 
market and capital could not be invested in large scale production 
of Indian raw materials due to a ban on European ownership of land, 
licence laws, internal customs and competition of the Company's
viii
remittance trade* Intermittent depression in British trade and 
shipping during this period lent an edge to the demand for greater 
facilities of remittance by the agency houses and for further 
opening of markets and development of raw materials by the 
manufacturers* It is significant that each Charter period was 
in the trough of a trade cycle*
The struggle against monopoly was thus conducted 
simultaneously in India and Britain* In India the private capitalists 
received the tacit, often an open, support of the Government;, in 
Britain they received the support of the manufacturers and the 
ship-owners* Between them the Company was hard pressed throughout 
the period and had to yield first its India and then, its China 
monopoly* 'In 1833 India was finally opened to the full impact 
of the Industrial Revolution and the British capitalist !' 
development* The Board of Control and the British Government 
played the role of arbitrators in these disputes* All the Charters 
granted between 1793 and 1833 were in the nature of compromises 
but inevitably registered the gradual ascendancy of the superior 
economic force of industrial capitalism*
No monolithic conception of history emerges from this study*
The pattern of co-operation or conflict was never absolute. Nor 
were the same interests always on the same side* A conflict between 
the shipping and the private trade interests was always latent within.
the Company while the contradiction between the interests of the 
group of lenders and group of borrowers (the agency houses) among 
the private British capitalists often became apparent during 
financial and canmercial crises* On the question of the British 
tariff the Company and the agency houses were on the common ground 
while, only in the last phase, did the manufacturing interest 
turn a qualified free trader* Private capital invested in British 
shipping was inimical to private capital invested in Indian 
shipping* The out ports did not see eye to eye with London and the 
established agency houses did not welcome the free traders with 
open anus* The determining cause of transition from monopoly to 
free trade has been found in the political and economic exigencies 
rather than in the arguments of the theorists or the blind forces 
of class war*
Apart from the Parliamentary Papers and the printed official 
records, the writer has used manuscript official records like the 
correspondence between the Government of Bengal and the Court of 
Directors in different departments between 1792 and 1833; the 
Proceedings of the Bengal Board of Trade and other departments where 
necessary; the correspondence on financial and commercial matters 
between the Board and the Court; the Charter Papers; the private 
correspondence artfl papers on the issues involved like those of 
David Scott (mostly edited by Professor Philips), Wellesly, 
Bosanquet, Liverpool and Huskisson (in the British Museum), Bentinck
(in the Nottingham University Library) and Ellenborough (in the 
Public Record Office); the private correspondence of the East 
India agents like William Fairlie (in the Commonwealth Relations 
Office Home Series or Charter Papers) and John Palmer (in the 
Bod^leian Library, Oxford)* For trade he had availed himself of 
a very valuable series of manuscripts in the Commonwealth 
Relations Office Library, the Bengal Commercial Reports which, 
besides giving the Custans House records of Bengal's external 
and internal trade, give a comparative study of trade with each 
quarter of the world and important informations on freight, 
shipping, prices in the Calcutta market etc* For finance he has 
depended on a similar series in the same library - Finance, Bengal 
Letters and Enclosures Received (Board's Copies) - which not only 
contain the financial letters from the Bengal Government but the 
annual reports of the Accountant General of Bengal which furnish 
a detailed survey of all financial transactions in the Presidency, 
the estimates and actual accounts and information on the^Bengal 
money-market* On shipping he has drawn from a contemporary 
compilation by an employee of the Master Attendant's Office and 
informations in the Bengal Commercial Reports* The contemporary 
pamphlets, journals and magazines and the files of some of the 
Vernacular newspapers have also been consulted*
CHAPTER I 
The Chart er of 1795
In this chapter I propose to analyse the financial position 
of the East India Company at home and abroad as well as the trends 
in trade relations between India and England between 1784 and 1792*
At the beginning of this period the Company, almost ruined in the course 
of the War of £881 American Independence, the First Marat ha and the 
Second Mysore Wars, had been brought under the control of the State*
At it.3 end, after six years of peace and partial recovery, it had fought 
and won another Mysore War and was on the point of entering the 
long spell of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars* The end coin­
cided also with the renewal of its Charter when the protagonists of 
free trade, who had already exacted various concessions, made a 
concerted attack on its monopoly* and persuaded the State to embody 
their rights and privileges formally into the Charter of 1793*
The balance-sheet of the Company always defied precise 
analysis and the more so in the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
when its revenue and commerce and India and China affairs were 
inextricably mixed up* It is not surprising when we consider the 
many variable factors that entered into its computation* like the 
revenues and charges in India, the rate of Interest on loans and the 
sale value of exports etc*, and the unknown quantities that had 
to be reckoned with, such as stocks in warehouses, shipping losses, 
imports in honest as well as clandestine trade by the foreign companies, 
the amount of private and privilege trade and of the bills of exchang*
drasvn from differsnt fresidencies in India on different accounts
which the Compaiy had to meet in London. The India budgets were
half guess-work and half based on stale statistics, likely to be
corrected in the next letter from Fort William. Dundas worked
on estimates about which Francis "remained fixed in opinion’1 that
they "might be so cut and contrived as to be made capable of sup-
(1)
porting any assertions, however glaringly monstrous or absurd,"
It was impossible to keep pace with the kaliedoscopic march of
events in India which set all Leadenhall Street calculations at
nought , turning certainty of prosperity into despair or bringing
relief to imminent bankruptcy with an Olympian whim. It i&
true; as William Playfair said, "Millions upon millions, and crorea
a leaving
upon crores appear to vanish like Chinese shadows bearing but a
remembrance behind," but thia was inevitable and implicit in the:
very nature, of thia unique institution. The East India Company
was continually and rapidly growing and an autopsy was impossible;
mdas*^ at a particular time in a particular year.
;tempt
i a balance- Nevertheless attempts to reconstruct its balance-sheet have 
aeet
to be made if we are to gain an idea of the financial structure
hm
of the Company. Rough sketches were occasionally drawn in the 
eighteenth centuiy, when new stocks had to be raised or bonds 
floated or when the State was called upon to help it out of soma; 
crisis. Dundas tried to grapple with a balance-sheet from his
1) Pari. Hist. XXVI P.160, XXVII P.566.
2) Strictures on the Asiatic Establishments of Greg-t Britain. 
Pamphlet, London, 1799*
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first budget in May, 1788, adding "incompleteness to unintelligL—
CD
bility," for be left out commerce* Francis Russell, Solicitor to
<2>tbe Board of Control,,, mad© one in 1790# Tbe enemies of the Company 
were always eager to draw balance-sheets in order to clinch their 
arguments against monopoly and the Company was forced to defend 
itself with elaborate statistical data* An analysis of one will 
bear out the faulty nature of these earlier attempts*
Dundas, in his budget speech of 25th Febiuary 1793, was opti­
mistic of the situation* In his ■view the net surplus revenue of 
the Company*s Indian possessions on the average of three years - 
1787-88 to 1789-90 - was £1,614,013, that of Bengal alone being 
£2,322,897* The estimated net surplus of 1793-4 [Dundas was rash 
enough to ignore the intermediate years the accounts of which 
were interrupted due to the Third Mysore War) was £1,725,000, 
Bengali contribution being £1,986,000* Deducting interest to 
the extent of £561,923 on the India debt amounting to £6,669,082 
and adding £350,000 stipulated for goods exported frcm Europe 
and far certificates to the commanders and officers, the fund avail­
able for the investment would amount to £1,409,127 which included
(1) C*H* Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834* Manchester
University Press, p* 65*
(2) "Concentrated view of the Affairs of the East India Company
regarding their Commerce and Finance" 14 April 1790 Hams 
Misc* 808, pp* 195-211*
-4-
(1)
China supplies worth £250,000* The corns re ial profit on India
trade in the last three years (March 1790 - March 1795) was on an
(2)
average of £551,831 which might he estimated In future at
£239,466 per year* Talcing both India and China trade into aecount
the average profit of the same period came up to £434,581*
The excess of annual receipts over payments of the Company at
home (including payment of a 8$ dividend) amounted to £1,239,241
of which as much as £1,059,027 was derived frccx the Indian revenue*
An analysis of stock: per computation on 1 March, 1793, stowed
(3)
£855,408 In favour of the Company*
Heal jBituation: When we look to the debt—account, however, the other
side of the picture comes into view# Total debts in India on
(4)
31st January, 1792, amounted to C*R* 9,08,45,508 — debts bearing 
interest being C*R* 6,93,39,432 and interest payable per year 
C#B* 59,22,097* This last enormous sum had to be deducted from the 
gross surplus revenue of India before it could be applied to the purchase 
of investment while a provision for payment of the principal was 
immediately called for If the
(1) Finds available for investment in fixture:
Surplus revenue - £1,725,000 
interest on debt- 561,925
Eat* of sale value of exports frcm £1,163,077
Britain and sum received for certs* 550,000
to commanders, '
£1,513,077
Dundas maifces other adjustments to bring it to a minimum of £1,409,127.
(2) Dundas admitted that this did not include interest or insurance
charges and was not a mercantile profit*
(3) Mr* Dundas** speeches on East India Finances, Heads of Mr* Dundas*s
Budget Speeches cf* 25 Feb* 1793 ^
(4) A current rupee is a booh-keeper*s fiction worth 2 shillings#
vicious circle of loans to repay earlier loans was to br broken*
Debts at home, exclusive of the capital stock, whose nominal amount
(1)
was £5,000,000 but real worth £7,780,000, totalled £9,247,019*
The debts, transferred from India according to the plans of 1785
and 1787, swelled them further to £10,601,069* Total assets at
home and India were calculated to be £17,112,854, most of which
(2)
had been long locked up in buildings, forts, warehouses etc#
Let us now look at the commercial aspects of the East
India Company which indeed were dismal* Dundas*s estimate of stock
per computation did not include capital which, so corrected, puts
(3)
the balance against the Company at £4,144,592* The gain from
India and China trade during 1780-1790 amounted to £1,866,420
which gives £5,16*8•$ on the original capital of £3,200,000, and
if the profits on export trade during the same period, £976,278,
(4)
be added, the out4 turn Increases to £8*17*8#$ Holden HUrber 
calculating on the real value of the stock, puts it at 5-5£$ and 
sees reasons for adding to the deficit* On the whole n*****the 
owners of East India Stock could presumably have liquidated their 
vast concerns without going very deeply in the red, but they could
(1) Holden Firber#John Company at Work* Cambridge, Harvard University
Press* 1948, p* 268*
(2) Leaving out dubious debts owing to the Company, Francis Russell
calculated Indian assets at £5,305,806, and assets in England 
at £12,776,692* op*cit*
(3) App. XXIII to the Report of the Committee of Accounts, 15 Feb* 1793*
Home Mi sc* 401, p* 193#
(4) Home Misc* 208 pp* 228-29* Another account places It at £7*2*6*$
George Anderson calculated a loss* cf* Francis Rissell*s 
Considerations etc* I*0*Charters Vol* 9, pp* 167-68#
net have recovered either the nominal or tiie aetuaX amount of their
investment® and nwe must also think; of the investment of at least
(1)
£6,000,000 in the Company*s India bonds as also wiped out*®
To sum up, in spite of its rapidly increasing acquisitions 
in India, the Company in 1792 was financially most vulnerable 
and was conducting a trade which no prudent merchant would consider 
profitable. As Dundas confessed, the Company went on with thetrade 
because It was still the best medium of remittance of the surplus 
Indian revenue consistent with its trade monopoly and Its sovereign 
status in India*
Resources for Investment: Dundas estimated this surplus revenue at
£1,621,050 (or £1,725,500 if commercial charges ware not deducted).
Other resources, on which the Company* s trade could rely, were bullion
and merchandise exported to India, funds obtained from sale of
certificates to commanders and officers of the Company*s ships,
sale of cctnmercial bills drawn on the Court and subscriptions
on account of the transfer of debt begun since 1785. Bullion
exported to India between 1783-4 and 1792-3 amounted to a meagre 
(2)
£721,914 and the export of merchandise, though rising from
£400,000 in 1784 to £1,000,000 by 1795, had never been very 
(3}
profitable. The sale of goods and stores, exported to India 
from 1786-87 to 1790-91, fetched on average C.R# 27,86,676 per
(1) Holden Ehrber* Op.cit. pp. 268-69
(2) ibid, p# 307*
(3) The First Report of the Select Committee appointed by the Court
of Directors to take into consideration the export trade from 
Great Britain to the East Indies, 1 Sept. 1791 puts the net 
loss on woollens at £27,790 and the net profit on metals at 
£9,875 between 1783-84 and 1789-90, 1.0. Charters Yol. 10.
incial
latiozi
Bengal
-7-
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year while the sal© of certificates brought C#R# 4,61,606# Bills of
(2)
exchange averaged at C.R. 4*10,806 and debts subscribed in India per
orders of the Courfc of 1785 and 1787 amounted by 30 April 1791 to
(3)
C.R# 1,71,77,967 and C.R# 1,94,51,927 respectively# So the Company 
ultimately depended on the Indian revenues to keep its whole concern 
going in India find China, for, though more than four million pounds 
in bullion and three million pounds in goods and stores had been sent 
to Canton between 1785 and 1791, the latter sold at loss and the
(4)
Supra cargoes pestered the Supreme Government in Bengal for finds#
Francis Russell recognised in Indian revenues the keystone of the
gigantic edifice of the East India Company and calculated an aid of
£765,000 per annum from India to the dammerdal gain of £766,687,
so that the Company could meet its commitments, establish a sinking
fund of £535,000 for its untransferred Indian debt and still have a
(5)
surplus for the liquidation of its home debts#
Of all the Company* s settlements in India the Presidency of Bengal 
alone provided the desired surplus, after meeting others* deficits#
(1) Appendix G# to Dundas*s budget speech of 1793# The Second Report
of the above Select Commit tea 29 December 1791 puts export- of 
merchandise, metals and stores to India at £1,179,342, £1,561,841 
and £1,255,259 respectively, Home Misc# 401# p# 31#
(2) App# inncrr of the: Report of the Committee of Acccunts 15 February
1793 op#cit# p# 210#
(3) App# XHT Ibid p# 177#
(4) China received, during 1766-67 and 1784-85, £94,000 per annum on
the average# Home Misc# 370, p# 63 and Letters from Canton to 
Bengal in Home Misc. 795, pp# 65-76, 92-96. During 1786-87 «*
1790-91 India supplied C.R# 21,21,686 per year and Ben^l*s 
contribution was C.R# 17,97,378# See Appendix G# to Dundas*s 
budget of 1793#
(5) Francis Russell, op.cit#
-8-
She has to bear not only the major burden of the Indian investment 
but undertake supplies to China, Bencoolen, Penang and her sister 
presidencies• Sale of import goods and certificates in Bengal had 
yielded during 1786-87 1790-91 an average of C.R* 11,03,260 and
CD
C*R* 2,54,733 respectively* The amount subscribed in Bengal
frcm 1788-87 to 1790-81, per orders of the Court of 15 September
1785 and 31 July 1787 regarding transfer of debt, came up to
(2)
C.R* 1,75,05,045* Bills of exchange were granted to the tune of
(3)
C*R* 2,07, 063 per annum from 1786 to 1791. These were about
all the extraordinary resources that Bengal could add to her own
surplus revenue, estimated for 1793 at C.R* 1,98,60,000 - which had
greatly shrunk as civil, military and debt charges increased* Out
of the total she had to meet annually the prime cost and charges of
(4)
tbe investment, on an average C.R. 91,51,808, supply Canton with
(5)
C.R. 17,97,378, Bencoolen and Penang witb C.R. 5,0Qp00 and Bombay
(1) App. XI of tbe Report of tbe Committee of Accaints op.cit. p.172.
(2) App. XXV ibid.|»i77
(3) App. X2QEEX, ibid. f> ■ 2-IO
(4) App. XV, ibid. Jo-m
(5) Dundas's budget speech of 1793, op.cit.
Cl)
and Madras with twenty five to t hirty lafrha each#
It Is hardly surprising in such circumstances that whenever
Bengal had to wind up the accounts of a war (as in the regime of
Sir John Macpherson) or to wage a new one (as in the regime of
Lord Cornwallis) she had to rely on loans at high interest or was
forced to open subscriptions for procuring the annual investment#
For both the Government had to tap an extremely limited capital 
(2)
market and}in the competition that ensued between a needy state ana 
the still needier private merchantay the only gainers were the 
Company’s servants# The remittance loans of 1780-81, investmentt.
loans of 1782-83 and 1783-84, bills on account or investment of
63)
1787-88 and 1788-89 tell their own sad tale# The debt of Bengal had 
stood at C.R# 3,62,00,000 in 1786# The Third Mysore Var increased it
(41
by 31 January 1792 to C.R# 5,90,54,344# About C.R# 45,00,000 of
(1) In 1789-90 Bengal supplied C.R# 24,90,857 to Madras and C.R. 
35,75,275 to Bombay which increased further with the Third Mysore 
\&r# See Home Misc* 404 p#73.
Bengal’s average receipts. Bengal’s average expenditure
Surplus revenue
av* during 1787-1789 C.R#2,32,28,970 Av# Investment* C.R#91,51,808
est# in 1793 C.R#1,98,60,000 Av* Supplies to
Av* Sale of imports Canton 17,97,378
1786-1790 11,03,250 Do. Bencoolen &
Av* Sale of Certs. Penang 5,00,000
1786-1790 2,54,733 Do. Bombay 25,00,000
Av* Subscription to debt to 30,00,000
1786-179Q 35,01,009 Do. Madras 25,00,000
(Total C*R#1,75,05,045) to 30,00,000
Av* bills of exchange
1786-1791 2,07,063
(2) Warren Hastings* Memoirs Relative to the State of India 1786
pp* 18-19 (3) l b  1 8 - * * 4  2 0 A W w t K  f l u e n t ,  t y e 3-
(^ ) App* H U *  Report of the Committee of Accounts op*cit#f' *73 *
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i plan
debt
msfer
this accretion had been raised at 12% and the rest averaged at
u)
8 Eiis was the state of affairs in Bengal after a 
crore and a half of debt had been transferred to England* So 
long as this debt remained — it would act as a drag on the surplus* 
the investment would be rendered uncertain and the Company* s credit 
would suffer* Moreover, if some mode of remittance was not deflsed.fpr 
income from this debt, it would, like private fortunes arising freon 
other sources, seek a channel to Europe through foreign trade*
The exigencies of public finance and the need for private 
remittance were thus impinging on each other in a way detrimental 
to the Company*s revenue and profit* The Government borrowed at high 
interest; the income was sent through the French, the Dutch or the 
Danes because the Company refused to allow a reasonable remittance*
The period under review saw the beginning of the creditors* struggLe 
for a channel of remittance through the Company*s trade which ended 
in their campaign against monopoly in 1783* We will now trace the 
story of that struggLe in Bengal from. 1785 in order to understand its 
transformation into a call for free trade and its ability to secure 
concessions from the Company*
Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras, and Sir John Macpherson, 
the Governor-General of Bengal, took upon themselves the duty of 
impressing on the newly constituted Board of Control the creditors* 
point of view* In 1785 the India debt stood at 8 crores, arrears of
(1) App. 1 of Dundas*a budget speech of 1793*
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(1)
payments to troops cane up to £930,000, discount on the Company’s
(2)
treasury orders was about 18 per cent and the Company’s bonds —
(3)
40 per cent# There was an acute scarcity of silver with 
deplorable effects on the investment and general trade# Though 
the Company lacked funds to procure investment it not only 
refused to allow private merchants and its own servants to send 
their fortunes in the Company’s ships but threatned dire consequences
A t Ub
of an illicit trade with^foreigners# This situation was inevitably 
exploited by the latter to the detriment of the Company’s home 
sales# George aaith, a resident merchant of Bengal wrote> n...#the 
Danas have in this season dispatched from hence for Europe fifteen 
ships, the Portugese six, whilst the English Company, though the 
Lords of the Country, have only and with difficulty despatched, and 
laden seven ships for England, a strong evidence of the necessity 
of channel of remittance through the Company, for our private fortunes. *  
The Committee of Secrecy had already received a letter from Lord 
Macartney in this strain urging the necessity of funding India debt
(6)
at home at low interest while increasing investment with the saving#
(5)
(1
IS
(3
(4
15
(6
George Smith to Dundas 30 November 1785. Home Misc# 434 pp# 208-9. 
Ibid p# 215#
Sulivan’s plan for transfer of debt. Home Mise# 369A. p# 26#
George Smith to Dundas 27 January 1785. Home Mist# 434 pp. 33-48#
George Smith to Dundas 14 February 1785. Ibid# p# 71
Lord Macartney to the Committee of Secrecy 14 October 1784. Home 
Misc# 370. pp# 141-142#
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Sir John Macpherson from Bengal lent his support to such a plan# After
roundly condemning the Company’s niggardly provision of £180,000 per
annum for private remittances and the penal clauses in Pitt’s India
Act which drove private trade with the foreigners underground,
Macpherson held out the hope that thirty lakhs of rupees, arising
out of retained interest on the bonds of 1787, could be applied to
augnent investment and that this sum would rise up to eighty lakhs in
(1)
1791-92* He proposed, in anticipation of the ©hurt’s consent, to 
take up six additional ships in Bengal to carry this increased invest­
ment to London# The urgency of the measure grew with the appearance
(2)
of the first .American ship In Calcutta on 17 June 1785, which with
cargo - Mare said to be English property, appearances are strongly fccr
(3)
their being so*tt
Dundas had been considering the problems of India debt and
clandestine trade since his appointment as the President of the Board
a htcuUU
of Control# A section of the Court, by Sir Francis Baring,
A
tried with his support to tackle the problem by a Convention between
the French and the English East India Companies in 1785-86, aimed at
preventing the former from trading on the capital of the letter’s
(4)
servants# But this move was strenuously opposed by Warren Hastings 
and his champion in the Court, Laurence Sulivan, on political grounds*
(1) Macpherson’s minute of 9 April 1785 containing his plan of 30 July
1785* Home Misc* 570 App* 2#P.152»
(2) G*©# in C# to Court (Foreign) 25 October 1785.
(3) George anith to Dundas 5 August 1785* Home Misc# 434 p# 133#
(4) C*H* Philips* The East India Company 1784-1834 op*cit. pp 47-48#
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(1)
Before the Convention fell through, the plans of Macpherson and
Macartney came up for discussion, and Dundas once more lent his support
(2)
partly for reasons of his oum# It seemed to enjoy the support
of Eastings and the Indian interest. Sulivan, with his own
intimate knowledge of Indian affairs and possibly influenced by
his son’s letters on clandestine trade, saw no objection to the
(3)
Dundas plan of transfer of debt# Only the old guards like Nathaniel
Snith opposed it as impracticable and impolitic#
(4)
Consequent on the Board’s insistence, the Company sent a plan 
of transfer of India debt which would not only reduce it »r»d enable the 
investment to be enhanced with the saving of interest but also scotch 
the foreign trade f^aich was being largely conducted with British 
capital by offering a parallel channel of rQuittance through the 
Company’s trade# It allowed a gradual transfer to the total extent 
of six million pounds, authorised subscriptions on debt account, for 
bills on the Court, and increased the investment of Bengal to 115 
lakhs (of India to 150 lakhs), the returns of which would be the fund
(1) The Convention was rejected by the French foreign minister,
Tergennas, who considered it humiliating and knew private 
dealing with the British would be more profitable# Holden Furber 
op#cit# p# 35# Private traders opposed it too. See Macpherson 
to Lord Hawkesbury 17 September 1787# Add# MSS 38,409 ff# 187-88*
(2) Professor Philips thinks Dundas wanted to encourage the Company’s
financial embarrasanents in order to make it more amenable to his 
control# The East India Company 1784-1834 op#cit# pp# 47-48#
(3) ailivan’s plan# Home Misc# 369A# pp# 21-27#
(4) Board to Court 10 September 1785# Home Misc# 370 pp# 19-49#
Separate General Letter to Bengal 15 September 1785#
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for the payment of tlie transferred debt# It fixed the rate of 
exchange on bills to be granted to the creditors at Is 8 d the 
Bengal current rupee, payable 548 days after date with option of the 
Company to postpone full payment on half-yearly interest at 3 per cent# 
Instalments of not less than 10 per cent of the principal were to be 
paid e ve ry year after 1 March 1790#
Bad news came from Lord Cornwallis# His description of the 
state ofA Indian finances on 16 November 1786 held out little hope of 
an enlarged investment# Like Macpherson ha had inherited bankruptcy#
A comparison of assets and debts in India left a debit balance of 
more than three crores against the Company# The total debt 
amounted to over six crores and a half on an average interest of 
8-j| per cent# Bonds bore a discount of 25 to 30 per cent and treasury
CD
orders 10 to 20 per cent# The jobbing of Government paper was 
scandalous, revenue was anticipated to pay the contractors of the 
Board of Trade, salaries were paid in certificates bearing 8 per cent 
interest, investment was reduced, supply to China was curtailed, and 
the plan of debt transfer nullified as the rate of exchange was 
inadvertently fixed too low at Is 8d while the market rate was not less
( & )  V.
than 2s# Moreover it touched only the fringe of the problem } 
providing for "about one tenth of the remittance which w§s required by
' — ■ 1 1  ' M 3 V  P P 1 0 7 - * !  ■
(1) George Staith to Dundas 30 November 1785#A Macpherson to Pitt
17 September 1787# Home Misc# 86 p# 698#
(2) James Sibbald to Dundas 25 April 1787 and 18 May 1787 Home Misc#
370 p. 433
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U)
the British, subjects###», and laid the door open to clandestine
(2)
trade# The Board was approached by the creditors for a
(3)
higher exchange and prevailed upon the Court to leave it to the
discretion of the Governor General in Council#
The problems which vexed Cornwallis most were those of the
investment and the China supplies# The system of procuring the
investment by contract had led to wholesale collusion between the
contractors and the members of the Board of Trade# The Court
lamented over clandestine remittance by their servants "to Copenhagen,
Lf Orient, and other different parts of Europe, the choicest
selection of the most valuable and profitable that the Country
(5)
affords*" While the private traders got 5b#9d# for the
rupee, the Company's investment "scarcely net us the rupee at
par#" Cornwallis called the Calcutta warehouses - "a sink of
(6)
corruption and inquity#" Macpherson*s economic reforms, by needlessly
(7)
reducing the official salaries, had only increased the abuses# Not 
only the Company but the weavers of Bengal suffered, being forced to 
work for unremunerative rates# The China supplies were another head­
ache# As British goods would not sell in China and the demand for 
opium was not yet high, Bengal was being denuded of silver to purchase
(1) David ScottTs Memorandum to Court 3 April 1787 Home Misc# 404 p# 63#
(2) Macpherson to Pitt. 17 September 1787 op.cit#
(3) Home Misc# 370 pp# 453-55#
(4) Court to G.G# in C# 31 July 1787#
(5) Court to G.G. in C# (Public) 27 March 1787#
(6) Cornwallis to Dundas 14 August 1787# A# Aspinall, Cornwallis in
(7) Cor nwaSi s^ fo^ §un das 15 November 1786 Ross ^Correspondence
Yol# 1 p# 227#
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the China investment* She could not "without ruin, continue the 
exportation o f ••••specie#"
Cornwallis took several measures to protect the investment, and 
prevent the abuses# The Collectors were prohibited from engaging in
(2)
private trade in 1787 and the prohibition was extended to the Revenue and
(3)
the Judicial departments by 1789* Cornwallis would have liked to
include the Cannnereial Residents, had not he apprehended a consequent
injury to the public investment# He compensated for this loss of
irregilar emdments by increasing the salaries and commissions of the
(5)
officials concerned# The contract system was abandoned (except in
(6)
opium) for the agency system# A regulation was drawn up to protect 
the weavers from imposition as well as to prevent defalcation of the in­
vestment through collusive sale to the foreigners# If they took advances 
from the Company as well as the private traders, they were bound to satisfy 
the Company first# The settlement in Penang was maintained so that
remittance from Bengal could be sent in Indian goods which would be sold
(7)
for Malay tin and species for the China market# With a similar end in 
view Cornwallis made a Commercial Treaty with Oudh which would not only 
develop Bengal trade with the Deccan but facilitate China remittance with 
the imported cotton of the Doab#
(1) Dundas agreed# See Dundas to Cornwallis 8 August 1789 AspinaBL
op#cit# p# 185#
(2) Cornwallis to Dundas 14 August 1787 Ross op#cit# p# 271#
(3) Gr#G# in C. to Court (Secret Separate) 9 January 1789*
(4) Cornwallis to Court 2 May 1792#
(5) Cornwallis to Dundas 26 August 1787 Ross op#cit p# 278# Minute of
#complete instmotions on the change over to agency 
system went out* For analysis of different systems of procuring 
investment See Cornwallis to Court 1 Novonber 1788, also Home Misc# 
393 pp# 4—6#
(7) Bengal Public Consultations (Straits Settlements) 2 May 1786*
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These measures, however, did not contribute to the Company's
financial affluence# Cornwallis considered reduction of expenditure as a
secondary object# Honesty, regularity, uniformity and simplicity were
(1)
the watchwords of his refonns and he preferred to pay the cost# The
ordinary charges of administration increased# Bombay and Madras added to
(2 ).
the burdens# Cornwallis had no resources far procuring the full invest­
ment# In 1788 and 1789 he was forced to take the momentous step of
accepting private goods for shipment on the Company's vessels though
(3)
Macpherson had bean condemned for such action in 1786-87# More, he
considered 2s to be the minimum exchange rate for transfer.of debt as the
foreigners, private traders, China bills, indigo and diamonds furnished a
better remittance# In a possibility of war, he further warned, "a
remittance at almost any rate is eligible, I might even say absolutely 
(4)
necessary#" The so-called "privilege trade" of 1788-89, however, was never 
given the ghost of a chance# By imposing a freight of £31# 16s# per ton
and allowing it only when the Company eould not procure goods on its own
A* (5)
account, the Court soon droveAinto foreign channels#
The agency houses; The people?most injured by this erratic policy, found
leadership in the agency houses who had by the nineties of the eighteenth
century solidly established themselves in Bengal# In 1790 there were
(6}
fifteen agency houses in Calcutta, mostly British# Messers Eergusson,
(1) G#G. in G* to Court (Secret Separate) 9 January 1789.
(2) Cornwallis to Dundas 4 November 1788 Ross op.cit* p# 378 and Corn­
wallis to Dundas 7 November 1789 ibid p# 446#
(3) Eur* MSS* D 281#f-»o-
(4) Home Misc# 370 p# 685.
(5) Scott MSS# Home Misc# 404 p# 178*
(6) The Bengal Calendar and Register 1790 pp# 113-38# There were twelve
Portugese, six Greek and fifteen Armenian individual merchants#
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Fairlie and Company was the most important British house while Paxton, 
Cockerell and Delisle, Lambert and Ross, Colvins and Bazett, Perreau and
A 'iT
Palling and Joseph Baretto were the other prominent ones# They had
corresponding houses in London, controlled the country trade in the East
after the War of fetee American Independence, financed the indigo and sugar
(1)
manufacturers, cornered the Government contracts, ran the three banks
(2)
and the four insurance companies at Calcutta and speculated in the public 
securities. They also dealt in the homeward private trade of the 
commanders and officers of the Company's ships and negotiated bills and
C3l
respondentia on the foreign companies# Agency was their least important 
business#
Their beginnings gD back to the hey-day of the Nabobs and their
original capital had come, first or second hand, from the pagoda
tree# A salt contractor like Vansittart, an opium contractor like
William Young, a Sir John Day or a Fowke did not like to put all his
eggs in the same basket# Far less did he like the Company to know
the amount of his gains or the manner in which lie got them# He
preferred diamonds to everything, trusted "the Dutch, the Dane and the
(4)
Devil," before he trusted the Company's Europe bills and deposited
(1) The Benk of Hindostan (1770), The Bengal Bank (1784) and The General
Bank of India (1786)#
(2) The Old Calcutta Insurance Company, Calcutta Insurance Company,
Bengal Insurance Company end Asiatic Equitable Insurance Company#
(3) Fergus son, Fairlie & Co# dealt with the French East India Company
and were its agents when it traded under the Danish flag after 
1793# The Paxtons had similar connections with the Dutch and the 
Danes and Joseph Baretto with the Portugese# See Holden Furber 
op#cit# Ghapt# II-ITT#
(4) Ear# MSS# E 6 item 23#
19
"the rest with the agency houses to be invested in country trade or 
in usurious loans to the Government# By 1790 the agency houses had 
made country trade their special preserve - a monopoly within 
the Company* s bigger monopoly - having ousted all other European 
rivals after the Second Mysore War* Before Cornwallis came there 
were still many private merchants who liked to plough a lonely 
furrow# The servants of the Company ventured in country trade, 
often in their own ships, undertook Government contracts or 
speculated in foreign bills and respondentia# But the fear of 
21 Geo III Cap 65 Sec# 29 and Pitt's Act, the decline of ill-gotten 
gains consequent of Cornwallis*s reforms and the growing insecurity 
of investing in the foreign companies forced them to quit business 
gradually# The introduction of the agency system put an end to 
the era of fraudulent contracts; abuses in the salt department 
were partially checked by sale by public auction; opium, still 
procured on contract, no longer produced a choice spirit like 
Y/illiam Young under Cornwallis*s vigilant eye; and when, in 1788, 
thirteen hundred Company servants in Beng^ tl ceased their private 
trading following the regulation prohibiting private trade to all 
but the servants under the Board of Trade, the only canpetitors of the
-20-
agency houses were laid low. Henceforth they dominated the scene, 
though still working on capital derived from the Company’s servants 
or sometimes borrowed frarr the indigenous bankers# The only 
consolation of the public servants in Bengal wqs an easy 8 to 12$ 
from the Company's securities and the prospect of a still higher 
profit from the country trade# For the remittance of the fanner 
and the conducting of the latter they were dependent on the agency 
houses#
The governments in India thus came into contact with the 
agency houses wherever they turned - be it a contract for opium or 
salt, rice or military stores; remittance of finds to Canton or to 
the sister "presidencies; issue of treasury orders or bonds far
(i)
investment or «ar* The imirlies supplied rice to Madras, dollars to
(2) (S)
Canton, draft animals and their provisions to the anny, and indigo
(d) (5)
to the Board of Trade# Colvins and Bazett built army barracks,
(6)
Roebuck and Abbott got contracts for coast salt and Gilchrist and
(?)
Charters for silk# The founder of the house of Paxtons gained his
(8)
fortunes in opium deals# On one head, namely the China trade,
the Company found itself more and more dependent on them# From 1781
(1) G.G# in C# to Court (Public) 5 September, 1792#
4 December 1792,3 March t, 1793#
(2) G.G# in C# to Court (Public) 12 August 1793#
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Military) 3 September, 1792#
(4) G.G# in C. to Court (Comm1) 14 December, 1792#
Do# Do. 18 May 1793# Ihey did all this up to the time of
Wellesley#
(5) G.G# in C# to Court (Military) 29 January 1793#
(6) G.G# in C. to Court (Camnr) 18 May 1793#
(7) G.G# in C# to Court (Comm1) 29 January 1795#
(8) Holden liirber op#cit# p# 91#
nces
Agency
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opium was not only a source of revenue but a medium of remittance to 
•Canton, first on the Company’s own account and then* from 1786. on
a)
private account. They had even extended their field of
speculation to the Indian finances. Though Hastings ascribed to the
(2)
natives an insignificant share in the securities ^  Cornwallis’s 
Minute on the Court’s letter of 31 July 1787still put them as the 
largest holders. The policy of debt-transfer, however, made the 
securities more valuable to the Europeans as a means of remittance 
and when the exchange rate was raised to Is lid and later more, their 
demand grew. The Securities ultimately came to be deposited with the 
agency houses who could and did indulge in stock-jobbing with the
(5)
rise and fall of their value. The Company could not thus draw 
upon the income of its own servants unless with their cooperation, 
could not send funds to Madras, Bombay or Canton unless they 
speculated in opium or salt, and always felt their hands in its 
throat In any financial or political crisis.
Their main grievance lay In lack of facilities for remittance 
and we have seen how they farced the Company, first, to introduce 
a regular, though inadequate, channel through the transfer of debt and 
secondly to accept occasionally goods on ’privilege*. Another 
grievance which increased every day was scarcity of silver in India.
{1} Home Misc. 795 pp. 65 et seq.
(2) Warren Hastings Memoirs op.cit. p. IS.
(3) George Snith to Dundas - 10 January 1790 and 12 November 1790.
Home Misc. 434 p* 36J> amd pp. 495 - 96.
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The agency houses had little fluid capital of their own and their
margin of profit declined as interest rate^ increased rapidly
aring to a shortage of money* It was a long-standing t r o u b l e by
haadachegfre* the Government since the days of
Warren Hastings* prising chiefly from the
drain of specie from Bengal - which had been amply discussed by
(1)
Sir James Steoart as early as 1772 — t£was further aggravated by a
(2)
mistaken policy of the Bengal government in overvaluing gold
in a bi-metallic currency* Steuart* s proposals for a paper currency
with a central bank, controlled by the Company, was far too in
advance of time and Francis, Clavering and Hastings all agreed on
(3)
J S ilv e r mono-metallism, gold being reserved for large payments or 
on agreement between the parties* Hastings*s Regulation of 
29 May 1777 set up a kind of limping standard by suspending gold 
coinage. But in 1780 the mint was again opened for gold coinage for 
the next eight years* The immediate result was discount on gold 
mohurs* Batta on gold, only 5 as* per Hs* 100 in March 1787^  rose to 
Rs* 3 in five months* Cornwallis s^ Committee on Currency of 26 
September 1787 identified the disease: while the natural ratio
(1) The principles of money applied to the present state of the coin 
in Bengal# 1772* Summary in Eur. MSS D 281* See also George 
Snith to Dundas - 27 January, 1785rjaane Misc* 4}34 pp* 57-64 
(B) Dr* J*C* Sinha - Economic Theorists among the servants of John 
Company* 1766-1806* The Econ^ift Journal- Marcfc 1925*
(3) Francis* s Minute on coinage* 13 March 1775*
JhiLrd 
ore } \h r
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betweea stiver and gold in India was 12:1 or 13:lfthe mint ratio 
had been fixed at 16:1. In Febiuary 1788 the official rate was 
reduced to 15:1 and the Regulation of 20 February 1790 discontinued 
seigniorage of 1% on silver coinage. The Mysore tfar, however, 
frustrated all these plans by causing a heavy drain bf silver 
from Bengal. Gold was again resorted to with the attendant evil 
of batta. The finance of Bengal suffered a set bade* The 
securities, which bore a premium after three years of Cornwallis’s
Cl)
unceasing reforms, began to fall. The Government could not pay 
the certificates that were due and when the purchasers of the 
Company’s opium applied to the private banks for cash, the latter 
tried to sell their papers all in a rush - resulting in further 
depreciation and stock-jobbing by the banks and the monied men.
Like Dundas, Cornwallis (’’his mind accustomed to world-wide 
maps") considered India as a vital point in the enduring rivalry 
between England and France. Though advised nto adopt a pacific and 
defensive system based on the universal principle•...that we are 
completely satisfied with the possessions we already have”, Cornwallis 
foresaw the war with Tipu Sultan of Mysore was a certain and 
immediate consequence of a war with France.” The Third Mysore War 
began in May 1790, four months after Tipu’a attack on Travancore.
No military preparations had been made in Madras, which in fact became 
the base of operations, and everything had to be done in Bengal in haste.
(1) George Snith to Dundas 10 January 1790, Home Misc. 454 op.cit. 
p. 359.
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Debts increased tfery fast and so did discount on them# On the eve 
of the war discount on bonds was 4^1$, on old certificates bearing.
8fo interest - 2-J to 6$ and on new certificates bearing 6% interest —
s, „(1)5^o to 6-%* Two months later discount on the old certificates rose
(2)
to 12$ and on the new to 17$* The agency houses could not cope with it#
On 12 March 1790 they appealed to the Government for relief that not
only included a moratorium on all payments but a loan of 10 lakhs at
(3)
8c/o from it# Anthony Lambert, of the house of Lambert and Ross, wanted
other reliefs like a drawback: on exports and Government support to
(4)
Bengal sugar and rum# George Smith advised immediate bullion imports
from England, abolition of import duties on bullion, a moratorium on
claims on the agency houses with the introduction of government-backed
(5) (6)
paper currency and encouragement of Bengal cotton and sugar#
Cornwallis refused as the notes would immediately bear discount#
But by way of relief he set on foot an investigation by John Bebb on the
ways and means of developing the country trade of Bengal and reducing
or abolishing the import duties at the three Presidencies which fettered
coastal trade* The military necessity of transferring funds and
C?)
supplies to Madras and Bombay was no doubt an added impetus# As a
(1) George Smith to Dundas 14 February 1790 ibid pp# 395-96#
(2) George Stoiith to Dundas 13 April-1790 ibid p# 405#
(3) J#C* Sinha, op*cit#
(4) Anthony Lambert to Lord Cornwallis, 8 September 1790, Eur# MSS
D# 281, pp# 15-17#
(5) George anith to Dundas 13 April 1790 and 6 January 1791, op#cit#
pp# 405 & 536#
(6) George Smith to G#G1 in C# 20 July 1790, ibiflpp. 437-442, pp#
471-78.
(7) Eur# MSS# D* 281, pp# 11-13# Bengal sugar paid 5$ at Madras and
6ap at Bombay; raw silk:, silk and cotton piece goods paid 2$*
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result of these suggestions and complaints Cornwallis established
virtual free trade between the Indian Presidencies* The crisis
went on, however, and when the discount on bonds and certificates
rose to 20$ and 20$ respectively, he.was forced to remit duties
to the French ships importing silver* The investment dwindled in spite
of an invitation of subscriptions from private traders which brought
(1)
no response# A rumour of the British reverses caused a financial 
panic in Calcutta in November 1791* There was run on the Bengal 
Bank: and the Bank of Hindostan and Cornwallis could not refuse 
them help In spite of the Court’s stringent orders, since
(2)
rejection would bring down the Company1 s paper still further - and 
affect opium revenue* Revenue and credit of the Company’s 
Governments had been inextricably intertwined with the private 
merchants’ need for circulating capital and for remittance of its 
fruits*
The private import of silver, which the Company released 
(3)
from payment of freight, eased somewhat this situation and brought 
enormous profits to the importers* The victory over Tipu Sultan in 
Etebruary 1792 improved the Company’s credit immensely besides 
bringing more bullion into circulation (and the rich pepper districts 
of Malabar)* The Governor General was discharging the 12$ loans
(1) ibid pi- 537*
(2) J*C. Sinha op*cit.
(3) H* FUrber puts it at £1,000,OQO op.cit* p. 307 fn* 11 but adds
that £773,551 went to Madras alone, ibid fn* 10*
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and the 8% notes were on par* This mas done partly with the
(2)
war indemnity exacted from Tipu* The investment for 1794 was
(3)
laid down at C.R. 1,10,00,000* But the problem of scarcity of
specie was not completely solved and the problem of remittance
of private fortunes remained even though the Governor General
in Council raised the exchange rate to 2s* to prevent
(4)
clandestine trade* The former was causing a deflationary
tendency which prevented improvement of agriculture and the
consequent lack of exportable raw materials aggravated the latter*
The promulgation of the Permanent Settlement was
precipitated by these considerations* Ho doubt the primary motive
had been - as the Court stated in its letter of 12 April 1786 -
avoidance of defalcations due to frequent changesof system and
acquisition of a stable revenue secured by the right of hereditary
A jvmnuL
ownership to be granted to the zemindar: **.*a moderate or
assesanent, regularly and punctually collected, unites the con­
sideration of our interests with the happiness of natives and 
security of the landholders more rationally than any imperfect 
collection of an exaggerated Jurarna to be enforced with severity 
and vexation** The whole financial structure of the Company 
rested ultimately on the land revenue of Bengal and our reference
(1) Thomas Crp«b»m to Dundas 6 Decanber 1792 Home Misc* 437 p* 33*
(2) G.G* to Court 26 August 1792.
(3) G.G* in G* to Court (Comm?') 30 November 1793
(4) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 14 December 1792*
to the financial and commercial situation in 1785 would explain 
the urgency of acquiring of secure land revenue as the bed rock 
of the Indian empire and the Indian investment# Everybody had 
a stake in this - the Company’s servant who drew his pay and 
commission, the agency house which gat its military contracts, 
the creditor who had to remit interest and the proprietor of the 
India stock who wanted his half yearly dividend# But Shore and 
Cornwallis saw beyond these immediate considerations# "The 
Company are merchants as well as sovereigns of the country", wrote 
Shore in his minute of 18 June 1789# "In the fomter capacity 
they engross its trade, whilst in the latter they appropriate the 
revenues* The remittances to Europe of revenues are made in 
commodities of the country which are purchased by them." If 
agriculture was not improved to facilitate remittance of the 
surplus revenue it would lead to actual drainage of specie which 
was acutely short already due to decline of country trade and
A
discontinuance of bullion import by the foreign companies# The 
scarcity of specie again would react on the government finance and 
commerce and agriculture# The vicious circle would go on till the 
proprietors were given an incentive to improve agriculture which 
could cone only from a fixed moderate jymma and a hereditary ownership 
Cornwallis made this idea clearer when Shore shrank from 
the ultimate execution of his own plan# In his minute of 3 Jbbmary 
1790 Cornwallis mentioned the heavy drain of wealth on public and
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piivate account, "now severely felt by the diminution of the current 
specie, and by the langour which has thereby been thrown upon the 
cultivation and the general commerce of the country#* In his 
letter to the Court,6 March 1793,he pointed out how in Bengal 
"agriculture must flourish before its commerce can become 
extensive# The materials for all its most valuable manufacture 
are the produce of its own lands# It follows therefore, that 
the extent of its commerce must depend upon the encouragement given 
to agriculture#* The conclusion was that increase of cultivation 
was not possible without granting benefits of a permanent settle­
ment to the landholders# It was not only necessary (as Shore would 
agree) but urgent in order to attract the floating capital of the 
natives to investment in land# The government was paying off its 
debts and the natives now had with them plenty of capital which 
could be profitably used for improvement of land and therefore of 
commerce# "As this paper is in a course of payment, there is every 
ground to expect that the large capitals possessed by many of the 
Katives (whieh they will have no means of emptying when the public 
debt is discharged) will be applied to the purchase of landed 
property as soon as the tenure is declared to be secure, and they are 
capable of estimating what profit they will be certain of drawing 
frcm it by the public Tax upon it being unalterably fixed#* More, 
besides giving the government a secure land revenue and the landlords 
a field for investment and an incentive to greater production whieh
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would help remittance to Europe on the public and private account, the 
Pemanent Settlement would create a loyal class among the natives when, 
challenged by the revolutionaiy ideas, the Government could scarcely 
depend on its own servants gone deeply into clandestine commercial 
relations with the foreigners* These ideas bore fruit in the proclamation 
of the Permanent Settlement on 22 March 1793 which fixed the Jumma at the 
level of revenue obtained in 1790*91 - i*e* at C.R* 2,68,00,989 per year 
for Bengal, Behar and Orissa*
The most significant effect of the Permanent Settlement was the 
creation of private property in land and the Cornwallis Code of Regulations 
(of which the first introduced it) made elaborate provisions for the 
protection of that property* The whole system of judicial administration, 
promulgated in 1793, was geared to this purpose* Cornwallis found fault 
with Hastings*s administrative and judicial system which was a compromise 
between the native Mughal tradition and the alien British principles, 
called forth by the exigency of ruling a foreign country* He particularly 
objected to the union of revenue and judicial authorities in the person of 
the Collector which had been revived by the Court’s order in 1787 and was 
favoured by experienced administrators like Stuart and. Shore* He considered 
it to be a source of oppression and abuse as the Collector’s right to 
private trade had been* The Permanent Settlement, moreover, made some 
changes imperative so that the Zemindars could be assured of an unhampered 
enjoyment of their newly secured rights of property* Regulation 5 of 1793 
established a Diwani Court in each district and four Provincial Courts of 
Civil Appeal while Regulation 6 made Sadr. Diwani Adalat the final Court of
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Appeal* Reflation 2 separated the Judicial and Revenue Departments and 
transferred the &iits formerly cognizable by the Revenue Courts to the 
Diwani Courts* The Collectors were thus divested of judicial authority not 
only in matters which dealt with the title of property but also in matters 
which arose out of revenue administration* Regulation 11 abolished primo­
geniture in the few cases it still prevailed, Regulation 25 facilitated 
division of estates, Regulation 34 rendered, in the case of revenue sale, 
null and void all engagements subsisting between the defaulting proprietor^ 
and his dependent talukdars while Regulation 17 gave the Zemindars right to 
distrain and sell personal property for arrears of rent*
The cumulative effect of the Revenue Regulations was to make land 
the most secure and sacred fozm of capital* They invited investment in land 
by other classes, not traditionally associated with land and thus led to the 
creation of a middle class* The Judicial Regulations led to the formation 
of another class, not directly dependent on land ownership* This class res© 
on the ruins of the native middle class dependent on public office* Cornwallis 
was against employment of the natives in key positions in the Revenue and 
Judicial Departments and ultimately eliminated them from posts they had held 
throughout the Mughal period and the early British rile* He filled not only 
the top cadres of the civil service with the covenanted servants of the 
Company but the lower ranks with non-covenanted European officials*
Natives ware retained in some minor positions, like those of the 
commissioners, who heard causes in which not more than fifty rupees 
were involved they were not strictly speaking Government servants,
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Cl)
their salaries being paid out of Commission* But Regulation 7 of 1793 
made for appointment of a number of licensed Hindu and Mohammedan Yakils 
as the legal representatives of jSuitors, to be selected primarily from
C2)
the Mohammedan College at Calcutta and the Hindu College at Benares, who
would help in the administration of the judicial system and, in Cornwallis’s
view, would with their legal knowledge be a check on the Judges* Hastings’s
Judicial Regulation of 5 July 1781 and Elijah Impey’s administrative genius
(3)
had already anticipated the establishment of such a professional class* 
Cornwallis gave it a greater momentum by elaborating the rules and regula­
tions of judicial practice,by enacting a complex Code of Laws and by setting 
up a larger number of Courts* This class was an indirect creation of the 
Company’s Government. In a way It was tied up with the system of land 
tenure for the defence of which it originated* But it was not directly 
attached to land and there was a possibility in future of this class, 
united by the strong ties of a technical profession, striking out an 
independent line of thought and action, critical of the policies and mea­
sures of the Government*
The private traders, however, were not prepared to wait for the long: 
term effects of the Permanent Settlement and they were affected by Corn­
wallis’s reforms in more thapi one way* The Regulation about the weavers 
prevented interloping In future, Regulation 38 of 1793 forbade holding of 
land by the Europeans (which forced the indigo planters to take out leases
(1) Cornwallis agreed to it reluctantly* See Aspinall op*cit* p* 91*
(2) ibid p* 89.
(3) Dr* Bankey Bihari Mishra The Judicial Administration of the East India
Company in Bengal 1765-82 p* 274*
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In the names of their native gomasthas) and Regulation 28 put irksome 
restrictions on their residence outside ten miles of the Presidency towns* 
They had done what could be done from India* They had exacted the con­
cession of sending goods in privilege, compelled the Company to export 
or permit the export of bullion from England and obtained a higher rate of 
exchange for their remittance in bills* They now looked up to a continuation 
of the straggle in England, where, the untiring zeal of one of their own 
members, David Scott, had already won some considerable success in relaxing 
the Company’s monopoly over exports to India*
David Scott: Anong all the free merchants and agents in India or England
who not only applied their minds seriously to the consideration of the 
private traders’ problem but their hands vigorously to tackle it, the fore-
CD
most In knowledge and ability was David Scott* Arriving In India as a
free merchant in 1763, Scott had made a modest fortune in twenty three
(2)
years and was one of the ’real rulers* of Bombay when he left for England 
in 1786 to establish the agency house of David Scott and Company* This 
house had affiliation with his old Bombay hcxise Scott, Tate and Adamson and 
Its Bengal correspondents - Fair lie, Fergus son and Company* He might have 
imbibed his laissez faire view as a student in Edinburgh where Adam 
Qaith was held as the prophet of the future millenlum "but the most power­
ful influences in turning him into a confirmed ’free trader* appear to 
have been his first bnnfl experience of the wastefulness and restriction 
inherent in the Company’s monopoly and his own appreciation of the Company’s
(1} G*H* Philips (Ed*) The Correspondence of David Scott etc* 1787-1805* 
Offices of the Royal Historical Society 1951* Int* Yol* I*
(2) Holden FUrber op.cit* p* 221*
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(L >
financial dilemma*" He lost no time in inflicting it on the Company and 
almost, forced his way into the Direction in 1788 and the Parliament in 1790 
as an indefatigable suggester of improvements of the Company’s trade and 
finance*
His first letter to the Court enclosed a memorandum on the unwise
policy of confining export trade without using the tonnage to the benefit
£8)
of the British manufacturer which had forced the trade into the hands of 
•the foreigners* Not directly challenging the Company’s monopoly of 
import trade and aligning himself with the manifest interest of the 
manufacturing class, clamouring since 1787 trade depression for the protec­
tion of the textiles and the extension of woollen export, Scott showed hi3 
genius for diplomacy* Moreover the export policy of the Company was
palpably absurd* Its exports to India had been about 5,000 tons per year
(3)
while the: foreigners sent 15,000 tons* Private trade of the commanders 
and officers had been unduly restricted by prohibition of cloth, copper, 
military and naval stores* Very little bullion had been exported, though 
profitable, and the purchasing power of the Indians had declined due to 
scarcity of specie* The sale policy of the Company was unwise* But the 
gravest wrong was the limitation on the remittance of fortunes of the 
Company’s servants and bondholders through the channels of the Company’s 
trade* Scott suggested that the Company should give up export trade frcm
England to India and from Bombay to China, supply funds to the private
(1) C*H* Philips* The Correspondence of David Scott op*cit* pp XXI—XIII•
(2) Scott to Court 3 April 1787 Memorandum entitled "Consideration on
the Export Trade from Great Britain to India with a plan and 
proposals for the increase thereof*" op*cit* pp* 91—95*
(3) ibid p* 55*
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traders at Bombay on promise of gradually increasing exports and charge
a freight of £5 per ton outward if, in exchange, the returns were placed
at its disposal in China for investment or in India for the discharge of
debt against which bills were to be granted on the Court at a reasonable
(1)
exchange* On 4 March 1789 he came back to the charge, this time with
special emphasis on the Company’s finances in India and the rapid growth
(2)
of clandestine trade which were interconnected* The only reply to the 
latter was not more stringent laws but "to send a sufficiency of European 
goods in our own ships from Britain, to supply India, and to bring a
a CL
sufficiency of India goods home to supply Europe" for which^corresponding
permission should be granted to the British in India to fill up a certain
determinate part of the Company’s homeward tonnage and spare tonnage at a
(3)
cheap freight* The commanders and officers were to lose their private
(4)
trade for a remuneration*
The Court’s reaction: The Special Committee of the Court of Directors,
appointed to go through David Scott’s proposals, agreed almost on all points
except the policy of woollen export whichit considered sufficiently liberal
for the present* The export trade could not, however, be entirely thrown
open. An offer of surplus tonnage to the commanders and officers of the
Company’s ships was recommended, provided they paid the proceeds in specie
or bonds at the Company’s treasuries* The private traders were to get the
refusal of the commanders at Bombay for export to China at a cheap freight 
JT) ibid pp. 85-89. See also Hon. John Cochrane’s "Plan for the Export Trade 
of Great Britain to the East Indies for the benefit of the Trade of 
Great Britain consistently with the Interests of the East India 
Company." ibid pp. 1-39*
(2) ibid pp. 277-78.
(3) He proposed £15 per ton .for goods other than fine cotton fabrics on
whicn he would pay 15$ on sale, ibid pp. 280-83.
(4) See amount of privilege before 1789 - 1 .0.Charters Vol. 10. 87 tons in all
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on condition of submitting the proceeds to tlie supracargoes* If th©
homeward investment could not be completed by the Company, nindividuals
should be permitted to avail themselves of the spare tonnage upon
reasonable terms and conditions as those which have been exacted hitherto,
are in general too high, and amount to a total prohibition against same
of the articles of the growth, produce and mamfacture of India#* This
report was adopted by the Court on 2 December 1789, as a result of which
the Company,s exports were increased by over 2500 tons, all surplus outward
tonnage was granted to the commanders and the Company’s servants a rid private
merchants in India were allowed to fill up the unoccupied homeward tonnage#
But as woollens, copper and stores were still forbidden, the extra tonnage
(2)
carried out by the ccmmanders up to 1790 amounted to 245 tons only, while
the policy of Cornwallis to allow privilege trade on the Company’s ships
failed as the promise regarding reasonable freight was never kept# In
1790 the Court’s order to replace the exhorbitant rate of freight (according
to Scott £31# 16s* per ton besides extraordinary demurrage) by a charge of
7ifo  on gross sales had to be suspended by Cornwallis on the advice from the
(3) M
Board of Trade since the latter would be sixteen times higher! Even when
pursuant to another report of the Court, 29 February 1792, the freight was
(5)
lowered to £15 per ton for piece goods and £15 per real ton of indigo, no
(1) The Report of the Special Committee of the Court of Directors - 22 July
1789* Home Misc# 404 p# 312#
(2) App* No* 4 and 5 of the Fifth Report. Home Misc* 401. p. 71*
(3) Minute of John Behb 2 December 1790*
(4) The foreigners carried goods at £18 per ton and Ostend or Lisbon did not
collect on sales as the Company did in London* See Scott MSS* Home
Misc* 404, pp. 179-181#
(5) Court to G*G* in C* (Comnr) 3 September 1792#
particular tonnage was allowed to the private individuals and the con­
cessions granted were seldom put into effect* Anyway the first round of the 
stiuggLe for open trade had been won due to the continued exertions of 
Scott and the creditors (who were also merchants) in Bengal* Exports in­
creased from £650,000 to £1,000,000* The next step was forcing the Company 
to allow a definite tonnage freon and to India#
Old {hipping Interest: Scott’s challenge was taken up by the Old Shipping
Interest whose vested rights he attacked by proposing relaxation of trade
(1)
and reduction of freight# Strongly entrenched in the constituion of the 
Company, wielding a majority in the Court of Directors and the Court of 
Proprietors, solidly linked with the City which was interested in its stocks 
and contracts, the ship-owners whose property in ships was worth £2 millions 
in 1784, the ships’ husbands who exacted exorbitant freights, the ships’ 
commanders who sold their commands and their privilege, tbs ship-wrights
who built the magnificent Indiamen and all other people directly or
remotely connected with the vast job of fitting out or receiving ventures 
to and from lands half the globe apart, the Old Shipping Interest^ was a 
formidable foe to encounter* All attempts to break through the serried 
ranks of Its monopoly had been in vain* Up to 1781 the Court abjectly 
submitted to its demands* In 1783 the owners asked for £37* 10s# per ton,
the Court offered £32 and when, on the fomer’s refusal, it advertised,
an immense wpisntity of shipping was offered* This brought down the
(1) On the Old Shipping Interest see C*H* Philips The East India Company 
1784-1834 op.cit. pp* 80-83 and C.H* Philips (Ed.) The Corres­
pondence of David Scott etc* 1787—1805 op*eit* Introduction#
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freight to £23. A little later many individuals led by John Hbtt, 
proposed to let out ships at cheaper rates and Anthony Brough offered as 
many as eighty ships. They were refused and Iiott»s valiant struggle 
for new shipping ended in the wreckage of his own ship which he was not 
permitted to replace. On 22 June 1786 the ship-owners passed a resolu­
tion by which the Directors were forced to take up old ships at £24 per
tone. Bylaws of 1788 precluded them, from hiring ships under 800 tons —
(1)
which reaffirmed the old ownersr monopoly. Yet they had suffered a
decline of profit and had to accept a lower rate of freight. In Scott*s
letters, therefore, they heard the undertone of a second challenge for
those were nothing but pleas for reduction of freight on the Company*s ships
and reduction of charges on the Company*s sales.
live reports were produced by a Select Committee on export trade from
Great Britain to the East Indies, ostensibly at the behest of the Lords of
the Committee of the Privy Council but really as a reply to the clamours
(2)
of the agency houses and the manufacturers* The first dwelt on thsj:
Company*s endeavours to push British woollens in India, the establishment of
copper coinage in Bengal to help British copper and the persistent support
(3)
given to Cornish tin against the much cheaper Banca product. It 
warned against the glut caused by the frenzy of exports by the 
commanders in 1787-89 and the danger of colonization if trade was
further relaxed* The second report detailed losses on exports t o ______ _
(1) John ELott Three Addresses, to the Proprietors of East India Stock,
and the Publick, on the Subject of the Shipping Concerns of the 
Company. London 1795 pp. 87-89. Also Add. MSS. 38, 409, f. 69.
(2) Fdr the Reports see Home Misc. 401.
(3) lirst Report published on 1 September 1791 ibid pp. 11-21.
( I )
Canton. David Scott, however, demolished these partial state-
(2)
ments and statistics. He showed that these included freight on
exports which the Company never paid, insurance though the Company
was its own insurer and an interest account unduly more than doubled.
And the manufacturers were not in a mood to bother themselves with
such nice calculations for the trade depression of 1792-93 was on.
manufacturing interest: By 1787 the Lancashire cotton industry
was fast catching up with the age-old textile manufacture of India.
A series of important discoveries in the technique of spinning,
weaving and bleaching took place between 1779 and 1786 - Crompton*s
mule in 1779, Cartwright*s power locm in 1785, Berthollet*s process of
bleaching by chlorine in 1785 and Bell*s process of cylinder
printing in 1784. "In the dyed goods we already excel! them,” wrote
the manufacturers, "and also in all the lower and middle qualities,
even in common callicoes" but "in the finest muslins they certainly
exceed us. We do not believe that we have at present any principle
of spinning by which the finest yarn can be spun, so equal and level
(3)
as they spin it."
The manufacturers, therefore, preferred import of raw cotton 
from India to the import of fine yarn which competed with the British 
spinning industry - and were afraid of the large imports of fine Indian
(1) Second Report published on 29 December 1791 ibid. pp. 24-25.
(2) Scott MSS. Home Misc. 404 and 1.0. Charters Tol. II, 1793.
(3) P.R.0* Minute of the Board of Trade 26 Febnary 1787 B.T.5
Vol. 4 p. 198.
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pi cca. goads* Xu 178S "they appealed to the Lords Commi ssi on©rs of
tlie Treasury and tlie Board of Trade for protect ion against this
(1>
allegedly hannful policy* The propositions of their delegates,
presented to Pitt and the Board of Trade, included measures for
reduction of calicoes, muslins and nankins to the quantity sold
in 1787, import of at least one half million lbs* of the finest Amood
and Bengal cotton with promise to increase it further, prohibition
of cotton yarn and compulsory re-export of three-fifths of all
(2)
imilimils, doreas, cossaes and Balasore handkerchiefs* The Court
insisted that the outcry against Indian imports was not due to any
excess on the part of the Company wbut solely the Distress which
involved many individuals in consequence of their having pushed
their Enterprises beyond all Bounds by raising fictitious credits,
(5)
and circulations to an extent unprecedented** It denied the
charge of injuring home manufacture when 17/20th of the calicoes
and 12/S0th of the muslins from India were re-exported and asserted
that any restrictions on their trade would divert it to* foreign
(4)
channels, increase smuggLing and affect the revenues of India*
(Ij P*R*0. Minute of the Board of Trade 27 March 1788 B.T.5 Yol* 5 p* 69.
(2) ibid pp* 103*105*
(3) ibid Minute of 3 July, 1788* The Court was right. The distress was
due to a trade depression which overtook: England in 1787—88* See 
W*¥*Rostow,British Economy of the Nineteenth Century — table II, p*33*
(4) App. 1* to the Report of the Select Committee of the Court etc. upon
the Subject of the Cotton manufacture of this Country* 1 February 1793 
Heme Misc* 401 pp. 135-37* Sale value of cotton manufacture imported 
from Bengal:
1784 £ 908,370 1788 £ 987,G12 1792 £1,131,771
1785 1,426,252 1789 959,434
1786 1,458,416 1790 1,516,493
1787 1,317,934 1791 1,285,696
1*0.Charters Vol* II*
-40-
Tha parliament thought, the protection enough and the home manufacture
looked up in a few months and made such remarkable progress that the
Company was forced to sell at or 1/3 less price* But the Court had
(1)
to order 2000 maunds of cotton in 1788 and, to placate the
mining interest, to export between 1788 and 1790 no less than 5000
tons of copper at a higher price than prevailing in the market.
With the onset of another slump in 1792-93 the clamour
C2>
against the Company restarted. The representatives of the 
manufacturers met or petitioned Dundas for various and sometimes 
contradictory remedies* The Manchester Deputation asked for prohibition 
of Indian cotton gcods and compulsory import of cotton wool by the 
Company, the latter to increase with British textile exports. The Glasgow 
letters of 19 March 1793 and 1 May 1793 wanted restrictions on import
of muslins under certain sizes and prices, a lower drawback on
re-export, permission for individuals to import raw materials in their 
own vessels and ban on export of textile machinery to India* The 
Cornish tin and copper mine-owners demanded an immediate guarantee 
for a regular annual export to China or purchase at a price named by
(1) George Smith to Cornwallis 10 September 1787 Home Misc. 434. p. 304.
(2} Bostow op.eit. p. 34. The number of bankruptcies meanted from
105 in November 1792 to 209 in May 1793* About a hundred out
of 280 country banks failed causing great constriction of
commercial credit. See also D* Macpherson Annals of Commerce, 
Manufactures,, Fisheries and Navigation, London 1805 p. 266.
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themselves. The Second Deputation from Manchester asked for reduction
of freight to £4 outward and £12 heme, exemption of private trade from
all duties in India and delivery of raw materials without delay and
the woollen manufacturers of Exeter-for participation in China trade
(1)
or a monopoly of supply to the Company. Apprehending idle
capital on the abolition of slave trade, the Liverpool merchants
agitated, as early as 23 Novonber 1792, for opening the outports
(2)
and organised a committee to that end* The gun-powder manufacturers
insisted on their right to import saltpetre as the Company’s imports
(3)
proved insufficient. To this battery of demands was joined a memorial 
from a canmittee, appointed by the agency houses in London, calling
for cheaper freight which could be obtained outside the monopoly of
(4)
old shipping at £10. Some of the pamphlets with pro-agency house 
bias, directly attacked the shipping interest — nthe millstone that 
hangs about the neck of the business.....tt Others dwelt on the 
immediate necessity of developing the raw materials of India like 
iildigo, sugar, cotton, hemp, etc. which was only possible if private
(1) I.O.Charters Yol. 10 & II. The last drew a eounter petition
frcm numerous manufacturers of London, Devon, Somerset etc. 
on 27 March 1793.
(2) Add. MSS. 38,228 f. 153 also 1.0. Charters vol. II.
(3) Edmund Hill to Dundas 13 May 1793. I.O.Charters Yol. 10.
(4) John Cochrane to Dundas 21 and 23 April 1793 I.O.Charters
Yol. II.
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trade could be carried more cheaply.
Charter negotiations: Meanwhile on 14 January 1793 negotiations had begun,
between the Court and the Board, on the renewal of the Company* s Charter.
nDundas has contemplated the possible abolition of the Company as a
political power from the time when it beeame evident to him, in the winter
of 1784, that the Indian interest in the Direction intended to keep a
(2)
check on his East India policy." Experience, however, had taught
him of the ncessity and certainty of realising the surplus revenues
of India through the medium of the Company* s commerce. When Lord
Cornwallis asserted - "if the fostering aid and protection, and
what is full as important, the check and control of the Governments
abroad are withdrawn from the Commercial department, the Company
would not long enjoy their new Charter, but must very soon be
(3)
reduced to a state of actual bankruptcy", Dundas seemed to be con­
vinced. "I am greatly shaken indeed" he f wrote back, "by what your
(1) (a) Hints respecting the E.I. trade 4 March 1793.
(b ) Thoughts as to Laying open the Trade to India - 23 
November 1791.
(c) On East India Commerce - 25 January 1792.
(d) Enquiry into the means by which the Commerce of India may
be managed so as to afford the Greatest Advantage to 
British Subjects.
(e) Upon the Expediency of renewing the Company’s Exclusive
Privilege - 1.0* Charters Yol. II.
Ironically enough, when it touches the cotton manufacturers, 
these free traders callloudly for a duty of 100^  on invoice 
price of Indian and Chinese cottons.
(2) C.H.Philips The East India Company 1784-1834 op.cit. p. 71.
(3) Cornwallis to Dundas 4 April 1790. I.O.Charfeers 11A p. 54.
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Lord ship suggests on that subject and strongly incline to feed,
that abroad, at least, such a separation of the government
and commerce cannot be made with safety, either to the manufactures
(1)
or to the manufacturers of India** That imports should be
/v tfvrcru g/v
continued && the Company he had no doubt but he was not so sure
of the exports* The reports of the Court had not been very
helpful* The clamour of the manufacturers was not decisive: ”1
am satisfied that the merchants or rather the manufacturers of this
country are under a delusion, which will vanish on a nearer
(2)
approach to the subject** But they bad a point in pressing 
for raw materials: *the import trade of the Company from India,
may be rendered more subservient, than it had hitherto been, to
(3)
the manufactuers of this country, by the importation of raw materials**
He wanted to steer between the palpable needs of the British industry, 
then in the throes of a depression, and the higher policy of imperial 
government which discountenanced open trade* He had evolved the 
idea of "a regulated monopoly* - *by which expression I mean that the 
monopoly must be so regulated as to insure to the merchants and 
manufacturers the certain and ample means of exporting to India, to 
the full extent of the demand of that country for the manufacture of 
this, and likewise a certainty that in so far as the produce of India
affords raw materials for the manufacture of Great Britain or Ireland,
(1) Dundas to Cornwallis 13 Novoaber 1790 ibid*f«7^
(2) First instructions of Dundas to Francis Russell W M H f C l h l U t 1 b id f*ino
(3) ibidjMG** also Mr* Dundas* s plan received from
Mr. Pitt 15 November 1792 (in typescript) !• 0 * C ^a ykvu 1 w l  •?.
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that produce shall be brought home at a rate as reasonable as
the circumstances of the two countries will admit of** He
had to offer something to the manufacturers though their demands
(2)
were contradictory*
Pitt and Dundas told the delegates of the English calico
(3)
muslin manufacturers that an absolute prohibition of Indian
cottons would ham British manufacture more and that a certain
quantity of tonnage would be offered to enable the British subjects
to bring raw materials - but this was to be dona through licensed free
merchants* They definitely declined to the Second Manchester
(4)
d^eputation to go lower than a freight of £5 per ton of exports and
requested them to- consider the peculiar nature of the East Indian
shipping before asking for a freight of £15 per tan of imports*
The China trade could not be thrown open though country traders
would be at liberty to take British manufactures from India to China*
Duties would be lowered, if possible, and private goods would be
dell veered early* In accordance with Dundas* s correspondence with
(5)
Lord Ihhnouth and other tin mine owners of Cornwall, the Company was
(1) Personal Observations of Dundas on Bints 16 February 1793*
Home Misc* 401* p* 248*
(2) John Cochrane* General observations on monopolists — The E*I* Co*
in particular - animadversions on their reports 14 April 
1793. 1*0* Charters Yol* H.
(3) 20 March 1793 Home Misc* 401* pp. 298-300*
(4) 23 March 1795 ibid pp. 295-97*
(5) Dundas to Lord Falmouth 22 March 1793 ibid p* 290*
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requested to take 800 tons of tin each year and^  inspit e of Baring* s
(1)
protest^  ths Committee of Correspondence had to agree to accept
800 tons of tin at £75 per ton and 1,000 tons of copper at a
(2)
price not below a fixed level*
The Observations of the Court on Dundas*s personal observations
of 16 February 1793 laid bare the real interest affected by this
talk of regulated monopoly - viz* the Old ^ hipping Interest* In
1792 the ffew Shipping Interest, now led by Brough, Chajajian, Fiott
etc*, had joined hands with Randle Jackson, Charles Grant, Thomas
Henchman and David Scott and opened a fresh attack against high
freight and abuses like * he redi t ary bottoms* and *sale and command*
(3)
which kept freight so high* Dundas was not to be drawn in to
make an open criticism* But he hinted at the need of moderation 
at Leadenhall Street: *1 have uniformly discountenanced every
suggestion which tended to set aside the present valuable capital 
employed in the shipping service of the East India Company****lt 
is obvious that the controversies which have taken place on this 
subject, cannot be matter of Parliamentary arrangement, but must be 
left to the discretion of those who have the management of the 
Commercial interests of the Company, at the same time I have no 
hesitation in declaring my opinion, that as on the one hand the 
freight should be settled once for all on a fair and equitable
(1) Baring to Dundas 9 March 1793. I- O. ve rt*  to
(2) 6 May 1793* 1.0. Charters Yol* 10*
(3) Notice to proprietors of East India stock and letter to Dundas
14 May 1792* 1*0* Charters vol* II*
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footing so on the other hand it ought to be understood that
freight so^ settled* persona whose property is embarked in this
(1)
concern* should not be kept in Constance agitation#♦*••♦*
A memorial on clandestine trade* which reached Pitt and
Dundas on 18 March* stiffened their attitude towards the Court 
(2)
considerably# It disclosed that private fortunes valued
at least ten millions sterling had been forced into foreign
channels since the grant of the Diwani due to the illiberal
policy of the Company# In 1791 the clandestine trade
amounted to 10,255 tons while the aggregate of British imports
was 7500 tons of which the privilege goods amounted to 500 tons
(3)
only# The legislature had* by mistaken penal measures against
agents* contributed to the perfection of the arts of evasion#
Dundas sent the memorial to the Court asking for permission to all
persons resident in India to act on agency for any persons*
reduction of freight homeward to £15 per ton and of charges to
3$ and permission to the Company’s servants to recover property in a
foreign country in the same manner as British subjects were entitled
(4)
to# This was evidently a concession to the agency houses who
(1} Dundas to Baring 23 March X795 I#0# Charters Yol# II#
(2) Memorial respecting; Clandestine trade* I#0* Charters Yol# 10#
(3) App# XTTT to the Memorial m. Horae Misc# 401 pp. 331-32#
(4) The Report of the Committee of Correspondence 25 March 1793
paper No# 22# I#0# Charters Yol# 10#
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suf fered greatly from frauds of foreign drawers of respondentia bills#
The Court was* however* playing a delaying game# The Committee
of Correspondence defended the Company’s rate of exchange* found
the scheme of debt-transfer a sufficient medium of remittance*
bargained about freight which it now agreed to lower to £20 (£8
out and £12 heme) and challenged the statistics of clandestine
trade in the memorial# Bent upon experiment, Dundas sent to the
Chairman the proposed resolution on the future government and trade
to India# He fixed the minimum of shipping to be allowed to the
(1)
private traders at 3Q00 tons at £5 out and £15 hone* reduced the
charges to 3$ and provided for quick delivery of raw materials even
before sale# He shrank only from one point# namely the demand of the
i z )
merchants to use their own ships#
In reply the Court published his letter of 18 March# Baring tried*
to delay the matter further by referring it to the General Court and
having it settled by ballot# This so exasperated Dundas that negotiations
were almost broken off and attempts were made to oust Baring from the
Direction# Dundas was now convinced of the free trader’s case# "In
the original views*" he wrote, "I was not aware of the extent of the
clandestine trade* and# of course# did not feel the importance
(3)
of this part of the subject in the manner I now do#"\ He could net
ignore the abundant evidence of illicit trade put into his hands by
(1) The Court was prepared to offer 6000 tons#
(2) Thomas Newfce to Baring 27 March 1793 I#0# Charters Yol# 11*
(3) Baring to Dundas and Dundas to Baring 7 April I7&# I.#0# Charters
Yol# 10*
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Da vid Scott as a reply to the Committee of Correspondence some time 
in mid March# Scott was not entirely disinterested* Apart 
from his well-known free trade views* he was being influenced 
this time by the needs of his correspondent in Bengal - William 
Fairlie# Messrs* Fergusson Fairlie & Co* unable to get tonnage 
from the Company for their piece goods# "were obliged to send them
CD
to Ostend, Lisbon and other ports*" They wanted reduction of
duties and charges on piece goods "as they had one or two ships
(2)
loaded with piece goods for London*" and desired that indigo
should not be charged by measurement* Scott lost no time in
jumping from the particular to the general: "If one merchant
hopes to send 1 or 2 cargoes what may not be expected - from
all Bengal, Madras and Bombay? You’ll see he points out the heavy
(3)
charges at the India House." A week later he supplied IXindas
with infonnation on the schedule of charges at other European ports
and a still greater weapon - his own masterly analysis of the
(4)
Company and clandestine trade# Finally convinced of the 
e no unity of the situation and the urgency of sane countervailing 
measure, Dundas never looked back#
Scott’s analysis comprehends India and China and all 
branches of trade# He put the average export to India from Europe
(1) W* Fairlie to David Scott 2 June 1792 I#0*Charters Yol# 10#
(2) Same to same 31 August 1792, ibid
(3) David Scott to Dundas 13 March 1793, ibid*
(4) Scott MSS. Home Misc* 404. pp# 99-255*
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for ten years between 1781 and 1790 at 37*454 tons per year
worth £2*393*610 of which the foreign companies held a share ~<ff
18*048 tons* clandestine trade - 10*255 tons# private trade in the
Company’s ships - 4*258 tons, and the Company itself - 4893 tons
worth only £346*070 or a little more than 14$ of the whole#
Clandestine export trade had grown from one ship of 700 tons in
1777 to twenty two ships of 10*255 tons besides those in India or
(I)
on the way back to Europe# Of this nine tenths originally
belonged to the English and eight tenths still remained in their
hands* 5505 tons fran Ostend were entirely English property
(2)
and Ostend was regarded in Europe as a British port* Private 
trade in the last five years had exceeded the average of the 
previous five and would rise to 20,000 tons if the Company gave 
similar facilities as at Ostend* Meanwhile the Company carfied 
more iron ballast than merchandise and had surrendered the 
trade in military stores to the Americans* though its trade in 
woollens and metals proved profitable and not losing as the 
Company’s accounts would have it* Imports from India in the same 
period averaged 34*650 tons per year of which the foreign companies 
held 19,106 tons, clandestine trade - 8,000 tons, private trade- 
582 tons and the privilege trade allowed in recent years - 300 tons 
while the Company Itself brought no more than 6662 tons# Out of a
(1) Ibid p. 100*
(2) ibid p* 101
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total sale value of £7*331*669 the Company’s share would amount
CD
to £1*962,095, barely equal to that of clandestine trade# This
could not have been otherwise* for# when eharges on import of Indian
produce were computed, a ton of raw silk bore &205 - 10-4 in
England# £27 - 12 at Ostend and £26 - 19- 12 in Holland; and
similarly in the case of piece goods which bore £158-9-3 in
C2)
England# £79-8 in Holland and £23-10-8 in Ostend* No wonder
that foreigners would try to exploit this situation, knowing
C3)
the need of remittance felt by the British subjects* Clandestine
trade had increased to 8000 tons worth about £2,000,000 per
(4)
annum and would still rapidly inorease now that the .Americana had 
appeared in the Indian waters*
Almost as soon as the first .American ship entered the
(5)
Hooghly in 1785 George Snith had warned Dundas of its significance*
Hydra, formerly a British frigate, with several British owners,
Commander John Haggy and a majority of British crew* with clearance
(6)
for Madeira and Rhode Island, naturally aroused his suspicion#
(1) ibid p* 155#
(2) ibid pp. 160-63,
(3) "There is not a proposition in Euclid moreeertain that that
trade will ever find its way to that country, where, with 
equal advantages* it enjoys most freedom*" - ibid p* 160*
(4) ibid p* 172# Holden Umber has estimated total drainage from
India through illicit trade at £6,750,000 or at most 
£7,000,000* (op*cit*p#308) But he has not added the drain 
through the channel of .American ships*
(5) George Snith to Dundas 5 August 1785, op*cit*
(6) Heme Misc* 605 - Notes on Americans, Madras, 27 July 1785# J»{J
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It was, however, allowed to unload under the Stench colours# The
next recorded case was of the Chesapeake which arrived at
Calcutta in 178? - owner a former military officer at Bombay
Cl)
and now of Calcutta, crew - British# Tha Government, unsure of
relations with the United States, treated it with the same
leniency# In 1788 Consul Temple warned the Marquis of Carmarthen
that .American ships earning back from India touched at an Itoeri'can
(2)
port for show, their real destination being London^* In the same
year an .American ship wasreported to carry £20,000 out of £50,000
in clandestine trade for Madras gentlemen1* who adopted this
circuitous route of getting their profits to England in preference
(3)
to the more expensive one of a direct remittance#w Even British
capital began to be invested for this purpose in ship-building at
(4)
Boston • According to David Scottrs information, in 1791, the
Americans sent 31 ships to India and China same of which returned
(5)
to Ostend laden with clandestine trade* In the same year Governor
Sir John Orde informed Grenville that the Americans were ousting
the British carrying trade in East India goods from the luTest 
(6)
Indies#
(1
C2 
(3 
(4 
(5 
(6
ibid# P* 6o <
Home Misc# 337 pp# 73-4#
Bond to Marquis of Carmarthen 5 May 1788 ibid# p# 77*
Sir John Temple to the same 7 May 1788 ibid pp# 85-86*
Scott MSS# op#cit# pp# 167-68*
Sir John Orde to Grenville# 31 July 1791, I#0# Charters Yol# II<
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Eroni Scott*s evidence and foreign Office reports on American
trade Dundas came to the conclusion that, leaving aside exaggeration
on the part of the memorialists, the clandestine trade could not he
put below £1,000,000 a year and must be immediately scotched if
London was to be made the great emporium of world trade* In this com iccticm .
Puvid Scott pointed out to him the crucial importance of the
piece goods trade* If the private merchants should fail to get
a share of home consumption, they must be allowed to import for
re-exportation without duty — "nothing but this can lay the axe
(1)
so as to reach the root of the clandestine trade*** Dundas
(2)
had already written about it to the Chairman and on Scott* s advice
(3)
again, contended for repeal of Sec# 29 of 21 Geo I H  Cap* 65# It was 
best that the agency houses be legalised so as to bring all agency 
business to the British subjects, more amenable to the Company*s juris­
diction# If the Company suffered from the proposals of reduction of 
freight, "it is the duty of the East India Company, circumstanced as 
they are, to concur in those ideas*" The end of the letter is 
significant: "The policy of continuing the exclusive trade of the
Company, rests on principles of expediency and political economy, 
not totally, but in great measure distinct from the pecuniary 
interest, either of the East India Company or of the Public*" This
was the final word* On 17 April, 1793 the Company surrendered*________
(1) Scott to Dundas 22 April 1793 1*0# Charters Yol* 10*
(2) Dundas to Chairman 15 April 1793 Home Misc* 401 p# 598 also
see advice of Scott to Dundas 11 May 1793* 1*0* C&tarters Yol* 10*
(5) Scott to Dundas* 28 April 1793, 11 May 1793 1*0* Charters Yol* 10*
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Aa analysis of the Charter of 1793 shows how, hy Its very 
nature and circumstances, It was a ccmpranise between diverse 
interests struggling far satisfaction* On one side stood the 
mighty shipping interest, entrenched behind a privilege grown 
sacred in more than a century of wglorious history**; on the other 
were ranged the forces of a new age, the protagonists of a new 
order which envisaged a still more glorious future# They 
included the new shipping interest which wished to obtain a share 
of the shipping contracts, the agency houses which wanted to 
do business unfettered by penal acts of the parliament and 
untrammaled by the Ccmipany,s overriding authority, private traders 
(agency houses in the last analysis) who asked for participation 
in the growing trade between England and India, the capitalists 
(agency houses again) who wanted to invest in the government 
securities at a high interest with regular facilities for remittance, 
the manufacturers who desired profitable markets for their 
rapidly mounting surplus goods and eheap sources for their much- 
needed raw materials, the creditors of the Company who asked for 
a ©xarantee for their loans and a safe transfer of debt and, last 
of all, the public, agitated over the controversy between free 
trade and monopoly, and bent upon exacting a price for the 
renewal of the Charter* In between stood the ministry - poised 
on the brink of the longest of wars that Britain had ever waged -
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the Revolutionary and Hapoleonic fc&rs* Dundas was not only
playing for political expediency but was working on sound camnon
sense when be decided on a compromise between monopoly
regulation* His object was nto engraft on open trade upon the
exclusive privilege of the Company and to prove by experiment,
first, bow .'far the complaints, to which X have referred, are well-
founded, and next, how far it is practicable to cure the evil
(1)
(of clandestine trade), withart injury to the public***
This empirical, almost pragnatic, attitude of Dundas as 
contrasted with the doctrinaire philosophy of free trade was the 
only rational if not the only possible one in 1793, when the 
question of shipping did not look so easy and the obvious merits of 
the particular kind of vessels, engaged in India and China trade, 
could not be ignored* A new system might wbII have jeopardised 
the existence of the Company for as yet a chimerical advantage*
We have seen Dundas was never sure of the outcome of the proposed 
relaxation, he even leaned on the side of pessimism* He ha^.been 
convinced, first, by his own experience of the Company’s finances 
and secondly^  by the correspondence with Cornwallis and Baring, of 
the interdependence of commerce and government in India and. the 
importance of the India monopoly for the maintenance of the China 
monopoly* Again, though this cannot be pressed too far, as statesmen,
(1) Dundas’s speech, 23 April 1793. Hansard’s Pari. Hist* 
Vol* XXX p* 683*
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the fstlnlsters could not have alienated tlie seventeen members of
th» Parliament of 1790-6 who belonged to the City and shipping
(1)
interest and voted with tlie government*
The compromise can be traced almost clause by clause* Tlie 
India and China monopolies were preserved for the Company but the 
private traders had a statutory claim on 3000 tons of its shipping* 
There were safeguards for the Company in the special licence 
required for ezport and import of certain articles which received 
preference in the Company*s list of investment (military stares, 
amnunition, naval stores and copper; calicoes, dimities, muslins 
or materials made or manufactured with silk or cotton or mixed 
silk and cotton); there were safeguards for the merchants and 
manufacturers in the provision for appeals to the Board and for 
the latter* s permission to individuals to export or import such 
articles according to the state of demand in the market* There was 
a general provision for an increase over the statutory 3000 tons, 
the freight was lowered to £5 per ton out and £15 per ton home in 
peace time and the charges were cut down to on sales* But the 
Company reserved the right to increase freight in war time which, 
again, was hedged with conditions and control of the Board* Sale of 
goods was to be in the hands of the Company but the sale of raw 
materials had to be frequent* The agents got many previous 
restrictions lifted even secured the right to obtain special
(1) C*H* fhilipa The East India Company 1784-1837 op*cit. 
Appendix 1, List III, p* 312*
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licence from the Board "but the Company retained the right 'to 
confine them within ten miles of the presidency towns and to cancel 
their licences for infringement of the covenant* ^  the 
creditors were assured of a priority for their interest next to 
civil and military charges and charges of collection, as also of 
transfer of their capital by a fixed annual amount (£500,000) the 
Company was allowed to make an investment of at least one crore of 
current rupees which could be increased with progressive
V
redemption of debts* This must be regarded as a great boon for the 
first time conferred upon the Company* Before 1793 it could invest 
only the surplus Indian revenue and the proceeds of its exports - 
the former being vague enough to involve it in commercial illusions 
and financial uncertainties* Now it could legitimately calculate 
on the basis of a fixed remittance* The shipping interest, which made 
a real sacrifice on this occasion, was spared the ordeal of a 
Parliamentary investigation into its not too savoury practices and 
of the statutory imposition of open and fair competition* The 
stockholders in general were given an increase of 2$ in the dividend 
without a too careful scrutiny of the balance sheet* Tha manufacturers 
were assured of cheap raw materials though the Company retained its 
hold on piece goods and raw silk trade* In the matter of freight 
and charges the spirit of compromise is evident* Bate of freight 
on export was lowered to £5 per ton to please the former and extend the 
sale of British manufactures abroad but they did not secure cheap
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freight heme, though charges were lowered to Z% to lessen the 
price of raw materials* The public, confused by the clamour of
A 1fcfL
free traders, and Parliamentary Jeremiahs like Francis, were
A
placated with a premise of £500,000 for the Exchequer^ but, here 
again, the balance was kept even by the introduction of a 
condition which suspended the payment when debts in India rose 
afeovfe £2,000,000 and bond debts in England above £1,500,000* 
Considering the little influence of the agency and 
manufacturing interest in the tarliamenfcs of the late eighteenth 
centuryj the degree of success attained by them appears to be 
flattering# The explanation of this success, however, lies 
elsewhere* The statutory relaxation of the Company’s monopoly 
was the logical culmination of what IXindas had felt about the 
Company since 1784 and what had been happening in Bengal (and in 
Madras and Bombay) for a long time* The dependence of the Indian 
governments on public loans for war or investment and on the 
machinery of agency houses for remittance of funds to China and 
supplies to other Residencies; the chronic lack of money to buy 
goods for London and the forced invitation to private traders to 
fill up vacant tonnage with privilege (and thus save the Company 
a lot of freight and demurrage); the scarcity of specie 
peremptorily calling forth private import of bullion; the frantic 
search for an article (besides piece goods) which would yield 
a profitable remittance and the ultimate selection of indigo 
manufactured by private planters (and financed by the agency
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> fa,
h o u s e s ) ;  th e political as well as^economic necessity of 
combating the evil of illicit trade — all these symptoms under­
lined a fatal disease which admitted of two alternative remedies#
Either the Company mast liquidate its Indian debts by 
producing a big and secure surplus and conduct an extended trade 
by increasing its capital and sending it to India in the shape of 
bullion or it must take the private traders into partnership «~nri, 
furnish them a commercial medium of remittance# As the Company 
was not prepared to adopt the former in 1793 it was bound by 
historical forces to adopt the latter and surrender a part of its 
monopoly#
The manufacturing interest made a lot of noise in 1793 
but it was not strong enough to force the issue# Its reaction was 
precipitated by a temporary trade-recession, not uncommon in the 
first stages of the Industrial Revolution* It was on the whole 
satisfied with what it obtained# Throughout the agitation over 
the Charter it was the agency houses which spearheaded the attack 
and David Scott, their representative, held high office in the 
Direction and had the ears of Dundas and Pitt# They were, in fact, 
so sangiine of success that they entered into speculative 
ship-building in Bengal for carrying goods after the end of i t e
t
monopoly# They also failed to secure their whole object* But 
considering the safety of the India^men, the freight was not so 
dear and the condition of the Indian market, the tonnage not so 
inadequte# They had secured the thin end of the wedge which, in future,
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could be used as a lever to prise the door open further and 
further# Unfortunately their calculations of gain were upset 
by the long drawn-out wars with Prance# TJhen the Indian and the 
London markets failed to respond to their frenzied speculation, 
the problemsof freight and remittance revived in a more 
virulent foxm# The smooth edges of the compromise wore thin 
under the impact of events and the irreconcilable contradictions 
between monopoly and free trade, between mercantile and industrial 
capitalfin, emerged once again* The shipping interest and the private 
trade interest knew they were each other’s real enemies# The 
struggle over the Charter of 1793 had been a preliminary skirmish 
which yielded only the outerwork of the monopolist stronghold#
Its next phase began almost as soon as the Charter was renewed to 
the Company for the next twenty years#
CHAPTER II
Wellesley and Private Trade
In this chapter I propose to deal with the failure of the 
compromise of 1793* I shall discuss the private trader*s 
grievances, the consequent increase of clandestine trade, the 
/fiUpreme government*s policy of supporting their claims to use 
India-built shipping, the conflict this produced between the 
shipping interest and V/ellesley who was supported by Dundas and 
David Scott, the extension of the conflict to the General Court 
and the fcarliament, Scott*s struggle on behalf of the private 
traders, his first success and ultimate failure, the intervention 
of the Addington Ministry and its imposition of a new compromise, 
favourable to the shipping interest, which heralded the victory 
of monopoly and the defeat of the private traders# The period 
roughly covers ten years of continuous war which deeply affected 
the struggle in its various phases*
Some time in 1794 Anthony Lambert, the head of one of the 
principal agency houses in Calcutta, Lambert and Ross, made an 
extensive survey of Bengal*s commerce# According to him the total
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British export trade from Calcutta amounted to C.R* 1,43,50,109 - 
Bengal’s investment in 1791, C.R* 1,06,00,109, being taken as the 
average of the Company’s export trader about C.R* 15,00,000 as 
the average of private trade and C.R* 22,50,000 as the average
a)
of privilege trade* Foreign shipping, clearing directly for
(2)
Europe and America, averaged at 12,963 tons during 1792-94 but to
this should be added 1036 tons as about one Sixth of all ships,
clearing for the Indian ports, went to Europe or America after
(3)
touching at an Indian port on the way* Valued at C.R* 1000
per ton, since it consisted mostly of gruff goods, the foreign
export trade of Bengal amounted to C.R* 1,40,00,000,almost equal
to the total British export trade*
What Lambert called the Pacific Commerce of Bengal was
generally known as the country trade and he usefully sub-divided
it into three component branches - the Coasting, the ^ ulf and the
(4)
Eastern trade* "The coasting trade of the Peninsula of 
Hindostan Is rendered of more than ordinary importance by its
(1) Eur* MSS* D 281 ,p* 27* Private trade averaged during
1790-92 at 300 tons per year, valued at £694 per ton, 
while privilege trade exceeded 750 tons a year, valued at 
C.R* 3000 per ton*
(2) ibid 1792 - 13,622 tons, 1793 - 14,717 tons and 1794 - 10,550 tons*
(3) ibid* The tonnage of ships clearing for the Indian ports was
taken to be 6212 tons*
(4) ibid p. 28*
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(1)
political relation to the Camp any , the Sovereign of Bengal#*
It had two great branches - Coromandel and Malabar — of which 
the former was the more valuable because it gave continuous 
employment to a large portion of the British Indian tonnage#
The principal exports to the Coromandel coast consisted of .grain, 
pulse, sugar, saltpetre, molasses, ginger, pepper, ghee, oil, 
silk, muslins and spirits# In 1793 84,045 tons cleared from 
Calcutta for Corcmandel - valued at 34 lakhs# Exports in native
ta)
dhonies amounted to 5 lakhs a year# Exports to Malabar in the 
same year occupied 28,100 tons of which 25000 tons consisted of 
grain and pulse worth C.R# 8,12,500 and the rest of sugar, 
raw silk, silk and cotton piece goods, bagging, hempen rope and 
saltpetre# The Gulf and Red Sea trade was conducted mainly 
through Bushire in Persia, Bussorah in Turkey, Muscat and Mocha# 
It was very profitable formerly, worth 30 lakhs annually, but bad 
greatly declined since anarchy prevailed in Persia and Egypt#
Trade to the 0ast coast of Africa, Mauritius and Maldives amounted 
to 8 lakh a in grain, sugar, silk and cotton piece goods# In the 
nineties the Eastern branch of the country trade was gradually 
superseding the other branches# Exports to the Andamans were a 
meagre half a lakh; to Ava,Peg$*,and Arracan - about 6 lakhs in 
piece goods, cotton, iron and naval stores, while opium formed
(1) ibid.
(2) A dhonie is a small native &oat#
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the grand staple of commerce with China, Malay, Manilla and
*
Batavia# In 1794 alone about 35 lakhs worth of opium was
(1)
exported to China and Pulo Penang besides grain, saltpetre,
iron, cotton and piece goods which amounted to another 20 lakhs#
The total maritime export of Bengal thus came up to C.R# 4,07,50,000#
The inland export trade to the Deccan, Tibet, Nepal etc# was
(2)
worth C.R# 98,42,359 in 1795#
Anthony Lambert ‘gives little information regarding Bengal’s
import trade# For that we have to go to the Bengal Commercial
Reports, a series of reports on Bengal’s external commerce, based
on the CustansHouse records, which begin in 1795. In that year
the private individuals imported about S.R* 1,13,48,871 in goods
(3)
and bullion, a meagre S.R. 22,73,161 of udiich came from London# 
Imports from Copenhagen were worth S.R. 7,70,136 and from Lisbon - 
S.R# 10,24,943, fran Hamburg - S.R# 6,57,431 and from the United 
States - S.R# 8,43,118. Coromandel sent salt, redwood, fine cloth
(1) ibid p#29# It was to protect this growing trade that IXxndas in
in 1790 asked Lord Grenville to secure an interim settlement 
in the East. Indies# The need for such a settlement was 
broached to him by FergusBon, an ex-*partner of Fairley and a 
partner of David Scott & Co# Rindas to Grenville 30 may 1790 
and 1 July 1790# H.M.C# Dropmore 1892, Vol# I, pp# 588-91#
(2) Bengal Commercial Reports 1795-1802. The series may be
obtairi^ ut the India Office (now Commonwealth Relations Office) 
Library.
(3) The value of a Sicca rupee (S.R.), the real rupee current in
Bengal (as distingaished from a current rupee which ms a coin 
of account); was about 2s#6d# Exchange between S.R# and C#R# 
was like 1 S.R# * 1#16 C.R. or 100 S*R.* 116 C.R# The sale 
value of the Company’s ifeports was C.R. 20,51,366 in 1795-96#
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and chintz worth S.R. £0,86,034, Malabar - sandalwood, coir, pepper,
spices and cotton worth S.R. 1,29,168, the Gulf area - coffee,
brimstone, dates, horses etc. worth S.R. 9,05,845, Africa and
Maldives - coir and cowries worth S.R. 17,167 and S.R. 47,975,
Pegi - teak, tin, wax, ivory and lac worth S.R. 1,55,301, Malay -
pepper, tin, wax, betdgnut, gold dust and specie worth S.R. 17,81,849
while China sent tutenagno, sugar candy, tea, alum porcelain
valued at S.R. 5,78,787. The trade balance was in every case
favourable to Bengal and either paid in silver or in bills on the
Court or on the government of Bengal or on the agents in England.
The rate of exchange on London was about 2s.ld. or 2s.2d. per
current rupee or 5s.6d. per dollar and the China bills were eagerly
bought by persons who wanted to remit funds to London. About
S.R. 1,12,93,453 worth of goods and bullion were imported into
(1)
Calcutta in inland trade in 1795-96.
The trade statistics given above are bound to be imperfect 
and unscientific but they show the trend of Bengal’s trade fcith 
the world. The foreigners were still on a par with the British 
traders in 1795 and the share of London wasfar from being paramount. 
The struggle detailed below centered on the attempt of the British 
traders, who were supported by men of vision like Bundas, Scott 
and Wellesley, to carry the Tiwri-mmn share of Bengal’s trade to the 
port of London. Itwas in fact the economic counterpart of their
(l) Bengal Commercial Reports 1795-1802 op.cit.
[E
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political offensive against foreign powers in India* Political
and economic supremacy in the East were interdependent and the
struggle for both went hand in hand*
ivances The private merchants of Bengal expected a great deal from
he
'ate the Charter of 1793* Secure in the possession of the country
ers
trade, the extent and ramifications of which had been described 
above, they looked forward to a profitable connection with the 
Mother Country which would be a medium of trade as well as of 
remittance* The three thousand tons offered by the Company, 
though inadequate, seemed to be a modest beginning save to those 
who had speculated in ship-building in India in the hope of 
abolition of the India monopoly* But the merchants were soon 
disillusioned about the good intentions of the Company as they 
ware disappointed in their wild expectations of a windfall, 
while the ship-owners began to press from the very beginning that 
their ships be hired by the Company and re-let to them for 
carrying private tonnage on their own terms* The angry acrimonies 
of the former and the persistent pressure of the latter soon 
created a situation which boded ill for the future of the
i
compromise of 1793*
Sir John Shore, the talented and industrious expert on 
| revenue matters who had done the spade-work for the Permanent
i
Settlement but the cautious and the conscientious administrator who
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had opposed the precipitate measures of 1793, had succeeded Cornwallis* 
To him the memorial of the merchants of Calcutta expressed in 1794 
this disappointment which had been heightened further by Shore’s 
refusal to take up the Lachmi, an India-built ship belonging 
to Lambert and Ross, though Cornwallis had provisionally accepted
P-)
It because of tbs shortage of the Company’s tonnage. But Shore
also refused to licence other ships offered to him or to find
(2)
tonnage for the cargoes prepared for those ships because he did
(3)
not feel justified in taking up ships merely for private tonnage.
He only recommended relief, specially for indigo, calculation 
of freight by measurement of which was positively oppressive and 
the advances for which were given in depreciated paper instead of 
in cash.
The memorial of 10 April 1795- was stronger and more 
elaborate* It considered 3000 tons for private trade inadequate,
freight too high for exportation of gruff goods and 33.1/3 to
50°/o beyond the rate offered by foreign ships, "a preference which 
precludes competition on our part, in all low priced goods, and must 
continue to force all the surplus produce of this country beyond the 
Company’s investment, or the greatest part of it, to foreigji
(1) G.G* in C* to Court (Comnr) 12 August 1793*
(2) G,G* in C* to Court (Comm1) 12 January 1794.
(3) Bengal Commercial Consultations 24 November and 9 December 1793.
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CD
ports.” The refusal of ships in 1794 had resulted in a wholesale
(2)
consignment to Copenhagen. The memorandum also protested against 
uncertainty of tonnage, limitation of the period in which tenders 
could he made which restricted the choice of the consigners to a 
dear market early in the productive season or forced them to fail 
their tenders, and finally, hazard of disappointment when the 
Government appropriated a tonnage far less than applied for. Though 
the Company had postponed the last date to accommodate merchants, 
the freight charged on tonnage,offered during the period of grace, 
was uncommonly high, about £35 per ton, while the ordinary war 
freight was no less burdensome at £22,10s. "To trade on these terns 
ia rather a species of gambling than a sober regulated commerce*”
(3)
Richard Johnson, a Bengal merchant, voiced other grievances.
As the Company cconbrolled the credit market by its huge debt 
transactions, they could neither borrow cheap nor, specially after 
Cornwallis’s reforms, lend dear. Salt and opium were entirely in the 
Company’s hands. The private traders could have made the same 
profit at a reduced scale of prices. The regulation for weavers, 
passed in 1787, had put undue restrictions on the relations between
them and the private traders, depriving the former of legitimate
(1) Eur. MSS. D. 281 p. 35. Fall of San Domingo in rebel hands had
increased the Continent’s demand for indigo and sugar# Reduction 
of tax on tea also contributed to it. High freight, however,
1 stood in the way of large scale export.
(2) Lambert & Ross to Prinsep (the owner of the Lachmi) 4 February
1794, Home Misc. 405.P-387*
Also Prinsep’t speech at the Court of Proprietors, 3 July 1799: 
ibid p. 84, and Foreign Letter to the Court, 18 August 1795,
(3) Richard Johnson to Dundas 23 January 1794 Home Misc. 435, pp. 113-116.
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price and the latter of the surplus produce of the country which 
was increasingly demanded by Europe. Raw silk and opium trade 
in the Red Sea area was affected by the Company’s trade in tha 
Levant. Over all stood the Company as a Colossus beating down its 
competitors with its sovereign powers on the one hand and surplus 
Indian revenue on the other.
The Bengal merchants were really trying to take advantage 
of a speculation in commodities in the British and the Continental 
markets in 1795, following f rcm the Revolutionary War, without 
having to pay increased freight, insurance and interest rates. Not 
only prices of imports were rising in the London market but 
re-exports to Hamburg and other places. 'Jhe private
traders reiterated their plea that the Company should take 
up Indian shipping not only to protect itself from loss which 
would otherwise accrue from hiring costly extra-ships in 
England, but also to enable them to trade cheaply and remit 
their fortunes profitably. They offered thirty thousand 
tons of shipping belonging to the British merchants, resident in
(]
Calcutta, of which above sixteen thousand had been built In Bengal,
(1) Eur. MSS. D 281 p. 36.
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at £12 per ton in peace and £16 per ton in war provided the 
owners were allowed to load the ships themselves car proctare cargoes 
frcm private traders at the same freight at whieh they had engaged 
with the Company* Such ships were to return in ballast or with 
British manufactures at the owners* option and the Company was to 
have an option to send stores or troops in them, the former at £4
CD
per ton and the latter for the usual allowance*
Shore cculd only help them by a liberal customs policy which
took off duty on grain, indigo and silk, if exported in the
Companyfs ships, on brass and copper utensils, spirits,distilled
in European manner} and goods imported for exportation* He
ordered Bombay and Madras not to levy duties on Bengal goods* E w j& /e r ,h c  
a for
SdOEt asked^permission of the Court to hire Indian ships next year and
charge private goods the same low freight as would be paid to their
(2)
owners*
Quite unexpectedly the permission came, first, to carry an
(3)
extended investment for which no regular tonnage could be sent 
the heme government having taken seven of the Company* s ships for 
war purposes - and secondly, to carry grain and rice to England
(1) For other grievances like restrictions on certain articles and
naval stores etc* see Memorials of London Agency houses -
15 Sept* and 11 Odt. 1794, 11 Oct and 25 Nov* 1795.
(2) C.G. in C* to Court (CommM 15 May 1795*
(3) Secret Committee of the Cottgt. to G.G. in C* 20 February 1795,
Of 11,550 tons offered in Calcutta - 2900 tons were accepted 
at once and the rest conditionally at £16 per ton* G#G* in C* 
to the Cottifb* (Ccrnm1) 2 November 1795*
I ’
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(1)
where an extreme scarcity was fait# The owners offered more
than 20,000 tons at £16 per ton for all goods save piece goods on
which they asked for £20# The Government closed on the offer
accepting the private tonnage required for 1795-96 also at this
freight, with a slight addition for insurance and interest#
Warren Hastings and the Caledonia of Bengal, both belonging to
Mr. William Pairlie, were accepted on the same terms as laid
down in the memorial of 1795# In self-justif! cation the
Governor General in Council wrote: *we were particularly
influenced by a consideration, that it is far the interest of the
Company that the produce of Bengal should be carried to Europe on
(3)
the Company*s ships in preference to those of a neutral power#*
go This was, however, not to end the private traders* distress.
Is amd
■essicon They had brought on themselves the inevitable result of a wild 
speculation in indigo in the years following the Charter# The 
Company was responsible for the encouragement of this article
A  P K
in the early stages# From 1779 to 1784 it bought contract from a 
single person (Mr# Prinsep) and frcm 1784 to 1788 from several 
others (like Udney, Fergus son, Barjfbtto, J#P# Scott etc#) always
at a loss# The remittance plan of 1788, adopted by Lord Cornwallis,
(1) G.G# in G# to Court. (Public) 11 January 1796# 8973 tons were
taken up for this purpose#Cf 15 ships sent, Messers Fairlie
onfl Co# owned 3# Lambert & Ross, John Reid etc# were other
owners#
(2) Lambert and Ross to the Bengal Board of Trade 5 October 1796#
(3) G.G. in C# to Court. (Comm1) 2 November 1795#
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tried to shift the loss to the manufacturers and secure a
7 (1)profitable remittance for the Company at 2s 4gd# The pecuniary 
assistance of the Company (which also reduced the charge on indigo 
imported in privilege to 5$ and on indigo manufactured with its 
advances to 2%) and the great demand for the article in the 
European market after the loss of San Domingo on the outbusak of 
the French Revolution^ BStt caused a speculation in indigo which 
was further enhanced by a conditional lease allowed by Cornwallis
(2)
to the European planters in 1789-90 on the advice of Jonathan Duncan#
(3)
When this privilege was withdrawn (really extended to 1800) in 1794
and advances to the manufacturers were first made in depreciated
(4)
paper [1793-94} and then stopped altogether (1794-5), the trade had
increased beyond all reasonable bounds# In 1795 out of a total
import in England of 4,368,027 lbs# Bengal alone supplied
(5)
2,955,862 lbs# - much above the average demand and four fifths in very 
low quality, the produce of Oudh and Agra• Since 542,841 lbs# of
this had been raised on the advances of the Company, the restAhaflfe
(1) Memorials of C# Blume, an indigo manufacturer. 30 December 1790#
Home Misc# 434 pp. 600-603# Also Court to G.G. in C# (Conim1)
25 June 1793#
(2) Home Misc# 406 pp# 90-93# Thp government later stated that the
lease was valid only in the case of Messrs# Gilchrist and 
Charters but was usurped by all planters#
(3) G.G# in C# to Court (Revenue) 29 December 1794#
(ft) Sir John Shore to Coawfc# 10 March 1796#
(5) Court to G.G. in C* (Comm1) 27 July 1796#
-72-
“been raised on private capital# Prices toppled down in the 
glutted London market, suffering from a financial crisis in
1796—97 and temporarily deprived of the Continental outlets#
First Calcutta hcuses like the Fairlies and Barifettos which had
CD
gone deeply into the indigo business, suffered a setback,IB
all the more increased their urge for sending India-built
shipping which would not only convey their private trade
cheaply but automatically remit their income on freight besides
proving on sale a source of repayment of loans contracted in 
CS)
England#
The distress of the merchants increased with the
interruption of the Eastern trade in opium due to the depredations
(3) (4)
of the French privateers and the outbreak of war with the Dutch#
Sir John Shore dealt them a hard blow when he refused in 1797
to take up India-built shipping on the last year*s tems after
(5)
a full discussion in the Board of Trade# Even though Messers
Prinsep and Saunders offered him 10,000 tons at £16 in war and £10
(6)
in peace free of all charges, the Calcutta Gazette of 2 January 1798 
advertised freight at £52 15s# per ton for private goods exceeding
(1) Scott to Louis BarjjJetto 16 May 1796 Home Misc# 728 pp# 414-15
(2) Scott to William Fair lie 12 July 1797 Home Misc# 730 p# 72#
also William Jhirlie to the Board of Trade - 26 December 1797# 
Heme Misc# 403 p# 161#
(3) G.GJ in C. to Court 2 June 1794 and
do do (Public ) 30 December 1797#
(4) Sir John Shore to Court 24 September 1796#
(5) Proceedings of the Board of Trade 26 July 1797.
(6^ ; John Cochrane on Private Trade and Shipping, Home Misc# 406
p» 60*
It
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the statutory tonnage and/or offered after the stipulated period*
Hot satisfied with this the government imposed an import duty
of 13jb on all indigo from Qudh and other western countries which to ffa tu L  
CD
qiany planters and agency houses* Its firmness became more
manifest when it refused to pay indemnity though goods of Messers
Colvins and Bazett and another agency house were blown up with the
Royal Charlotte which was carrying powder to the Cape without the
(2)
knowledge of the injured parties*
Lndestfcime The result of this negative attitude, assumed possibly at the
ide*
behest of the Court, was disastrous* British merchants either bought
Danish flags at Serampore and engaged in illicit trade with Batavia
and Copenhagen or lent capital to the -Americans to trade
(3)
circuitously, sometimes even trading under their flag* The
N&CTV
Americans K B  monopolised the illicit trade to Hamburg as the Anglo-
A
Danes monopolised that to Copenhagen* British capital remitted 
through foreign channels, mainly Danish* - Portugese and American 
(a few Germans and Venetians joined the game), may be roughly 
calculated frcm the Bengal Commercial Reports compiled by the Reporter 
on External Commerce of Bengal* The excess of exports to Copenhagen
(4)
over its imports to Calcutta during 1795—6 and 1797—98 was S#R* 15,73,540*
(1) Ragulatiaa. XX of 1797*
(2) G.G* in C* to Court (Public) 31 October 1797*
(3) Prinsep*s speech op*cit p* 96*
(4) CALCUTTA - COPENHAGEN (PRIVATE)
Yr* Imports* S.R* Exports* S.R*
1795-96 7,70,136 8,13,832
1796-97 5,14,936 17,73,511
1797-98 85,303 3,56,572
C  c r m w  o rt~i a. L  R e b c r r t o  1 Y e}  $  7 8  -
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To this mist be added exports from Serampore which the Reporter
on External Commerce puts at S.R. 2,00,000 in each of the first
two years and at S.R. 24,00,000 in 1797-98 when Shore refused
permission to India-built shipping. Excess of exports to Lisbon
(X) (2)
in the sama period was S.R. 19,40,604, to Hamburg - S.R. 17,53,640
(3)
and to America - S.R. 31,02,189. Reckoning three fourths of this
trade as carried on with British capital at the lowest, eighty three
lakhs of rupees had been remitted to Europe by the British traders in
Bengal in three years besides their lawful remittance through the
(4)
Company* s channels.
ti)
ibid
(2)
Yr.
1795-96
1796-97
1797-98
Yr.
1795-96
1796-97
1797-98
I bid.
(3)
Yr.
1795-96
1796-97
1797-98
•bid
(4)
Yr.
1795-96
1796-97
1797-98
Lbrd _
CALCUTTA - LISBON
Imports
S.R.
10,24,943
5,18,025
6,94,320
- HAMBURGCALCUTTA
Imports
S.R.
6,57,431
15,801
1,66,411
CALCUTTA - AMERICA
Exports
S.R.
21,81,371
7,10,926
12,85,595
Exports'
S.R.
17,37,342
6,19,973
2,15,968
Imports Exports
S.R. S.R*
8,43,118 19,49,319
15,49,773 25,60,267
10,40,108 20,25,602
CALCUTTA - LOUDON (PRIVATE)
Imports Exports
S.R. S.R.
22,73,161 84,08,800
17,83,002 50,79,310
15,34,219 69,71,529
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If the war with the Dutch d O H i  increased profit in tlie Anglo-A
Danish trade^089HI the ambiguously-worded Jay Treaty offered many
(1)
loop-holes to the Ameilcans# The Jay Treaty, published on 30
September 1797 in India, did not insist on direct voyages to India
nor try to confine the cargoes to the manufacture and produce of
-America, nor again did it expressly prohibit exports to any port
of Europe# The British government, unable to foresee the long war
ahead and desirous of amicable relations with the United States in
the midst of its mortal struggle with France, did not consider it
wise to clarify the clauses# The thirteenth article of the Treaty
moreover placed the British and the .American ships on par in the
matter of customs and charges on pilotage# The cases of the
Perseverance at Bombay, the America at Madras and the Ellxabeth at
Calcutta made the Bengal government aware of the lacuna in the
treaty# The first was charged with carrying on a circuitous trade
between India and .America via Hamburg on account of a British 
(2)
citizen# Mien the Solicitor to the Company at Bombay advised
leniency,shown before to the Eliza and the Fame at Calcutta, the
(3)
Perseverance was allowed to clear out for Han burg. The America
a  i r r
loaded goods at Tranquebar, landed them at Madras and asked permission
U)
to @ 0 to Bengal# The Elizabeth was charged with trading between
(1) Hunter Miller (ed#) Treaties «Ti<i other International Acts of the
United States of America, Uashington 1931 Yol# II# pp# 255-56#
(2) Home Misc# 337 pp# 171-75
(3) £sz ibid pp# 407-408#
(4) Port St# George Public Consult# 18 April 1797#
Cl)
Serampore and Batavia after loading cargoes at Calcutta# The
Governor General concurred with the Advocate General that, though
this was not strictly port to port trade within the meaning of
(2)
the treaty, this would divert all trade to Serampore# The
Three Sisters was another American ship, stopped while proceeding
(3)
from Serampore to Manilla but later allowed to leave for home#
Even the very liberal Advocate General held back from allowing an
agency house to load an American ship for Manilla#
Hugh IngLis, the Chairman of the East India Company,
suggested to Dundas provisions which would counteract this evil
which threatened the country and the coasting trade but the latter
a m
refused to impose more severe conditions on the treaty than originally
(4) A
intended and politically desired# When the Kingfs Bench£!ivision
finally laid the seal of judicial approval on the widest interpre­
tation of Article XIII in Wilson v# Maryat and the unfortunate 
case of the Danish ship Eelsingoer brought to light the amount of
clandestine trade going on between Bengal and Batavia, Dundas had
(5)
to think of prohibiting trade between Calcutta and Serampore and the 
Bengal goverment had to reimpose duties on goods entering that
(1) Home Misc# 537 pp# 545-54 and p# 575#
(2) G.G. in C# to ftoftCotCffc# (Foreign) 28 Augist 1797.
(3) Proceedings Foreign Department 2 June and 23 June 1797.
(4) Dundas to High Inglis 14 June 1797, letters from Board to
Court vol. 1# p# 444#
(5) Dundas*s memorandum 10 November 1799 Home MiscI 337 pp# 589-93#
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settlement from the Company*s territories#
Revolutionary Vfeir and Bengal finances:
As the exigencies of war had enabled the neutral nations
to seize a lion*s share of Bengal*s foreign trade so had they
affected Bengal*s public finance# Shore made a modest beginning
on CorngaIIists foundations which were none too secure# Thft
(3)
revenues of Bengal were thriving towards the end of 1794, showing
an increase over the three preceding years# Discount on 6fo
(4)
promissory notes did not exceed Rs 1 - 12 as The government
felt so secure that it abolished the town duties at Calcutta and
7 (3)
reduced export and import duties at that port to 2g$# rnhTmra-n
(6)
conditions of the A jo ora molunghees were partially alleviated by
abolition of the tenure which was repugnant to "the spirit of the
(7)
Regulations, and the dictates of justice and good policy#*
Batta on gold was diminishing and a payment of &fa notes was 
(8)
proposed# Tet within six months the chimera of prosperity had
vanished into thin air# 8$ loans, which sold at a premium of
(1) G.G. in §# to Court (Separate) 29 September 1798.
(2) See government decision to limit investment of 1793#
to Court (Ccmm^ J 12 January 1794# Discount on 6$ notesAdolTdo# 
13 February 1794#
(3) G.G# in C# to Court (Revenue) 18 August 1794#
(4) Shore to Court 21 August 1794*
(5) G.G. in G* to Court (Public) 24 December 1794#
(6) Those who made salt were called molunghees and they were divided
into two groups — Ajoor and Thica — the former tenure being 
based on prescription maintained by coercion, the latter 
being based on contract#
(7) G.G# in C. to Court (Revenue) 29 December 1794#
(8) Shore to Court 31 December 1794#
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Rs 2 - 8 in October 1794, sold at a discount of Rs 4 - 13 as in the
(1)
middle of 1795 and 6% loans, at a discount of 4$ since 1794, sold
(2)
at a discount of 10$ early in 1796. Advances to indigo manufac-
(3)
turers had to be stopped in 1796 which had severe repercussions on
the Government credit during the indigo-crisis#
The Government was worried about its revenues# Opium revenue
showed decline from 1795-96, the primary cause, besides the
expensive contract system, being over-speculation and glut in the
(4)
Eastern umxfcet and the secondary cause - import of cheap opium from
(5}
the Vizier’s territory# Hostilities with the Dutch worsened
the situation further by interrupting comminications with the East 
(6)
Indies# The Government was so anxious to keep up the monopoly
price that it forced the Vizier of Oudh to acquiesce in prohibition
(7)
of opium import from his territory and even burnt a thousand chests
of that drug in Calcutta when none came forward to offer the fixed 
(8)
price# Salt revenue fluctuated as the CourtTs policy of deriving 
the maximum from an extensive sale collided with the Bengal Govern­
ment’s cautious policy of dBriving it freon artificial restriction of 
production sale# Only land revenue bore like Atlas the whole burdenodf
(1) G.G. in C# to Court (Caram*") I5  ^ 7  1795*
(2) Shore to Court 18 January 1794# G.G# in C# to Court (Public)
2 Novanber 1795# 1
(3) G.G# in C# to Court (Comm ) 7 March 1796#
(4 ) G.G# in Ci to Court (Separate) 11 January 1796#
(5) G.G. in C# to Court (Separate) 2 Novsaber 1795#
(6) Shore to Court 24 September 1790.
(7) G.G# in C# to Court (Separate) 20 May 1796#
(8) G.G# in C* to Court (Separate) 30 December 1797#
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administration, commerce and war# Even there defalcation was not
infrequent and revenue sale of the period went high# The
government tried hard to impress the Court that this was not due
to over—assessment, for, otherwise, the value obtained at the
sales would not have fetched ten to sixteen years1 purchase#
But though it knew that sales were mostly caused either by the
malafldes of the speculating proprietors, who bought back in
others1 names (and thus quashed all previous rights arid
encumbrances attached to the property), or by their extravagance
and bad management, the government, anxious to protect its only
sure resource, allowed itself to be blackmailed in 1795 when it
passed Regulations 35, 36 and 37 which gave the landlords summary
(1)
rights of distraint for non-paynent of rent# Two years later
it introduced a new tax called the Stamp Tax (Regulation 6 of
(2)
1797) to bolster up a hard-pressed exchequer#
The disbursements, however, kept pace with the revenues#
With the outbreak of the Revolutionary War the French settlements in 
India were taken# A naval squadron under Admiral Rainier, 
accompanied by an expedition equipped at Madras, occupied Ceylon, 
Malacca, Banda and Amboina in 1795# The invaders were assisted by 
the partisans of the OrangLst party in Holland who were indignant
(1) G.G# in C# to Court (Revenue) 15 May 1795# also G.G# in C#
to Court (Revenue) 1 September 1796#
(2) G.G. in C# to Court (Revenue) 31 August 1797#
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at the establishment of a republic# Under the impact of war Bengal
had to meet relentless demands from Madras and Bombay to which
a tfa c x p c n A e A e f
were added th irr'Tniti'Iahti rrf rt^ rinnxrtnra nof (YinTmrrrrn^ emfl^ crrn n supply 
to England in 1796 and the spate of bills from Canton# The Bombay 
government was in the hands of native shroffs like Gopaul Doss 
Hurrykissen Doss and Monohar Doss Dwarka Doss who lent it three
a)
lakhs a month for bills on Benares atudisadvantageous exchange#
Madras drained Bengal of much-needed bullion worth 8 lakhs and
(2)
drew to the extent of 14 lakhs, besides getting permission to
draw regularly three lakhs a month and disposing of notes
(3)
transferable to Bengal at<\ disadvantageous exchange. A stream
(4)
of gold flowed again to Madras in 1797. The supra-cargoes of
Canton drew to the extent of 100,000 tales, obtaimd 12 lakhs on
loan and a promise that Bengal would pay China bills in cash at
(5)
unfavourable exchange. Even Borecole n tras not to be left out of
(6)
these financial frolics. The deficiency caused by such
(7)
extraordinary demands reached 30 lakhs at the end of 1796-97 and 
the Bengal investment had to be reduced from the traditional 
105 lakhs to a mere 60 (later raised to 84)# In 1797-98 discount
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 28 August 1795 and 31 August 1796#
(2) G.G. in C# to Court (Public) 11 January 1796#
(3) G.G. in C# to Court (Public) 20 May 1796#
(4) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 19 January 1797.
(5) ibid# also G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 2 March 1797# Supplies
to China frcm India rose from an average of 2#4 lakhs per
year between 1792 and 1796 to S.R. 20,35,469 In 1797—98#
(6) G.G# in C# to Court (Public) 30 December 1797#
(7) G.G. in C# to Secret Committee 2 March 1797#
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on 6$ paper fluctuated between 14$ and 21$, on 8$ paper between
(1)
8$ and 14|$ and on 12$ paper between ^ $ to ljj$*.
Defences of the government against the agency houses, who
were on the look out for exploitation of such a financial distress,
were one by one broken# In order to increase the investment for
(2)
1797-98 the government was forced to open a loan at 12$
(3)
advise other presidencies to do likewise, to give the opium dealers
a high exchange rate on bills from Canton and Bencoolen," to seek
(4)
pecuniary assistance from the Raja of Benares and ultimately to 
intervene in the Court-intrigues of Oudh where it received£high 
price for helping Nawab Saudut Ally against his brother YizierrAlly# 
Sir John Shore informed the Court that tt.##tha actual addition 
made by the treaty to the subsidy is twenty lacks twenty two thousand 
three hundred and sixty two#” He assured further that "this very 
considerable augmentation of our resources, added to the 12 lacks 
which the Nawbub has paid, agreeably to the treaty, for the expenses 
incurred in placing him on the musnud, and 10 lacks which the 
Governor General has borrowed from Almas Ally Khan, will enable us 
not only to keep up the investment of 1798 to 105,00,000 of current 
rupees the standard of last year, but also to appropriate the further
(1) ibid
(2) Shore to Court 5 September 1797#
(3) G.G# in C. to Court (gublic) 31 October 1797£.
(4) Shore to Court 5 September 1797#
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sum of three lacks of sicca rupees towards the Increase which you.
C1)have desired to be made in the provision of sugar#*
In abort the system, devised in 1793, bad broken down* The
financial arrangements of 1793 bad been made on tbe hypothesis of
a continuation of peace and a steady return from tbe Permanent
Settlement of Bengal, calculated in 179X to yield more than 
r (2) 
crores per year* The very first year of tbe new Charter,
however, saw tbe beginning of tbe Revolutionary War which rendered
the first hypothesis untenable* The Permanent Settlanent by its
very nature was rigid and unadaptable to increase of expenditure*
It held the hands of the government when civil and, specially,
military charges began to rise rapidly due to extension of warlike
measures to the foreign settlements in India and the East Indies*
Surplus revenue of Bengal stood at C*R* 2,53,99,682 in 1793-94* It
dwindled to C*R* 1,75,10,814 by 1797-98 and the charges rose frcm
C*R* 3,33,19,778 to C*R* 4,03,16,599* Besides paying an interest of
3 5  to 40 lsfrha a year on debt, Bengal had yet to contribute towards
(3)
Investment G.R* 1,33,48,793 on average during 1793-97*
(1) Shore to the Secret Committee 5 March 1798*
(2 ) Dundas* s speech Pari* Hist* Yol* XXX* pp* 667—68 also G*G* in C*
to Court (Revenue) 31 October 1799*
(3 ) Bengal Investment
Yr* C*R*
1793-94 1,40,20,382
1794-95 1,10,84,487
1795-96 1,45,95,470
1796-97 1,20^23,944
1797-98 1,50,19,685
"Fhft average of Indian investment was £2,242,258 per year* v
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In 1796-97 the total Bengal debt had risen to C.R. 6,20,63,941 - 
debt bearing interest being C.R. 4,97,20,523. Next year the former 
leapt up to C.R. 7,67,30,178 and the latter to C.R. 6,07,43,580.
Inspite of the addition of more than two crores of debt over two
(i)
years, Bengal famished C.R. 1,50,19,685 for investment in 1797-98.
Dundasfs concern for India debt and his solution: It is not surprising
in this content that Dundas, who now bore the burden of the India Board
as well as the TJar Ministry, became increasingly anxious about the
large investments ordered frcm India inspite of the lack of resources,
and about the rise of war freight, the scarcity of ship-timber and
of sea men or that ha grew more solicitous about the use of India-
built shipping for all but the regular and legitimate trade of the Company.
TChen the Court ordered more silk for throwing it up into
organzine, Dundas advised the Chairman, "whenever you see it
necessary to make experiment at speculation of the nature in question,
or where you are bound to make provision for bringing home private
or privilege trade, it would be infinitely more wise to give a
power to your Governments abroad to take up shipping on the spot,
(2)
to the full amount requisite. * He warned the Court against
(3)
trading beyond its capital and since, as sovereign of the Indian
(1) Dundasr s budget speeches 12 March 1799 and 25 March 1800. In
1797-98 total India debt stood at C.R. 11,03,26,452 and invest­
ment at £2,479,965. Heads of Mr. Dundas* Budget Speeches, op.clt.
(2) Dundas to Devaynes 7 January 1795, Board to Court op,cit.
"Vol. I pp. 381—82.
(3) Dundas to Chairman 21 October 1796 ibia p. 422, Dundas to David
Scott 10 April 1797 ibid p. 433.
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possessions, the Company could not circumscribe its trade without 
encaaraging; clandestine commerce which would foil his dream of
making London the emporium of Eastern trade* the only solution
(1)
appeared to be engagement of country shipping at cheap freight
- as had been proved beyond doubt by Shore’s policy in 1796#
Dundas supported this policy in a letter to the ship-builders of the
Thales who* frightened at the arrival of Indian ships* tried tot
influence the ship-earpenters at the time of the general mutiny
of the navy* The British territories in India”* he firmly
asserted* "are under the sovereignity of Great Britain* and the
ships built there are equally entitled to all the privileges of
British-built shipping, as those built in the West Indies or Canada#
(2)
or any other foreign dependencies of the Empire**•*" He was* 
however, not challenging the peculiar claims of the India and China 
ships of the line* Since their high freight* still further 
enhanced by war, private trade and the Company’s trade in gruff 
goods would never be able to bear* he suggested the propriety of their 
conveyance in cheap India-built ships*
(1) Dundas’s budget speech of 12 March 1799* Heads of Mr* Dundas*s
Budget Speeches op»cit#
(2) Dundas to the Committee of ship-builders of the Thames
I July 1797* App* IX of Thomas Henchman’s Observations 
on the Reports of the Directors of the East India Company* 
respecting the trade between India and Europe* London* 1801#
ottVfr.
hipping; 
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David Scott, elected Beputy Chairman of the East India
Company in 1795 and Chairman in 1796, found time to help the cause
of India-built shipping in the midst of his relentless struggLe
against the CLd Shipping Interest begun earlier in 1794* 1/hen the
latter tried to continue the existing shipping system on the plea
that war had made it "impracticable to lay down a fixed, permanent
(1)
rate for future freighting", and the Directors agreed to £35* 5s,
per ton, though they first offered £31 4s, XGd,, Dundas made up his
mind to interfere on the side of the Hew Shipping Interest which
(2)
had been angling for his favour since 1792, In retaliation theOLi
Shipping Interest charged Scott, wham they considered as the
henchman of Dundas, with having an interest in an agency house
with affiliations in India and ended in passing a resolution which
debarred the Birectors from, any connection with an agency house in
(3)
future • Scott was not to be beaten. By 1796, mainly due to his 
exertions, cheap extra ships were accepted at £35 in war and £20 
in peace which forced the regilar ships to come down. The Court 
determined to employ no ship but such as the owner of which wcnld 
build for Its service for six voyages, All old ships were considered 
as permanently engaged for six voyages at a fixed freight each season
(1) J, Hott - Addresses on Shipping, London 1795. General Court 
Debates 19 March 1794,
£2) Board to Court 8 Nov, 1794, op,cit, p, 383,
(3) Scott to William Eairlie 30 March 1795. C,H, Philips, The , 
Correspondence of David Scott op.cit, Vol. X, pp, 21—30*
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and additional war allowances were to be settled between the
Court and the old owners, "About £150,000 saving in the present
season", wrote triumphant but sober Scott, "but not above
£70,000 per annum in peace and their Cold owners*) whips are taken
up while they will last. Probably in peace gman ships may be
had at £18, in which case we have purchased peace with the old
owners at an expense of £140,000 per on 40,000 tons while they
last, and the cheapest purchase ever the Company made if they can by
(1)
it build by free and open competition," By 1800 this salutary
(2)
reform had saved for the Company £130,000 per annum. The other 
thing that was left "to give Britian what her acquisition of
Bnpire in the East appears to be now inherent right" was "a
(3)
reduction of duties". He had started to move in that direction
already. It was he who was behind Sir John Shore’s plan of
(4)
reducing import and export duties to 2^ in India and who had 
prepared *A memorial from the Directors of the E,I,Co, to the Lords 
of the Treasury, 7 May 1797, on the subject of regulating the Duties 
on East India Goods* which prayed for reduction of the prohibitions
(1) Scott to William Fairlie 8 Januaiy 1796 ibid p,52», also, Scott
to Alexander Adamson 11 January 1796 ibid p, 56,
(2) C,H, Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834, op.cit, p, 87,
(5) Scott to William Fairlie 8 March 1797. C,H, Philips, The
Correspondence of David Scott, op,cit, p, 96,
(4) Scott to Governor Duncan, 31 July 1797, ibid, p, 115*
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duties at the London end so as to put the Indian articles passing
A <JMV
through Great. Britain on equal footing with those which might
(1)
find their way to the Continent directly from India*
Scott might have liked to break the shipping interest 
altogether, says Professor Philips, by admitting more small ships 
to the Company*s service had it not been time to go out by rotation* 
Unable to make any further impression on the monopolists from the 
centre, he looked towards India-built shipping he had ordered during 
his term of direction to bring investment and rice* Two specimens 
of such ships, the Caledonia and the Warren Basti ngs, both 
belonging to his Bengal correspondents, Messers Eairlie and Co*, 
seemed to presage his (as well as Dundas*s) great dream of
(2)
bringing "into the Thames almost the whole of the Eastern Commerce. **w
Before his retirement he had persuaded the Court to approve Shore’s
conduct, the object of which was *no doubt to make India as useful
to itself and to the mother country as possible1*. But, out of (Tu,
direction, he observed with dismay the Old Shipping Interest by *•••
excluding ships built at the cutports and India built ships*.,wish
to transfer the monopoly which before rested with the *old owners
in the front and river builders in the rear* to the * river builders in
(3)
the front and the old owners in the rear*** He was grieved to
 --------— — ------------------- "T(7?ZS3--------- - ---------
(1) App. 47* Supplement to the 4th Report* paper. No* 4*
(2) Scott to William Ehirlie* 8 March 1797 oplcit*
(3) Scott to Sir Stephen Lushington 9 May 1797. G*H* Philips The
Correspondence of David Scott op.cit* p. 101#
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hear about "foreign ships* arrival in Denmark and elsewhere abroad 
supposed laden with English money and amounting from £50,000 t©
£100,000 each" and told Shore that though he could not be of much 
help now, "it will be great pleasure to me to find that you have 
been able to put this in such a train as to prevent its afterwards 
fowing to any petty interests partially operating) taking a
ID
retrogade motion when you have left the Government• ”
Unfortunately, however, ’petty interests* mled the destiny 
of the Company: "The present Chairman is our staunch friend and one
of the best of men, but opposition have apparently proved too strong, and
(2)
indeed run wild*" In the despatch of 25 May 1798 the new Court, after 
dryly congratulating the Bengal Government for sending India-built 
shipping with grain, remarked - "that under the authority of this 
approbation you are not to* consider we mean to sanction as a general 
measure the practice of hiring ships and re-letting them to 
individuals for the purpose of their being solely laden on their own 
private account, as took place in the instances of the Warren Hastings 
and Caledonia * * • .the tonnage vfoich the law has allotted to the 
use of the individuals in meant for the accomodation of every 
description of merchants, whether concerned in shipping or not, in 
which they have all equal claims of participation • » • whatever 
shipping therefore you may hereafter be under the necessity of
(1) Scott to Sir John Shore 11 June 1797 ibid p* 106*^
(2) Scott to William Eairlie 14 July 1797 ibid p* 109*
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taking up in India — faust be devoted to the general demand, and
(1)
not to the use of any particular individual** The Shipping
Interest, frightened out of its wits at the amount of tonnage
available in Bengal at such low freight, took away the only
advantage which made low freight possible*
To this explosive situation came Lord Wellesley in 1798 asfaU. 
lesley
Governor General of Bengal in succession to Sir John Shore* He 
had an ability matched only by his ambition, a vision which saw 
through the haze of ignorant goodwill and unrealistic prejudices, 
a drive that cut through conflicting interests as a knife through 
cheese and a single minded zeal which brooked no baffling obstacles* 
He had also his share of human vices - impetuosity, arrogance and 
a cold aristocratic aloofness which refused to see the other manys 
point or hold back for the price which others had to pay for his 
decisions* During his apprenticeship at the Board of Control
1795—97, he came into close contact with David Scott and Henry 
Dundas and before he left for India he had imbibed the former* s 
liberal views on trade and the latter*s forward policy which in 
ultimate analysis appeared to him complementary* Indeed, Dundas, 
a pragnatic politician, found his ideal of an interdependent 
empire, heightened since the beginning of the war, force him more
(1) Court to G.G. in C. 25 May 1798
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and more to take a stand against rigid monopoly and Scott, a hard- 
headed merchant, found his free trade doctrines, whetted by 
phenomenal industrial progress since the nineties, force him more 
more to take up the cause of imperial expansion* To Wellesley, who 
had undergone such orientation, the realities of the Indian situation 
in the end of the eightieenth century urged with greater vehemence the 
immediate adoption of a liberal trade policy if the imperial dream 
wqs to be fulfilled# In his inflamed vision the mercantile interests 
of the Company appeared trivial and tiresome while its sovereign 
character loomed large as the grand arbiter of India* s destiny, 
thrown up on the vortex of history, which submerged for ever in a 
fell sweep the greatness and the menace of the French empire# He 
only asked of the Company, his countrymen and the Providence the 
proud privilege of being the supreme architect of this abiding glory 
gnfl not to sink into oblivion - an inspired administrator like Shore*
He found to his chagrin a hostile Court, now thoroughly alarmed and 
aroused, fighting with its back to the wall every sign of the new 
heresy that prophesied and tried to procure its downfall* In this 
conflict of character and temperament, ideas and interssts^there was 
no respite until one party was broken#
On his way out Wellesley got a letter from Scott recommending
William ihirlie for information and advice on all commercial matters, for
"X suppose no English House in India has such extensive concerns as
(1)
Mr. Eairlie* s1*# Concerned himself in putting through, with the
help of Pitt, the Warehousing Bill, Scott entrusted to Wellesley
the task of encouraging exports from Bengal which would bring out
the full benefit of the proposed Act: nI hope your Lordship will
prevent the merchants in India having reason in future to complain
for want of tonnage on low terms to carry the produce of the East
to Britain1*# As the Company*s investment had been reduced due to
financial embarassment, Wwe should endeavour to encourage the
merchants to take off the superabundant produce which must arise
(2)
in proportion to that reduction,11 and which might in absence of any
arrangement leave through clandestine channels reported to amount to
(3)
20,000 tons In Bengal alone#
Being;aL finances in 1798: The financial enbarassment, referred to in the-
(4)
letter of Scott, was indeed very grave# Allowing for a supply of one 
crore of rupees to Madras and Bombay In 1798-99, the total deficiency 
in India came up to S.R* 2,13,81,321# While the sums applicable to 
investment in the last two years amounted to S.R# 81,43,858 and 
S.R# 96,44,550 respectively, the actual investments rose to C.R# 2,30,70,125 
and C.R# 2,65,45,040* Since the sale of import goods and certificates
(1) Scott to Wellesley 2 January 1798 Add* MSS# 37,262 f# 9.
(2) Scott to Wellesley 4 April 1798, ibid, ff# 15-16#
(3) Walter Ewer to Dundas 24 February 1798 Home Mi sc# 438, pp* 277—79.
(4) Wellesley* s Minute of 12 June 1798# Secret Proceedings of
20 June 1798 and G.G-* in C* to Court (Political) 3 July 1798#
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In the same years amounted to C.R. 38,19,380 and C.R. 58,28,330 and
bills drawn on^  Court fetched C.R. 79,88,699 and C.R. 32,87,2(3, the
remainder must have cams from loans. Bengali deficiency would
be about S.R. 1,28,68,360 and its debt bearing interest stood at
C.R. 6,07,43,580. Moreover war with Mysore seemed to be in the
offing. On his landing in India, 26 April 1798, Wellesley had
learnt of the negotiations of Tipu with France and her dependency 
tl}Mauritius. Preparations were at once set on foot (as early as
June 1798) end troop3 were ordered to take the field in Madras
and Bombay when he heard of BonaparteTs landing in Egypt on 18
(2)
October. Money on account of the sinking fund was not available 
in Bengal even at wo favourable a rate as 2s 6d. per sicca rupee 
payable twelve months after date. There were thus two alternatives 
before the Government - reduction of the investment or large scale 
borrowing on less favourable terms. Since the former would be 
unpalatable Wellesley proposed a decennial loan at 10fo which the 
Court could postpone two years more. It was no doubt much more 
unfavourable than the short tem \Z fo loans but must be accepted 
in the present situation of the money market. Over and above 
this the Court- should assist the depleted resources of Bengal with
(1) Montgomery Martin Ed. Wellesley Despatches Vol. I, V * 213.
(2) A sinking fund was established In Bengal In 1798 per Secret Letter
from Bengal 16 March 1798* It was proposed to raise a fund for 
payment of existing debts by selling bills drawn on Court 
quarterly for S.R. 3,25,000(or S.R. 13,00,000 per year).
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re gular and liberal export or bullion*
Inspite of this loan, however, and acceptance of the 
discredited 12$ paper on par as subscriptions, the latter showed in
October 1798 a discourt of to 1 while 8$ notes showed a discount
. (1) 
of 17 to 18$ and 6$ notes of 24^ to 25^* To give Madras gfnd
Bombay greater relief investments had to be cut down and bullion for
(2)
China withheld* To protect opium revenue, poppy cultivation in
(3)
Bengal was destroyed and 1855 chests of that drug were burnt while 
to protect land revenue, greater power of distraint was granted to 
the zemindars#
But all this failed to dyke the high tide of war expenditure* 
Undaunted, the Governor General wrote, "It would have been a most 
improvident and mistaken economy to have hazarded the peimanent 
safety of the British empire in India, and to have abandoned the 
soirees of your conmercial prosperity without defence to the attack 
of the enemy, for the purpose of preserving a spacious and delusive
(5)
appearance of security in a conjuncture of real danger*“ Desperately 
in need of funds for War, he reduced the sight of bills on the Court from 
12 months to Z months, fixed the rate of exchange at 2s 6d the sieca
rupee, pemitted individual'merchants to supply the Cape of Good Hope
(1) Gr*G> In C* to Court [Political) 1 October 1798*
(2) £.£♦ in G* to Court (Political) 3 October 1798 also G*G* in C#
to Court (Public) 2 September 1799*
(3) G*C* in C* to Court (Separate) 29 September 1798*
(4) Reflation of 1799* G.G* in C* to Court (Revenue) 23 September
1798*
(5) Wellesley to Court 21 November 1798*
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and Messers Fairlie and Co* to export cot tan to England on their 
. (1)own ships and finally, not only reduced the Bengal investment to
C*R. 87,76,848 (and Indian investment to £1,507,124) hut allowed
individuals to send gpods to England in their own ships above
12000 tans (besides the five vessels licensed to proceed to Cape)
in the manner observed by Shore regarding the Caledonia and the
(2)
Warren Hastings and since forbidden by the Court*
This last act was differently viewed by the Court and the Board*
The former had insisted on large investments for a long time*
Sending specie to India for the first time since the Third Mysore
War (about £759,226} Jacob Bosanquet, the Chatman of the Court,
wrote to Wellesley in 1798, wthey will enable you, whatever
temporaiy difficulties you may get into, to keep up the course of
your returns for this country, as you will recollect that such
(3)
returns are a necessary part of our existence*** Hugh Inglis
reiterated next year the same sentiment about investment "without
(4)
which we cannot keep the machine in motion*** Inspite of large 
sales at India House, the Company had been in distress since 1796 
for three principal causes - "the increase of commerce - the increase
(1) Gr#Gr* in C# to Court (Comni^ ) 31 July 1798* This was the result
of agitation by Cotton manufacturers* See Sir Robert Feel 
to the Committee of the Court Novanber .1797 App* O' to 
Thomas Henchman op*cit*
(2) Bengal Commercial Consultations 1 October 1798* The order of
the Government was issued on 5 October*
(3) Bosanquet to Wellesley 19 September 1798 Add MSS* 37,278 f* 51*
(4) Hugh Inglis to Wellesley 3 June 1799 ibid f* .60*
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of war freights — and the decrease of finds in consequence of the
(U
inefficiency of Bonds**, besides the Bank of England*s demand for
repayment of £700,000* The Company was allowed to raise two
million pounds in capital but preferred to ask the Government for
repayment of expenses incurred on account of expeditions against the
(2)
French in and outside India# Under such circumstances the only
sure resource was investment*
The Government, however, sharing the same view about
investment, differed with regard to the means of purchase* Pitt
replied his inability to repay and insisted on immediate export of
(3)
aims and silver to India* Dundas sarcastically referred to
yearly investments of three and a half millions while the territorial
(4)
surplus did not exceed a mere half# Not satisfied with irony, he 
wrote to Wellesley to see to the reduction of debt **which the mixt 
exigencies of war and commerce had createdtt and which not only
exhausted the whole surplus in war but threatened the operation of ffcc
(1) Chairs to Dundas 20 October 1796. Home Misc* 208 p* 292.
Sale at India House Freight paid
1795-96 £ 6>52S,969 £1,275,516
1796-97 £6,153,510 £1,496,414
1797-98 £4,718,822 £1,396,927
1798-99 £8,337,066 £1,708,540.
(2) Hugh Inglis to Dundas 27 September 1797 ibid pp* 296-97*
(3) Pitt to Chaiman 26 Augist 1798 ibid pp* 299-300#
(4) Dundas to Chairman 8 April 1799 ibid pp* 312-15#
-96-
sinking fund i^ * Government credit, after the return of peaee*
Dundas did not fall a prey to the Court*s "flattering delusion**
0of large sales but still he considered large investments imperative
provided they were bought with Company*s own heme resources* Erport
of bullion to India, as demanded by Wellesley, had bee one
supremely urgent* It would alleviate scarcity of capital and,
bringing down the rate of interest, assist public and private credit.
Once the loans at high interest were stopped the capital of the
debt itself could be considerably dwlnished through the remittance
plan which had now dwindled to insignificance as money could be
invested for much higher remuneration in public securities* Even
then, capital of the Company would not be big enough to embrace more
than half the produce of India as had been proved by the trade of
(2)
neutral nations in recent years* To bring the whole trade to the 
Thames there were two ways - diminution of duties and charges, which 
the Warehousing Act proposed,and authorising the Government of India 
nto license the appropriation of India-built shipping to the purpose 
of bringing home that Indian trade, which the means and capital of 
the East India Company is unable to bring home*** IXmdas was 
considering the eligibility of the second measure since 1797 and now
(1) Thomas Graham, a Senior member of the Board of Revenue and
later of the Council in Bengal warned Dundas of the bad 
effect on public debt of large investments as early as 1793# 
Graham to Dundas 20 December 1793 Home Misc# 437 p* 113*
(2) See Dundas*s budget speech of 12 March 1799 HeadJt of Mr. Dundas*s
Budget Speeches op.cit*
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that Wellesley had adopted It, though, “the whole weight of the
shipping interest will he opposed to such a proposition, under a
most false and erroneous idea that it is prejudicial to their
interest,* he (Wellesley) “need not. be under any apprehension as to
(1)
the result of it**
Here It must be said that though Dundas affilmed and
(2)
re-affirmed his concurrence on the subject of India-built shipping
and even promised full support of the government in case Wellesley
(3)
liked to continue the policy of sending India-built ships,
he also stuck to his other position regarding reduction of the
India debt* Considering the permanent settlement of land revenue
in Bengal and the double government in the Carnatic, Tanjore,
the Northern Circars and Oudh as the most baffling obstacles before
improvement of resources, Dundas supported Wellesley’s policy of
U)
subsidiary alliance and, considering the French his Mysore
War but he would not allow augmentation of debt or use of
Aifc, (5)
additional revenues of^  conquered Mysore for Investment* He supported
the Court of Directors - “in the proposition of not diverting*••*for
the purpose of war the specie sent out from the country for the
(1) Dundas to Wellesley 18 March 1799* Gwen, A Selection from the
despatches, treaties and other papers of the Marquess Wellesley etc* 
pp* 696-701*
(2) Dundas to Wellesley 21 March 1799 Add* MSS# 37,274 f* 142*
Ttandaa to Wellesley 14 June 1799 ibid f* ZZtm
(3) Dundas to Wellesley 23 July 1799 ibid f* 229*
(4) Dundas to Wellesley 1 November 1799 ibid f**5G9 and
18 July 1800 ibid f * 110*
(5) Dundas to Wellesley 10 October 1799 ibid f* 264*
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(1)
purpose of commerce.*' In attempting tit© impossible task of
striking an equilibrium between the commercial calculations of the
Court and the imperialist strategy of Wellesley, Dundas even
contradicted himself — "if the revenues of India are not adequate
to the purposes of war, when we are engaged in war, the Government
must find the remainder in the same way as It has any other of its
(2)
military expenses#* This desperate advice ran exactly counter
to his policy of debt reduction#
David Scott supported Wellesley's policy for very much the
same grounds: "Between your practice in encouraging such an
import of wealth by those ships, and the Bill (Warehousing Bill}
in qiestion becoming an Act of Parliament, the intercourse between
(3)
the East and this country will put on a new face"..*# This was
written by Scott in the midst of answering charges, put forward by
the Shipping Interest, of his and his firm's complicity In
clandestine trqde between Denmark and Batavia, Manilla and Bengal and
even of giving out state secrets to the enemy# The charges were ably
refuted by Scott himself in his speech at the India House on 20
(4) .
March 1799# and Professor Philips thinks the decisions of the
(5)
Directors and Proprietors to acquit him were just# But the fact
(1) Dundas to Wellesley 23 July 1799 op.cit*
(2) tb -i cL
(3) Scott to Wellesley 19 April 1799 Add#MSS# 37,282 f*85#
(4) The Asiatic Annual Register Vol# I# 1799, pp# 151-52#
(5) C.H# Philips, The East India Company 1784-1837 op.cit# p# 99#
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that soma of the agency houses in England in conjunction with setae
of the agency houses in Bengal were carrying on a large scale
illicit trade between Copenhagen and the enemy territories came out
Irresistibly* The Helsingoer or its cargoes might not have belonged
to David Scott Junior & Co* and Scott Senior certainly did not
give inf emotion to Captain Murray about the capture of Manilla
but that Fairlie, Gilmore & Co* had been trading between Batavia
and Europe under Danish colour and Duntzfeldt & Co* of Copenhagen
traded with Manilla were proved* For both David Scott Junior & Co*
did agency business in London* Duntzfeldt, an old Bengal merchant,
was a friend of Fergisson who was a former partner of David Scott
and him Scott and Lennox had helped when his ship, the Amalieribugh,
(1)
was captured by the navy in 1797* William Fairlie still had an
equal share with William Lennox, one of the trustees for David
(8)
Scott Junior & Co* Scott recognised the exertions of Fairlie for
(3)
Ms House, did everything to help him out of his distress during the
(4)
indigo crisis, recommended him to Wellesley and, even after the 
charges had been levelled, &££$ sent him a list from which to choose
future partners in view of "the close connection and the inter-woven
Scott to Dundas 10 June 1797* C*H* Philips (Ed*)
The Correspondence of David Scott op.cit* p* 104*
(2) Scott to Hercules Ross 1 May 1796 ibid* p* 70*
(3) Scott to William Fairlie 14 July 1797 ibid. p* 109*
(4) See above*
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(1)
interests and future prospects of these two Houses*" He
even admitted that he was a partner of Fairlie & Co*^.though a
sleeping partner - and though he believed William Fairlie "had
no interest in any of the Batavia ships, and had acted in no
respect except as agents to the Danes", ttSi he talked of
pushing through indemnity acts to copdone the agency houses
(2)
guilty of the Traitorous Correspondence Act*
A second fact emerged also* Behind the precipitate 
fabrication of the Charges, the unjust mode of accusation and the 
unseemly prosecution proceedings, the hand of the Shipping 
Interest - Uphinstone and Cotton - were clearly perceived* They
(3)
began the conspiracy in Secret Committee as early as 3 March 1799,
egged on Jacob Bosanquet, the Chairman (who belonged to the City
interest and was drawn into this affair because of his intense
jealousy of Scott* s influence with the Government) and through
their henchman, Twilning, tried their best to procure at least a
(4)
Bill of Discovery against the House of David Scott Junior & Co*
The protagonists of private trade interest rallied to David 
Scottrs cause for they found in its defeat their own undoing.
Thomas Henchman, Handle Jackson, Aldennan Lushing ton and Peter Moore 
defended him stoutly in the General Court debates of 20 March, 19 June
(1) Scott to William Fairlie 19 ApriX 1799 ibid p* 178*
(2) Scott to William Fairlie 11 July 1799 ibid p* 20^
(3) John Cochrane to Dundas 3 March 1799 and 10 Marcii 1799 Home
Misc* 405 pp* 1-18*
(4) The Asiatic Annual Register, op.cit* p* 160*
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and 28 June and saved the house from a Bill of Discovery# Scott took
the offensive wLthoat delay and pushed through the Parliament
a bill for regulating the manner in which the Company should hire
(1)
and take up ships for the regular service# Peter Moore brought a 
motion in the General Court for concerting with the India 
Commissioners the best plan for bringing all commerce of British 
India in~to the port of London as the arrangement under 33 Geo# ttt 
Cap* 61 had failed* The general demand was that British ships should 
be put on an equal footing with foreigners so far as the residue of the
Indian trade was concerned* When KLphinstome asserted that the
*  ^^present Act gave sufficient tonnage, Sir William Pultney challenged
(2)
it with statistics of clandestine trade# The battle between 
monopoly and private trade was fill on - precipitated by the wild 
attack of the Shipping Interest on David Scott# The nert round was 
to be fought over Wellesley's policy of sending India-built 
shipping# Balked of Its prey, the Shipping Interest turned to its 
recalcitrant Governor General for vengeance as the private trade 
interest turned to him for relief#
After doing its best to send more than a mi 13-ion pounds of 
specie to India in 1798-99 and about a million pounds In 1799-1800
(1) Scott to Wellesley 19 April 1799. C.H* Philips The Correspondence
of David Scott op* cit* p. 186* It later passed as Act 
39 Geo* I H  Chap. 89#
(2) The Asiatic Annual Register op.cit* pp* 183-87# Debate of 5 July*
Also Scobt to Wellesley 9 July 1799 Add* MSS, 37,282 f. Ill*
Peter Moore to Lord Macartney - 11 July 1799 Home Misc# 405 
.p* 242#
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the Court was astonished to find regular ships coining home
(D
full* Even Scott complained, for, the purpose of increasing
the cargoes of India men to 17 laTrha each was to save on freight
(2)
and Insurance* Though the Supreme Government has refrained
from sending country ships in 1799 per order of the Court of
(3) (4)
25 May 1798, the financial account it gave in January 1800
was far frcm pleasing inspite of the resounding victory over Tipu
Sultan on 4 May 1799* The account showed an ordinary deficit of
about 84 lakhs in 1798-99 and estimated an ordinary surplus of
9 lakhs only for the next year* Adding extraordinary receipts
and deducting extraordinary disbursements, the total deficit reached
the fabulous sum of S*R* 2,77,40,801 In 1798-99 of which S.R*
2,18,30,396 had been raised by loans, S»R* 1,34,24,360 in Bengal
alone* Next year the estimated total deficit would be well nigh
(5)
four crores, three of which were to be borrowed in Bengal*
Wellesley M  ended with the usual plea for more gold which world 
ease public credit and enable the Company to secure the produce of
(1) High Inglis to Wellesley 27 September 1799 Add* MSS* 38,409
f* 63. Court to G.G* in C* (Conm^ ) 31 October 1799*
(2) Scott to Wellesley 15 April 1800* Add* MSS. 37,278 f* 72#
(3) Except the ship Caledonia of Messers Fairlie & Co# G.G* in C*
to Court (Comm1) 2 September 1^ 99* Proceedings of Bengal 
Board of Trade 12 November 1799*
(4) G.G* in C* to Court (General) 23 January 1800*
(5) This was Bengal's fate even when she had produced in 1798-99
a clear surplus of S.R. 1,78,38,4X4*
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India to the exclusion of other foreigners* He had warned the 
Chairman earlier "that the exports of Portugal frcm Bengal in the 
year will nearly equal those of the Company," hoping he would
(U
"draw the natural conclusion frcm this fact**
It Is in such circumstances that Dundas again found it
necessary to explain his position with regard to debt to Wellesley
and his position with regard to India shipping to the Court* He
seemed to have considered the huge debt for Mysore war "necessary"
and justified on grounds of policy* The French menace ted been
uppermost in his mind since ha took over the control of Indian
affairs and he was prepared to pay the price for their elimination
from the Indiem scene* But he felt himself constrained to
caution Wellesley about debt in view of a future emergency like this
when even loans at extravagant rates of interest migfct not enable the
(2)
Government to manoeuvre for credit# He was pained at the 
insignificant surplus estimated for 1799-1800* India was to be 
"a source of great ottimI. addition to the wealth and capital of this 
country instead of * * # • • a large provision for great numbers of
(1) Wellesley to Chairman# 29 November 1799*
(2) Dundas to Wellesley 10 October 1799 Add MSS* 37,274 f# 264*
Increase of debt In Bengal and India
Tear Bengal India
on 30 April 1798 C.R* 7,67,30,178 C.R. 11,03,26,452
on M * 1799 C.R* 9,21,86,617 C.R, 12,99,55,2f9
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Mcivil and military servants existing upon its establishments#n
(2)
To the Court he gave an assurance that he was not challenging the
claims of regular ships to carry the Company's regular trade, that
he was still unconvinced of the arguments for abolition of monopoly
and "the supposed advantages thence arising are at least problematical,
and would certainly be very precarious and short-lived", that he was
against investment of private British capital in India which "would
be introducing a rival capital in India against the Remittance trade
of the East India Company" and that he thought little of the
prospects of export trade to India# But, then, he considered the
arrangements for supplying tonnage to private merchants of India, made
in 1793, had been rendered innocuous by the Company's policy# He did
not object to, he had even facilitated neutral trade with India but
"nothing certainly can be more just and natural than that those
nations who traded to India, should trade there on their own capitals#"
He had found them trading with British capital and aiding France
through the ports of Holland, Hamburgh and Copenhagen# Not only on
account of enziching Britain with the fortunes of the British but
also to destroy "the colonial resources of our enemies," and to
add ."proportionally to cur commercial resources, which are, and ever
(3)
must be, the sole basis of our maratime (sic) strength", trade on
(1) Dundas to Wellesley 11 July 1800# Add# MSS# 37,275 f# 100#
(2) Dundas to the Court 2 April 1800# Paper No* 122* Tol# 7
of Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons of 1801
(3) Dundas to Wellesley 31 October 1799. Ad. MSS, 37,274 f# 312*
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British capital mast be brought to England - for which either 
the British merchants themselves or their agents under the control 
of the Easfc. India Cptnpany should be allowed to bring the surplus 
produce of India in India-built shipping#
Dundas had supported Wellesley's policy on India-built 
shipping from the beginning and he now assured Wellesley of the 
favourable outcome of his letter to the Court, hoping that Vfellesley
had already acted upon the principles laid down in his former
(1)
correspondence on that topic# Meanwhile, deprived of the right
given to them by Wellesley in 1798, the ship-owners and merchants
of Bengal were agitating for some such action# Out of twenty six
ships - all but two of which had been built at Calcutta - and six
building, which according to the Board of Trade were prepared to go
to London in 1799, Messers* Fairlie, Gilmore and Co* owned or
managed six, Lambert & Ross owned five, Hudson Bacon & Co* owned
(2)
two and the house of Aberdeen two# Mr* Fairlie, having in hand
an immense quantity of sugar, piece goods and silk, wanted for the
agents "a fixed permission without which they could not act in 
(3)
freedcm*" and considered the Government's negative attitude"*#.
as indeed perverse to an extreme and really is creating trouble
(4)
for themselves"#
(1) Dundas to Wellesley 27 June 1800 Add. MSS* 37,275 f# 6#
(2) Board of Trade to Wellesley 24 December 1799 Home Misc# 405
pp* 590-91*
(3) William Ihirlie to William Lennox 16 November 1799 ibid# pp# 637-38*
(4) William Fairlie to William Lennox 7 December 1799 ibid p# 635*
Fairlie could have been well impatient* Price of East India sugar 
had risen from 60 to 70s* per cwt* in 1793-4 to 96 to 115s in
1798-99. Macpherson op.cit. p# 232, pp. 523-24*
!l
!%L06**
Goods of "tii© individuals exceeded 10,000 tons and the foreign
competition had raised the price of Indian produce*. William
Lennox wrote to Dundas that, in consequence, alt, private trade
was ngoing into the hands of th© Americans who were powerfully
aipported by most eminent houses in London” and would surely
be captured by foreigners and Englishmen domiciled In foreign
(3)
ports with the return of peace* The agitation in ffngTand a-nfl
India by the agency houses had two results* Dundas urged the
Court again to settle matters regarding trade and finance for, "if
we are remiss, other nations neither are, nor will be so",
and Wellesley sent India-built shipping again* These ships sailed
+%
at a low freight, out of season, and loaded and unloaded more
quickly than th© Company^ s ships - thus demonstrating fully the truth
(3)
of their claims*
,lesleyrs In 1799-1800 Wellesley had obeyed the Courtfs order, sending
>ond
illenge- private goods on six chartered ships on the Company* s terms (Order 
of 25 May 1798)at £22* 10 per ton but he had notified the 
disinclination of both merchants and ship-owners to tender 
unconditionally as the freight fell heavily on gruff goods like sugar 
whiCh alone had a profitable sale in England* The fear of combination 
Among- ship-owners was baseless since most of them were also merchants
(1) James Alexander to Edmund Boehm & Co* 19 May 1800 ibid p* 6J|9*
(2) William Lennox to Dundas 27 June 18Q0 ibid pp* 655—56* William
Lennox was the manager of David Scott Junior and Co and 
Dundas* s informant on Indian trade*
(3) C*N* Parkinson. Trade in the Eastern Seas 1793-1813 Cambridge 1937
p* 363*
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as well as agents for merchants and were interested in procuring
{1)
freight on cheap terms# On 9 March he reiterated the 
expediency of sending India-built shipping, according to his order 
of 5 October 1798, for the goods on the market were leaving by 
foreign channels# No reply came to either of these letters# In 
September Udney of the Bengal Board of Trade reported that not 
even one-fourth of the funds with which the Americans purchased 
their investments in 1799-1800, worth S.R. 37,87,937, came from 
America# In 1798-99, when private merchants had been allowed to 
arrange with the ship-owners, the Americans had to import more than 
they exported for the first time since 1795-96, while in the very 
next year, due to withdrawal of Wellesley*s liberal policy, their 
exports had again exceeded imports# He even favoured import of 
British capital in India which waild relieve the money market and
(2)
help the British to oust all foreigners from India*s foreigg^ trade.
(1) 6.6# in C# to Court (Comm?*) 1 March 1800*
(2) G* Udney to Wellesley 15 September 1800# Home Misc# 406 p* 298# 
See Bengal Commercial Reports of 1798-99 and 1799-1800#
CALCUTTA - UNITED STATES (PRIVATE)
Year Imports Exports
S.R. S.R*
1798-99 13,40,572 11,89,542
1799-1800 35,24,614 37,87,937
Trade with Lisbon and Hamburg also showed the same tendency one 
year later#
CALCUTTA - LISBON
Year Imports Exports
S.R# S.R#
1798-99 2,04,182 4,40,880
1799-1800 46,56,391 33,44,435
1800-1801 9,69,319 20,57,936
CALCUTTA - HAMBURG
1798-99 2,18,945 5,91,175
1799-1800 72,533 61,582
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A very interesting conflict now developed in the Bengal administration#
While U d n e y a n d  Myers, the Accountant
General, supported the cause of private trade, John Bebb of the Board
of Trade, at first in Wellesleyts good books, went over to the
other side on receiving inspiration from Leadenhall Street* He
quarreled with Jhirlie and the private merchants and even went SO1
far as to ask the Court to send bullion directly to the Board of
Trade so that it could be applied for investments without fail*
Wellesley "attempted to steer a middle course, but experience has
(1)
proved that my first track was the most safe** With his 
conviction unaltered regarding the expediency and justice of his
(2)
plan of 5 October 1798 and in view of the shortage of tonnage in 1800
(3)
- he asked for a speedy reply on this matter* Apart from the 
usual arguments for the use of India built shipping, he introduced 
a new factor in the controversy by courageously advocating investment 
of capital from England# • • * "to augment the produce and 
manufacturers of your dominions to the full extent of any possible 
demand”, specially when such capital had been financing the 
Portugese, the American and the Danish trade* Finally as no specie 
had arrived, the investment of 1800 was reduced, a second decennial
loan at 10$ was floated - and, by an Order in Council of 19 September
(1} Wellesley to Scott. 4 October 1800 Add. MSS* 37,£82 f. 188.
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Camm^ ) 13 September 1800
(3) Wellesley to Court 30 September 1800*
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1800, export of private goods was allowed in country ships on the
(1)
basis of 1798.
The state of public finance forced Wellesley to take the same
course in 1801. Salt sales were falling and the average piiee of
(2)
opium was coming down* Debt had increased by about two crores 
in the previous year and its burden, aggravated by the disadvantageous
13)
terms of the late loans, amounted to another crore per year*
Public securities, improving after the success in the fourth Mysore
U)
War, suffered a set back. Notwithstanding many heavy liabilities
the government; had to bear the expences of an abortive expedition
against Batavia and to finance Baird's expedition to the Red Sea to
(5)
drive off the French frcm Suez and Nosseir. To raise money it
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 16 February 1801*
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Separate) 16 February 1801
(3) G.G. in C. to Secret Committee 9 April 1801*
(4) Public Securities on 30 April 1800*
6$ 8$ 10$ 12$
Discount Discount Premium in course of payment
(5) There was a good deal of vacillation on the part of Wellesley 
in deciding the destination of the naval attack. At first
he considered an expedition against tfee Mauritius, then against 
Batavia and back again against t&e Mauritius* Dundas relieved 
Mm  of this dilemma by calling forth an expedition to the 
Red Sea. C*N.<fc Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas 1793-1895 
George Allen Unwin, 1954 pp. 166-70*
-110-
issued treasury bills to the extent of a crore of rupees at 12/S
and advertised for a new loan. But as the latter had little
possibility of supplying such a great deficiency, it reduced
investment again. Considering, however, the danger of withholding
advances, which would affect manufacture and ultimately land revenue
in a country where agriculture and manufacture were pursued by the
same people, "....it has appeared to be necessary to afford in the
present season etfery possible encouragement to the private merchant
in order that he may be enabled to supply the place of the Company
in the market, and to furnish that support to the manufacture
which for the present season cannot proceed from the Company1 s
* 4.LJL
funds"• This Wellesley badwaferee by allowing the system of 1798,
(1)
revived in 1800, to be repeated in 1801-02.
To sum up, several things entered at once into this defiant 
decision of Lord Wellesley - political and economic conditions in 
India as affected by the Aagio-ITrench wars, the Court’s inability to 
send specie in large quantity or in time, strong support and even 
positive encouragement given by Dundas and Scott, and finally the 
dictates of his own liberal views and his own imperial design - 
sustained against wise Counsel or interested motive by a proud 
Unbending temperament. We have observed the exorbitant demand of war 
on India’s public finance. Wellesley was absolutely right in 
asking for aid from London. But the Court must be absolved from the
(1) G.G* in C. to Secret Committee 9 April 1801 oplcit#
- m -
charge of intentional delays or stoppages in export of specie 
or of niggardliness# The Court appreciated the need of bullion
Cl)
export even by borrowing# Between March 1798 and March 1800 over
(2)
£2,500,000 in bullion was borrowed and Aent# The delays were
caused by war or difficulties in obtaining dollars# The exigencies
C3)
of tha State sometimes deprived it of the supply# We have dwelt 
on the encouragement given by Dun das# Scott was equally responsible#
As early as July 1799 he talked of his and Dundas’s plan of obtaining 
Parliamentary sanction for India built shipping and hoped "that as
much as the Company’s investment for want of resources i3 reduced
* < (4) will be at least made up by the country ship’s imports#" He
urged again in the beginning of 1800, when he learnt Wellesley’s
policy had been discontinued in 1799 during his absence from the
centre of government, "I hope on your arrival you’ll put all to
(5)
rights; whatever you do will be approved#" When a second indigo- 
crisis began in the same year and extreme scarcity of food was 
apprehended in England, Scott again tried to persuade Pitt and
Wellesley that nothing short of permission to India built ships
(1) Scott to Wellesley 19 April 1799 Add MSS. 37,282 f. 85.
(2) Pari. Hist. 2XSGT p. 12. 25 March 1800.
(3) Hugh Inglis to Wellesley 15 June 1800. Add MSS. 28,409 f. 74#
Bosanquet to Wellesley 29 May 1801 ibid f. 85.
Scott to Wellesley 9 January 1801 Add .MSS# 37,278 f. 188#
(4) Scott to Wellesley. 9 July 1799# C.H. Philips. The correspondence
of David Scott op.cit. p# 199#
(5) Scott to Wellesley 5 March 1800 ibid Yol# II p# 236#
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(1)
would induce merchants to bring such, goods# Wellesley, moreover, 
had to do something for the people on whose moral and financial 
support he relied for the execution of his imperialist design# The 
agency houses supported war in their own interest# It would 
give them plenty of contracts, alleviatec scarcity of money 
through enforced imports of bullion and open up prospects for 
investment at high rate of interest# In return for this support 
they wanted facilities for remittance in their own ships which 
could also become a medium of import of much-needed capital 
from England# Wellesley could not deny them this advantage 
specially when he found the diminution of the Company’s demand would 
effect Indian manufacture and even revenues# Above all was the 
characteristic arrogance of an aristrocrat - deeply stirred by the 
intrigues between John Bebb and the Court - "I am a dreadful tyrant^  
"arbitrarily jealous of power, sovereign Lord and Master, and
impatient of all control in India, excepting that of my own sense of
(2)
right and wrong#n In the same vein he replied to Dundas’s 
complaint that he was using commercial funds for military purposes#
"Do you really mean that in the event of sudden war, the government in 
India is not (like any other government in the World) to consider the
(1) Scott to Wellesley 15 July 1800 ibid p# 278#
(2) Wellesley to Scott, 4 October 1800 Add* MSS# 37,28Z f# 188#
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security of Its military resources as tlie paramomrfc object of its
attention? * • • Indeed this doctrine would lead to a state of
warfare between the sovereign and mercantile characters of the
Company, and I must say that it more resembles the maxima of a
(i)
merchant, than those which became a Sovereign#1* When Dundas
importuned him to cut down European infantry, the cost of which
hung like a millstone round the neck of Indian finance, as
unnecessary after the Mysore War, Wellesley begged him "not to
suffer a fallacious and illusory clamour for investment to impair
the foundations of the empire in the very crisis fran fortunes in
(2) (3)
the East#1* and to look at the credit side of the balance sheet#
He not only gave a lame excuse of why he sent regular ships half-filled
(1) Wellesley to Dundas 25 January 1800 Add# MSS# 37,275, ff# 12-13#
(2) Wellesley to IXindas 12 November 1800 ibid f# 230#
(3) Wellesley to Dundas 13 November 1800 ibidff# 233-35#
(4) Wellesley referred to a fall of prices when indeed they were
rising#
1801-1802
(4)
Articles 1795-96 
S.R# A S.R.A# 
7 - 8 to 8 - 8Benares Sugar 
per md#
Cossinbazar 6 - 4 to 6 -12
silk per stcr#
Benares Cotton 14 - to 17 -
per md#
Bu eke r gunge - 12 to 1 - 2
rice per mdi#
1799-1800 
S.R. A S.R. A 
7 - to 9 --
7 - to 7 - 8
15 — to 28**# »•
- 12 to 1 - II
S.R.A* S.R. A.
7 - 4 to 8
6 - 8 to 8 - 8
15- 8 to 2 0--
1 —  to 1 - 3
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but resoundingly declaredAhe would help all British merchants
"because I feel that the public interest is deeply involved in
(i)
theirs#" Wellesley had turned an embarassing disciple to his
erstwhile teachers#
Court's Response: Brought to bay by Dundas's insistence on a debt
policy and Wellesley's intransigence regarding country ships,tte
growing evidence of clandestine trade and repeated appeals of British
(2)
merchants for permission to take out smaller ships to India, the
Court answered the charges in a series of reports of the Special
Committee appointed to consider Dundas's letters of 2 April and
(3)
28 June 1800 and 21 March 1801 and Wellesley's letter of 30
September 1800# The first report came out on 27 January 1801 and
(4)
the second on 2 April 1801# Both were written by Charles Grant
who, meanwhile, was trying to persuade Dundas to his views on the
i (5)question raf a voluminous pamphlet written in July 1800 and two
(6)
letters - one in the same month and the other on 17 March 1801#
(1) W&llesley to Dundas 13 November 1800# op#cit.
(2) Memorial of Merchants of Exeter and Glasgow manufacturers 11
May 1799# Home Mi sc# 405 p# 25#
Memorial of Merchants of London to Court 31 March 1800 ibid 
pp# 619-21
Letter of William and Horsley Palmer Home Misc# 406 pp* 221-23# 
There was a short trade depression in the late months of 1799. 
Rapid increase of the tonnage of British shipping caused a 
pressure for employment in the Indian waters#
(3) Dundas advised in this letter to make concessions on the
Company's own initiative and disaim the opposition#
(4) The Asiatic Annual Register vol4.2 and 3#
(5) Home Misc# 405 pp# 691 - 858.
(6) ibid pp. 687 - 88#
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Char les Grant was fitting Adam Snith in his 'Observations' 
while his reports fought with his living exponents - David Scott 
and Wellesley# The researches of Dr# Ihrber have laid bare the
CD
early career of this redoubtable gentleman - who was, from now on
till his death in November 1823, the most influential member of the
Court and the most ardent champion of the cause of monopoly and
moral upliftment of the heathen Indians. Admiring "the goodness
of God that has given me power to get wealth" in clandestine silk
and piece goods contract, when “R e s i d e n t  Malda, he had managed
(2 J
to become the Commercial Adviser of Cornwallis and, after his 
retirement, had entered the Direction in 1793 in the wake of David 
Scott as the enemy of the shipping interest with the Ministry's
(3)
support# He had loyally supported Scott in all his conflicts
over the cjiestion of fair and open competition but, when, in the
middle of 1798, the controversy turned an the superior advantages
of small ships and the Court viewed it as an attempt to introduce
India built shipping, Grant got worried about the intensity of
(4)
feelings aroused in the majority of the Court# With a pardonable 
ambition for the Chairmanship, which he could not hope to carry
(1) E. EUrber# John Company at Work cp*cit* App# A. p# 337
(2) G#H* Philips# The East India Company op.cit# p# 69.
(3) ibid p# 84#
(4) Grant to Scott 25 August 1798. C#H* Philips. The Carresponlence
of David Scott^vol# 1# pp# 146-48#A
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wit hart the help of the shipping interest, Grant began to persuade
himself of the dangers inherent in Dundas's letters and the logical
pursuit of Scott's plans# Wellesley's actions brought him off his
fence but still he did not openly avow the cause of the
(1)
reactionaries#
ifcfc ’Observations' contained the arguments with which he 
&e«S£er£et Ic i& m k f tried to wave Dundas from
the culmination of his policy in colonisation of India and
her ultimate defection like the American colonies from the Mother 
&untry# He challenged the false claim of the British subjects in 
India that the Charter of 1793 ^ve them freedom of trade as ttu, 
foreigners enjoyed* Ship-building by individuals was not warranted 
by the Act but "when ships were built a necessity was created of 
employing them#" The tonnage was granted to private merchants for 
conveyance of their fortunes and the average excess of exports joverc? 
imports to London on private account, amounting to one million 
sterling, was sufficient for this purpose if bills averaging 
£514,238 per year for the last five years be added to it* If there 
were still surplus goods in India and they were sent through foreign 
or illicit channels, capital engaged in purchasing them mist have 
been sent from England, Europe or fineries and the Company could hardly 
be held responsible for its remittance# Grant also challenged the
(1) Grant to Wellesley 14 September 1801 and Grant to John Bebb
4 June 1799# Montgomery Martin (Ed#l#^  Wellesley Despatches,op.c \ t . 
vol# 5# pp# 138—140 and p# 143*
contention that the Americans had engrossed all exports from 
the enemy settlements and half of all bonafide neutral exports - 
their share was no more than 1/5 to 1/6 of the whole foreign trade 
of Bengal for which they imported much-needed silver* The 
Company's share was about half and the individual private trade 
to London was greater than all clandestine and neutral trade which 
together had secured a little more than J in the proportion of 
2)6 : 58* Moreover, the exports to foreign Europe and America were 
progressively dminishing and the balance taken out of Bengal by 
all neutral and clandestine traders did not amouhtl;t© 22. lakhs of
a)
rupees while that taken by private traders to London averaged at 
4:3 lakhs in the last four years* Free trade in this context would 
mean competition between two capitals - both British - one from 
England and the other frcm India*
Hence admitting the difficulties and inconvenience of 
private traders, the need for bringing the best part of the clandestine 
trade to London and even the expediency of using India-built 
shipping, he was against onploying India-built ships for the sake of 
employing them alone - i*e* for the profit of the owners - who 
considered ships not as vehicles for carrying Indian exports but 
as consisting in themselves a profitable employment of capital#
Cl) Put at 25 lakhs in the First Report of the Select Committee#
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"As a means I would admit it, as an end, X think it not entitled
a)
to encouragement”.
The Eirst Report, submitted on 27 January 1801, further
rebutted the crucial arguments that there was a surplus the Company
could not carry with its resources, that it was possible to
increase the produce and manufacture of India and the Company had
done nothing on that account or was incapable of doing anything# It
was due to the Company* s encouragement, the Report reminded, that
(2)
indigo and sugar had prospered since the days of Cornwallis* Thanks
to the speculation of the private traders the market for the former
was over-stocked, thanks to the opposition of the West Indies planter,
the market for the latter could not grow# The remittance plan for
indigo was indeed discontinued in 1795 but ever since the second
(3)
crisis in 1800,it had been revived# Cotton of India could not 
succeed in competition with .American or West Indies cotton due to 
war freight and it was being used as the Company*s remittance to
(1) See also the same sentiment in the lirst Report of the Select
Committee: "••• and though the merchants of India so often 
urge the policy of bringing the produce of the East into the 
Thames, transfer is not the sole end, and the employment of 
Indian ships merely the means; but in part the transfer is the 
means, and the ships the end#w
(2) Company*s advances to indigo manufacturers* App* 47 Suppl* to
4th Report*p* 224*
Year Amount (£) Year Amount (£)
1793 110,389 1796-99 11,226
1794 102,045 1800 116,000
1795 137,148 W &X 70,000
1802 70,000
(3) Scott to Wellesley 5 March, 10 March and 15 July 18Q0#
C H. Gwt4^rHcic*U fyVaWL Seofr p*23 Ai p. x*7
M L
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China* Saltpetre could not be entrusted to the private traders 
during the war* No further improvement of raw materials was 
possible in the present state of the Company*s finance unless 
capital was introduced from England which would open the door to 
colonisation and thus was politically inadvisable* Introduction of 
Indian shipping would create a new shipping interest' and excite a 
similar demand from the British ship-owners* Finally, calculating 
the bonafide surplus capital originating in India as £250,000 
(remitted neither in trade nor billsthe Company promised to 
take it off at reasonable freight or to empower the Indian 
government to send Indian ships under the Company*s service*
The Second Beport, submitted on 2 April 1801, objected to 
Wellesley*s attempt to create on behalf of the Indian ship-owners 
a permanent right where before they had a privilege dependent 
on the Company*s discretion* It referred to considerable decrease 
of neutral export trade and increase of neutral imports* mostly
arising from European wars* The:return of peace would re-establish 
the balance again* This must be quickened by reduction of duties 
in London and a demand for the end of abuse of the Jay Treaty*
a)
in specie The foreigners* trade was a trade of contingencies
(1) PRIVATE IMPORTS FROM FOREIGN EUROPE AND AMERICA
Years Merchandise
S.R.
Treasure
S.R*
1796-97 to
1798-99
1799-180G to 
1801-1802 37,98,576
34,32,034
1,76,96,201
45,31,392
oA Comm c c R  rfU .
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T3i0 reports resulted in the resolutions of 4 February 1801# 
They were aimed against "‘systematic admission of any such privileges 
as would necessarily tend to antiqute the present system of regulated 
monopoly - without any assurance of equal advantage and safety to 
the political, financial and commercial interests of the country***
The Court offered, in addition to 3000 tons fixed in the Charter, 
three, four or five thousand tons more or as much as might bo required 
to be wholly applied to: private trade, which should neither be 
destined nor detained for political or warlike services* All 
commodities except piece goods, raw silk and saltpetre - and even 
those with a license, should be laden on such ships and sold in the 
Company* s sales* Such ships were to be built by the Company and 
when they would not be sufficient^ the Indian governments should 
freight Indian ships for conveyance of such goods* No admission of 
India built ships on Wellesley’s basis would be allowed - as they 
seemed "to involve-principles and effects dangerous to the interests 
of the Company and of the nation*1*
Dundas did not view the introduction of British capital in 
India with such alarm though he had opposed the same in his letter of 
2 April* If the British capitalists thought they could make good 
returns from investment in Indian trade, no restriction could prevent 
it* So long as the Europeans were forbidden to hold land in India 
the safeguard against colonisation was assured* He even considered
The*
PriLvate
Traiderts
res3ponse
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a little export of capital necessary to develop Indian raw materials#
He doubted whether regulations for remittance from India could be
founded either on a standard of tonnage or a supposed amount of
(1)
fortunes annually trasmitted from India#
The avowed protagonists of private trade like Thomas Henchman,
(2)
John Cochrane and Sir George Dallftyreplied with greater vigour#
Henchman*s ’Observations* was regarded as a text book on private
(3)
trade by Dartmouth and Wellesley considered it to be the bejtt
(4)
vindication of his policy# In Henchman’s opinion Grant’s 
statistics were all wrong# Out of the total foreign exports of Bengal 
which cams up to S.R# 2,59,68,000 in 1799-1800 the Company held only 
about a crore, far less than half; the legal private trade to London 
in that year fell below the neutral and clandestine trade by 
S.R* 24,36,000; instead of the trade of foreign Europeans and 
Americans being a little more than \  of total trade, It was a little 
less than 1/5 and more than half of the total trade on British 
bottoms# Decrease of foreign trade was questionable considering the 
number of foreign ships in Calcutta in 1799—1800* Henchman thought
(1) Dundas to Charles Grant 31 July 1800 Home Misc# 405 p# 885#
(2) Thomas Henchman, Observations on the Report of the Directors of
the East India Company, respecting the trade between India and 
Europe# London 1801. John Cochrane,Private Trade and Shipping 
O p # C i t #  SCy t  'P titfa s rU L y  cn . (fa  b ra d * - b^tcO^SA^.
/'h 4 v a  <v » 4, £.urppe,. fQol, . ^  ^
(3) Dartmouth to Henchman 15 August 1801 Add#MSS# 22,130 f# 25*
(4) Wellesley to Henchman 7 March 1803 ibid f. 40.
the coastal trade, a share of which passed into clandestine channels,
CD
shaild also be reckoned in estimating the trade on British capital#
(1) CALCUTTA - LONDON (PRIVATE)
Year#
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801
1798-99
1799-1800
1796-97 to
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801
Imports
S.R#
17,43,314 *
47,37,462
44,72,669
CALCUTTA - AMERICA
13,40,572
35,24,614
49,75,700
CALCUTTA
6,15,052
10,16,474
10,22,520
CALCUTTA - LISBON
2,04,182
46,56,391
9,69,319
CALCUTTA - HAMBURG
Exports
S.R#
41,07,834
67,91,406
84,87,336
11,89,542
37,87,937
61,06,700
- COPENHAGEN
l,ll,087-(plus :S.R# 
9,56,145 10,00,000 from 
7,14,825 Seranrpore)
4,40,880
33,44,435
20,57,936
2,18,943 5,91,173
72,333 61,582
CALCUTTA - MALABAR
2,73,082 8,87,898
3,06,084 26,29,856
31,564 14,08,175
CALCUTTA - COROMANDEL
1796-97 to
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801
6,24,615
8,24,162
8,22,546
14,22,364
27,66,697
24,80,351
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He remitted the Court*s argument about Indian cotton with reference
(1)
to the growing supply to China* The only difficulty was high
freight which,Sir Robert Feel thought as early as 1797, could be
(2)
circumvented with country ships# He challenged the profitability
of the Company* s trade while it raised investments by bills or
loans* In his estimate it made a profit of £3,200,000 on India
trade between 1790 and 1801 or £266,666 per year which dwindled into
(3)
insignificance when commercial charges were added# Its capital
A AT06
was trifLing* Its management of trade costly and wasteful* In Henchman*sA i
view private remittable British capital^  had been grossly under­
estimated by Grant: "The Private fired property of British
European subjects in India, was long since estimated at £2,500,000
(4)
and there Is no doubt that this is at present a very small part of it,** 
and as even this was insufficient for proper exploitation of the 
Indian market^  export of capital frcxa England would be welcome#
Comparing the prices of ship-timber in Bengal and England and the 
cost of construction^  he considered the Court*s plan of building 
extra-ships ruinous and too dear for private gruff ©cods and 
concluded that acceptance of Wellesley’s plan would be the only real
(1) 60,000 bales of cotton employing 20,000 tons of shipping were
exported to China from Bombay and Surat and 34,000 bales to 
TT.K* alone in 1799-1800* Three fourths of the latter came 
in India built shipping#
(2) App* IV Henchman op*cit# p# 150*
(5) Wisset calculated the average profit between 1793 and 1796
as £183,298 per year* Home Misc* 449 p. 38. For actual profit 
see App. 25 Fourth Report#
(4) Henchman op.cit* p* 66#
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(1)
solution*
Not content01 with, publication of this pamphlet^  Henchman
together with other influential spokesmen for the agency houses
like Cockerell, Johnson, Lambert, Prinsep, Paxton Boehm tried
in the General Court of 28 May to refer the whole matter to- tfH
C2)
previous Governors General* When this was negatived by 80-135,
(3)
mainly due to the opposition of Scott, Baring, Bosanquet and
Lushington, they called for a ballot* The other party appealed
shrewdly to the fear of the British shipping interest and, before
the decision of the ballot, sent draft paragraphs* (no* 139),
supposed to be unanimous, based on the resolutions of 4 February
1801, to the Board for its approval before being despatched to
India* The Board, finding in it censure of Wellesley’s conduct,
stalled it on the ground that it involved politcal as well as
(4)
commercial questions# The General Court on 5 June confirmed 
these resolutions, however, by 809 - 234 against which the agency 
houses lost no time in appealing to the Board on 8 June*
(1) See also his jBpeech in the General Court debate of 28 May
1801. William Woodfall’3 Reports, 1801*
(2) Eur MSS* D 107 p* 14#
(3) Scott had also to sign the Ilrst Report. See his Special
reasons - Scott to the Special Committee of the Court 
2? January 1801 Home Misc* 402, p. 97*
(4) Board to Court 2 June 1801 vol. IX* pp. 16—18* Dundas
cancelled the first sixteen paragraphs containing censure 
on the servants of the Company in Bengal and proposed to 
substitute them by one of his own - "provided the Board 
should concur to anything being now sent" (in pencil)
Fnma Misc* 402. But he bad resigned from the Board at the 
beginning of March 1801
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Reiterating all their grievances they warned the Board that the 
proposed resolutions would not be able to secure the end in view 
and would ultimately divert Indian trade to the French settlements 
and European trade to Intwerp, which the French designed to 
declare a free port, aiid to America* On 12 June Sir William Pulteney 
asked for papers on India trade in the House of Gammons so that
CD
he could bring a motion next session allowing India built shipping*
While Baring tried to drive a wedge between Indian and British
(2)
ship-owners Dundas, no longer the president of the India Board,
solemnly warned the House of the extreme scarcity of timber in
England and affirmed the eligibility of teak-built shipping and
C3)
Pitt, now the leader of the Opposition, said he would be glad to be 
informed by what .rLgfrfc the East Irdia Company or the nation could 
deprive the people of India (?) of the privilege of exporting 
their own produce and manufactures in their own shipping - “it 
seemed to him a natural riggit belonging to ail nations, of which
(4)
they could not be deprived without the most flagrant injustice#"
The private traders had at last brought the whole question before 
the nation and had secured the open avowal of a very important section
(1) Woodfall*s Parliamentary Reports, Commons 12 June 1801 p* 589*
(2) ibid pp* 591-92.
(3) The Pitt Ministry resigned on the Irish question on 14 March 1801*
(4) Woodfall’s debates op.cit* p* 596#
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of the Gammons#
The Board, now headed by Lord Lewisham, later Lord Dartmouth, 
temporised over the draft despatch (now No. 159) as the matter
was before the Parliament. Ylhen the Court pressed again cm
(2)
the ground that the Governor General continued hostile, the Board
returned the draft without the paras censuring Wellesley for
(3)
connivance at clandestine trade# The Prime Minister, Addington,
had to intervene when the Court advertised for ready-built ships of
500 to 600 tons and for building of ships of 500 to 550 tons —
ostensibly to bring gruff goods of the individuals but really to
forestall Wellesley’s sending Indian ships in 1802. The Prime
Minister thought such ships "far beyond what can be deeunSd necessary
(4)
for the purposes of their regular trade," and the Board thought the
£5)
draft inexpedient once again* Both these measures were taken on
(6)
the appeal of the East India agents#
Of all persons ScOtt requested Addington to put off his negative
to the new tenders and he explained this novel request as well as his
{?)
strange conduct for some time past in the same letter* He was
(1) Brodrick to Court, 20 June 1801 EOR. MSS D 107 pp. 119-20•
(2) Ramsay to Brodrick 16 July 1801 ibid pp. 133-34.
(3) Brodrick to Court, 21 July 1801 ibid pp# 141-42 also Lord Lewisham
to Chairman 21 July 1801 ibid pp. 169—70#
(4) Addington to Court 31 July 1801 ibid p# 157#
(5) Brodrick to Court, 4 August 1801 Ibid pp. 161-63.
(6) Letter from East India Agents to YIseount Lewisham 8 June 1801,
pnmft Misc. 402 pp. 185-192. Their representative, John Taylor, 
met him in early August ibid pp. 335-36Q#
(7) Scott to Addington 11 Augist 1801 Eur. MSS D. 1Q7 pp. 173-82*
YiLctory 
off the 
SihLpp- 
img
Imterest
in fact in a very unenviable position as the Chairman of the
East India Company in 1801* “in that quality, as organ of the
Court, I have according to usage, appealed to profess the same
opinions as the Court, and indeed, in the General Court of
Proprietors upon the same principle, have supported them, although
I have differed from the majority * * * on same material points in 
(1)this question*" He was trying to push through an urgent
(2)
plan of retrenchment and would like to throw a sop to the Court 
by allowing it to take up smaller ships at least in an experimental 
way* Moreover he did not like the question to came before the 
Parliament when he would have to resign from the Court as it would 
be impossible for him, then, to cloak his real views* Loath to 
give up his reforms and not prepared to resign until at the last, 
Scott naturally wanted a compromise with the government on 
private trade* Addington understood his dilemma but stressed the
£3)
importance of exploiting teak resources of India#
Things were, however, moving very fast for a cool compromise*
On 14 August Scott offered to resign and make way for a Chairman
(4)
more in accord with the majority view on private trade* The Court,
irritated beyond measure by his frank confession, brought a motion
(1) ibid*
(2) These measures would lead to a saving of £250,000 a year* It
was half of what Scott proposed at first*
(3) Addington to Scott 13 August 1801* Eur* MSS D* 107 pp* 189—90*
(4) ibid pp* 201- 203*
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of no-confidence against him which was negatived* But this
supreme affront drew from Scott a dignified letter of resignation
(1)
on 2 September which was accepted with indecorous eagerness*
The shipping interest had at last secured the final defeat of its 
chief enemy*
The struggle with Dartmouth followed with another victory
(2)
for the Court* Dartmouth’s greatest sin was to accept Scott’s
(3)
advice regarding India-built shipping and retrenchment. But the
protest of the managing owners of the regular ships, who were
afraid of the introduction of a new class of ships for eight
(4) (5)
voyages, and the memorial of the merchants and agents also
influenced the President’s decisions. After the Secret Court h cu i
accepted the caupromise offered by Vansittart (Addington’s
representative) on 17 November and further amendments of Addington
(6)
on. 25 November, the private traders found the government ranged
* (7)
against them in the Commons debate on Sir William Pulteney’s motion*
(1
(2
(3
(5
(6
(7
Scott to Court 2 September 1801 ibid pp. 205-10.
See the details in C.H. Philips. The East India Company 1784-1834, 
op.cit* pp. 112-117 
Dartmouth to Scott 14 August 1801 Eur. MSS, D. 107 pp. 193-97. 
Managing owners of regular ships to Dartmouth 25 September 
1801. Bur. LIS S. D. 107 pp. 233—35*
Memorial of the merchants and agents to the Board - 25 
September 1801 ibid pp. 225-29. 
ibid* pp* 56-63*
The Asiatic Annual Register Vol. I H  pp. 227-58*
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Addington backed the eleven resolutions of the Secret Court of
17 November iriiich provided for employment of India-built ships
for two years as an experiment but bound the Indian governments
not to employ them after 1 April 1803 except in confounity with
(1)
the resolutions#
Influenced again by the agency houses who rejected the
(2)
resolutions outright, Dartmouth pushed on a lonely and doomed battle 
of drafts. On 25 March 1802 the Third Report of the Special
(«
Committee delivered a vicious attack on Dundas, Scott and Wellesley#
On 8 April Twining attacked in an India House debate Henchman,
Dallas and all the protagonists of India-built shipping as private
traders while Baring charged Dartmouth as "surrounded by the
instruments of Mr. Dundas, and accessible only to the agents of the
(4)
private traders of India". Deserted by Addington, Dartmouth had 
no way but to resign. Only Wellesley remained and the Third Report 
had already opened on him the first volley of offensive# It
(1) Wellesley had permitted India-built ships to come home in
1801-02 as also some of the ships, T&iieh took part in the Red 
Sea expedition,in 1802-3. The new arrangement ms thus to 
operate from 1803-4#
(2) "Papers on the subject of the Private Trade between India and
Europe etc." in reply to Vansittart’s Propositions of 17 
November 1801. Also the letters of the agent w to Vansittart 
23 December 1801 and 4 January 1802. Heme Misc# 402 pp. 651-708* 
Also "The Englishman’s Letters Relative to the Trade between 
Great Britain and the East Indies etc." London, 1802. ibid# 
pp. 743-776.
(3) Home Misc# 403# pp# 131-33#
(4) The Asiatic Annual Register Vol HT pp. 310-48.
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described him as a tool of the Calcutta agency houses like the 
Eairlies and their correspondents in London. It charged him as 
well as Dundas for phenomenal increase of the India debt which 
stood at £14,433,717 on 30 April 1800 (in Dundas’s Budget given 
as £14,640,401).
In 18Q). Wellesley was indeed pre-occupied with a huge
debt - increasing by two crores per yeari In May 1801 discount
on 6/o paper rose to 20$, on 8$ paper to Rs* 11-4$, on 8$ paper;
paying half yearly interest^ to Rs. 10-4$, on bonds to Rs. 11-8$.
The 12/s not63 were on par and the late 10$? decennial loans alone
(1)
showed a premium of Rs. 3-8$* Though land revenue had improved
slightly, salt sales were not up to the expectation due to a
(2)
combination among the dealers. The indigo manufacturers were
(3)
to be helped per order of the Court and repeated requests of
(4)
David Scott. A second indigo crisis was on because of “high
freights and insurance, scarcity of cash and high interest,"
consequent of mr, as well as bad seasons and eager competition
(5)
between the Bengal and Oudh manufacturers. In one of Fairlfi^ ’s
letters,soliciting government assistance,we learn that more than
(1) Bengal Commercial Reports 18G1-Q2.
(2) G.G* in C. to Court (Separate) 31 July 1801. Net surplus revenue
of Bengal (after payment of interest) fell to S.R. 88,92,936 
in 1800-1801.
(3) Court to G.G3L in C. (Separate) 28 August 1800.
(4) Scott to Wellesley 10 May 1800, 15 July 1800. op. t i t .
(5) Colvins and BaSCett to Acting Secretary of the Board of Trade
2 November 1801. Home Misc. 737 p. 99.
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U)fifty lakh a had been invested in indigo manufacture# The 
government could not stand by and see so much of wealth destroyed 
without repercussions on its credit and opium sales# On top of 
this treasury bills at 12$ had to be redeemed and a full invest­
ment secured#
The government took desperate measures* It resumed 
extended the twwn duties abolished in 1795# It re-established 
government customs at the increased rate of 5^$ on inland imports
and exports of Calcutta, Hughly, Moorshedabad, Dacca, Chittagong
(2)
and Patna which had been discontinued since 20 June 1788# Though
a drawback on town duties were allowed on articles exported to
EngLand^the duty affected Bengal’s foreign trade with other
countries and internal trade# A new tax on spirituous liquors
manufactured outside Calcutta in European manner was introduced#
When no more than £50,000 in specie came from London, it was compelled
to float an 8$ loan at a premium of 7$ and a 12$ loan for two years
to absorb the treasury bills# It cut down Bengal investment for
1801-02 and provision for rice ordered by the Court in July and
December of the previous year# Ultimately it took the same step
as Shore did in 1798 to augnent Bengal’s financial resources - it 
(ft) Ihirlie to Capt# John Malcolm# 6 November 1801 ibid p# 102#
(2) G.G# in C. to Court (Separate) 31 July 1801 .Regulations 5,
10 and 11 of 1801# See Report by Mr* Courtenay relative to 
duties on export, import and transit of goods in India
25 January 1814# Heme Misc* 523 pp# 19—25#
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forced the Nawab of Oj^ dh "to make a cession to the Company in
perpetual sovereignty of such a portion of his territory as
be fully adequate, In their present impoverished condition, to repay
(1)
the expenses of the troops#" The Boab, one of the richest
provinces in the Vizier’s Dominions, which grew fine cotton In
abundance, was ceded in Novonber 1801 and was placed under the
C2)
charge of Wellesley’s brother, Henry Wellesley# It was very 
welcome revenue#
(3)
The Court could not send specie to Bengal but it had
proposed several measures of relief# It permitted the Bengal
government to draw bills at 9 months date on sue count of interest
accruing to the Company’s creditors (but strictly called upon addition
(4)
to investment to an equal extent# J It ordered Canton not to draw 
(5)
on Bengal# Yet we find the Vice President In Council informing
the Court of a deficit of more than a crore in 1802-3 and a deficit of
about two crores in 1803-4, taking investment only at 75
lfiTrha in the former year and at 90 lakhs in the latter but leaving out
bullion supply from England# Since the government did not anticipate
such a large supply from the Court - it opened another loan at 8$#
When Dundas’s plan for reduction of debt and the Court’s orders on
(6)
reduction of military establishments arrived, Wellesley wanted time
(1) Quoted from The Cambridge History of India Vbl#5p# 353# Wellesley
to Colonel Scott 22 January 1801# The date of the treaty was 
November 1801#
(2) Wellesley to Court 13 November 1801# Wellesley to the Secret
Committee 14 November 1801#
(5) Court to G.G# in C# (Public) 26 March 1801# Court to G.G# in C#
(Public) 22 April 1801#
(4) Court to G.G# in C# (Public) 11 February 1801#
(5) Court to G.G. in C. (public) 8 April 1801.
(6) Court to G.G. in C. (Separate) 31 August 1801#
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up to the end of 1802 to commence operation of the former and 
flatly refused to expedite the latter#
U)
In spite of all the manoeuvres of the government and
(3)
facilities given to the creditors^ subscriptions to the sinking
fund and the loans remained low* Madras government, in the grip
(4)
of the unscrupulous British Baric, drew mercilessly on Bengal*
(5)
Dependence on bullion supply from England grew more acute# A 
second loan at 8$, floated in August, still left need for half a 
crore if the 12$ floating debt was to be liquidated in 1803* The 
only concession made to the Court wqs enhancanent of investment 
in 1802/3 to 88 lakhs# Even the edge of that good news was taken
A tfcc
away by dropping fll charges of illicit trade against Medsers
(6) ’ (7)
Ihirlie,Gilmore & Co* and other agency houses on lack of evidence
and by permission granted to three ships, employed in the expedition
(8)
to Egypt, to proceed to England# According to Wellesley it was 
a great moderation of his earlier policy and if the final orders 
regarding private trade did not arrive in time,he would have to decide
(1) Wellesley to Court 13 March 1802#
(2) G.G* in C* to Court (Public) 5 April 1802
(3) ibid# Interest bills were drawn on the Court payable at 3 months
sight#
(4) G#G* in C. to Secret Committee 5 June 1802#
(5) G.G* in C* to Court (Public) 29 September 1802.
(6) Ordered by the despatch of 31 October 1799*
(7) G.G* in C. to Court (Ccmm1) 17 April 1802#
(8) G.G* in C* to Court (Public) 4 October 1802# In 1801-02 the
Court had given permission to country ships to come to England 
if they carried a certain amount of rice# Out of 26,982 tons 
of private goods shipped In that year 15 to 16,000 tons 
consisted of rice* See G.G. in C. to Court (Comnr) 30 
October 1802^
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the case of other applicants for the same favour#
The Court’s Commercial Despatch of 16 June 1802 (received 
in Bengal at the end of the year) contained these final orders# It 
laid down the basis of "a final and satisfactory arrangement 
between the Company and those interested in the private trade#*
Any amount of shipping would be made available to private traders 
for all goods save piece goods (for which a special license was 
necessary) and saltpetre# Ships for this purpose were to be built 
in India {6 in India for 1803-4} or England and the Company was 
to contract with the builders or owners for eig£it voyages* To 
ascertain the rate at which teak-built ships were available^  the 
Government was to advertise for such ships as required provided 
their freight did not exceed that of those lately contracted in 
England (I*e# £14 plus £3 if built during war and other allowances). 
The Government could also engage ready built ships for two or more 
voyages for this purpose provided their freight did not exceed the 
rate actually paid by the Company for such ships in the present 
season and provided they confirmed to certain standards# Such 
ships were to be re-let by the Company to such merchants as might 
be disposed to export or import Indian goods, charging according to 
the proportion fixed in 33 Geo HI Cap# 52. The Court confirmed 
the Government’s contract with ships taken up for the Red Sea 
expedition, provided they left Bengal and Madras before 30 April 1803
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and Bombay before 31 July 1803* Hie engagement of ships by permanent
contract came into effect after April 1803* To afford a provisional
aid to private trade and encourage disposal of India—built ships tho
Court permitted properly equipped ships between 300 and 600 tons to
be hired for one voyage to be sold in England* If inspite of all
this there still remained a shortage of tonnage^the government was
to hire private ships for one voyage only* ‘Resort of the Europeans
to India was to be strictly controlled and agency houses were to be
compelled to follow the regulations of 1793 in letter as well as in
spirit* Wellesley had no way out of these comprehensive and clear
instructions* The victory of monopoly was complete* Its vengeance
was to follow soon*
The Private Traders* Problems: It is evident from the story narrated
above that India-built shipping was merely a symbol, tho real
issue behind it was the imperative necessity felt by the Indian
governments and the British merchants for free movement of British
capital to and from India* The former supported its cause partially
because it would be the Channel of Capital Cmport from England (surer
than the Cburtfs supply) which would replenish the scanty resources
(1)
of the Indian Capital market, bring down the prohibitive rate of
interest and thus help the government not only to establish its_____
(1) Warren Bastings appreciated this as a great obstacle to his
policy of consolidation* "The want of credit, as it is falsely 
called, in Bengal, Is not, as the term implies, a want of 
confidence, but of means, in those who were the creditors of 
our Treasury. When these had no more ready money to lend, the 
government appeared to be greatly distressed*Memoirs 
Relative to the State of India* op*cit* p. 19*
credit but its ability to draw cheaply in future Emergencies 
attendant on a forward policy in India and a continuous war in 
Europe* The private merchants* need for capital was no less 
real or pressing* They had to compete with the government for funds 
in the same limited capital market and naturally wanted to obtain 
an independent and cheap source of supply as well as a flexibility 
to switch from one field of investment to another which followed
CD
from it* Increasing country trade also demanded larger capital*
a)
Year
1796-97 to
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801 
1801-1802
CALCUTTA - CEim
Imports
S«R*
8,90,705
15,79,784
29,39,951
20,77,062
(PELTATE)
Exports
S.R*
6,46,840
14,70,525
24,30,008
14,73,108.
CALCUTTA - Pulo Penang and Eastward
1796-97 to
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801 
1801-1802
1796-97 $0 
1798-99
1796-97 to
1798-99
1799-1800
1800-1801 
1801-1802
8,04,726
12.35.625 
22,48,188
23.83.626
CALCUTTA - Pegu
2,09,058 
CALCUTTA - Gulfs
6,89,827
6,10,493
8,74,372
9,10,430
22,06,227
25,70,640
21,71,382
6,62,283
7,71,281
4,35,593
4,06,031
13,31,257
(P^rrt* ,
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If they were eager to get funds at low interest for employment in 
ships or foreign trade - indigo or sugar^they were more eager 
to get funds, when such speculations failed or were hindered 
by the Company* s policy, to lend to the government at a high 
rate, Bereft of open and abundant facilities, the private 
merchants solved the problem of capital scarcity by greater 
imports of merchandise from London and through India-built 
shipping as they solved the problem of remittance by indulging 
in clandestine trade.
An analysis of private trade with London during this 
period would clearly show the urgency of these problems* Prom 
1796-97 to 1798-99 the private traders imported from London 
S.R* 37,51,054 worth of merchandise and S.R* 13,09,481 worth 
of treasure* Imports of merchandise from London were about 24$ 
of the total imports of merchandise by private merchants from 
all parts of the world* In the next three years the logic 
of capital needs forced them to import a much larger quantity 
of merchandise from London - 37$ of their total import of 
merchandise from all parts of the world* Import of treasure 
from London fell from 14$ of the total treasure imports in the
-138-
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first three years to 9$ of such total in the last three*
British manufacture and mining profited more and more by this
A Cft*-
change* In 1797-98A value of articles imported from England stood 
as -
Woollens - S.R* 58,934
Metals - S.R* 48,603
Articles for the 
use of the
Europeans - S.R. 6,27,133
Liquors - S.R. 3,52,584
In 1801-02 the various items stood like -
Broadcloths - S.R. 1,07,409
Metals - S.R* 1,62,186
Wines & liquors - S.R. 12,67,410
Between 1795-96 and 1801-02 glasswqre had increased from S.R.1,10,565
to S.R. 1,48,185, cutlery from S.R. 24,710 to S.R* 45,964 and hats
(2)
from S.R. 15,110 to S.R* 85,352*
(1) CALCUTTA - L0KDQK (Private)
IMPORTS
Merchandise Treasure
S.R* S.R*
1796-97 to
1798-99 37,51,054 13,09,481
1799-1800 to
1801-02 1,09,32,610 23,34,536
CALCUTTA - WORLD 
IMPORTS
Merchandise Treasure
S.R. S.R*
1796-97 to
1798-99 1,53,77,166 90,23,386
1799-1800 to
1801-02 2,95,62,017 2,52,69,177
(2) Bengal Commercial Reports 1795-96 to 1801—02*
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This was possihle only because the manufacturers sold their goods to
the agency houses on credit for long bills or for cash on high
commission# To get the credit or the commission the agency houses
had to import British manufactures into India#
The remittance of fortunes to London, however, through the
medium of exports, encountered great difficulties# In 1795-96 out
ofAtotal export of S.R* 2,04,50,131 in merchandise by private merchants,
London received only S.R* 84,08,800 or about. 41^# Indigo was the
staple export in private trade to London or the principal means of
remittance of private fortunes* At the end of thi3 period the total
private exports in piecegoods had risen, indigo had declined due to
two crises caused by mr and over speculation, sugar had risen in
comparison to 1795-96 but fallen in comparison to 1799-1800, grain had
risen due to scarcity in England, silk had gone up by nearly 40^ and
opium had doubled* London*s share of the exports had increased to
(1)
42^  of the higher total. The sale value of privilege and private
(1) CALCUTTA - WORLD (Private Trade)
1795-96 1801-02
S.R* S.R*
Indigo 62,51,424 38,48,139
Grain 9,11,365 22,59,618
Sugar 8,20,186 12,01,798
Silk 5,81,183 13,65,882
Piecegoods 94,83,284 1,65,91,309
Opium 13,08,360 27,51,915
CALCUTTA - U.K* (Private
1795-96 1801-02
S.R* S.R#
Indigo 61,44,180 37,71,407
Grain - 7,52,852
Sugar 3,05,050 2,17,899
Silk - 1,70,906
Piecegoods 14,91,410 66,68,290
1 Commercial Reports 1795-96 to 1801-02#
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(1)
goods went up* But it was dear that if the private
merchants were to replace indigo by something which would fetch
a more profitable remittance they could not fall back on cloth
which still paid high duties inspite of the Warehousing Act,
a cm
nor on grain which had a temporary demand, nor sugar so long as
the West Indies monopoly prevailed# They had to rely on .silk,
sugar, cotton and indigo which could not offer a good remittance
unless borne in cheaper vessels and produced on a large scale in
the European manner* The first pointed out to the India-built
(2)
shipping and the second to the need for capital import,of which one 
medium was such shipping*
(1) Lohdon sale value of privilege and
Private trade
Tear Sale Talus
£
1794 623,639
1795 843,747
1796 868,328
1797 953,561
1798 939,907
1799 1,329,723
1800 2,117,947
1801 2,113,391
App* 45 and 46 Fourth Report {W *)
(2) As early as 1792 Thomas Law, late member of the Council of 
Revenue, Bengal,wrote ”A Sketch of Same late Arrangements, 
and a View of the Rising ^ sources, in Bengal1* asking for 
development of^sugar, if need be,with imported capital* 
p# 2XEX: See*CoIebrodz?s Remarks on the Husbandry and Internal
Commerce of Bengal, Calcutta 1804#
Tha Governments1 view.: The Bengal Government understood best
the link between private trade and public finance. So long as 
private individuals were unable to secure cheap money for speculations 
in raw materials or to carry the same at low freight, so long as 
salt and opium remained a close monopoly and silk all but the same, 
they waild want to invest their Indian fortunes with the government
a &y\A. to SCLl c l i t  tticfrr olu.rCn-g f a n a C r l s d
for the highest possible renuneration* The government felt their 
stranglehold at the end of the. eighteenth century more than in the
a)
days of Cornwallis* Cornwallis had spoken of the natives of
*
India as possessing the major shjpe in public securities* But the
establishment of the Permanent Settlement in 1795 had changed the
whole situation by creating a new and respectable field of secure
investment for native capital* Dundas and Russell held a somewhat
rival opinion that at. least two million pounds of the India debt
should be kept unpaid in native hands to secure their loyalty to
(2)
the government* Sir John Shore was debating whether he should
5®)
follow the first policy or the second# The rapid rise of land 
values in the years following the Pemanent Settlement had the 
effect desired by Cornwallis. In 1795-96 land3 were bought at
w
revenue saXos at mor© than 15 years’ purch&s©# Bis© of inter©si;
CD See Henry St. George Tucker*s Memorials of  Indian Government Edited 
by John William Kaye, London, 1953* P-354.
(2) Castlereagh wanted to raise it later to four million pounds*
Castlereagh to Chairman 7 March 1803 Home Misc* 371* p* 537*
(3) G.G* in C. to Court (Public) 8 Marcfc 1794*
(4) G.G. in C. to Court (Revenue) 31 August 1797*
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rates in the next two years, however, lowered the land values to
(1)
12-13 years* purchase in 1796-97 and 9| years* purchase in 1797-98.
It fell still lower In the next two years when the Government 
borrowed heavily for war - (showing that quite a. few of the zenindaries 
were bought and sold for speculative purposes and not with 
Cornwall!sfs noble aims in view). But the establishment of the sinking; 
fund, import of British capital in consequence of Wellesley*s trade 
policy and the Court* s bullion supply helped the government credit and 
enabled it to lower interest to 8/b* The native capitalists at once took 
to investing in land, now armed with summary powers of distraint, and 
in inland trade which according to the Reporter of External Commerce
U)
they soon monopolised# This process was further facilitated by 
the Court’s order to draw interest bills which was beneficial to 
the Europeans alone who began to buy out the native holders of paper.
H. St. George Tucker, the financial adviser of Wellesley, computed that 
the debt held by natives in Bengal on 31 January 1801 amounted to
(3)
S.R* 1,89,45,000 while that held by the Europeans ?as S.R* 6,69,20,000. 
The British merchants’ control of public credit was complete# Wellesley, 
like Cornwallis, found it difficult not to oblige his creditors and 
sought remedy in greater import of capital frcm England, preferably by
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Revenue) 23 September 1798*
(2) He estimated the increase of native circulating capitali$n Calcutta
between 1797-98 and 1801-02 to be £16 millions.
(3) St. George Tucker’s Minute on transfer of debt 22 June 1801,
Home Misc. 370, p. 769.
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the Court, but If that was accompanied by stringent eonditons which
shackled his freedom of action* by the individuals#
The Court’s View: In the Court’s view it had done enough for the
extension of British manufactures and improvement of Indian articles#
The invoice vahie of its woollen exports was £580*280 during
(1)
1793-94 and 1801-02 and of goods and stores - £1*936,913* 'The
consignment of cloth to Bengal rose from 753 bales in 1794 to 1354
Adv n d .tt& t (2)
bales in 1800, of metals remained steadily progressive# ItsA_
The Company’s exports to Bengal from 
Europe• Xnvoi c e value
(in £)
Tear Woollens Goods and Stores
1793 27,107 184,493
1794 48*818 154,784
1795 54,139 162,221
1796 58,241 152*641
1797 80*779 176,080
1798 86,229 162,198
1799 71,872 324*944
1800 85,687 228,785
1801 67*408 380,767
MiXbum Oriental Commerce Vol. 2 pp# 178-79
(2) Court’s CamnBrcial Despatches 1793 to 1800* Copper rose to 
990 tons in 1795, lead to 600 tons in 1801 and iron to 420 
tons in 1801# Steel was exported about 50 tons each year*
The sale value fetched* however, only an average of C.R. 19*42,716 
per year. See Dundas’s Heads of SpeeciiJ^ op.cit#
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imports from Bengal were fairly large during the whole period* The
average sale value of Bengal piece goods imported into England during
(1)
1794-95 to 1801-02 was £1,175,297, of Bengal raw silk - £335,409.
(2)
Sale value of sugar imported during 1791 and 1799 averaged £208,854
and saltpetre imports averaged fifty to sixty thousand hags*
Notwithstanding trade crists in England in 1793 and the rapid
improvement of British cottons^ the Company kept up an average investment
of 65 lakhs of current rupees in piece goods of Bengal* It started
throwing silk into organzine frcrn 1794 to help Bengal raw silk which
(3)
was for same time falling in the London maxket. Sugar was continued
U)
inspite of ita high freight* .Advances to indigo manufacturers were
(1)
Sale value of Bengal goods imported
by the Company 
1794-95 - 1801-02 '
Tear Piece goods Raw Silk
(£) t£)
1794 1,249,704 309,743
1795 1,353,599 381,385
1796 1,323,594 327,427
1797 651,92$ 258,644
1798 1,228,308 322,873
1799 1,056,840 390,149
1800 1,406,879 297,645
1801 1,131,531 395,410
Milburn op.cit. p. 235 and p. 257.
(2) ihid p. 274.
(3) Devaynes and Cheap to Dundas 9 Eebiua^r 1794 Home Misc. 210* p. 123.
(4) The Court sent one Mr. Paterson in 1792 and one Mr. James Hanson
Keene in 1794 to look after improvement of sugar and ordered 
Bengal to make regulations prohibiting the landlords from 
increasing rent on sugar cane growing lands. G.G. in C* to 
Board of Revenue 17 September 1792#
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kept on till financial crisis forced the Bengal government to stop it
in 1796* But advances were resumed from 18GO by the Court’s special
orders-^from 1793 to 1801 the Company advanced £476,758 to the
manufacturers)# In 1793 Bengal began its first experiment in jute*
(1)
hemp and sunn* Though It was stopped in 1797 because of the 
weakness of the first two and the inferiority of the last in comparison
C2)
to Bassian hemp, the Secret Committee’s orders of 10 October and
4 December 1800 led to its revival* It was more and more clear, however,
from 1799 that fine piece goods, particularly muslin, could not
(3)
withstand the products of machine and sugar began to suffer from
recommencement of supply from tho West Indies# In 1801 the Tdent
for calicoes and cottons was increased to redress the balance of
muslins and prohibited goods* Henceforth silk, indigo and calicoes
supported the Company’s trade*
It was no good augury for the future but during the period
under review large sales at India House gave comfort to the Court and^
what Dundas and Wellesley caHed#a delusion of prosperity* The Court
was now anxious to see the surplus revenue of Bengal, which lay at the
(4)
core of large investments, fast dwindling into deficits*
(1) The first sample of hemp and ijute was sent by the Bengal Board
of Trade in 1791. See letter of 11 March 1791* The Court ordered 
1000 tons in 1793* See Commercial Despatch 23 October 1793* 
t2) Proceedings of the Bengal Board of Trade 7 March 1797*
(3) In 1747 Dacca ©sported fine piece goods worth 28,50,000 Arcot
rupees* In 1797 its export fell to 14,01,545 Arcot rupees of 
which the Company took only piece goods worth 5,07,388 rupees*
Home Mi.sc* 456 3T p* 113*
(4) (on following page)
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Footnote (4) (from previous page)
Actual revenues and charges in Bengal 
in 1793-94 and 1801-02
Year Be venues 
CUB#
Ctiarges
CUR*
1793-94
1801-02
5,87,19,460
7,12,79,887
3,33,19,778
4,70,55,825
Indian Surplus and deficiency after 
payment of interest and supplies 
to Bencoolen etc#
Year Surplus
£
Deficiency
£
1793-94
1801-02
1,654,852
£383,743
From Dundas’s Heads of Speeches op*clt#
It refused to look at the other side of the balance sheet: We admit
that considerable additions have of late been made to our resources
by the subsidiary engagements entered into with the Nabob of Oude,
the Nizam and with the Rajah of Mysore, yet if the augnentation of
expenses goes hand in hand with the additional resources which appears
to us to be too much the case at present, the advantages of the
(1)
Company by these engagements are at least problematical** It was 
still further irritated to see its commercial profits dissipated in 
what it thought unnecessary military adventures which never brought 
quick returns*
The private traders would not have ^ined much had their claims 
been conceded* The French privateers from Mauritius were wo iking
havoc among the merchant shipping* They even dared to capture a ship
(2)
at the mouth of the Hooghly* The small and unamed India-built 
vessels would have been easy prizes to be had for the taking* The 
Court warned against this danger* So far as the Court’s failure to 
understand the strain of war on public finance is concerned, we must 
remember that such understanding was not ccrnmon even before World War I* 
Nor can it be blamed for putting its commercial interests before its 
sovereign’s obligations* Only men with great foresight and vision like
(1) Court to Gr.Gr. in C. (Separate) 31 August 1801f also Bosanquet to
Wellesley 29 May 1801 Add* MSS 37,278 f* 89*
(2) C*N1. Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas op*cit* pp* 159-60*
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Dundas, Scott and Wellesley understood the logic: of the assumption 
of sovereign power in India or were prepared to pay the inevitable 
price for its achievement. The Court could hardly realise that Bengal’s 
resources were not enough to* meet expenses of continuous war and still 
provide supplies to the Companyts settlements in India, Bencoolen and
CD
China and investments for England# When It realised the
gravity of the situation it began to send bullion to purchase
(2)
investment and allowed bills on account of interest in addition to
(3)
its subscription plan.
(1) Investments from Bengal including Supplies to China
Year Amount
C.H#
1793-94 1,40,20,388
1794-95 1,10,84,487
1795-95 1,45,95,470
1796-97 1,20,23,944
1797-98 1,50,19,685
1798-99 87,76,848
1799-1800 1,19,77,640
1800-1801 89,76,910
1801-02 73,96,514
Dundasfs Heads of Speeches op.cit#
(2) Between 1798-99 and 1801-02 the Court sent £2,851,769 to India, ibid
(3) Bills drawn from Bengal on Subscription plan#
Year Amount (C.H.) Year Amount (C.R.)
1793-94 39,22,367 1798-99 9,45,998
1794-95 59,44,717 1799-1800 12,81,658
1795-96 50,40,196 , 1800-1801 7,53,897
1796-97 40,75,727 1801-1802 13,03,427
1797-98 19,19,989
ibid#
But Bengal, saddled already with a huge debt, could ill afford to 
wait for the irregular arrivals of gold# Only Dundas’s plans 
could have enabled it to provide for debt as well as investment 
but that only in peacetime# Cost of war had to be borne either 
by India or by the Company or shared between them - and in that 
process wculd bring more clearly to light the fundamental 
contradiction between the commercial and the sovereign adpects of 
the Company#
To sum up, Dundas and David Soott dreamt of an interdependent 
empire in which colonies and dependencies would contribute to the: 
security and prosperity of the Mother Country but in return would 
obtain equal treatment among themselves and a preference against 
all outsiders# Free trade, or at leadt trade under the least 
possible restrictions, would be the golden chain which linked the 
raw material-producing East with the manufacturing Britain, each to 
the other’s advantage and most to that of Britain# Both saw, 
though dimly, its possibilities as a weapon in economic warfare 
against France# The Court of Directors, however, moving in their 
narrow groove of monopoly, placidly complacent if their regular 
ships earned high freight and Bengal produced large surpluses 
for big investments, neither understood its implications nor supported 
the course of actions its implonentation would inevitably entail# The 
Imperialism of Dundas and Scott was enlightened imperialism, for, 
corresponding to the stage of economic development In India and
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and EngLand and the fremewoik of the East India Company*s government 
there could not he any better economic relation than envisaged 
by Dundas and Scott# Public investment in and management or 
encouragement of an Indian Industrial Revolution mas unthinkable#
For this the Company sadly lacked capital# It mas incompatible 
with its history, spirit, tradition and organisation and, if at all 
attempted, mould have been prematurely crushed by the British 
manufacturing interest# Industrial Revolution under private aegis 
mould mean the abolition of the Company*s monopoly as well as its 
sovereignty. In fact the opponents of the far more innocent 
imperialism of Dundas and Scott could be found not only in the camp 
of the monopolists but also in the camp of the principal staple 
manufacturers of England who, together with the Uest: Indies sugar 
interest, stalled all liberal customs reforms while shouting diatribes 
against monopoly# That the Company tock up in the words of
✓
Dr. Spear na plan for the regulation of economic life in India 
rather than a positive plan for the development of Indian resource^ -
a)
an nenabling rather than a mandatory plan* — was due on the one 
hand to the blind and selfish interests of the monopolists and on 
the other to the equally blind and selfish interests of the British 
manufacturers and the colonial planters# To prices of Indian
(1) Percival Spear India, Pakistan, and the VTest Oxford University 
Press 1952 pp# 148-49#
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articles already enhanced by charges, commissions, freight and
interest which remunerated the Company, its servants, contractors
and creditors, were added the duties which protected the British
(i)
textile manufacture from the Indian calicoes and the West Indies
(2)
planters from Indian sugar# Moreover the encouragement given 
to Indian raw materials was erratic and irregular and largely 
dependent on scarcity of supply from other quarters# America w§s 
the chief supplier of cotton, tfest Indies of sugar and Russia of 
hemp# It was war which created demand for Indian cotton, henp and
(1) Rate of duties on Indian Piecegoods
Year UZhite calicoes plain i.'-uslins and nankeens
1787 5s 3d per piece plus £16#10s$ 5s 3d per piece plus £18$ ad vail.
ad val#
* * £19.163$ " »1797 5s 9d per piece plus £18#3s./o 5s 9d ft
ad# val#
" " £32.16s.$ " "1798 5s 9d per piece plus 
ad# val*
£21*33 #/c 5s 9d n
1799 6s 8d per piece plus 
Id# $ ad vsp.#
£26»9s* 6s 8d « " “ £30.3s.9d./j "
1802 6s 8d per piece plus 
£27#ls#ld#$ ad
6s 8d ft " "£30.15s.9d.$ ""
val# -
Cotton manufacture, not “enumerated, imported by the Company; paid £50$ 
advalorem# After the Warehousing Act considerable drawback were, however, 
allowed# See Edward Baines, The History of the Cotton Lfenn&facture 
London 1835 p# 325#
(2) Sate of duties on Indian sugar
Tear Rate
1796 £57 16s 3d $ advalorem plus 5s 2d per cwt#
1799 £5$ adval# on warehousing#
£37 16s 3d plus 3s 2d per cwt# on home consumption#
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sugar even though t h e y  were costlier than the products of other 
countries* It was war again which gave India her monopoly in 
silh and indigo* Development of raw materials on a regular basis 
depended on the investment of British capital, the promulgation of free 
trade and the introduction of cheap shipping* TChat Dundas, Scott and 
Wallesley failed to achieve could now be achieved only in the event 
of abolition of the Company1 s monopoly* This the private traders 
realised from their defeat in 1802 and bent all their energies upon 
to bring about at the next renewal of the Charter* As in 1795 they 
could rely on the cotton manufacturers of Lancashire who had increased 
their exports to Ports east of the Cape from a mere £156 in 1794 to
£21,200 in 1801 and expected to flood India with the products of 
their looms once the great enemy of free trade and the patron of 
the Indian textiles was removed from the field*
CD
(1) Value of English Cotton goods exported t o  
Ports East of Cape of Good Hope
Tear Value
(£)
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
1800 
1801
156
717
112
2,501
4,456
7,517
19,575p
21,200
Return to an Order of the House of Commons, 4 May 1813*
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CHAPTER III 
The End of the India Monopoly
In this chapter I propose to deal with the train of 
events which ultimately led to the abolition of the Company*s 
India monopoly* The defeat of Wellesley* s commercial 
plan in 1802 prompted the private traders to try clandestine 
channels of remittance* The stagnation of trade after 
the resumption of the Anglo-French struggle in 1803 
diverted their remit table income to the optional loans tahen 
by Wellesley to finance the Maratha War* They were forced by the 
state of commerce after 1806 to ask for a transfer of debt to 
England and under the pressure of such transferred debt and 
poor sales at home,the Company tried to revive Its monopoly 
with greater vigour* When it failed, the Company had to 
ash for the help of the parliament which, because of the 
prevailing trade depression and the vehement public agitation, 
could not but lay the India trade open*
Inspite of difficulties and disappointments the private
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export trade from Bengal to London had phenomenally Increased
during the twenty years between 1777 and 1797* In the former
year it amounted to a mere S.R. 3,00,000 out of a total private
export amounting to S.R. 28,32,667 or a little more than 10$. In
1787 it rose to S.R. 32,55,110 out of S.R. 74,84,281 or about
43/^ and in 1797 it rose still further to S.R. 69,71,521 out of
S.R* 1,51,20,209 or over 45$. The British merchants had a lionfs
share of the export trade by 1797, amounting to S.R. 91,97,610
or just below 61$; the Tuscans, the jews, the Chimse and the
Buimans had an insignificant share while the rest was divided in
the following way -
the Americans - S.R. 24,48,000 or about 16$
the lortuguese - S.R. 9,02,000 or about 6$
the Armenians - S.R. 8,64,000 or about 5.7$
the French residents
of Calcutta - S.R. 2,20,000
the Danes - S.R. 1,52,000
the Arabs - S.R. 2,96,000
the Telinga mer­
chants — S.R* 4*47,806
the Bengalee Hindus - S.R. 2,60,000
the Farsees - S.R. 2,57,000^)
the Muslims - S.R* 1,65,000
Within two years, however, the picture was greatly changed. 
In 1799-1800 out of a total export of £3,500,000 the British held 
£1,600,000 or over 45$ and the others in the following manner -
(1} Bengal Commercial Reports 1795 — 1802 op.cit. for the 
year 1796-97.
the Americans - £500,000 or over 14$
the Portugese - £600,000 or over 17$
the Danes etc. - £300,000 or over 8$-
the Amenians - £150,000 or over 4$
the native 
inhabitants - £350,000 or 10$
The share of the British had declined and the clandestine trade through 
the foreign European states had increased conspicuously — a position 
which Wellesley* s liberal trade policy tried to rectify in 1798, 1800 
and 1801 but the Courtrs negative policy bade fair to worsen in 1802.
The indigenous traders had never any chance against the more 
enterprising foreigners who had not only command over a larger 
capital but a greater mastery over the scientific technique of 
navigation and the economic technique of credit. From the beginning, 
of the nineteenth eentuiy some of than took recourse to internal 
trade and some to long terra investment in landed property - Government 
loans being no longer remunerative as before and their conditions 
being more favourable to the Europeans. According to the Bengal 
Commercial Reports this major shift in Bengal*s investment pattern 
took place about 1802-3 and the reason must have been the growth o f  f a ,  
American and foreign European trade of Bengal. Prior to 1799-1800 
piecegoods and raw silk worth only S.R, 40 lakhs were imported into 
Calcutta from the interior. In 1801-02 their value rose above 120 
lakhs. Previous to 1798 a ship arriving in Bengal had to wait long
(1) ibid for the year 1799-1800
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for assortments of goods, "whereas at the present period, there
are seldom less than one million sterling in value of cloths
belonging to the native merchants deposited in Calcutta for sale,
and ©very other species of merchandise in an equal proportion."
The Reporter on External Commerce of Bengal adds with a slight
tinge of jealousy that "the foimerly timid Hindoo now lends money
at respondentia on distant voyages, engages in speculations to various
parts of the world, and as an underwriter, in the different
insurance offices, erects indigo works in various part of Bengal,
and is just as well acquainted with the principles of British
laws, respecting comae roe, as the generality of European merchants,
and enjoys moreover two very great advantages over the latter: the
first, in trading on his own instead of a borrowed capital; and,
secondly, of living and conducting his business at probably l/lOth
(1)
of the expense of the European."
But the Reporter on External Commerce failed to notice the
precarious foundation on which the edifice of this ephemeral
prosperity was built. The indigenous traders could never go in to
(2)
the more profitable foreign trade themselves for lack of shipping, 
trading capital was more often than not borrowed and at a higher
(1) Bengal Commercial Reports 1802-03.
(2) This was not true of the nttive merchants of Bombay who had
throughout a fair share of Bombays shipping and country trade*
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interest than obtained among the Europeans and, after they had
been deprived of the Company*s contracts since the introduction
of the agency system in 1788, the whole improvement of indigenous
trade depended on the foreign European and American demand for
the Indian cotton manufacture which already faced a stiff
compeition from the machine-made Britsh textiles. It Is true that
the foreign traders had largely compensated for the loss of the
Company* s orders during the years of the last Mysore Vfcr. The
(1)
curtailment of the investment caused a setback which would have 
degenerated into a depression had not the private European and 
American traders ccme to their rescue with a demand for medium 
quality piece goods. At the height of the indigo crisis in
1802-03 piece goods alone accounted for S.R. 1,85,94,676 out of a 
total private export trade of S.R. 3,49,32,170. But this 
dependence on artificial conditions like the financial crisis of 
the Company or on the foreign European and American demand ua3 
the inherent weakness of indigenous trade. If the conditions for 
direct renittance trade with London improved or the foreign 
European and American trade fared worse or the demand for the 
Indian cotton manufacture in the international market fell, the
^  See the answers to the interrogatories proposed by the Governor 
General in Council in 1801 to Judges of Circuit and Zillah 
judges in Bengal - particularly the returns from Hooghly, 
Ihdnapore, Huddea, Dacca and Buckergunge. Parliamentary 
Papers, House of Commons, 3 June 1813*
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Indian summer of indigenous trade would come to an end. Unfortunately 
this was the actual course of events and it was further assisted 
by the Bengal government*s customs policy. Hhen the India trade 
was opened in 1813 and the private British capitalists of Bengal 
did not have to remit through clandestine channels, the "timid 
Hindoo" once more went back to his limited field of inland trade.
The import trade from London did not flourish either, 
though Its value had increased from S.R. 15,34,219 in 1797 to 
S.R. 48,54,070 in 18C2. It was not important for its own sake 
but as furnishing capital for the purchase of Indian articles or 
investment in country shipping and trade. High prices of the 
imported British goods were beyond the means of the Indians and 
their demand was limited within the circle of the Europeans which, 
however, was expanding with the expansion of the Company*s civil 
and military services and greater resort of the Europeans as free 
merchants or mariners, indigo or opium speculators. The import 
trade was a precarious trade based on commission or credit and they 
were not sufficient incentives without other advantages. Only 
the commanders and officers of the Company* s ships, who got 
their privilege free, and the owners of the India-built ships, who 
did not have to pay freight, obtained some return and between them 
they have largely obviated the need for bullion export* The 
proportion of treasure to merchandise in the private import trade
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from London was 1:5 in 1797 and 1:4 in 1802 while that in the 
total private import trade was 29:39 and 117:112 respectively*
Hhile other countries in foreign Europe and America had been 
importing more treasure than merchandise, Britain was already 
sending more than three fourths of her exports in merchandise - 
i.e. her own manufactures* If this advantage was to be clinched, 
the India-built shipping must be allowed to come home or, If the 
monopoly of the Company was to be safeguarded, the Company*s 
investments to and from Britain must be generously enhanced* 
Cla.ndestine trade: The victory of the Shipping Interest in
1802 precluded the former and brought about a crisis in the 
mercantile and shipping world of Bengal# Between 1781 and 1800 
no less than thirty five ships had been built at Calcutta - 
totalling 17,020 tons* In 1801 and 1802 alone, under Hellesley*s 
encouraging policy, another twenty nine ships of 14,535 ton3 had 
been added* The Court*s letter of 16 June 1802, however, pricked 
the balloon of this speculation* Between 1803 and 1806 an 
average of 5774 tons were constructed per year - just sufficient for
a)
the expanding country trade and the ordinary wear and tear#
No tenders were offered in 1803 for building of ships according to
(2)
the stringent terms laid down by the Court# Advertisement for
(1) History of Ship-building in Calcutta: from a Collection of
Relative to Ship-building in India etc. Compiled by John 
Phipps. Late of the Master Attendants* Office Calcutta 
1840 p. XH, pp* 126-27*
(2) G.G. in C* to Court (Caram1) 21 March 1803*
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ready-built ships for two or more voyages met with the same fate 
and, when,in response to a call for tender of ready-built ships far 
one voyage to London on condition of being sold there, two ships 
were offered at £14 per ton, the government rejected as their demand
a)
exceeded £11, the maximum freight homeward fixed by the Court#
The private traders had to look elsewhere than in direct trade
with London for remittance of their fast growing income from
military contracts, the opium trade and government securities#
The lairlies had monopolised the elephant, bullock and victualling
(2)
contracts of the Bengal amy* They were also the agents of
(3)
one Andrew Kelso who got the contract for anny clothing.
M
Fortification contracts went to Lambert and Ross# Others had a 
lesser share in this Wellesley war-bocm but everyone had prospered 
from the high interest on war loans# The largest source of 
profit, however, was the country trade in opium# From IS02 opium 
was king# Exports to China leapt up from S.R# 38,64,597 in 1802-3 
to S.R# 70,79,641 in 1805-6 of which S.R. 32,94,370 was in opium# 
Exports to Pulo Penang showed the same tendency, rising frcm 
S#R# 19,78,098 in 1803-4 to S.R# 34,80,416 in 1805-6 of which 
S#R# 21,25,209 was in opium# The average exports to the Coast of
(1) G.G. in C# to Court (Comm?-) 17 October 1803#
(2) G.G. in C# to Court (Military) 18 August 1794, 31 January 1795
and 1 February 1796.
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Military) 29 August 1799.
(4) G.G. in C. to Court (Military) 20 Marc|c 1795#
of Sumatra rose from S.R# 3,84,714 during 1800-1802 to .
S.R. 5,25,935 during 1803-1805, opium supplying S.R. 3,20,748 to
(1)
a total of S.R. 4,93,901 in 1865-6#
TJhen war and high freight prevented this profit from being
(2)
carried to London except in 1803, the private capitalists tried to
canalise them through the foreign European and American channels
(3)
or put than in to coastal trade# The excess of the Portugese
(1) CALCUTTA - CHINA (Private)
(2)
(3)
Yr#
1802-3
1803-4
1804-5
1805-6
1802-3
1803-4
1804-5
1805-6
1802-3
1803-4
1804-5
1805-6
1802-3
1803-4
1804-5
1805-6
1802-3
1803-4
1804-5
1805-6
Imports
S.R#
29,56,439
31,32,476
61,16,945
33,10,409
CALCUTTA
16,78,382
12,73,454
16,06,633
27,90,608
CALCUTTA
5,19,790
3,55,763
1,49,587
7,26,075
CALCUTTA
48,54,070
40,41,001
37,32,165
44,97,877
CALCUTTA
51,56,031
45,12,640
39,23,317
67,67,910
- PENANG
- SUMATRA
- L0RD0N
Exports
S.R#
38,64,547
52,72,316
67,87,441
70,79,641
33,31,968
19,78,098
23,66,409
34,80,416
3,44,468
6,60,681
4,23,725
4,93,401
1,11,45,261
1,08,15,545
89,16,188
60,99,065
- AMERICA
48,62,147
67,60,058
33,44,593
62,78,055
Footnote
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(3) Continued:
CALCUTTA - LISBON
Yr# Imports Exports
S.R* S.R#
1802-3 15,66,744 26,59,588
1803-4 22,95,891 24,66,343
1804-5 15,33,055 25,59,338
1805-6 22,43,119 13,96,343
CALCUTTA - COPENHAGEN
1802-3 5,72,041 2,61,009
1803-4 3,86,867 5,04,619
1804-5 5,51,992 12,36,964
1805—6 7,96,401 6,51,308
(fUf&crrfc -
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exports over imports in 1803 and 1804 were S.R* 11,95,735 and tliat
of the Danish exports over imports, excluding the large exports
from Serampore, amounted to S.R* 8,02,724# The average American
export between 1795 and 1802 was S.R* 39,65,450. In 1803-4 it
exceeded the average by S.R* 27,94,608 or almost 7Qffo\ The Americans
were as before abusing their neutral position since the renewal
of the Anglo—French War in 1803 and the provisions of the loosely
worded Jay Treaty* The Harmony and the Astrea cleared from London,
giving a false destination outside the Company’s Charter limits and
cleared for America from Calcutta but were captured while
U)
exchanging goods on tbs coast of Malay for pepper* The Brigantine
r»)
Hazard was captured carrying goods for the- Dutch East India Company# 
Though the Americans began to import more into Calcutta, than they 
exported since 1804 it did not mean the end of their clandestine 
trade* They only shifted their scene of operation, to Bombay from 
where came news of their extensive trade in cotton and Java sugar#
It will not be wrong to suppose that some part of the excess of 
exports over imports in the coastal trade of this period found
(1) Bengal Foreign Consultations 4 August 1803#
(2) Bengal Foreign Consultations 16 June 1803*
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(1)
way to England through, the Americans* They even appeared in
(3)
the Mediterranean* British trade was so much affected that
Lord Castlereagh, the President of the India Board, had to ask
for the immediate formulation of regulations for checking the
illicit trade and consider imposition of duties on exports from
(3)
India in foreign vessels* Messers Eairlie Gilmore & Gofs
name wa3 again being mentions! in this connecttoft. The Court wanted
to know why they had been allowed to raaove to Calcutta 440 bales
of piece goods lying in the godowns of Serampore If they did not
(4)
really own them*
Wellesley's Optional loans: The government itself offered the
private capitalists a more lucrative field of investment than indigo
U)
CALCUTTA - COROMANDEL
Yr# Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*
1802-5 11,59,752 36,62,938
1803-4 9,60,657 25,74,156
1804-5 6,57,311 25,29,672
1805-6 9,26,922 24,10,253
CALCUTTA - MALABAR
1802-5 10,75,075 36,30,652
1803-4 5,28,035 31,87,854
1804-5 3,53,594 , 57,93,196
1805-6 1,79,413 53,60,781
CALCUTTA - GULES
1802-3 12,60,390 12,13#314
1803-4 7,88,334 10,68,634
1804-5 9,56,431 13,94,275
1805-6 11,68,912 21,85,287
C crr^T T ^fj-LsC s ia jL  6 i t - p c l t Z .
(2) John Ross to John Turnbull 15 July 1804* Home Misc* 337, pp* 867-75*
John Turnbull to John Roberts ibid pp* 877-85.
(3) Lord Castlereagh to Lord Montrose (President of Board of Trade)
29 October 180^-ibid pp* 893-95.
(4) Court to G.G. in C* (Public General) 28 September 1803*
-165-
and a safer medium of remittance than the neutral channels* By 
1801 the greater part of the public loans, contracted since 1798 
for the prosecution of war, had been transferred to the European 
hands* This was possible not merely because the loans were floated 
at a high rate of interest but because they possessed certain other 
alluring conditions which attracted the Europeans more than the 
opulent natives* Before 1798 transfer of the principal of India 
debt through bills was restricted by the Charter Act to £500,000 
per year at Is lid* Uncertain of the amount as well as the time of 
arrival of bullion from England, Wellesley found himself compelled 
to make further concessions to the European capitalists to finance 
the wars with France and Tipu Sultan* Decennial loans were floated 
in 1798 and 1799 which not only tied the hands of the Government 
for ten years but provided for the transfer of the principal by
Cl)
bills at 15 months date at 2s 6d the sicca rupee* The first 
8$ loan, floated in 1799, promised to pay interest in bills (but the 
principal in India) while the second 8$ of 1800 promised both 
interest and the principal in bills* None of these was payable without 
18 months previous notice and not until the old registered debt had 
been paid off* From 1800 a series of optional loans were floated 
at 8$ which did not ask for a previous notice like the first and 
second 8$ loans but which could demand bills on aecount of interest
(1) G.G* in C. to Court (Public) 31 July 1798* G.G.*s Minute, 
Proceedings in the Secret Dept* 20 June 1798*
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(1)
ahd the principal at any time* The private capitalists cculd ask
for no better terms than these which assured them a handy and
profitable investment, marketable at a premium whenever needed in
India, and readily remit table to England when the medium of trade
ceased to be profitable. The decennial loans catered for the needs
of long term investment and the optional loans for those of liquid
capital* Between 1798 and 1803 over six millions of sterling
were obtained in such loans. Everybody in Calcutta was happy* The
Court alone received the news with a premonition of future troubles
which cculd arise from large unexpected demands on the home funds
(2)
and urged the Bengal Government to. avoid them* The admonition 
fell on deaf ears, for, Wellesley had already started the Second 
Maratha War in August 1803 and, throwing caution to the winds (and 
ignoring a harassed Court which he hated openly), had begun to 
advertise for optional loans in quick succession*
Castlereagh's plan for liquidation of India debt: The exigencies
of the Indian Governments not only proved a windfall to the private 
merchants but also thwarted the plan for the liquidation of India 
debt - originally put forward by Dundas, adopted by Castlereagh and 
modified in consultations with the Court* Dundas had been thinking
(3)
hard about India debt ever since the Fourth Mysore War had broken out*
(1} G.G. In C. to Court (Separate Financial) 17 December 1808*
(2) Court to G.G. in C. (Public) 10 November 1803 and 22 August 1804*
(3) Dundas to Wellesley 18 March 1799* Owen — A Selection from the
Despatches, treaties and other papers of the Marquis
Wellesley pp* 696-97*
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We have seen earlier how he had been harping on the same theme
for quite a while in his correspondence with the Court and Wellesley*
Wellesley gave a prior importance to the security of the military
(1) (2) 
resources and considered the investment otf*the India debt secondary*
The investment could be easily made up from the revenues and tributes
(3)
of the new conquests if only the Court would be more patient and the
India debt could be liquidated by funding a small proportion, even
(4)
a quarter, in England and sending bullion for the remainder* Not 
convinced by these arguments and despairing of pushing through any 
military retrenchment, Dundas went back to his earlier plan of 
debt-transfer* In Ms last budget speech of 12 June 1801 he detailed 
this plan and left it as his legacy to the next incumbent at the India 
Board, Lord Castlereagh, who thought the Peace of Amiens to be the 
opportune moment for it* Interest on the India debt had increased
(1) "When you have disgraced Lord Clive's government, and driven him
home, I advise you to recall me, send Paul Benfield to the
government of Madras; and Sir John Macpherson to the 
government General; you will then have plentiful investments***n 
YiTellesley to Scott 1 October 1801* Add* MSS* 38,765 f* 61*
(2) Wellesley to Dundas 25 January 1800 Add* MSS* 37,275 f* 12*
• (3) YiTellesley to Dundas 12 November 1800 ibid f* 231, 13 November
1800 ibid f* 233*
(4) Wellesley to Dundas 7 March 1800 ibid f* 17* Wellesley to 
Lewisham 30 September 1801* Add* MSS* 37,282 f* 258*
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frcsrrt £400,252 to £1,350,000 between 1795 and 1801 and it was a
(1)
great drag on the surplus revenues and the investment* During;
three years ending 1794—95, supplies available for commercial
purposes In India were on the average £1,350,000 per year* In the
year ending 30 April 1801 there was a total deficiency of
£1,093,961# The Charter Act's presupposition that £1 million would
be available from the Indian surplus revenues for commercial
purposes had completely fallen through and the Company had to
confront any futureenergency with £18t millions of debt and half a
(2)
million of revenue deficit* The remittance plan of 1785, 1787
and 1793 had failed since 1798, the total debt transferred between
1798 and 1801 being only £821,020 or £205,255 per year while £4,288
(3)
was subscribed in 1802-3 and none at all in 1803-4*
The, main proposal of Dundas and Castlereagh was that a sinking
fund being a novelty in India and too tedious in operation, the India
debt could best be transferred by means of additional investments
which would be purchased with bullion sent from England where it would
be purchased with funds raised from loans* Bills on the Court would
(4)
cover any deficiency of funds sent from home* The Company they
thought should be reliered of at least £10 millions of debt in five
(1) In Bengal interest had increased from G.R* 35,05,510 in 1795-96
to C*R* 97,15,566 in 1801-2, but with the general revenues the 
surplus had increased*
(2) Budget Speech of 14 March 1803. The Asiatic Annual Register
Yol* Y pp. 17-51*
(3) App. 35 Third Repert{|$fj)While £428,499 was subscribed in Bengal
during 1798-1801, only £132 was subscribed in 1802-3*
(4) Dundas to Chairman 17 January 1801 Home Misc* 208fP.541-33
Castlereagh to Chairman 10 September 1802 Home Misc* 500 pp* 2-13*
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0)
years, &£ millions a year, and should be able to resume payment 
to the public according to the terms of the Charter only £500,000 
of which had been received in 1793 and 1794. To achieve this £1 million
A  tfU'
would be raised fromAnet proceeds of the Companyfs London sales
on an investment of £4 millions in India and China ( to which
the net surplus Indian revenue wculd contribute 1 million) while
the other million waild be borrowed in England at 5%.
The Court, under the Chairmanship of Jacob Bosanquet,
a City banker, had other views about the increase of debt* He
repeatedly asked the Indian governments to reduce expenses and
procure a surplus; "Additional territory is of no real use to us
if it brings with it an addition of expense* In short, unless you
can contrive to cut down our A m y  establishment, and curtail
other expenses so as to give us a clear surplus of at least
£500,000 to £600,000 per annum, I shall despair of doing anything
(2)
effectual for the real improvement of the Companyfs situation*”
In his opinion, in the last nineteen years since 1783, "not a single
shilling had been realised from these acquisitions, and that except
for the produce of the Company1 s commercial concerns, India would
long before this have become a fcurthen upon the finances of the
(3)
Mother Country*” Such a person wculd naturally think Castlereagh1 s
(1) Castlereagh later considered liquidating £12 millions of debt
in 6 years*
(2) Bosanquet to Uellesley 11 May 1802 Add* MSS 37,278 f* 90*
(3) Bosanquet to Y/ellesley 10 September 1802 ibidff* 93—94*
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plan too determined and inflexible to be adapted to the
U)
circumstances and even unwarranted* Bosanquet considered
it more practical to leave the surplus in India for the discharge
of debt, to provide in Europe for the purchase of an annual
investment of £4 millions by means of bullion, goods and stores
and bills, to appropriate the surplus arising from, extended
sales at home either for the purchase of silver or for payment
of additional bills and to act on the plan experimentally for two
years. He fundamentally differed from Castlereagh. He provided
for the liquidation of one million where Castlereagh provided
for two and ho depended for it on territorial surplus i.e* ordinary
resources and not on extraordinary funds like the increase of the
capital stock or bonds which Castlereagh suggested* He was loath
to touch the capital stock of the Company with £4^ millions of
(2)
bills hanging on the Company1 s head*
Castlereagh challenged his review of trade and his analysis 
of the profit and loss account* The Company1 s ccramercial profit had 
been about 10*1/3 $ in 1800 and 1801 and never higher than 13fe in
(a) -
1802-3* There had been a clear territorial surplus of £3,281,500
"after paying all charges, many even of a description upon which 
a considerable doubt may be raised.***.*.particularly the charge 
of a considerable proportion of the interest.” This surplus, "if not
(1) Bosanquet bn the state of finances Home Misc* 500 pp* 49—73 and
Add. MSS. 13,814ff 1-13. According to him in the last 18 years 
the territory had produced a deficit of £2,242,978 and commerce 
a surplus of £5,777,343*
(2) Bosanquet to Wellesley 29 September 1802* Add* MSS 37,278 f* 101*
(3) Castlereagh1 s Observations on Bosanquet*s memorandum 12 November,
1802. A aa. i'iSS. 13,814, f .34.
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applied to territory, it is equally natural to suppose has been
(1)
absorbed by commerce#" He was inclined to think "the capital
of the Company as subscribed, even with the usual proportion of
bonds in circulation, has not been sufficient •••♦•for the
(2)
purposes of their trade" and that extension of the capital stock
to liquidate two millions instead of one million of debt per year
was urgently called for in view of the repercussions of a new war
(3)
On a narrow money-market# In all this he followed Dundas closely
and,as Professor Philips suggests, for very much the same motive
i.a* to increase the financial embarrassments of the Company in
(4)
order the better to control it, and he complained to Dundas about
(5)
Bosanquet*s obstructive tactics#
It must be pointed out, however, his review of the situation 
was much more correct than Bosanquet*s whom fra described as "a great 
coxcomb#" Bosanquet committed innumerable self-contradictions in 
his correspondence with Wellesley# In the very same breath he 
complained of deficits produced by war and played panegyrics on the 
Sword - "we owe our safety to the Sword, not to parchments, and we
(1) ibid f# 37#
(2) ibidff# 33-34#
(3) ibid f# 40#
(4) C#H# Philips. The East India Company 1784-1834 op.cit#
pp. 124-25*
(5) Castlereagh to Dundas 19 November 1802 Home Misc# 504 p# 26*
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(1)
ought to look to that which has carried us through our difficulty."
He could not make up his mind whether the territory produced a
deficit or surplus# His unequivocal orders for retrenchment were
followed by warnings of the French designs whose "exertions will
be unabated to destroy our Indian empire, and it will be nrcessary
for cur Government to keep a watchful eye upon every mode of
access to India, and every measure that may be adopted for our
(3)
annoyance in that quarter of the globe." Castlereagh was in
(4)
the same predicament over Wellesley*s Carnatic and Oudh policy*
But, unsound in devising the solution as a whole, he was sounder 
than the Court about the problem of the India debt* He did not 
minimise it, nor did he ascribe its increase solely to territorial 
deficits and calling upon the Company to increase its commercial 
capital, he showed fcis grasp of the economic realities* A 
ccmmercial Company, which had most of its £6 millions of capital 
locked up in dead stock and could little rely on a surplus revenue 
in times of war, had no other way of increasing investment up to 
£4 millions*
There may be one explanation, however, of the Court* s 
obstructionist attitude* It might have seen through Castlereagh*s
(1) Bosanquet to Wellesley 11 May 1802 op.cit* f* 90#
(2) Bosanquet to Wellesley 10 September 1802 op*cit# Contra Bosanquet
to Wellesley 17 December 1802 Add. MSS. 57,278. f# 106*
(5) Bosanquet to Wellesley 10 September 1802 op.cit* f* 96*
(4) Castlereagh to Wellesley September 1802, Montgomery Martin*
Despatches etc. op.cit. Yol* II p* 75* and Scott to Wellesley 
23 April 1802 C.H. Philips (Ed.) The Correspondence of David
• Scott op.cit* Yol* 2 pp* 394-95*
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subtle game and mi git be trying: to checkmate him in a way which would 
also tie down the hands of a t oo independent Governor General#
CD
Indignant at Wellesley*s policy regarding private trade, his expenses
on account of the Fort William College and the Government House
(2)
at Calcutta and loans to indigo manufacturers, the Court was loath to 
trust him with dearly borrowed money# The plan which was ultimately 
sent to India in June 1803 was a compromise# An investment of 
£4 millions - equally divided between India and China - was to be 
raised from £1 million in bullion, £2 million in goods and stores 
sent frcm Britain and £1 million of the Indian surplus revenues#
If there were any deficiency in these resources, the Government was to 
draw bills on the Court* In the next two years for such further sums 
as were required for a discharge of £2 millions of debts per year, 
the Government was also to draw bills provided bills on this account 
and bills on aceount of investment did not exceed the difference 
between the value of exported goods, stores and bullion and the sum 
of £5 millions# With the increase of surplus revenue,bills on the 
Court were supposed to diminish# The maximum amount of bills thus 
prescribed included bills on account of the principal of decennial 
loans and the principal and interest of other remittable loans taken
(1) Bosanquet to Wellesley, 29 May 1801 Add* MSS# 37,278 f# 83#
11 May 1802 ibid f# 89, 17 December 1802 ibid f* 105#
(2) Bosanquet to Wellesley 29 September 1802 ibid ff# 102-03#
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(1 )
since 1800# John Roberts, the Chairman of the year, repeatedly 
emphasised this and also that the provision on an investment of 
£4 millions was to take precedence of all applications of funds 
and the aims obtained for bills drawn on the investment account
03)
should be exclusively used for that purpose# To accommodate
the Company, the Government gave up its claims, to participation
(3)
for the. time being#
Surprisingly enough the plan was cade on the hypothesis of
peace prevailing during its operation, trade retaining its old
vitality and facilities for getting bullion remaining unimpaired#
Even before the despatch was sent, John Roberts wrote about the
(4)
closure of the Continental market by i:apoleon*s orders and
Bosanquet expressed his regret for the inadequate supply of bullion,
(5)
advised preparations for the next French attack and finally asked
(6)
Wellesley to act upon the plan more slowly# Bosanquet was rightly
afraid that,with the renewal of war with France,a great part of the
bullion sent in 1803-4 (£1,700,000) would be diverted to military
(7)
purposes on the Coast# Next year only £700,000 could be sent in 
bullion# Meanwhile the war/ with the Llarathas had been in full swing
(1) Court to G.GI in C#(Separate)! June 1803# Professor Philips
does not note the difference between the draft and the final 
despatch* See The East India Company op.cit. pp# 123-24*
(2
(3
(4
(5
(6
(7
John Roberts to Wellesley 17 March 1803 Add* MSS* 37,278ff* lll-14i 
Castlereagh to Chairs 19 February 1803 ibidff* 119-20*
John Roberts to Wellesley 18 March 1803 ibid f# 123#
Bosanquet to Wellesley 17 March 1803 ibid f# 121#
Bosanquet to Wellesley 17 May 1803 ibid f# 125#
Bosanquet to Wellesley 24 June 1803 ibid f* 130#
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since August 1803, and the resources of the State were being severely 
taxed* The creditors in these circumstances saw their chance of 
defeating the plan for debt transfer which they considered less
U)
profitable* They wanted a transfer in their own time and on 
their own terms and as the exigencies of direct or circuitous 
commerce dictated* Even as it was they remitted from Bengal alone 
C*R* 1,65,27,824 between 1800 and 1805, mostly in interest bill3*
But for the time being they wanted to retain their principal in India 
to obtain a difference of 3°h in interest provided they also obtained
A
option to transfer principal at any time. In the midst of hisA
Maratha Wars Wellesley had to accept their terms#
The Second Maratha War: The final victory over Tipf^and the treaties
with the rulers of the Carnatic and Tanjotfehad left the Company by 
1800 in virtual control of the entire peninsula south of the 
Maratha states. When in their wake the Nawab of Oudh ceded the 
districts lying on the eastern, southern and western borders of his 
Kingdom in commit at ion of his subsidy (by the Treaty of 20 November 
1801), the Company*s territorial possessions marched on three sides 
of the large and chaotic Maratha empire - torn by incessant internecine 
strife and wild power politics. Wellesley considered it an anomaly, 
a source of constant danger to the security of his provinces and a
A
hothouse forAFrench intrigues in India* The treaty of Bassein with
(1) See Prinsep*s attack on the plan 29 July 1803. The Asiatic 
Annual_ Register vol. 5. pf - m<j -173 .
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the Peshwa^ on 31 December 1802 and the supplementary treaty,
which followed on 16 December 1803^  not only brought the head of
the Maratha confederacy into the subsidiary system of Wellesley
0
but added Bundelkhund to his acquisitions from (Xtdh. It was not
unnatural for the restive Dowfut Rao Simdhia to draw the only
possible conclusion. Like a fish, instinctively trying to break
through the inexorable net closing in an all sides, Sindiah and
then Holkar tried to break through the subsidiary system which
threatened to enmesh the political independence of the Mughal
succession states and the irresponsible exercise of sovereign
authority by their princely class# They failed not because they
did not have well-disciplined and trained aimies but because they
did not have economic and psychological resources to withstand the 
\
strain of prolonged warfare. When even the Companyts finances,
with all the resources of a mi^ity industrial nation, were well
nigh broken, it was idle to expect a predatory economy like that
of the Marathas to survive far less to v/in the unequal struggle.
War was declared against Sindiah in August 1803 but
(1 )
preparations began as early as May 1802 during a flourishing state
of the revenues in Bengal. The average sale price of opium had
(2)
reached the unprecedented height of S.R. 1377 per chest and that of
(1) The Asiatic Annual Register vol. 6 p. 355.
(2) Wellesley to Chairman. 24 December 1802. Really S.R. 1388, G.G.
in C. to Court (Separate) 23 March 1805.
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(1)
salt S.E* 387 per ICO maunds* The Bengal investment for 1802-3 was
C2J
about S.R. 90,00,000, exclusive of that from the Ceded Provinces,
(3)
inspite of large supplies to Madras and Canton* All government
securities, is axed since 1801, bore premium and the discount on the
old securities did not exceed lg$* The premium payable by the subscribers
to the new loan of 1803 (to absorb the 12$ paper payable at the end
(4)
of the year) was raised freon 2$ to 4$* The Government was capable
of exploiting the accumulated capital of the private merchants which
"cannot be estimated at an amount inferior to sixty or seventy lacks
(5)
of rupees*.*." and which was unable'to find way to England for
stagnation of trade* To "facilitate upon reasonable terns the
investment of that capital in the public securities" ..it proposed an
increase of the sinking fund and withdrawal of the discredited
treasury bills, amounting to. lijr crores of sicca rupees, through the
establishment of a paper currency in exchange of deposit of gold in 
(6)
the treasury*
The pressure of war, however, worked in the opposite direction* 
tTrh<=> premium on 10$ loans fell from Rs*7 8 as$ in June to 8 as$ in 
October 1803, on new 8$ loans from Rs.3$ to Rs*X — 8 as$, on 8$ loans
(1) G.G* in C. to Court (Separate) 1 March 1804, 23 March 1805* 
v ) net profit from salt in 1802/3 was S.R* 97,81,459*
(2) Ret revenue raised from the Ceded Provinces alone in 1802/3 amounted
to S.R. 1,20,50,912. G.G. in C. to Court- (Dept* Ceded Prov*
Public) 20 October 1803*
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 11 January 1803.
(4) G.G. in C. to the Secret Committee 9 April 1803.
(5) ibid. I
(6) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 9 June 1803.
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of 1800 from. Rs 1 - 8 as$ to Rn 1$ while the premium on the old loans
(1)
was entirely extinguished* The agency houses in Iuadras, specially
Chase, Chinnery and Macdowal, tried to take advantage of this
situation by proposing to supply seven lakhs of pagodas annually
(2)
for six years repayable by bills on the Court at 10s 3d* Though
this was rejected by the Governor General, a deficit of S.R. 1,30,00,000
(3)
in Madras and of S.R. 1,00,00,000 in Bombay had to be made good*
Another loan was floated in October 1803 at a reduced premium. Inspite
U)
of an apparent affluence, the Bengal debt began to rise rapidly -
(5)
almost a crore and a half being added in 1803-4. The investment
(6)
was kept up .at' S.R. 1,11,00,000 partly from high profits of the salt
(7)
and opium monopolies and partly from loans*
, VNot that victory came late. Arthur Wellesley (late the Duke of 
Wellington) defeated the combined aimies of Sindhia and the Bhonsle 
raja at Assaye in September 1803 and forced the latter to sign the 
treaty of Deogaon on 15 December. Under its terms Cuttack was
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 20 October 1803*
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 9 June 1803.
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Public)50 April 1804.
(4) The surplus revenue of Bengal in 1802-3 was C.R. 2,58,12,290 and
in 1803-4 C.R. 1,86,73,550.
(5) Bengal debt bearing interest
on 30 April 1803 - C.R. 10,34,54,620 
on 30 April 1804 - C.R. 11,63,44,710.
(6) G.G. in C. to Court (Comin1) 13 January 1804*
(7) Net profit from salt in 1803-4 - S.R. 1,21,99,390 (Average price
S.R. 428 per 100 mds). Net profit frcm opium in 1803-4 -
S.R. 55,24,696 (average price rising to S.R. 1963 per chest) 
G.G. in C. to Court (Separate) 17 October 1805#
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ceded to the Company and the Bhonsle raja accepted the subsidiary
alliance. Lakers anay won an equally decisive victory In the Laswari
Campaign - forcing Sindiah to sign the Treaty of Surji Arjungaon on '
30 December 18Q3. Within five months of the commencement of the
Second Maratha % r  Wellesley seemed to have gained his objective and
bewildered his critics at home - the most vehement of whom was
(1 )
Bosanquet at the Court and the most vacillating - Castlereagh.
This fait accompli temporarily saved the political situation
in England but cculd not save the financial impasse in India. The
army was never completely withdrawn from the field and at the
beginning of 1804-5 war was declared on Holkar. To rapidly increasing
(2)
military charges marine charges were added when commerce ( and opium
revenue) had to be protected from Admiral LinoisTs fleet prowling
in the Indian ocean. Inspite of additional resources of the provinces
(3)
conquered from the Marat has, Bengal revenues did not increase as
salt and opium sales were affected, the former because of a fall in
(4)
price and the latter in reaction to excessive exports to the Eastern 
market for several year3 combined with losses inflicted by the French.
privateers. The government had again to fall back on loans at"1*0$!
(1) Soott to Wellesley 11 May 1804 C.Il. Philips The Correspondence of
David Scott op.cit. vol. 2. p. 439. Scott to Wellesley 14 Hay 
18&4 ibid p. 440. Even Addington was prepared to sacrifice 
Wellesley to keep his Parliamentary supporters belonging to tha 
Company interest.
(2) Military charges in Bogal rose from £2,377,888 in 1802-3 to
£3,743,868 in 1805-6; in India from £6,000,000 to £9,000,000. 
App. 6 Second Reportsisio)
(3) They yielded a net revenue of C.R. 96,32,580 in 1804-5. Revenue
from the Ceded Provinces went up to C.R. 1,55,45,640. Yet the 
surplus revenue of Bengal was C.R. 1,87,24,160.
(4 ) Net salt revenue in 1804—5 amounted to S.R. 1,13,25,752 (average
price S.R. 356 per ICO maunds) G.G. in C. to Court (separate)
7 June 1806.
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(1)
for two years without any premium at all, the ITawab Vizier of Cudh
had to be persuaded to offer a Voluntary* loan of 30 without
(2)
interest and the European investment for 1804-5 was curtailed to
(3)
60 lakhs. On 30 April 1805 Bengal debt bearing interest stood at
C*)
S.fi. 13,36,65,940 - an increase of three crores in two years.
Wellesley’s departure: The war with Holkar came to an end in
December 1805 five months after Wellesley had handed over charge to
Lord Cornwallis. The Cour$iad been pressing for his recall for a
long time and Pitt’s Ministry, in power since early May 1804,
could not but agree to spare it further acts of arrogance and
insubordination. Wellesley knew that his attitude towards private
(5)
trade had earned him the implacable hatred of the Court. Though
(6)
he studiously denied any undue influence of the Bengal merchants, 
the Court was not to be weaned from its conviction of his complicity
with them and it followed all his measures with a settled bias. Soott
infonned him that the Court was fulminating against the Fort William
m
College because of its resentment over private trade. He was
(8)
prepared to go as early as 1802 but only his sense of an unaccomplished
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 30 April 1804.
(2) Wellesley to Court 28 March 1805.
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Comm1-) 18 January 1805.
(4) App. 7, Second Report.
(5) Wellesley to Addington 13 March 1802 Add. MSS. 37,282 f. 375.
Wellesley to Dundas 13 February 1803 Add. MSS 37,2?5ff. 250—51.
(6) Wellesley to Scott 28 March 1802 ibid f. 407 Scott to Addington
26 August 1802 C.H. Philips The Correspondence of David Scott 
op.cit vol 2 p. 401.
(7) Scott to Wellesley 23 April 1802 ibid p. 394.
(8) Wellesley to Scott 17 March 1802 ibid p. 390.
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mission made him stay on to put Indian finance in order. The President
of the India Board requested him to do so after Scott and Dundas
(l)
intervened in his favour. But Castlereagh’s term was one of half
(2)
measures and the Court; kept the Board under its influence. The
Maratha war came hotly on the heel of the Treaty of Bajsein almost as
Bosanquet had predicted. The plan of debt transfer was disrupted,
finance once again strained for what seemed an unnecessary military
adventure and commerce left without support. Financially and
commercially, the result was too disastrous for the Company to continue
Wellesley as the steward of the Indian Empire.
In return for an average annual export of £2,004,260 in bullion,
goods, stores and bills the Court received from India an average invest-
(3)
ment of £1,406,900 during 1798-1805. There has been no surplus revenue
(1) Dundas to Scott 13 September 1802 ibid p. 404 and Castlereagh to 
Pitt 11 September 1802 Home Misc. 504 pp. 1-2.
(2) Scott to Wellesley 14 May 1804 C.H. Philips. The Correspondence of
David Scott, op.cit. vol. 2 p. 440.
I
(3) INP/A
1798-1805 1798-1805
App. 5 Third Report
Bullion sent to India Bullion sent to Bengal
£5,079,793; average £634,974 £2,742,908; averagd £342,863
App. 8 ibid
Goods and Stores: value Goods and Stores value
received £4,580,478 av. £572,559 received £1,946,379; £243,297
p^p. 6 ibid average
Bills drawn on General Bills drawn all ae/-
ac/. £3,369,973; av. £421,246 £2,201,680; average £275,210
App. 6 ibid (App. 26 Fourth Report)
Bills drawn on debt
ac/- £3,003,848; £375,481
average ■ £861,370
£3,004,260 
Investments during 1798-1805 
£11,255,306; average £1,406,900.
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in India since 1797 except in 1802 and in 180y the deficit stood
at £2,268,608* The total India debt had Increased meanwhile from
£11 millions to over £28 millions. It was not unnatural for the
Court to refuse to see with Wellesley prosperity round the comer
(1)
of the next military triumph. The extension of the empire must 
either justify itself in terms of large investments and larger 
dividends or be given up as a ruinous luxury.
Failure to revive Kfcnopoly: Inspite of Its vigorous efforts to
revive its monopoly, larger investments were not forthcoming. In 
1802 the defeat of the private traders seemed to be aygodd augury 
for the future specially occurring during the lull of the Peace of 
iqtiens which was supposed to deprive the Americans of their 
advantages of neutrality. The Company tried, therefore, to recapture 
the muslin market of France and the home silk market (from the 
Italian ccmpe tition). The prospect of calicoes was not bad either, 
the British cotton industry being still unable to make stout cloth 
for such cheap prices as the Indians could, mainly because of 
lower labour cost in India. Repeated orders went out to Bengal
£l) Wellesley to Dundas 25 December 1803 Add* MSS. 37,275 f. 258.
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(1)
to raise the investments in piece goods and raw silk. A 
similar attempt was made to monopolise the cotton market of China
(2)
with the bountiful produce promised from the newly Ceded "Jrovinees.
(3)
Even jSunn and hemp were retained. It was forbidden to assist
(4)
indigo manufacture at the cost of raw silk investment and other
regulations were ordered to make the private traders’ position
(5) 
difficult.
(1) Court to G.G. in C. (Coram1) 30 June 1802, 4 May 1803, 24 
August 1804 and 31 August 1804.
Year Indent for cloths Quantity (pieces)
S.R.
1802 66 lakhs Muslin 163,220
Calicoes 671,800 
Prohibited 166,800
1803 60 lakhs Muslin 146,695
Calicoes 695,100 
Prohibited 168,800
1804 56 lakhs Muslin 140,445
Calicoes 650,000 
Prohibited 170,900
1806 45 lakh a Muslin 95,440
Calicoes 424,800 
Prohibited 188,000
(2) Court to G.G. in C. (Comm1) 24 Augist 1804. 6 November 1805.
12 February 1806.
(3) Court to G.G. in C. (Comm1) 31 August* 1804, 18 January 1805.
(4) Court to G.G. in C. (Comm1) 8 September 1802. 31 August 1804.
(5) Court to G.G. in C* (Public) 20 June 1804.
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Yet the Court did not succeed. The returns from India 
and China daring 1803-4 and 1805-6 fetched only £5,714,812 per year
ui
on average. Hie Court put the blame on extensive private
£2)
import of piece goods and raw silk of debased quality. It is 
tiue that the indigo crisis of the early years of the nineteenth 
Century forced the private traders to invest In piece goods and 
raw silk with inevitable repercussions on the Company’s sales. But 
the private exports in piece goods began to decline frcm 180S.
They were not solely responsible for the Company’s failure to 
revive the monopoly. With the renewal of war in 1803, the main precondi­
tion of success was gone. The Americans began to exploit the war situation
again,
(1) App. 22 & 25 Fourth Report^ lfi)
(2) Court to G.G. in C. (CommM 4 July 1804 and 19 June 1805. Also
see A Memoir on the Trade to and from India etc. Home Misc. 
406 pp. 381-485.
Private export of Commodities to London
Year
1801-2
Piece goods 
S.R.
66,68,290
Raw silk 
S.R.
1,70,906
Indigo
S.R.
37,71,407
Sugar
S.R.
2,17,899
1802-3 64,70,203 2,95,050 27,79,100 2,30,727
1803-4 48,72,016 9,56,444 42,29,921 672
1804-5 12,28,637 12,23,363 60,28,524 116
18C£6 3,31,582 7,87,106 45,23,124 54,478
Bengal Commercial Reports 1801-1865
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the Pencil government became more vigLl^ hi^  against British 
imports and the advance of the British manufacture did the rest*
With the aid of cheap West Indies cotton ■» Manchester lad 
cheapened production by SO to 305$ - it had even excelled in
Cl)
making finer goods which had a demand in Paris or Versailles*
With great dismay the Court reduced its indent for piece goods 
from 66 lakhs in 1802 to 45 lakhs in 1806. Promulgation of the 
Berlin decree on 21. November 1806, the series of countervailing 
Orders in Council which started on 7 January 1807, and the 
retaliatory Milan decree of 1807 sealed its re-export market
(a)
finally* The Court had fallen between Napoleon and Lancashire
and, chary of relying on raw silk alone for its remittance frcm
India, which an impecunious Bengal government could hardly procure
(3) (4)
to the amount of the indent, took up indigo from 1806* The
agency houses in Calcutta, who financed the extensive indigo
(5)
manufacture of Bengal, could breathe again*
(1) Court to G.G. in G. (Comm?*) 4 July 1804 and 23 July 1806. Price 
of No* 100 cotton yarn was 38s* per lb* in 1786, 15s Id* in 
1793, 8s 4d. in 1802 and 7s 2d* in 1806* E. Baines The History 
of the Cotton Manufacture, op.cit*^ *
(S) S. Hacfcsher, The Continental System, pp. 83-84. In 1.798 the
Company sold £3 millions worth of piece goods, in 1807 it sold 
only £433,000 worth* Third Report 1810 App. 1* SQBEBI
(3) The Companyrs average indent was for 4000 bales but it received
78,950 lbs in 1802, 336,189 lbs* in 1803, 415,917 lbs* in 
1804 , 460,303 lbs. in 1805 and 235,215 lbs in 1806 respectively. 
Reports and Documents connected with the Proceedings of the E.I, 
Company in regard to the culture and manufacture of Cotton wool, 
Raw silk and Indigo in India 21 December 1836.
(4) Court to G.G. in C. (Comm ) 30 July 1806.
(5) John Palmer to Henry Trail. 29 September 1808. Palmer Papers
C. English Letters. Vol. 68|&rBod£l&an Library, Oxford*
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After-effects of the Maratha War: Lord Cornwallis, a good
general and a better financial administrator, was sent in 1805
to wind up Wellesley*s Maratha War as well as to recoup the
Companyrs finance and commerce as he once had done in 1788* The
latter seemed to be the graver problem and the new Governor
General found it harder to tackle in view of the renewal of war
with Sindiah, grown bold since Monson*s debacle and Lakets
stalemate before Bharatpulf» Regular troops were in arrears for
five months, the Commissariat for still more, and to pay them, the
irregular troops must be disbanded. He had to call for treasure
from Madras and detain treasure destined for China, extensive
opium trade with which was now sufficient• to provide the supra
(X)
cargoes with funds. This was, however, received too late to
(2)
enable the timely despatch of ships to England and Cornwallis
himself died in October on his way to the front. Sir George Barlow,
Wellesley*s Vice president in Council, and suspected by the Court
to have toed his line on private trade, took over on 10 October
1805. Immediately he tried with Lake to secure an honourable
peace after which a prompt reduction in expenses of the irregular
(3)
troops could be effected. In an endeavour to re-establish himself 
in the Court*s confidence Barlow reduced the expenses of the Fort
William College, abolished certain posts and the Commercial
(1) Cornwallis to Court 1 August 1805, 9 August 1805.
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Public) 5 October 1805.
(3) Barlow to Secret Committee 2 February 1806.
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residencies of Bareilli and Etwah, laid up the gun boats, closed 
the Company's press and retrenched the Church and the Botanical
a)
Garden establishments# Salt revenue was to be increased by 
larger sales (addition of the Maratha salt province of Cuttack
(2)
made this possible) and more stringent regulations against smuggling# 
Opium prices, which bad fallen from S.R# 1963. per cheat in 1803
to S.R# 1510 in 1804 due to the competition of GUzerat opium, were
(3)
to be restored# Yet the surplus revenue of Bengal fell to
C.R# 61,04,720 and the investment for 1805-6 could not exceed 60
(4)
lakhs# Inspite of a liberal supply of bullion from England, a
biennial loan at 10$ in October 1805, and the end of war, Barlow
(5)
estimated for 1806-7 a probable deficiency of nearly two crores#
In March 1906 6$ paper showed a discount of Rs# 7-8$, old 8$ -
Rs# 2$, new 8$ - under Re* 1$ and treasury bills - Rs# 2-8$# Only the
(6)
10$ biennial loans showed a small premium#
(1) G.G# in C# to Court (Public) 3 February 1806#
Barlow "displayed In every public advertisement and introduced 
Into every secret despatch* "the determined spirit of penury" 
inculcated by Castlereagh. Owen's Despatched op.cit# p# 804#
(2) G*G# in C# to Court (Separate) 17 October 1805#
(3) G.G* in C# to Court (Separate) 14 February 1807# The British
Government ultimately persuaded the Portugese Government to 
prohibit export of Malwa opium frcan Goa# See G.G# in C# to 
Court (Public) 7 June 1806#
(4) G.G# in C# to Court (Public) 13 March 1806#
(5) G.G# in C# to Secret Committee 14 March 1806#
(6) Barlow to Chairman 22 March 1806#
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Barlow* s Proposals: The government proposed three measures to
bolster its credit - the import of more bullion from England, the 
floating of an 8/i loan and the issue of treasury notes at 10$ to 
absorb the discredited treasury bills and the establishment of a 
bank at Calcutta* It would be "of the greatest service to the 
commercial interests of this I residency" and would "afford the 
most essential aid to all the financial operations of this 
goverhment, by defeating the measures and combinations to which 
the numerous individuals at this Presidency, who possess an 
extensive command of money, invariably resort, for the depreciation 
of public secuiitios, whenever an opportunity is afforded to them
(1)
for that purpose, by the pressure of public or private distress.*"
Y/hat Barlow aimed at was an apparent reassertion of the
Company*s intere$(s against the agency house interests* This was
playing safe after Wellesley*s blatant championship of the private
traders* cause* No doubt his government needed bullion badly* For
a 1713
the first time since 1 Bengal had
A
suffered a deficit of C*B* 13,16,770 and the Indian deficit had
C2)
risen to £3,152,322* Madras was still under the clutches of the 
agency houses who had been exacting all sorts of concessions (like 
permission to transfer 8p paper to a IO^ j loan and transfer the
(1) G.G* in C* to Court (Public) 13 March 1806J
(2) Net revenue from salt fell to S.R* 88,26,522 (average price -
S.R* 319) though net revenue from opium began to rise again* 
It afforded S.R* 59,76,169 (average price - S.R* 1510 per 
chest)*
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latter to Bengal or England)* Bombay allowed Forbes & Co* and 
Bruce Fawcett & Co* to do the same, issued treasury bills at 
9^yj with 2$ premium and reduced the freight of the China ships to
Cl)
accommodate the private cotton traders* Madras and Bombay had 
to be saved and the Indian deficit, mainly caused by military 
charges, made up. It was true again that the government had 
been suffering a loss on exchange and from advance in the price 
of investment following payments in discredited treasury bills*
But the import of bullion or the discontinuance of treasury bills 
or the establishment of a bank was going to help the private 
capitalists none the less. Apart from speculation, the exigencies 
of foreign trade and indigo manufacture often forced the agency 
houses to sell out public securities on a large scale \iiich 
caused their depreciation and thus loss to the Company's servants 
who had invested in them* Import of bullion and the establishment 
of a bank would obviate the necessity for large scale sale of 
public securities* The bank would afford the agency houses easy 
credit while the proposed issue of treasury notes would offer a 
field of investment for the capital which had been accumulating 
due to stagnation of trade with Europe and America* Withdrawal 
of the discredited treasury bills would lead to the appreciation of 
such notes and save the agency houses from acceptance of interest or
(1) G.G* in C* to Court (Public) 7 June 1806 and 14 February 1807*
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(!)
price of indigo in a depreciating paper* Barlow and Wellesley
pursued the ssme end, only their means differed and Barlow was more 
tactful*
The arrival of bullion in July 1806 enabled the Government
(2)
to bring securities to par and discharge the Oudh debt but the
disbursements were so great again that Bengal could not increase
(3)
her investment beyond 67 lakhs in 1806—7* Though measures were
taken to disband the irregular troops and reduce pensions, debt
had to be enhanced by S.R* 2^19,60,102 mainly by the issue of
(4)
treasury notes at 10$ and a loan at 8$. 10$ notes and loans alone
totalled S.R* 3,45,19,000 and some sort of funding at a lower
rate of interest was absolutely imperative if finance was to be
stabilised and investment to be maintained at the old level in 
(5) 
future*
Hinding of debt: The Goverhment began funding its 10$ debt at 8$
by opening an 8$ loan at 3$ discount - allowing subscription of the 
10$ notes and loans at par* As further inducement it allowed 10$ 
interest up to November 1807, granted interest bills on the Court 
at 2s 6d at six months sight and bills for the principal at 
12 months sight* To facilitate this operation, interest on the
treasury notes was reduced to 8$ and the investment was stopped
(1) Letter addressed by Merchants of Calcutta to G.G. in C* 30
December 1805* Public Consultations 9 January 1806*
(2) G.G* in C. to Court (Public) 23 July 1806*
(5) Barlow to ELphinstone 16 October 1806.
(4) App* 7 Second Reporfc'Jputs the increase of Bengal debt in
1806-7 at C.R* 2,46,36,820*
(5) G.G* in C* to Court (Public) 18 February 1807*
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U)
till, at its end, only one of 50 lakhs was somehow scraped*
This optional loan, floated against the positive orders of
(2)
the Court, enabled Barlow to fund the huge floating debt of Bengal
but the second binnial loan (of 1805) could not be absorbed 
(3) A
as expected* Y/hen he tried to fund this with supplies from Canton, 
Madras and Bombay and another 8$ loan, the ta&am p + mw\wu} who
A
looked askance as this funding business (which reduced the rate of
(4)
interest and hence their margin of profit), exacted again the
option to transfer the principal^  to England at the still further
(5)
reduced sight of 3 months* Bengal had turned the corner* She
had reduced the rate of interest, got rid of most of her floating
(6)
debt, reduced the principal of bond debt and almost stabilised 
the public securities* But all this was achieved at the cost of the 
home finances* We soon find the bills caning hams to roost and 
starting something like a chain reaction Thich ended in the 
abolition of the India monopoly*
Gilbert Elliot, the first Earl of Minto, succeeded Sir 
George Barlow in 1807* His assumption of power coincided with the 
Peace of Tilsit between Napoleon and the Czar of Russia which roused 
once more the apprehension of an overland French invasion of India
(1) Ibid.
(2) Court to G.G* in C. (Public) 23 July 1806.
(3) G.G* in C* to Court (Separate, Financial) 23 April 1807*
(4) G.G. in Cl to Court (Financial) 20 October 1807.
(5) G.G* in C* to Court 12 February 1808*
(6) But debts transferred from other presidencies swelled it to
C.R. 17,25,57,040 in 1807-8 - an addition of C.R. 51,29,300*
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through Persia* The time was not propitious enough for securing 
a revenue surplus of £1 million and Minto did not see in Barlow's 
policy of retrenchment the ranedy of the financial ailment. He 
was convinced that "retrenchment of civil establishments though 
not to be neglected, can afford no supply adequate to the great 
object of meeting the general exigency of the Company's financial
a)
situation" and that further reduction of emoluments "would have the
(2)
effect of countenancing abusive profits*" Secondly, war with
France, even with the limited objective of reducing the Portugese
and the Dutch Settlements, could not be financed without supplies
(3)
from England, far less if preparations to resist the overland 
French invasion were added when the Indian deficit still stood at
U)
£309,122* He warned the Court that "pending a French invasion
of India, no surplus but, on the contrary a great increase of
debt is to be expected and provided for*” This was not India's
fault* wIt is to disasters of Europe, to battles in Poland, to
the peace of Tilsit, that the necessity of waging a burthenscme war
/
in India must be traced* Besides the augmentation of military
(5)
charges and durbar charges which it produced, the decennial loan
(1) Minto to Mr* Elliot of Wells 4 September 1809 Lord Minto in India
Life and Letters of Gilbert Eilliot, First Earl of Minto from 
1807 to 1814 etc* Ed* by the Countess of Minto, Longmans, Green 
& Co* 1880 p* 354*
(2) ibid p* 355*
(3) Minto to Sir Edward Pellew 1 November 1807 ibid pp* 52-57*
(4) Bengal had a surplus of C.R. 2,2L,07,750«*n if^ 7-5.
(5) Minto was referring to the missions of Harford Tones and Malcolm
to win over Persia to the cause of Britain which were being 
financed from Bengal*
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of about two croras in Bengal had to be paid of f In 1808 and 1809*
"We can provide for our own contests by our own resources; but the
contests of the empire can not be maintained by one of its
provinces, for, although Asia may became the field of battle, the
war is purely European* The quarrel is European, the war is waged
for European interests; and it is proportioned in Its extent,
and therefore in its charge to the resources of two great empires
and not to the limited and circumscribed means of the East India
(1)
Company's territorial possessions*"
Tr>ade depression: For a long texm remedy Minto suggested extension
(2)
of free trade* Unfortunately, however, trade with the West declined
markedly from 1807 and the decline degenerated into a depression in
(3)
1808* There were several causes of this decline. Private
exports from Bengal, of which indigo formed the largest part before
(4)
1800, could not bear "high freight^ , long outlays and heavy expenses*.•”
The Calcutta merchants complained of high freights charged by the
(5)
Company and similar complaints were mad© by the agency houses in
(6)
England before the Commons Committee on East India Affairs in 1809* 
According to them the Company raised the rate of extra ships from
(1) Minto to Chairman 21 May 1808*
(2) Minto to Robert Dundas December 1808* Lord Minto In Indiacp.cit*
p* 362*
(3) "I would sooner sell my Father on the Spot, than send him to you
on speculation." John Palmer to H* Trail 21 September 1808*
Palmer Papers op.cit* vol.* 68, p. 64*
(4) John Palmer to Jacob Rider 2 June 1808 and also John Palmer to
H. Trail 6 June 1808 ibid*f i 8
(5) The Memorial of the Calcutta Merchants 27 November 1807 No* 23
App. 47* Fourth Report (1812)*
(6) No* 2 to No* 14. ibid*
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£14 per ton to £22* 10s* per ton in 1805 and 1806 and enforced it 
retrospectively* Secondly, the extra ships ■were notiient in proper 
seasons and the merchants were compelled to accept tonnage on the 
regular ships in 1805—6 at £44* In 180? the extra ships failed to 
appear again and regular ships were offered at £30* 10s* The freight 
of £44 per ton on cotton, sugpr and hemp was prohibitive and even 
£22* 10s* on extra ships increased^ price of hemp by 11^$ and of 
sugar by ?|$* Insurance had to be made upon ship or ships from
(1 )
India instead of upon a particular ship carrying the goods insured*
The Court had no difficulty in showing that it ms war really
(2)
which occasioned high freight and the irregularity of voyages*
It denied charging more in 1805, explained its inability to send 
extra ships in 1806 for reasons of State - they were sent by the 
6ommander-in-ghief to reduce Cape of Good Hope - and thought it 
made ample amends by offering regular ships at £31* 10s* in 1807*
Who were tfe* people like the Fair lies to challenge It when they 
themselves demanded £19 and £21 in 1803 and 1804 for the India-built 
ships and, as directors of the insurance canpanies, mulcted the 
private traders themselves? In fact, it was the same Continental
(1) CALCUTTA - LONDON (Private Trade)
Tear Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*
1806-7 64,81,421 90,34,869
1807-8 39,31,929 84,25,199
1808-9 36,88,629 72,83,021
1809-10 36,58,895 80,28,920
Bengal Commercial Reports 1806-^*
(2) Court to G*G* in,C* (Comm1) 28 June 1809 and "Observations on 
the evidence before the Commons Committee" 24 January 1810. 
No* 16 App* 47 Fourth Report (1812).
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System of Napoleon, which restricted the Company’s exports since 
1806, also restricted the private exports to London# Improvement 
of the British cotton manufacture affected both equally* Trade
u)
with London waild not answer even in the case of indigo and silt,
(2)
the latter because of the Company’s policy of exclusion*
Foiled in their attempt to drive a profitable trade witiL 
London, the merchants and private capitalists turned to foreign 
trade - with little success* Trade with Copenhagen showed an excess 
of exports in one year only, 1806, and after the seizure of Serampore 
at the outbreak of war with Denmark in 18C8, it petered out* Trade 
with Batavia and the Isle of France, clandestinely conducted under 
the Danish flag, could not be continued* The Portugese imported 
more in each year till Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula 
stopped their direct trade altogether* Trade with Manilla, 
monopolised by them in recent years, met with the same fate* Last of 
all Jefferson’s embargo caused a complete stoppage of the American 
trade in 1808 after it had been considerably curtailed in 1807*
CD Private Exports:- Calcutta - London
Tear Piece goods Indigo Sugar Silk Cotton
S.R* S*R* S.R. S.R. S.R*
1806-7 8,09,208 59,31,390 33,714 11,20,999 3,92,206
1807-8 2,24,641 72,07,505 - 3,14,565 2,03,428
1808-9 2,83,703 59,46,117 - 5,50,504 1,07,014
1809-10 5,28,831 35,07,753 19,025 8,58,451 20,25,227
Bengal Commercial Reports 1806-9 
(2) John Palmer to Blane 8 November 1808* Palmer Papers op#cit vol* 
68 p* 155*
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Moreover the general pattern of trade with the foreign countries
had entirely changed* It was no longer financed by private
remittance* On the contrary it seemed to have been made the medium
of capital import in recent years, after the Court had virtually
CObanned the India-built shipping* The reason is not far to seek*
(1) CALCUTTA.- COPENHAGEN
Yr*
1805-6
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1809-10
Yr.
1805-6
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1809-10
CALCUTTA - LISBON
Import s 
S.R*
22,43,119 
22,09,621 
22,06,359 
x
Imports
S.R*
7,96,481
2,42,777
6,64,887
1,23,991
x
Exports
S.R.
6,51,308
4,78,153
4,76,999
x
x
CALCUTTA - BRAZIL
Exports 
S R* 
13,96,343 
13,94,867 
21,28,688 
x 
x
Import s 
S.R.
Exports
S.R*
10,a,400 8,37,100
CALCUTTA - U* S. A.
Yr.
1805-6
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1809-10
Yr.
1805-6
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1809-10
Imports
S.R.
67,67,910
1,09,92,970
58,29,063
x
69,92,565
CALCUTTA
Imports
S.R.
3,06,915
x
x
2,05,596
21,58,627
Exports
S.R*
62,78,055
90,27,472
71,13,281
5,71,218
68,02,489
- MANILLA
Exports
S.R*
9,84,956
4,25,207
x
12,72,615
6,99,323
6
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As the Government demands had denuded the Bengal money-market of 
funds, the agency houses, unable to afford such high rates of 
interest, looked towards import of capital through the foreign 
channels*
It was this aspect of Bengalis foreign trade which raised
a controversy between Charles Grant on behalf of the monopoly
interest and Erancis Baring on behalf of the City interest* Uhen
the Court objected to the American trade in Eastern goods in the
(1) (2)
Nest Indies , the American import of Turkish opium in China
and the American attempts to monopolise the carrying trade in
C3)
the Eastern seas and the coastal and country trade of India and 
proposed prohibition of all except direct trade, enhancement of
(4)
duties and restrictions with regard to piece goods, silk and indigo , 
Erancis Barirgopposed these proposals as based on ,fthe narrow 
principles of a haberdasher1 s shop*” Apprehending the loss of 
American customers for India and China bills and the loss of an 
avenue of capital-export, Baring condemned the talk of countervailing 
duties which might be frustrated by Erance’s opening the European 
ports and world be untenable in peace time* If the Company attributed
(1) Chairs to Castlereagh 28 November 1805 Home Llisc* 439, p* 189*
(2) Alexander John Ball, Governor of Malta to John Turnbull
18 March 1805 ibid pp* 199-200*
(3) The Committee of Correspondence 24 October 1806 Home Use*
337 pp* 899-925.
(4) Elphinstona and Parry to George Tierney 24 December 1806 ibid
pp* 929-32*
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superiority to the American vessels and asked for facilities to 
compete with them, •••"what conclusion will he drawn? That the 
disability arises from our constitution, that for British subjects 
to have a fair chance, the trade must be thrown open? Is this 
opinion not gaining ground? Is it not commercially speaking
a)
unanswerable?" When Charles G-rant accused the Americans of
(2)
using more capital lately to capture the India trade, Baring
attacked him as "♦♦•in 1795 the advocate of private trade,
against the Company, in 1801 maintaining the cause of the Company
and foreign trade against private individuals, and in 1807 arguing
(3)
for private traders against foreign nations#" The contradiction 
between a commercial monopoly,which thrived on restrictions on 
capital movement^  and the City interest, which thrived on profitable 
movement of capital^ was emerging*
In 1807 the monopolists had the upper hand and the Courtsent 
a despatch to India strictly prohibiting any but direct trade to the
U)
Americans. In 1808 it ordered an imposition of double duties on
(5)
foreign vessels# The Bengal government had other ideas, however, 
about the American trade. Nothing was done in the matter of customs
(1) Baring to Court 15 September 1807 ibid pp# 937-53#
(2) Edward Parry and Charles Grant to Baring 14 October 1807*
Home Ivhsc# 494 pp* 5-113*
(3) Written about 4/5 January 1809. Home Use# 494 p# 293.
(4) Court to G.G* in C* (Separate, Customs) 6 November 1807.
(5) Court to G.G. in C* (Separate, Customs) 3 Augist 1808.
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(1)
till the Court reaffirmed its orders on 28 March 1810*. It was 
not before 1811 that the new custans regulations could affect 
American trade when, owing to the outbreak of the Anglo-American 
Vfkr?they were of little avail# In one sense the American trade 
in these years was some help to the Company for it canalised 
a portion of the private remittance which might otherwise have 
been demanded in bills#
Remittance through bills: The private capitalist had failed to
expand export trade to London due to high freight and insurance, 
closure of the Continental market and the improvement of the British 
cotton manufacture# They had failed alike to utilise the medium 
of foreign European and American trade due to the extension of 
war to Denmark and Portugal and Jefferson* s embargo on the American 
commerce# Ultimately they fell back on the remittance of the 
principal of the optional loans# In the earlier period they 
could manage with the remittance of interest alone; "Not a lakh 
of rupees of the principal of such loans had been transferred to 
England from 1801, to 1805 though the lenders obtain a good
a)
exchange rate#" Due to a disparfciy of interest rates between 
England (usually 5$) and India (Usually 9 to 1 0 ^  it was more
cir G.G# in C. to Court (Separate) 26 December 1810* John Palmer 
thought it was so imposed to injure the private traders#
John Palmer to E* Trail 3 July 1811 Palmer Papers op.cit#
Vol# 7?, p# 196#
(2) G.G. in Cl to Court (Separate Financial) 23 April 1807#
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profit able to retain the principal in India and remit the
interest in bills# In 1807 a concatenation of two causes conspired
to change the situation# One was the anxiety over the French
invasion and the other, the stagnation of trade* The funding
operations of Barlow and Minto precipitated the change by narrowing
down the margin of difference between the Indian and the British 
@
interest rates - at a time Then the exigencies of large capital 
exports from England, caused by war expenditures of the British
(2)
government, were forcing up interest in the London money-market#
All these circumstances led to a hectic transfer of the principal
of the decennial and optional loans which threatened to swamp the
Court under bills into bankruptcy#
Minto funds debt: The Court bad ordered the Bengal government to stop
(3)
floating optional loans and to retain as much of the principal in 
India as possible "for the present state of Europe, which in a manner 
unprecedented, obstructs the vent of the Company*s Indian investments, 
renders it more than ever essential to the convenience of our 
affairs at home, tbat no extraordinary pressure on account of the
U)
Indian debts should come upon us#" Minto, however, proceeded with 
the funding of the decennial loans and the old registered debt with
(1) G.G* in C. to Court (Separate Financial) 20 September 1808#
(2) W.W# Rostau# op#cit# p# 15. Also A.D# Gayer, W.N# Rostow and
A#J# Schwartz# The Growth and Fluctuation of the British 
Economy 1790-1850# Oxford 1953 Vol* I pp* 103-7#
(3) Court to G.G# in C. (Public) 23 July 1806
(4) Court to G.G* in C* (Separate Finance) 9 December 1807#
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a new 8/0 loan without option which further precipitated the
consequences apprehended by the Court# Llinto did so with the best
of all intentions* He had plenty of money at his disposal* Bengal
revenue had a smaller surplus in 1808 than in the previous year but
still it was C.R* 1,91*75,340 and the revenue deficit in India
amounted to £26,042 only* The governments credit was high and
(1)
it could reduce exchange to 2 s 4d# There was such an abundance of
capital in Bengal, rising from the profits of opium and coastal trade>
and seeking fruitful investment^ hat the Bank of Bengal reduced its
(2)
rate of interest from 10 to 9fo- In these circumstances Minto hoped
(1)
(2)
John Palmer to J* Richardson 2 December 1808* Palmer Papers 
op*cit Vol. 69 p* 34*
G.G* in C. to Court (Separate Finance) 14 May 1808 also John 
Palmer to Sir Francis Baring 24 August 2j808. Palmer Papers 
op#cit* Vol* 6 8 * /T- 3 9 -3 *7-
Year
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1805-6
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1805-6
1806-7
1807-8
1808-9
1I81-?
1807-8
1808-9
OALcirm
Imports
S.R.
38,40,209
51,57,950
57,85,467
CALCUTTA
32,26,686
21,31,999
29,25,184
CALCUTTA
1,79,413
3,04,718
1,81,778
12,93,175
CALCUTTA
- CHUTA
- PEMKG
Exports
S.R*
47,10,513
69,43,049
69,85,626
17,34,394
24,54,308
24,88,012
- MALABAR
9,26,922
12,46,357
16,27,466
6,83,760
CALCUTTA - GULFS
11,68,912
17,97,049
18j6lj494
6,62,637
53,60,781
50,18,260
38,00,520
43,04,785
CQRCMANDEL
24,10,253
44,50,872
41,42,420
13,01,984
21,85,
lt;§S;S8
20,69,325
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to absorb the burdensome optional loans into one consolidated debt 
which involved payment of the principal in India alone and thus to 
take off a great load frcm the Court’s back* Naturally he 
had to start with the funding of the decennial loans and give notice 
of payment to the first and second optional loans before he could 
tackle the thirteen optional loans taken since 1800* The new 
8% loan, floated for this purpose, was to accept subscriptions of 
the registered debt at 5$ discount and the decennial loans at 
par* The foimer was at once absorbed as the conditions were very 
alluring and the latter took a little more time as they earned
a higher interest* The principal of the India debt was reduced by
(2)
S.R*1,07,37,738 in this process* But the creditors took fright
and began to demand transfer of the principal of the optional
loans by bills* Between May 1808 and March 1809 the transferred
(3)
India debt amounted to £3 millions*
The This was too much for the Company*s home finance which had been
Parlia­
mentary showing deficits since 1806* As ¥* Ramsay, the Secretary to the Court, 
review: --— ----------------------------------------- ----------------
(1) The Company’s loans were paid in consecutive order* Tie old
registered debt came first, then the decennial loans of 1798
and 1799, then the first and second optional loans of 1799
and 1800, and last of all the thirteen optional loans taken
since 1800* In 1808 the old registered debt amounted to
S*R* 1,43,40,000, the first optional loan to S.R* 32,13,800,
the second optional loan to S.R* 1,17,62,300 and all other optional
loans to S.R* 9,54,46,100 See G.G. in C. to Court (Financial)
17 December 1808 and 13 January 1810*
(2) G.G. in C* to Court (Financial) 20 April 1809*
(3) ibid* Bills from Bengal amounted to C.R* 15,93,8CS in 1806,
C.R. 27,59,515 in 1807 and C.R* 1,23,57,975, in 1808*
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explainedjthe Company had sent out £2,712,526 more in goods, stores
and bullion between 1803 and 1806 than in the three preceding
years and had met the increased home charges (i*e* the political
charges of the Indian governments paid out of the heme treasury)
of £2,191,497 between 1799 and 1807 while its sales had fallen off
by £3,268,671 between 1803 and 1806# The Indian investment
(1)
fetched only £1,309,497 in 1807-8* It met the deficit in 1806
out of £1 million paid by the government tcr.wqpds its account with
the Company* In 1807 the parliament empowered it to raise bond
debts by £2 millions instead of adding £1 million to capital per
(2)
37 Geo* HI Cap* 32* In 1808 the home deficit rose to £4 millions
and similar deficits were apprehended in the next two years due
(3)
to the pressure of the transferred India debt* As the Directors
(4)
were unwilling to increase capital stock and the public clamour was 
high, Robert Dundas, son of Henry Dundas the first Lord Melville, 
who had succeeded Tierney at the India Board, had to appoint a Select 
Committee to review the Company’s affairs and report on its petition 
for assistance in 1809* The government meanwhile paid £lp millions 
more towards its account with the Company* In return the Directors 
agreed to allow direct trade between Africa and North and South
America, and also between the Cape, New South Wales and Ceylon*
(1) Expositions of the state of the Company’s Finances at Home and 
Abroad* by W* Ramsay* The Asiatic Annual Register*. Yol H I  p* 308.
(2) See Fourth Report 10 April 1812*
(3) App* 49 Fourth Report
(4) App. 11* Second Report
—204*7
The Select Committee published four reports between 1808 and
(1)
1812* The Second Report dealt with the history of ordinary
revenues and charges of the Indian governments between 1792 and
1808. As certain material adjustments of the assets had to be
made and the extraordinary receipts and disbursements had been
(2)
entirely left out, the Third Report of the Select Committee went
over the field more minutely. According to the Second Report the
excess of charges, after defraying interest upon debts, in the
(V>
seventeen years since 1792^had amounted to £4,987,676 to which 
the ordinary charges of the Board of Trade and the Commercial 
establishments, not added to the invoice price of Indian goods, 
£3,056,251, must be added* The rapid growth of military charges 
in this period had been primarily responsible for such deficit*
These amounted to £3,477,027 in 1793 but rose to £7,659,791 in 1808* 
The excess in this field alone accounted for almost the whole
(4)
excess of the ordinary charges*
(1) Ordered to be printed 11 May 1810.
(2) Ordered to be printed 21 June 1811.
(3) Surplus revenues 1792—1808 - £6,478,397
Surplus charges do do - £11,466,073. Second Report*
(4) There were two periods of increase-frcm 1796 to. 1801 and frcan
1802 to 1805. The former saw the new modelling of the army*
’the increase of pay and batta, the wars with France and Tipu 
Sultan, the expeditions to the Eastern islands and the Red Sea 
while the latter saw the renewal of the Anglo-French war after 
the failure of the Peace of Amiens and the Second Maratha war* 
The high level of the later years was due to permanent 
additions to the military establishment. A very material part 
of civil charges was caused in the process of military expansion 
viz* stipends to the nati^ princes under the subsidiary 
treaties#
This deficit of £8,043,927 must have been provided by
extraordinary resources - i.e. aggregate produce of the supplies
from England and sums raised on loans. The Select Committee
was here confronted with the fundamental difficulty of separating
the political from the commercial concerns in order to apportion
the debts between them. The home finances were equally involved*
Ordinarily the funds were received from the sale of India and
China goods in London for which returns were made in export of
goods, stores, bullion and bills. But occasionally extraordinary
funds had been raised from the increase of capital stack* or of bond debt
or from repayment by the government for disbursements in India etc*
In the opinion of the Select Committee, "till it shall be clearly
ascertained that the supplies frcm the Home Treasury to India
and China were derived from sources purely commercial - the question
of a distinct view of the proportion of the Indian debt which
is to be termed political or commercial, must remain undecided*" It
made a tentative calculation in the Third Report according to which
(1)
'supplies to India amounted to £43,808,541 and supplies from India
(2) (3)
to £42,178,640 - leaving a balance of £1,629,701 in favour of England*
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Footnotes (1), (2), & (3) relating to previous page:
(1)
Supplies from. England: 1792-1808
TO INDIA
Invoice value of goods and 
stores sent to India 
(Sale value in India 
&S, 904,068. App. 8 Third 
Report)
(A) Bullion received 
Bills of Exchange 
Sundry receipts
3* Actual receipt 
£31,404,230
(B) Political charges 
(or Home Charges)
App# 46, Third Report
(c) Disbursements of H#M#
Payraas te rT s Gene ral
£11,534,218
7,360,752
14,746,038
395.372
£ 34,054,380 
6,193,049
5.560.912 
£ 43,808,341
TO BENGAL
do do..........£4,838,329
(Sale value 
- £3,602,340)
do do 5,322,124
do do 8,129,215
do do 507.062
£ 18,596,730
(App# 3# Third Report)
(2 ) Supplies from India: 1792-1808
Investment of goods £ 25,407,099 App. 4, Third Report
Sundry advances for bills
repayable in England 2,329,236 do do
Commercial charges not
added to invoice 2,916,279 ^
Net supply to Canton 3,313,654 App. 15# Third Report
Advances and Charges In
Indio* admitted as claims 8,212,372
on public and paid by
H#M.G.---------------------------
£42,178,640
(3) The Court claimed £8,118,861 as due from territory to commerce.
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Actual extraordinary receipts in India amount^to £31,404,250 in 
goods, stores etc. and £20,905,194 in credit or in all 
£52,509,424 and actual extraordinary disbursements to £43,794,623. 
The difference between the total extraordinary receipts 
and disbursements, after adjustments, came up to £8,298,660 
of which £5,615,494 was in cash at the different treasuries 
and the rest might be said to have increased the dead stock. 
Deducting such assets from the loans contracted there was
CD
CD
Extraordinary 
Receipts in India
Goods, Bullion 
Bills etc.
Loans
(App. 2 Third 
Report)
Extraordinary
disbursements
After adjustments
£ 31,404,230
£ 20,905,194 
£ 52,309,424
£ 45.794.623 
£ 8,514,801
£ 8,298,666
* 3E * App. 4 Third Report puts 
investment at £25,407,099. 
Fourth Report puts net supplies 
to Canton at £2,877,161
^ raordinaix
Disbursements in Indiav
(a) Excess of Political
Charges
(b) Commercial charges
not added to invoice
(c) Investments
(d) Net supplies to
Canton
(e) Advance payments to
commanders, Advance 
freight & demurrage
(f) Service of H.M.Navy
Ships of War etc.
(g) Sundry
(hj Advances on acc/ of 
Ceylon etc. not in­
cluded in territorial 
charges and not 
admitted.
(i) Payment to Public
creditors of the Nawab 
of Arcot 
(j) Do Do Tanjore not trans* 
ferred to London 
(k) Loss of remittance
between Presidencies 
(1) Sums written off
£ 5,078,015
2,916,279
26,038,266
5,315,654
1,128,780
913,778
286,678
1,661,345
1,058,955
64,044
873,403
461.428
£43,794,623
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a total defalcation of £12,606,528 in India, the causes of which
might be described as the excess of political charges (which should
be debited against the territory), secondly, the commercial charges not
added to invoice (which shaild be debited against the Company*s commerce),
thirdly, advances on account of Ceylon etc. not included in the Indian
charges (which cu^ it to be repaid by the British Government) fourthly,
payments to the private creditors of Arcot (the nature of which was
(1)
always dubious).
(2)
The Fourth Report contains a review of the home concern, a
profit and loss account of the India and China trade and an analysis
of the present causes of deficit and distress. The average sale
proceeds of Indian goods amounted between 1795 and 1809 to
£2,637,746 per year. Deducting the average cost and charges -
£2,328,185 - the average profit on India trade amounted to
C3)
£309,561 per year. In the several years from 1793 to 1805 the 
average prime cost of the Indian investment brought to sale - 
£1,356,490 - considerably exceeded the 1793 estimate except in 
1797 and 1804 when it was a little below. After a couple of years
(1) App. 27. Third Report.
(2) Ordered to be printed 10 April 1812.
(3) Average sale proceeds of Indian goods - £2,637,746
Average cost and charges - £2,328,185
Average profit on Indian goods - £ 309,561
When the commercial charges, not added to invoice, are taken 
into account, the average profit is reduced to a mere £156,639.
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of depression it had again picked up from 1808-9. The average 
A  Ctc
annual profit onAChina trade had been £981,932 but it had been 
much less affected by the contingencies of war. The total 
amount of the Company*s funds, exclusive of new stocks and loans, 
was £115,643,987 in these seventeen years and the total payments, 
exclusive of repayment of loans, was £119,893,583 - leaving a 
deficit of £4,249,596 most of which had been made good by the 
sanctions of the Parliament. Considering the Indian deficits to be 
£12,606,828 and deducting from it improvement of the favourable 
balances in CjxLna, Prince of Wales Island, Cape of Good Hope,
St* Helena and London - the net deficit of the Company’s concerns 
at home and abroad amounted to £11,020,566. The Select Committee 
considered the Political branch to be responsible for £6,364,931 
of this deficit while the increase of dead stock accounted for 
£921,690 and the doubtful part for £5,953,660. The difference 
between these items and the net deficit - £2,219,715 - must have
4D
cone frail the Company’s commercial profits*
The view that emerges out of this forest of statistics is
none too favourable to the Company’s claim to the India monopoly*
It had earned on India trade an average mercantile profit of
£156,639 (calculating the commercial charges not added to invoice)
(1) The Select Committee thinks that the charges of the ^ Settlements 
in Prince of Wales Island, Bencoolen and St. Helena should not 
be debited to the Territorial tfccount - wit being very 
questionable whether these settlements are more requisite for 
political or Commercial objects.n
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which was negligible* But the China trade, which was partly 
an indirect remittance trade from India, was profitable enough 
to enable it to contribute towards the territorial deficits 
£2,219,715* It was unable to meet its obligations through the 
medium of canmerce and had to appeal for public assistance each year 
since 1806 but one must remember also that the period was one of 
continuous war in India and Europe which caused unprecedented 
expenditure, upset estimates of investments and sale receipts
(1)
and ultimately unloosened the avalanche of the transferred debt#
The advance of private trade, which did not have to bear
such strains, was naturally remarkable* From 1793 to 1809 the
sale produce of privilege and private goods amounted to £33,991,256
of which the privilege trade from India per Charter Act of 1793
(2)
amounted to £21,035,573* Total tonnage supplied to the
individuals was 21,743 tons outward and 70,444 tons homeward besides
(3)
private trade in India-built shipping which was 56,780 tons* The 
outward tonnage had been very little used during 1795-1802, being 
only 1466 tons* But the outward tonnage, demanded since 1803,
(1) Great Britain incurred a total debt of £245,004,157 from the
beginning of the war in 1793 to 1813 which, minus the redemption 
through the sinking fund, stood at £101,798,716* Blic Halevy* 
England in 1815* Benn* Second Revised Edn* 1949 p* 368* .
(2} App* 45. Fourth Report*
(3) App* 46* ibid*
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had been 20,277 tons which was a striking evidence of the growing
export of British manufactures to India* The tonnage supplied
homeward had also increased frcrn an average of 3775 tons between
1795 and 1802 to an average of 5030 tons between 1803 and 1810*
The average value of the privilege trade had risen paripassu
from £617,365 between 1794 and 1798 to £1,780,234 between 1799
and 1807 and had fallen a little to £1,129,408 in 1809* Over the
whole period the average of the Company*s trade amounted to
£2,656,000 and the average of the privilege trade to £1,314,000*
Even more remarkable was the benefit to the Enpire as a
whole* YJhile the people of India and China benefitted frcm about
£46 millions spent on the investment, the returns thereof together
with the private fortunes sent through the medium of commerce,
the amount of duties received by the State and of profits received
a *Ko Less Ov<v>v
by the manufacturers led to the diffusion, of £185,960,000 In the
CD
circulation of the empire or about £10,900,000 per annum* The
(1) Distribution of returns from India and China
in purchase of the produce and manufacture
of England £ 29,200,000
Employment of shipping 25,000,000
Payment of bills o-f exchange 24,500,000
Purchase of bullion the imporb of which 
may be supposed to have been In
payment of British exports 9,400,000
Disbursement of home charges 11,600,000
Dividends and interest on bonds 12,500,000
Sale of private goods and privilege goods 33,800,000
Duties on imports and exports 39,960,000
o^ujiXh Rs^ vortr.
£ 185,960,000
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Fcurth Report v/as of course not accounting for tlie other side 
of the balance sheet and exaggerating a bit the benefits derived from 
the Company's India and China monopoly in order to divert the 
public attention from the realities in India* Yet the account was 
not so bad after seventeen years of continuous warfare*
Let us S8e what Bengal paid for this* Her total surplus 
revenues in this period, after defraying interest on debt, were
a)
£29,315,979* Goods, bullion and bills etc* from England accounted 
for another £17,360,651* Barring loans, her ordinary and 
extraordinary receipts amounted to £46,676,630* Her disbursements
(2)
on investment and supplies to the presidencies amountwlto £45,884,059*
The receipts and disbursements almost tally if the debts struck off, 
the increase of dead stock etc* are taken into account* ’<Vhy then the
(1) App* 3 Second Report*
(2) Receipts Disbursements
App* 3 Surplus revenues £29,315,979 Investment £16,405,816
Third Report (App *4 Third Re-
App* 8* Sale value of port)
Third Report goods from England 3,602,340 Commercial charges
rrv er rtoo -**>* added to in-App* 3 (Bullion 5,322,124 * /A
Third Report (Bills ^ S ’oS ™ ra Report) ’ 1,625,072
(Sundry 507,062 Net supplies to
Madras 14,385,665
£ 46,676,630 Ret Supplies to
Bombay 13*467*506
£ 45,884,059
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(1)
enormous loan of £14,150,255 in seventeen years? It was 
because, over and above her own expenses, she had been bearing all 
the expenses of wars, expeditions, maintenance of the occupied 
territories, supplies to Canton and the outlying settlements and 
even relieving the other Presidencies of a large part of their 
unfavourable loans at an unfavourable exchange* It is not easy to 
envisage the British Government or the Company maintaining such a
large standing army in the East or working out their war strategy so
smoothly without the resources of Bengal* Bereft of such
resources the other foreign goverments failed miserably* But to
achieve this end her future revenues had to be mortgaged* She
was held in ransom by the l&iropean creditors of the Company*
Bengal had to provide for the remittance of not only the
(2)
income of such loans but the private fortunes which arose from, other
(3) (4)
sources - savings from salaries, profits of shipping, docks etc*
(1) Loans - £14,150,255 (App. 2 Third Report)*
(2) Reckoned to be about £2 millions per year G.G* in C* to Court
(Financial) 23 August 1809*
(3) Greatly increased with additions to the civil and military
establishments*
(4) Reduced since 1803* There were about 1Q9 merchant vessels
belonging to the port of Calcutta in 1803, there were only 
69 in 1809* The building of ships was also on a lower 
scale - only 6027 tons were built between 1807 and 18Q9* 
Both, however, began to rise after 1809 — there being 111 
ships of 41,865 tons in 1813 and 50 vessels of 24,732 
tons being built between 1810 and 1813* See Phipps op*cit. 
pp. 126-27. Milburn op.cit p. 173* Messers Kyd & Co* 
and Messers John Gilmore & Co* were the biggest builders 
while Fairlie, Fergus son & Co* and Hogue, Davidson & Co* 
were the largest ship owners*
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(1)
income from indigo manufacture, income from
houses owned by the Europeans in Calcutta, which amounted to no
tat
less than 2Q lakhs per year, and profits of the country and coastal 
trade* The demand for transfer of capital was the last straw*
As general trade with Europe and America stagnated it became 
gradually impossible for Bengal to remit these vast obligations 
through the medium of her produce* "Indigo alone has perhaps 
prevented the private European capital from being withdrawn fran 
the country, for had it not afforded a channel of remittance, a 
large proportion of the Company's debt must have been transferred to 
England*" Even persons, who were not holders of the public 
securities, found it necessary to purchase them frcm the resident 
creditors with a view to exchange them for bills dn England*
It was not the Court alone which had been hit by the transfer 
of capital* The agency houses, which conducted business mostly on 
borrowed capital and lived on the margin of difference between what 
they gave for money and what they got for it, were feeling the pinch
as capital flowed away from Bengal* The Government, solicitous for
(1) About S.R* 76,00,000 worth of indigo were being exported 
annually since 1806 by private individuals* Dr* Buchanan 
Hamilton's sample survey of 180^refers to 75 indigo factories 
in Purnea, 7 in Patna and Gya, 18 in Shahabad and 21 in Dinajpur, 
while S.R. 6,30,000 of Eiropaan manufactured indigo was annually 
exported from Rangpur* Almost all Bengal districts produced 
indigo under European management* See Hunter's Bengal
MS. Records 4 vols and Palmer papers op.cit*
(2) On the basis of a 5£ house tax which yielded S.R* 1,00,000* See 
G.G* in Cl to Court (Financial) 23 August 1809*
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their interest, continued with the Bank of Bengal much against
(l)
the Court's desire* The names of A* Colvin, John Palmer and
J* Alexander in the list of the Directors of the Bank point out
in whose interest mainly it was being established* For the
Court the government suggested acceptance of bullion from the-
Americans, the Spanish Americans and the Portugese in return for
bills on Bengal* If England had demand on Bengal and Bengal had
a favourable balance with America, Lisbon and Brazil, this could
be easily done and was being done in the triangular trade between
England, India and China* Convinced that the Court would accept
its advice, the ■government did not hesitate to draw bills on
account of the principal of India debt to the extent of £2,292,606
(2)
in 1809-10*
Failure to revive monopoly: The Court faced this when the Company had
(3)
lost 14 ships valued about £2 million in the course of 1808-9*
The Indian investment of £1,425,928 could not meet such a huga deficit*/
With her surplus revenue reduced to C.R. 1,72,00,690, for which Minto
(4)
made the expenses on the Persian mission responsible, Bengal
(5)
contributed about 85 lakhs of sicca rupees to the investment* The
(6)
Court had itself reduced the piece goods indent to 22 lakhs but
(1) Court to Gr*Gr* in C* (Public) 9 September 1807 anil G.O* in C*
to Court (Public 1 March 1809*
(2) App* 1 Second Report* Bengal drew for S.R* 94,00,730*
(3) Court to C*G. in 0* (Commercial) 16 January 18IQ* App* 2 Second
Report puts it at £1,048,077*
(4) Minto to Chair 23 April 1809*
(5) G.G* in C* to Court (Com^) 22 October 181Q*
(6) Court to G.G. in C. (Commr) 2 September 1808*
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though it had increased the indent for indigo from 10 lakhs to
CD
20 lakhs and desired as great a quantity of silk as could he
(2)
obtained, the Bengal government sent far less of the former as
(3)
its price had been raised too high due to private competition
C4)
and held out little hope of suddenly increasing the latter* As
a gesture of good will to the cotton manufacturers, hit by the
American embargo, but more in a blind search for a suitable
remittance, the Court ordered cotton on its own account apart from
allowing the private traders to bring it in country ships in
(5)
1809-10. Hera too Bengal failed on the ground of difficulties
(S)
in procuring fine cotton*
The Bengal government's attitude was not a little influenced 
by the private traders' towards the Company's attempts to revive
(7$
its monopoly, While favouring the Company* a purchase of indigo,
(8)
they looked askance at its attempt to monopolise silk, thought it
should "better leave those (cotton) speculations to us poor
(D
Bengalese" and criticised its investment in inferior cloth* Opftum 
was too sacred to be touched and when the Court ordered its Canton
servants not to do agency work for private opium traders or the
(1) Court to G.G* in C* (Comm-) 30 June 1809
(2) Court to G.G. in C. (Camr) 26 Fsbruary 1808*
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Conmr) 25 November 1809, 5 January 1810*
(4) G.G. in C. to Court (CoramD 3 March 1809*
(5) Court to G.G. in C. (Coamrr) 10 February and 21 April 1809
(6) G.G. in C. to Court (Canm ) 19 July 1809
(7) John Palmer to H. Trail 29 September 1808. Palmer Papers op.cit*
vol* 68•P'<J7
(8) John Palmer to Blane 8 November 1808, &CA V -IS T
(9) John Palmer to George Millet 14 December 1809 ibid Vol* 75 p* 60*
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British navy occupied Macao, there was an uproar among the agency
(1 )
houses* Like them the Government frankly avowed that the
channel of trade no longer afforded remittance to the Company
either facilities should be given them to take country ships to
London or send goods indirectly through the Americans so that
private remittance, now demanded in bills, could be diverted*
There was another alternative. The Court could accept bullion from
the foreign traders in return for bills on Bengal. In short it
(2)
advised the Court to give up its monoply to its sworn rivals.
Ironically enough the Court ordered large investments in 1810-11
partly to compensate losses of 1808—9 and partly to recapture trade
(3)
from the Americans during the continuance of the embargo. It
still regarded the commercial channel adequate for all remittance -
public and private. It blamed the agency houses for transfer of
(4)
the principal and exhorted the Government to become the sole agent 
for the non-resident creditors. The Americans now showed too little 
excess of exports to be absorbed in England and the Company could 
not hawk around its Bengal bills in New York or Lisbon* The 
only way to recover the damage done by war and the pressure of
(1) John Palmer to H. Trail 20 January 1809 ibid vol. 69, p. 139*
(2) This was one of the reasons for not imposing double duties on
the Americans till 1811..
(3) Indent for piece goods rose to 60 lakhs and silk to 5000. bales
(Commercial Despatch 30 March 1810), indigo to 45 lakh3 (Secret 
Committee to G.G. in C. 27 February 1810) and cotton to 
14000 bales (Commercial Despatch 29 August 1810).
(4) This was palpably unjust. The agency houses suffered no less
for transfer of capital. See John Palmer to J. Drummond 17
December 1808. Palmer Papers op.cit. vol* 69 p. 79*
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bills was to send an enlarged investment or, if that was 
impossible, to send bullion*
Ibur events - two commercial and two financial in nature — 
not only denied the Court the fulfilment of this dr earn but greatly 
added to its burden* There was a renewal of American competition 
in India* There were further funding operations and a large scale 
expenditure on account of the expeditionAto the French Islands in 
1810 and to Java in 1811* Finally there was a trade depression 
in England*
To increase its surplus revenue the Bengal Government
(2)
introduced customs regulations, which badly hampered internal
trade and hurt the indigenous traders, but it could not send the
(3)
investments ordered* As debt bills were scarcely available and
(4)
other bills gave 2s 4d where indigo gave 2s 6d the sicca rupee,
the price of indigo went high which American competition and low
(5)
production increased further* Cloth prices rose by 55$ and silk
(6)
too, till it was almost monopolised* Nor could bullion be sent to
(?)
auy appreciable extent as bullion was required in Bombay to 
facilitate her funding operations and Canton, itself in trouble,
(1) Court to G.G* in C. (Public) 20 June 1810.
(2) Regulations 9 and 10 of 1810*
(3) John Palmer to H. Trail 31 January 1810 Palmer Papers op.cit*
voL* 76 p. 48. The agency houses were paying a premium of 
Rs. 4-10 to Rs 4-12$ for the transferrable 8$ and Rs. 4-7 to 
Rs 4-8$ for those of which interest only was payable in bills*
(4) G.G. in C. to Court 28 February 1811
(5) John Palmer to H. Trail 3 October 1809. Palmer Papers op.cit.
Vol* 73, pp. 72-74.
(6) G.G. in C* to Court (Comm ) 30 April 1811*
(7) About 40 lakhs worth of bullion was sent from Bengal*
could send little. Even this small exertion incensed the agency 
(2) 
houses*
They were further incensed by the successful attempt of the
government to fund the optional debt by opening an 8$ loan on
1 September 1810. To prevent interest bills, they were made
payable at a premium of 2$. More, the government devised a plan
to reduce interest on the registered debt from 8$ to 6$ and on
treasury notes from 6$ to 4$. induce the creditors 8$ was allowed
to 30 June 1811, interest was made payable by bills at 12 months date
and a hope was held out that part of the principal might be
(3)
transferable in future. The optional debt was largely funded and
interest: on five millions at least was reduced to 6$>. But this
measure led to a transfer of S.R. 4,79,12,755 of the principal of
(5)
India debt from India. The agency houses were furious. John
Palmer gave a piece of his mind on "the trickish conversion of the
8$ into a 6$ loan": "that the ct (the Court Jknew, approved and
sanctioned the measure I am satisfied, in spight (sic) of pretended
(6)
ignorance and disavowal..."
(1) Madras and Bombay received I*? crore^ in 18IQ-11. Canton received
net supplies of £141,287 in 1809—10 and £337,272 in 1810—11.
(2) The investment amounted to S.R. 1,20,00,000, yet Palmer wrote,
"I think this effort to crush the private trade - for It was 
senseless to suppose they look for profit - must recoil with 
desperate effect on the Leadenhall." John Palmer to H. Trail 
10 February 1811 Palmer Papers op.cit. vol. 78. p. 357.
(3) G.G. In C. to Court (Financial) 4 January 1811*.
(4) G.G. in G. to Court (Financial)16 February 1811.
(5) S.R. 2,23,00,000 from Bengal# G.G. in C. to Court (Financial)
3 February 1812*
(6) John Palmer to E. Trail 3 July 1811 Pakner Papers op.cit. vol. ,
79, p. 190.
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Though they bad been demanding reduction of Mauritius from
( U
1808, the financial effects of IIintoTs expeditions to Mauritius in
1810 and Java in 1811 were hardly to their benefit# The former
destroyed the tiest of the Ifrenck privateers which preyed on the
country ships (and took a heavy toll of India^men in 1809} and the
latter forestalled Napoleon*s plan to make Java the base of future
maritime operations against British commerce in the China seas# But
they cost £7 millions* This together with the exodus of a large
amount of capital on the debt account for several years^  created
a great scarcity in the Bengal money market. Speculative commercial
adventures to Mauritius and Java accentuated it further and soon the
rate of interest among private traders reached 12$* Indigo prices
soared* trade became dull from 1811 and the Anglo-American war put
(2)
a stop to the only considerable foreign channel of remittance#
John Palmer to Prendergast - 21 January 1809 ibid vol* 09 p# 175# 
C.N. Parkinson, Jar in the Eastern Seas 1793-1815* op#cit* 
pp. 371-73#
(2) CALCUTTA - LONDON
Tr# Imports Exports
S.R* S.R#
1810-11 38,67,224 70,87,766
1811-12 39,44,247 85,12,791
1812-13 49,50,945 72,96,970 •
CALCUTTA - COPENHAGEN CALCUTTA - BRAZIL
Yr* Imports. Exports Imports Exports
S.R* S.R* S.R. S.R*
1810-11 13,464 x 18,94,085 14,62,230
1811-12 x x 14,98,203 29,31,815
1812-13 x x 22,76,850 39,48,552
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Footnote (2) continued.
CALCUTTA - U.S.A. CALCUTTA - MANILLA
Yr.
1810-11
1811-12
1812-13
Imports
S.R.
67,71,894
5,85,434
6,17,391
Export s 
S.R.
68,36,365
15,95,374
10,94,609
Imports
S.R.
29,69,942
3,27,450
1,72,432
Exports
S.R.
12,70,541
8,73,481
3,19,776
CALCUTTA - MAURITIUS CALCUTTA - JAVA & MALACCA
Yr.
1810-11
1811-12
1812-13
Imparts
S.R.
1,34,688
3,37,715
8,79,934
Exports
S.R.
5,72,807
14,51,280
15,03,232
Imports
S.R.
19,885
3,45,451 
m 5,88,964
Exports
S.R.
4,34,656
10,73,485
8,57,436
* only with Java. There were very little imports from 
Amboyna. Exports to Amboyna were S.R. 2,73,191 in
1810-11 and S.R. 3,89,396 in 1811-12.
Co vyx clL ■
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The agency houses, in response to peremptory demands of their
European constituents, began to sell out securities which wer8
(1)
consequently depressed. To preserve their value as well as to 
maintain the salt and opium revenue, the government offered a 
loan of 25 lakhs to the agency houses, allowed some transfer of
(2}
capital and asked for the Court’s permission for further transfer.
Jhen the Court castigated the government for Its unfulfilled
(3)
promises to send bullion and ordered one million in specie, the 
latter thought of relieving the home treasury by floating a
reserving the option to grant transfer 
at 2s 6d though the Court had already adopted the plan of re-transfer 
of debt to India. Bengal debt bearing interest rose to C.R. 23,50,42,400 
on 30 April 1812 inspite of a surplus revenue of C.R. 2,32,98,550. 
Bullion was sent and the year’s Indian investment amounted to
(4)
£1,693,397 but the bills on the Court reached S.R. 1,04,09,593.
Meanwhile England had entered into a period of trade depression. 
The speculative South American bocm failed and with it the speculative
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Financial) 3 February 1812
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Financial) 17 August 1812. This helped
the agency houses by re-introducing option and relieving the 
pressure of export of capital. John Palmer to II. Trail 
27 October 1811. Palmer Papers op.cit. Yol. 79, p. 204.
(3) Secret Committee to G.G. in C. 8 March 1812.
(4) G.G. in C. to Court (Financial) 10 October 1812*
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import of commodities* Hapoleon had ql* dered a more stringent
application of the Continental System since 1810 and the
countervailing Orders in Council worsened the situation* The
Anglo-American \&r deepened the crisis in 1812* The Court*s
expectation of a larger investment and a larger sale could not
(1) (2) 
materialise* It reduced the indent for piece goods* Cotton
had already been stopped with the temporary renewal of the Anglo**
(3)
American trade at the end of the embargo* Sugar had been
(4)
discontinued and sunn and hemp discarded except on public
(5) (6),
account. Tha Court depended solely on indigo and Bilk now
(?)
and even thought of erecting its own indigo factories. But
(8)
though the government sent about 40 lakhs in silk and resumed its 
saltpetre monopoly, it sent little indigo against the Secret
(1) £1,510,790 from India and about 85 lakhs of S.R* from Bengal*
(2) Court to G.G* in C. (Comm) 15 May 1811* Indent for Dacca
piece goods had now fallen to a meagre 3 lakhs*
(3) Court to G.G. in C* (Coran1) 29 August 1810, 30 October 1811*
(4) Court to G.G. in C. [Cam. } 11 September 1811*
(5) Court to G.G. in C* (Comm1) I May 1812
(6) Secret Committee to G.G. In C* 14 February 1812.
(7) John Palmer called it an "infatuation"* John Palmer to Henry Trail
4 November 1811* Palmer Paper5op.cit* vol* 79 p. 212*
(8) Silk sent on account of the Company -
Yr* lbs*
1808 325,243
1809 116,124
1810 373,598
1811 258,953
1812 558,862
Reports and Documents connected with the Proceedings of the East India 
Cpmpany in regard to the culture and manufacture of cotton wool, raw 
silk, and indigo in India. 21 December 1836*
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(1 )
Committee’s order for an enlarged supply* It sent only 42
(2)
lakhs in specie - a veritable drop in the ocean*
Lord Minto was recalled in 1812# In May 1811 he had promised
to send one million of specie in the three following years and on
that basis the Court had accepted more than four Billions of India
debt* Not only could he not keep his promise but he had increased
the Court’s burden further - (the last time) for the avowed reason
(3)
of relieving the private traders from distress* . He had no
backing from any political party in England and had collided with
Robert Bundas over many questions of policy - particularly over the
mission of Harford Jones to Persia* He had made himself unpopular
with the powerful body of the Company’s creditors by his policy of
(4)
funding and reducing interest* As Wellesley recognised to his 
discomfiture that necessity of private capital import and private 
capital remittance was a primary concern of the Indian government, 
so did Llinto to his own* The dilemma was apparent to the Indian 
government, if not to the Court, that either It must assist private
(1) Indigo purchased by the E*I* Company*
Yr* Yalue,
1807 9,62,690
1808 17,59,706
1809 X
1810 18,24,811
1811 4,71,567
See G.G* in C. to Court (Comm1) 10 October 1812
(2) G.G* in C* to Ccurt (Financial) 19 December 1812*
(3) In all Llinto could send £1,858,719 while bills on account of
principal and interest since 1807 had been £7,141,000 and 
£4,326,000 respectively. See Court to G.GI in C* (Public) 
9 September 1812*
(4) Charles Ricketts to Lord Liverpool Add* MSS* 38,410, f* 297*
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remittance through the channel of private trade (as Wellesley did)
or it must allow remittance through the transfer of capital (as
Minto was forced to do) — in each case affecting the Company’s
home concerns deeply* The only way out under the circumstances
was a surrender of the India monopoly* Continuation of the
Napoleonic wars and the exigencies of imperial expansion in India
had left no other alternative before the Company*
At home the Company had been living on public assistance
since 1807* In 1807 its deficiency had been met from an extension
of bond debts, in 1808 frcm the government’s repayment of a part of
advances made in India* In 1810 the Government again came to its
(1)
help with the issue of £Xj million of exchequer bills, in 1811 with
a further authority to extend its bond debts by £2 millions*
Notwithstanding the favourable reports of the Select Committee these
proceedings roused a host of critics* Some condemned it for
charging high freight, some for monopolising silk and cotton, some
(2)
for its never-ending balance with the home government, same for
(3)
trading on borrowed capital, and sane again for increasing customs
(4)
in India deliberately to hurt private trade* YJith the trade
(1) Court to G.G. in C. (Public) 29 June 1810*
(2) CreeVy, 14 May 1810* The Asiatic Annual Register Yol* XLI p* 195*
(3) Pari* Hist* N* S* Yol* II p* 1074*
(4) The private traders charged the Company with increasing customs
from 7-g$ (including town duties) to 10$ by Regulations 9 and 10 
of 1810* The amount of drawback and the mode of valuation also 
came under attack* See Report by Mr* Courtenay relative to
duties on export, import and transit of goods in India etc*
25 January 1814* Home Misc* 523 p* 10*
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depression of 1810-11 affecting industry, commerce and shipping,
the manufacturing interest and the shipping and commercial
interests at the aitports rose in unison to join these critics
in demanding a total abolition of the Companyts monopoly at the
end of the Charter period in 1813*
Charter negotiations: The Charter Correspondence seriously
(i)
began at the end of 1811 and the President of the India Board struck
in his very first letter the theme that runs through the whole of
it# If the Court held to its old opposition to private trade and
to its oft-repeated arguments about colonisation etc# "I cannot hold
out to you the least expectation, that His. Majesty's Government
will be disposed to depart from the proposal entertained in my
letter, or that they will concur in any application to Parliament,
for the continuance of a System of trade, conducted under all the
restraints now imposed upon it, and for the pemanency of which
(2)
the Court of Directors have so strenuously contended#” Hith a
formal reply that reiterated the necessity of an es elusive trade,
"interwoven as that trade is with the very frame and integrity
(3)
of those possessions*#**##,” the Secret Court thought it better to
appoint a deputation to meet the ministers and the Chairman proposed
(1) It started first in December 1808 but was postponed pending
publication of the Select Committee Reports#
(2) Melville to Chairs 17 December 1811# 1*0# Charters Yol# 14#
(printed)p# 44 -
(3) Chairs to Melville 4 March 1812, ibid p* 49*
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before the deputation certain hints to be submitted to Lord 
Meltille which outlined the limits of concessions the Court was
U)
prepared to make# Earlier conversations with the Ministry had
persuaded the Court to declare its terms and they were still
formidable# The Company was to retain its China monopoly and the
private traders would be allowed to trade with India freely on
certain conditions# They could not take up ships below 400 tons,
must get a licence for sailing out and mustnot take military and
naval stores. They would need licence for exporting piece goods
while silk and saltpetre would still renain exclusively in the
Company's hands# London was to be the sole emporium of trade and
the Company's the sole warehouse# There were to be restrictions on
residence in India and the residents would be liable to taxation#
The public was to bear charges of His Majesty's troops beyond a
maximum and to fund the transferred debt of 1812-13# The
(2)
deputation later asked for a tern longer than 20 years and an
(3)
addition of ten shillings to the dividend, free of income tax#
Like his father, the second Lord Melville had not much
illusion about augmentation of British exports but still he negatived
the main proposals of the deputation which v/ould have rendered
(1) Hints to be submitted to Lord Melville 3 March 1812# These hints
weredrafted on the basis of the Chairs' conversations with 
Melville- on 20 and Percival and other ministers on 24 February 
1812# ibid# pp. 62-70#
(2) Deputation of Court to Lord Melville 18 March 1812 ibid p# 80#
(3) Deputation of Court to Lord Melville, 19 March 1812 ibid p. 81#
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all concessions nugatory* He did not commit Himself even about
the China monopoly; "public discussion on such an important
question, may possibly produce an alteration of opinion on some
(1)
of the details*" He was wise to have done so as public
agitation in the manufacturing, mining and commercial centres
outside London had grown intense during the summer of 1812*
Parliament was pestered with hundreds of petitions from
all parts of the country demanding abolition of the Company* s
monopoly* Glasgow referred to the American bid to capture all
trade between the Bast and the Vslbst and considered confinement of
(2)
trade to London unnecessary, unjust and impolitic# Liverpool
dwelt on the distress caused by the stoppage of Anglo-American
trade which had halved her exports between 1810 and 1811, rendered
(3)
her ships idle and affected her salt trade* Paisley, Kirkaldy
and ICilmarnock asserted the CompanyTs lack of capital for
conducting India trade while the country had a surplus capital
(4)
which sought a new field of investment* Birmingham complained
of distress among metal-workers and made a plea for a market for
(5)
British iron and steel manufactures to which the iron rasters of
(1) Lord Melville to Deputation of Court 21 March 1812 ibid p* 84*
(2) 19 March 1812 Pari* Deb* vol* 1X11 pp* 89-91.
(3) 23 March 1812 ibid pp* 111-12 Liverpool lost four fifths of
its export trade when the Anglo-American Vfeir broke out in 1812# 
See Herbert Heaton; The American Trade in C.1T* Parkinson 
(Ed) The Trade Hinds 1948 p* 205*
(4) 7 April 1812, ibid pp* 216-21*
(5) 8 April 1812 ibid p. 239* See also Ashton Iron and Steel in
the Industrial Revolution P* 151*
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(1)  ^ (2)
of Sheffield and Shropshire joined* Petitions from the woollen
(3)
manufacturers of Gloucester, Exeter and Leeds were followed by
M
those from silk manufacturers* The Cornish tin-miners pressed
for an annual purchase of 1200 tons of tin at a higher price
(5)
by the Company.
Duly disturbed by this agitation, the Court appointed a
deputation on 9 April 1812 to confer with the ministry# besides
unleashing a spat© of counterpetitions and defensive pamphlets
which eloquently argued for the preservation of its exclusive 
(6)
privileges* The fomal protest came in a letter to Duke of 
Buckinghamshire, the successor of Lord Melville in the Teyeewxl
Cabinet, 15 April 1812* The Court sarcastically remarked that*... 
"little is said about the advantages to be derived from adventures
(1) 29 April 1812 Pari* Deb* op.cit* pp. 1115-17.
(2) 14 April 1812 ibid pp. 325-29*
(3) 27 April 1812 ibid p. 1049 and 30 April 1812, ibid pp. 1125-26
and 8 May 1812. Pari Deb. vol. XXLI p. 96*
(4) I  July 1812 ibid pp* 873-75.
(5) 24 February 1812 sent with Lord Melville*s letter to the Court
5 March 1812. 1*0. Charters vol. 14* p. 87*
(6) Petitions of
London Merchants 4 Jamary 1813 Pari. Deb* Vol. XXIY p* 435* 
Shipowners of London 7 April and 22 Apiil 1812 ibid vol XXIX 
pp. 213-16 and 716-18*
Woollen manufacturers of Cornwall 29 June 1812 ibid vol*
XXIII p* 800.
Resolutions of a Meeting of buyers and others interested in 
the sale of East India piece goods. 21 April 1812. 1*0* Charters 
vol. 14. pp* 133-137*
For pamphlets see East India Tracts Vo&  463*. H(SI* 4 •
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to the unexplored parts of India, and the objects likely to be 
most warmly contended for are not new accessions of commerce to 
the nation, but a transfer of much of those branches of trade, 
already carried on by the Company in London, to individuals in 
the outposts." If all ports were opened and ships of small burthen 
allowed, there TOuld be no end of smuggling, the ptlblic revenue 
would be jeopardised and private sale would always anticipate tkc 
Company* s sales, particularly injuring the cotton manufacture 
and silk manufacture of England. Loss of India trade and 
unrestricted country and coastal trade Y/ould "leave the China 
monopoly so insulated and unsupported as to bring that also at
a)
length to its fall." It is interesting to note that the
Company was trying to use the Indian country trade interest which
was opposed to the introduction of rivalry from British vessels
and to hold up the bogey of Indian textiles before the Lancashire
manufacturers. Poor Charles Grant still considered the arguments
of his Observations of 1800 would suffice in the second decade of
the nineteenth century when the British manufacturers had beaten
their Indian rivals in cost of production* He was naive enough
to hope that the country traders would forget their debacle of
1802. The Court was no longer united, nor had it the same bargaining
(2)
power. While begging the ministry for a loan of £2^ millions, it
(1) Tbfl Chairs to Duke of Buckinghamshire 15 Apiil 1812* 1.0. Charters
Vol. 14 pp. 108-130*
(2) 9 April 1812. Secret Committee Minutes vol* 4. Secret
Miscellany Book. 1.0. 95 f* 40*
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committed the audacity of refusing Buckinghamshire*s terns of
19 April 1812, which proposed to maintain Its China monopoly in
tea but to throw open trade in other China goods, If procured in
India, and to permit private ships to clear out from any port in
Britain but to import into those ports which possessed the
(1)
warehousing system* The tone that was adopted in the General
Court of 5 May 1812 by Randle Jackson and others was definitely a
defiant tone which ill befitted a supplicant*
Not content with petitioning Parliament and publishing
(2)
pamphlets, different manufacturing and commercial bodies in Britain
sent a deputation to London which appointed a committee to meet
(3)
and canvass the Ministers in the Spring of 1812. This Committee 
(of which K* Finlay, the cotton manufacturer, was a prominent member) 
met Perceval and Buckinghamshire on 12 May 1812 and was assured 
that the Prime Minister had previously approved Buckinghamshire*s 
attitude towards the opening of outports, that the principal ports 
would surely be opened and the licensing of private traders would 
not be left solely to the option of the Court* The Committee hoped
(1) Secret Court to Buckinghamshire 20 April 1812* 1*0* Charters
Vol. 14. p. 132*
(2) Letters on the East India monopoly originally published
(a) in the Glasgow Chronicle etc. 2 Edn* Glasgow 1812*
(b) General Thoughts contained in a Letter on the subject of
the Renewal of the E.I* Co*s* Charter* 1812*
(c) Free Trade or an Inquiry etc. 1812*
Cd) The Question as to the Renewal of the E.I. Co*s Monopoly 
Examined, Edinburgh 1812*
(3) Randle Jackson’s speech in the General Court debate of 5 May 1812*
Also a pamphlet of Richard Twining Jr.: Observations relative
to the East India Company’s Charter 1813, and |#etters of Civis in 
the Times 1813#
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that the minimum burthen of- vessels would be fixed considerably
below 400 tons and prayed that China trade, intimately connected
with the Indian and South American trade, should be opened too#
(1)
To the last the Ministers could not agree#
When the assassination of Perceval threw natters into
confusion in 1812 the Committee, apprehensive of the late defiant
tone of the Company and of a possible change in political weather,
reflected that "His Majesty* s ininisters are surrounded by their
commercial enemies, and by all maimer of flatterers and deceivers,
the never failing attendants of ministers, and of Kings, whilst
they themselves are far removed from all opportunities of
advocating their own cause#" It even threatened the government
that if it failed to fulfil promises, "#..#all their utmost exertions
will be required in the painful and momentous contest in which they
(2)
must be engaged#w
When the Secret Committee of the Court, after finding the 
Liverpool Ministry adamant on the question of outports, passed open 
resolutions against such a proposal on 18 December 1812, the Committee 
of Liverpool Merchants, which continued agitation on behalf of 
outports, began to pour petitions on the new Parliament# It 
invited deputations from all outports and commercial towns to
London "there to cooperate with other deputies in concentrating the
(1) Add. MSS. 38,410ff# 81-84#
(2) Note of Mr# Thomas Attwood the High Bailiff of Birmingham, 18
September 1812 ibidff# 90-91#
(3) Thomas Narle, Chaiman of the Committee of Liverpool merchants
to Lord Liveipool 1 January 1813 ibid f# 185#
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weight and influence of the mercantile, manufacturing and trading 
interest of the United Kingdom, unanimously, firmly, and 
respectfully directing their joint efforts in support of their 
just claims*" The Chairman of the Committee stated in no uncertain 
terms that "•••the concession of a free trade to India alone and not 
to China, will be considered by the merchants and manufacturers as 
a nugatory measure, in as much as it will continue to( the Company 
the power of opposing innumerable obstacles to the trade with
(1) ibid f* 184 Trade with China, Penang, Sumatra and the Coast 
of Coromandel had declined since 1811 but was still alluring*
GALCUTTA-CKIKA CALCUTIA-PENANG C ALCU TTA-SUliATRA
Yr* Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
S.R* S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R*
1809-10 83,17,183 66,13,639 17,12,498 21,66,552 50,400 4,03,464
1810-11 65,83,956, 73,72,295 32,64,297 25,34,351 6,35,884 3,27,614
1811-12 48,01,149 62,22,009 20,97,239 25,28,183 3,34,385 11,58,624
1812-13 54,60,195 46,91,931 15,39,992 19,89,853 3,56,321 4,98,969
C ALCUlTA-CBRavlAJTDSL CALCUTTA-45ALABAR
Imports
S.R.
Export s Impo rt s Export s
S.R. S.R. S.R.
CALCUTTA-GUEES 
Import s Exp<orts
S.R*S.R.
1809-10 8,15,753 16,14,260 1,94,971 29,40,231 18,72,791 21,66,552
1810-11 10,00,463 11,23,456 3,91,565 22,38,699 9,40,010 21,90,208
1811-12 9,78,191 17,16,698 5,72,695 21,32,370 14,39,571 31,78,579
1812-13 10,90,568 15,34,459 9,05,794 39,68,498 13,00,776 32,13,894
Bengal Commercial Reports 1809-12#
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of Liverpool and Bristol wanted a share of the still considerable 
coastal and country trade in India. The Edinburgh Chamber of 
Commerce sent similar resolutions to Liverpool on 14 January.
Lord Liverpool, who had formed the Ministry after Perceval*s 
assassination, toyed with the idea of transferring all political 
power from the Company wit hart rousing any suspicion of the Indian 
people "that there was any intention of making any considerable 
change in the system of government" or any outcry that the Charter 
was being violated or the patronage of the Crown increased# India 
trade was to be thrown open and China trade put under the control of 
a Consul# Revenues were to be transferred to the Crown along with 
India debts# Rights of the Company as a joint stock concern were to 
be subjected to a Commission established by the Parliament ishich
i d
would judge all pecuniary claims# Liverpool confessed the plan
was anomalous and liked it so but Buckinghamshire opposed parts of
(2)
it and soon the greater pre-occupation with Napoleon put an end to 
these academic discussions which seoned to imply too dangerous an 
innovation at the moment. Buckinghamshire*s correspondence with 
the Court give dark hints of such deliberations. When the latter 
tried to repeat seme of their old arguments, he frankly threatened, 
w#.#It will be for Parliament to determine, whether the Nation Is,
(1) "Considerations on the Government of India on the event of
the Charter of the E.I.Co. not being renewed." Add* MSS 38,410 
ff. 171-82.
(2) Marginal notes by Buckinghamshire on the same pages#
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in this respect, with.ait an alternative; or whether, if a change
of system should be rendered necessary by the decision of the East
India Company, measures might not be taken for opening the trade, and
at the same tune providing such an administration of the government
of India, as might be found compatible with the interesrt and
(1)
security of the British const ituti on, "
With Hume alone defending Buckinghamshire’s proposals in
the India House debates, the Court tried to take its stand on its
(2 )
services to the British manufacturing class* It was a boomerang,
(3)
for, the private traders could make an equal if not a greater claim# 
When Castlereagh presented eleven resolutions of the government to 
the House of Commons on the proposed terms of the new Charter, the 
Court proposed to call evidence on llie impossibility of augmenting, 
British exports to India* It is no wonder that the evidence adduced 
by the CompanyTs witnesses before the Select Committee (which sat 
from 27 April 1813) corroborated the official point of view* Warren 
Hastings, Lord Teignmouth, Sir Thomas LIunro, Sir John Malcolm,
(1) Buckinghamshire to Chairs 4 January 1813* I*0*Charters vol* 14
p • 183 *
(2) Invoice value of the Company’s exports in woollens to Bengal rose
frcm £40,418 in 1792 to £81,976 in 1806-7, though it fell to 
£51,816 in 1808-9* Goods and stores, other than woollens, 
rose from £108,501 in 1792 to £403,522 in 1808-9* Milbum 
op*cit* pp* 178-79* In 1811-12 the Company imported about 
£319,141 in goods and stores* Bengal Commercial Reports 1811*
(3) Private exports of British manufacture to Bengal rose from
£448,835 in 18G2-3 to £452,562 in 1809-10* In 1812-13 it 
rose to £597,850* Bengal Commercial Reports 1812#
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U) (2)
V/illiam Cowper and Thomas Graham — all servants or ex-servants of
the Company - spoke in unison of the insurmountable difficulties
of extending the sale of British manufacture in India because of the
native inhabitants’ lack of purchasing power, simplicity of taste
and religious prejudices* Even Wellesley, who had once been so
vocal in the cause of British manufacture and considered free trade
to be the open sesame of the Indian market, asked the House of
Lords "to take into their consideration the products, manners, habits,
and custans of the natives of India.*.***A free and unrestrained trade
with India, therefore, would be most injurious to our manufacture by
inundating the country with the Indian piece goods*” Hastings had
tried to push it into Bhootan and Tibet, Shore into Nepal and
Wellesley into the Ceded Provinces - with no success* Yfilliam Fairlie,
the doyen of British Indian merchants, attributed the recent
increase of exports to a rise in the European population* The scale
of remuneration of ordinary labourers, and hence their purchasing
power, had not improved during the British rule* According to
William Cowper wages of a labourer in Chittagong was about 3s a month
(3)
and in Calcutta about 5 to 6s in 1788* It was so while Graham
U)
left Bengal about 1808. The labourers, engaged by the Europeans,
(1) President of the Bengal Board of Trade for five years, menber 
of the Supreme Council for ten years#
(a) Member of the Supreme Council of Cornwallis and Wellesley*
(3) 5 April 1813* Evidence before the House of Lords on the E.I*
Co’s Affairs*
(4) 6 April 1813 ibid* According to William Fairlie who left Bengal
about 1812 - it was between 5s and 7s 6d when employed by the 
natives and between 7s 6d and 25s* when employed by the 
Europeans#
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(1)got a little more — 7s 6d and those engaged by the indigo planters
(2)
still more - from 10s to 15s* According to John Stracey, who
left in 1805, a labourer in IJymensingh got 3s 9d., in Tirhoot 5s*,
(3)
in Doab 7s 6d and in Dacca 3s 6d* a month* Moreover the
economic foreign policy of the State had dictated the Company’s
import policy* Silk was encouraged during war with Italy, com
during war with France, hemp during war with Russia, cotton during
(4)
war with America* The heavy duties for the protection of
British manufacture depressed imports further* When, thus
circumstanced, the Company fared badly in trade, all blame was
put on its monopoly; "They branded it with the name of monopoly,
and armed with the authority of Dr* Adam Qnith, they declared all
monopolies to be mischievous, and with that of Thomas Paine, to be
(5)
contrary to the imprescriptible rights of man#"
A perusal of the pamphlets, petitions and letters of the 
contending parties reveals their many self-contradictions* The 
merchants and manufacturers were more moved by their individual
hardships and immediate interests though they clothed them in a
common garb fashioned by Adam Smith* Thus while the woollen
manufacturers of Cornwall, Devon and Somerset (who got their
(1) Evidence of Alexander Kyd 6 April 1813* ibid*
(2) Evidence of William Fairlie* same date* ibid*
(3) 7 April 1813, ibid#
(4) Letters respecting the Claims of the E*l* Co* for a Renewal of
their Exclusive Privileges* "Yerax" 1813*
(5) A view of the Consequehces of Laying open the Trade to India etc#
Charles Maclean 1813#
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contracts from the Company) wanted the monopoly to remain, their 
brothers-in-trade from Exeter, Leeds, Aberdeen and Y/iltshire 
wanted it to go* The ship-builders and dockers of London did 
not see eye to eye with their fellow-professionals of Liverpool* 
Merchants of London and Glasgow did not share a common notion of 
the inherent birth-right of the British subjects* The free traders 
showed great solicitude for the vjelfare of the Indian people but 
their Ideas of freedom did not extend to the export of machinery 
to India* The London and Yarmouth ship-builders differed on the 
eligibility of the out ports but not on the hannfulness of the
U)
India-built, shipping* The Court wrote to Dundas on 13 January 
1809 that India trade was unprofitable; on 29 April 1812 it 
thaight otherwise* It attacked American trade in 1807 as 
detrimental to the Company’s interest but defended the same in 1812 
and 1813* In the same breath it claimed to have extended the igale 
of British manufacturers in India and asserted the impossibility of 
doing so in future* The evidence before the Select Committee 
seemed to belie the facts* The Value of British exports to 
India had risen from £774,063 in 1792 to £2,095,422 in 1811 (a bad
(1) Petitions of ship-builders of London and outports to Lord 
Liverpool 18 May 1813 Add* MSS* 38,410 f* 247*
-239-
(1 )
year) and that of cotton manufacture alone from £165 to £107,306#
It was idle to point out that the balance of the Company1 s unsold
A- (setuKi-n C2)
imports into Bengal amounted fessaagf 1801 and 1807 to S.R# 23,68,000
 ^emphasize [3)
or toAthe decline of American trade since 1811 • No tortuous logic
could explain away a favour to the Americans which was denied to
fellow-countrymen in distress#
The evidence before the Select Committee did not change the
mind of the ministry and when th9 Chairs met Liverpool, Castlereagh
and Buckinghamshire on 31 May and 10 June 1813, the latter asked
the Company not to use its powers to cramp private trade by
carrying on a losing trade of remittance: "they would not have
the experiment of a free trade interrupted, or, as it was expressed
overlayed (sic) by the weight of the capital of a great Company#"
Y/hen the Chairs wanted monopoly in some staple article like raw silk
or piece goods,they turned it down as unfair# On 15 July the Court
(1) Commodities exported to India
(3)
Value Value
in 1792 in 1811
£ £
Woollens 110,524 277,196
Copper wrought 136,175 240,636
Tinplates and tin ware 2,710 10,226
Iron cast and wrought 34,660 177,002
Iron bar 945 84,026
Lead 12,038 70,310
Cotton manufacture . 165 107,306
Glass and earthenware 26,584 118,172
Report of the Inspector General of Imports and Exports 11 !
Court to G#G* in C# (Comm1) 29 September 1809.
CALCUTTA - U.S.
Imports. S.R# Exports# S.R#
1810-11 67,71,894 68,36,365
1811-12 5,85,434 15,95,374
1812-13 6,17,391 10,94,609
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recommended closing on the Governments terras - particularly because
it was afraid of a worse dispensation from the opposition led by 
„ U 1the Grenville Uhigs# The resolutions were discussed and passed 
in June# On the second reading of the Charter the Canningites tried 
to shorten the China monopoly by ten years, but failed. On the 
third reading Thornton tried to make bills payable in England fall 
on territorial instead of on commercial funds - and thus indirectly 
to withdraw a great part of the commercial funds from the control 
of the Board# He failed too.On 13 July the bill was passed and 
the East India Company lost its historic India monopoly#
The new Charter re-invested the Company with exclusive trade 
with China and trade in tea for another twenty years terminable after 
three years1 notice by the Parliament after 10 April 1831, Trade 
to and from India and other places ?dthin the Charter limits 
except China was thrown open after 10 April 1814 - save In military 
stores to any place in Asia between the Indus and Malacca. Ships 
in private trade were to clear out of and import into places in the 
United Kingdom to be specified by Order in Council, nor would they 
be able to go to any places between the Indus and Malacca - except 
the Company1 s principal settlements unless they iB.d special licences
(1) See Grenville1 s speech in the House of Lords on presenting the 
petition of Bristol on 28 April 1812. Pari# Deb# Vol# EXII 
p# 107? and speech on 9 April 1813 ibid vol# KXV pp. 709—52# 
Grey thought it "hardly decent to avow a decided opposition 
to their (the Company1s)claims#"
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from the Court, the granting of which, however, was made subject, 
to the control of the Board. The Court would grant licences to 
the principal settlements as a matter of course. No ships 
under 350 tons were to obtain the above privilege. To protect 
British silk and cotton manufacture - no articles manufactured 
of silk, hair or cotton or any mixture thereof, imported from the 
Company1 s territories, were to be entered into or taken out of 
any port save London except for re-exportation. No customs duties 
imposed by the governments in India were valid till sanctioned 
by the Court and approved by the Board. The Company and private 
traders were suthoritod to employ India built ships till 1 August 
1814. When the Court refused permission to persons to proceed to 
the Bast Indies, their applications were to be transmitted to the 
Board which might direct certificates to be granted. But to 
prevent colonisation, governments in India might declare 
certificates and licenses void if the grantees seemed to have 
forfeited their claims to protection and might not sanction 
residence to the British subjects without the authority of the Court. 
If they traded or occupied immovable property outside ten miles 
of the 'presidency towns, they would be subject to local 
jurisdiction and must procure certificates of permission from the 
Government#
The territorial and commercial accounts were to be entirely
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separated* Revenues arising from the territorial acquisitions 
were to be applied to maintenance of the army, payment of interest 
on India debt, expenses of establishments and liquidation of 
territorial or bond debt* If India debt was payable in England - 
provision should be made by consignment of appropriate remittances 
to England* A sum equal to the payment from commercial funds 
at home on account of the territorial charges (minus commercial 
charges and charges of commercial establishments defrayed in India) 
was to be applied in India to procure the investment or remittance* 
All commercial profits were to be applied to payment of bills of 
exchange, debts except principal of bond debts, dividends and 
to reduction of India debt or home bond debt* Rome profits were 
not liable to territorial charges till the dividend had been 
provided for - except for payment of bills and certificates for 
which value had been received in India and for interest and nking 
£ind on the loan of 1812* If home funds, after payment of dividends, 
be insufficient to discharge bills drawn on account of interest of 
the existing India debt, the deficiency was to be made up as the 
Parliament directed* A similar deficiency of commercial profits 
for payment of dividends was to be made up from surplus territorial 
revenues after payment of charges and interest. Uhen the principal 
of the debt bearing interest in India should have been reduced to 
£10 millions and the bond debt in England to £3 millions, then
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and thereafter, surplus proceeds of the territory and commerce, 
after providing for the above payments, should be applied to 
the more speedy payment of £2 millions lent to the Company in 
1812* Any further surplus was to be paid to the Exchequer to 
fom a Guarantee Blind not exceeding £12 millions for the capital 
stock and dividend and if there be still any suiplus, one sixth 
of it would belong to the Company and the rest to the government* 
But if debts went beyond £10 millions in India dnd £3 millions 
in England - such surplus proceeds were to be appropriated for 
their reduction*
In teims of actual commercial profit the loss of the India 
monopoly meant little. Even considered as a trade of remittance, 
it had already been facing great hardship* The cotton manufacture 
of India - the foundation of the Company1 s commercial prosperity 
for centuries - was tottering on its last legs* The indent for 
Bengal piece goods declined in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century rapidly - from 66 lakhs of sicca rupees in 1803-4 to 
20 lakhs in 1813* The muslins were the hardest hit* In 1803 
163,220 pieces were ordered, in 1613 only 11,385* The indent 
for calicoes was just halved and for the prohibited goods fell to
1,001,820 pieces 393,815 pieces 
See Court to G.G. in C* (Comm1) 30 June 1802 and (CamiL$eparate) 
2 June 1812
Dacca received a paltry order worth a lakh andone third
(1) Indent for piece goods in 1803-4 and 1813
1803 1813
11,385
331,830
50.600
muslins 
Callicoes 
Prohibit ed
163,220 
671,800 
166.80Q
-2 4 4 -
twenty thousand* Indigo prices were very high after 1809* Silk 
was the only major article which could return a profitable 
remittance* But as we have seen the Bengal government could 
seldom supply the amount wanted though it’ had almost monopolised 
the silk production $ £  Bengal* Cotton was out of the question 
after restoration of peace with America* Even the speculation 
of 1809-10 had failed because of a sudden resumption of trade with 
America* Towards the end of the period bullion was'being 
remitted from Bengal*
The financial aspect of the loss of monopoly was not so 
bleak* With the end of war in Europe and maintenance of a strictly 
pacifist policy in India the Company hoped to regain its lost 
equilibrium* At first sight the separation of the territorial 
and commercial accounts seemed to tie its hands in using 
territorial revenues for the investment in India as the end of 
monopoly, by affecting its sales, seemed to lower its chances of 
securing adequie funds in London* On further analysis it will 
be seen that the commercial profits of the Company were no longer 
liable for any territorial payment until dividends were paid and 
if in any year the fund for dividends fell short, the surplus 
territorial income of the preceding year was to make good the 
deficiency* The Company was moreover not to be left to a 
participation of the casual surplus of the territorial income as
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aid to its investment. The deficits of 1798 - 1801 and 1803-1808
had shown how precarious this source was* It was stipulated
in the new Charter that a sum not less than the ancunt of the
territorial charges paid at home, which exceeded a million sterling,
should be paid yearly out of the territorial revenues for the
investment* This not only secured the investment but took off the
burden of the territorial charges from commercial funds at home:
"And although the power will not remain with the Company, of
rendering, at their discretion, the territorial and commercial
funds mutually serviceable to each other, yet the allotment of a
find from the revenue for the provision of the investment is made
more certain and absolute than it was by the Act of 1793; and,
in fact, the removal by specific enactment, of a power which, only
in practice, was left to the Company through the period of the Act,
is rather a derogation in point of credit, than any real subtraction 
(1)
of benefit•" The application of whatever amount should be
allowed to investment, whether to provide for territorial charges 
or for annual payments of India debt, was to be controlled by the 
Court. The Government premised aid if the Company in any year failed 
to discharge its obligations regarding India debt* Thus the 
Company gained more certainty in the matter of the dividend, the
(1) Minute of a Committee of the whole Court of Directors,
15 July 1813* 1*0. Charters Vol. 14 p* 505*
- 246-
A conoi'tfU.
investment, payment of tiLe territorial charges and of the
A
transferred India debt at the cost of its trade monopoly and 
its freedom to mix up the territorial and commercial accounts 
which, whatever the Court might say, did not always help the 
territory*
The Charter of 1813 recognised a fait accompli. Inspite of 
war* (or because of itj^ the percentage of Bej^al’s private trade 
with London had surpassed that of her private trade with other
a)
quarters save China (and that also in exports)• It was stagnation
(1) GAiarm-LOKDON 
Imp or t s Expor t s
ck
1807-8 1SU5/16 21.5/16
1808-9 22*8/16 27
1809-10 13*6/16 24.4/16
1810-11 13*6/16 20.12/16
1811-12 21*12/16 24.9/16
1812-13 23.4/16 23.1/16
CALCUTTA - LISBON (from 1810
with BBiZIt)
E E-E Imports Exports
tfTP $
1807-8 8*15/16 5.6/16 1809-10
1808-9 X x 1810-11
1809-10 3.12/16 2.8/16 1812-13
1810-11 6.9/16 4.5/16
1811-12 8.4/16 8.7/16
1812-13 10.11/16 12.8/16
CALCUT’EA.-AljEaiCA
Imports
C7/“
23*10/16
x
25.10/16
23.6/16
3.4/16
2.14/16
CALCUTTA - CHIHA 
Imparts
1807-8
1808-9
1809-10
1810-11 
1811-12 
1812-13
55
20*14/10
35.5/16
30.7/16
22.12/16
26.8/16
25.10/16
Exports
*
18
x
20.8/16
20
4.10/16
3.7/16
CALCUTTA-I.AlttLLA 
Impa it s 3xpor t s
1o
7.14/16
10.4/16
4.2/16
2.2/16
3.11/16
4.12/16
Exports
$
17.9/16
25.14/16
19.15/16
21.9/16
18
14.13/16
Sea Bengal Commercial Heports 18C7-1812
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of trade that forced the merchants to seek remittance through 
bills on the Court* It was never very profitable to the capitalists 
who lost the difference of interest between India and England and 
it really hit the slender resources of the agency houses* Naturally 
they wanted resumption of remittance through the normal channels of 
trade and avidly engrossed the share of the Americans when war broke 
out between England and America in 1812. But the Company with its 
inexorable monopoly was still there* So long as they were unable to 
increase Indian produce by increased investment of capital and 
carry the same to London in own shipping, so long as they were
debarred from dealing freely in articles like silk or from
< . (1 )
bargaining freely for land and labour for extensive indigo manufacture,
they could not rest* It is clear, however, that there was a greater
pressure on the monopoly from England than frcm India in 1813*
While the established houses like the Palmers apprehended a chaotic
(2)
competition in banking or indigo business once the trade was free, 
the large shipping concerns like the Ihirlies had much to fear from 
an invasion by British shipping on their close preserve of the carrying, 
country and coastal trade* The Lancashire manufacturer, who now
(1) The government was becoming increasingly, conscious of the
oppressions and abuses committed by the indigo planters in the. 
interior and taking steps to prevent them. - particularly the 
system of forcing advances on the ryots and forcible cultivation* 
See Circular letters sent on 13 and 20 July 1810 by G.G. in 0* 
to Magistrates* Pari* Papers printed per order of the H*C* 27 
April 1813* Fcrf cases Set Ev re f t  a m  fr *U e ^ \fU -\2 W  t.O. US’
(2) John Palmer to George Millet 14 December 1809* Palmer Papers
op*cit* Yol* 75 p* 61*
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produced cotton yarn more cheaply then the Indian spinner, and 
the ship-owners and merchants at the outports, who wanted to 
redeem the loss of the American and Continental trade, formed the 
spear head of attack in 1813 though the Indian agency houses lad 
prepared the soil be fore .7k dost of No. 40 English yam in 1812 
was 2s 6d per lb. while the same yam in India cost 3s 7d;Cfccost
CD
of No. 60 yarn was 3s 6d in England and 6s in India and so on. 
Productive capacity had been greatly enhanced by the improvements 
of loom by Horrocks in 1803, 1805 and 1813, the discovery of ETule 
machine by James Boulton in 1805 and a greater use of power in 
textile factories. The dyeing methods were improved by James 
Thompson in 1813. The distressed traders in Bristol or Liverpool, 
Manchester and Paisley thought it time to forge on the lead, 
already established by the European traders from India, with this 
new weapon of power. It would not be untrue to say they looked also 
with avarice on the rapidly growing country trade with China,
Penang, the Gulfs and the Coasts which only the Europeans, resident 
in India, could exploit, while the newly acquired French and Dutch 
islands held out further possibilities of speculation.
The East India Company was not the only one to be sacrificed 
in 1813* The abolition of the India monopoly revolutionised the
(1) Comparative statement of tlie cost of English and Indian yard, 
in 1812 and 1830. Kennedy* s evidence before the 
House of Commons 1831.
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traditional pattern of trade between India and the Nest and
shattered India*s age-old economy* As the Commercial T^nopoly of
the Company succumbed to the much stronger economic force of
industrial capitalism, so did the domestic economy of India, which
was the basis of that monopoly, to the industrial economy of
Britain* Beaten in excellence and cheapness, the Indian artisan
was now to lose his own domestic market and the Indian spinner soon
went the same road to ruin* With the speedy removal of the
Company from the field of commerce qua commerce the Indian textiles
lost a valuable and constant patron whose long association with the
producing class was more personal than the free traders ever
cared to establish. Human hand would have lost to the machine in
any age or place but equal opportunities were never given. When
a Ur
Indian manufacture needed all the protection in the Hbrld^ sfae was 
not only shut out of the European market by the Continental Systran 
but by prohibitive tariff which really acted as a bounty to British 
manufacture. The new Customs regulations in Bengal imposed 
additional burdens. Charles Trevelyan lays bare the ruinous 
process of this policy which not only made large scale production 
impossible for the lack of a national market but for the lack of 
cheap raw materials. Cotton paid 5/3 in raw state — 7^ more when made 
up into yam, zjf/o more when manufactured into piece goods and' still
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(1)another If dyed# After paying this 15$ in transit duties (9$ of
which was drawn back on export) in India, plain calicoes had to face a
duty of £3*l6s*8d$ for warehousing and £78*5s*8d$ for home consumption
in England* Under such circumstances Indian piece goods industry would
have been killed even without the competition of the machine, Machinery
only precipitated its destruction and made Its decline look more cataclysmic#
The decline of the foreign European and American trade, the fall of
demand for piece goods and the imposition of injurious transit find town 
(2)
duties affected the mercantile class of Bengal* The Cornwallis system had
not only deprived the natives of administrative jobs but the banians of
their business as agents of the young Supervisors and Collectors who went
out to Bengal*s interior districts* The British agency houses had driven
them from the field of export-import trade* These people were forced to
invest in hcuses, lands and Government loans and, later, when the terms of
such loans increasingly favoured the Europeans, in zemindaries, urbansltes
or internal trade* The spurt in native trade, due to the remarkable growth
of the American commerce since 1795, has been noticed before* The Americans
preferred the native banians to the British agency houses which charged
30$ more for goods than the market rate and Mwho ever is dependent upon
any of them for credit,” wrote Henry Lee, one of the pioneer American
(3)
traders, ”must pay dearly for it**»*n__________________________
(1) Charles Trevelyan* A Report upon the Inland Customs and Town Duties of 
the Bengal Presidency. Second edn* Baptist Mission Press, Calcutta 
1835, p.6* Raw silk paid a transit duty of 7^ $ on a fixed valuation; 
oil and oil seeds, 7i$ ad valorem; wrought copper and brass - 10$
on a fixed valuation;. sugar, goor, hides - 5$ ad valorem*
(2) ibid* Town Duty Report pp. 7-28* .
(3) Henry Lee to E* Lee, 13 May 1615* Kenneth WiggLns Porter* The Jack­
sons and the Lees. Two generations of Massachussets merchants 
1765-1844* Harvard University Press 1937 Vol. II pp# 1139-40#
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Ramdulal Day — Ram Dullol or just Dullol of the Jackson and 
Lee correspondence - was their chief banian at Calcutta from
a)
1802 onwards# He began an amazing career as a sircar of the
Fairlies and by his assiduous industry, remaiklabXe ability artd
proverbial honesty, built up a fortune of half a million at the
(2) £3}
lowest* The Americans borrowed from him often to a large
(4) CS)
extent, though he was charged with usury by Jackson and with
C e )
exaction by Lee# But the stoppage of the American trade in 
1808 and after 1811 injured these banians greatly and, after 
re-opening of trade in 1815, most of the American business went to
(7)
the established European houses like the Palmers or the Alexanders*
In 1813 Ramdulal Day had one ship in the port of Calcutta - the
last tragic gesture of the Bengalee ship-owner before complete 
(8)
annihilation# Where even the European country traders failed to 
withstand the challenge of the free traders, it is idle to expect 
the Indian would hold his own#
(1) P*T* Jackson to F* Cabot Lowell 26 November 1802 ibid Vol# I#
p* 594* * ff5JL
(2) Thomas Bracken*s evidencea?Etfe&fc* Q,* 1930 et aeq* Same other
names mentioned by Bracken and Lee are : Ram Chunder Mitter, 
Tillock Bonarjca, Ramdullov Day, Duggo Fesaud* RuggoRam, Golluck 
and Kissen#
(3) p.f#Jackson to Ramdullol Day 27 July 18Q3* The Jacksons and the
Lees op.cit* Vol* X p* 599*
(4) P*T* Jackson to Ram Dullol Day 6 October 1806 ibid p* 619.
(5) ibid#
(6) Henry Lee to P*T*Jackson 1813 ibid Tol* IX p# 996*
(7) Henry Lee to C.D* Miles and R.C* Cabot 1 8 1 7 * P?'
(8) The only other names of Bengalee ship-owners in the East India
Register and Directory up to 1813 are: Faneho Dutt (1805),
Ramgopal Mullick (1809) and Mild dan Dutt (1809)#
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The Parse© and the Mohammedan merchants fared better for 
a time in the Coastal and Gulf trade* One Dorabje© had three 
ships in that trade in 1803—5, Dorabjee Byramjee had as many as 
sir in 1806 and Byramjee Cowajee two in 1813* Seid Hussein and 
Said Mohuramed had one ship each in 1803 and Gullum TTn grain 
shared one ship with an European. In 1813 Gullum Hussain was 
the owner of four pretty large ships and one Syed Sadock had 
one* But they had been already facing bitter rivalry from the 
Imam of Mi scat’s enlarged fleet and would soon fall back before 
private British ships*
There were two important consequences of the loss of the 
American customers and the decline of the Coastal and Gulf trade* 
The Bengalee traders came to be increasingly dependent for finance 
on the up-country shroffs who soon got a stranglehold on the
U)
internal trade of Bengal* Secondly, the decline of the demand 
for indigenous products forced them to concentrate on the sale of 
British manufactures* which was still a losing concern* The 
imparts by land into Calcutta fell considerably but
(1) Some of the important banking houses were: g^ paul Doss,
Monohar Doss, Urjoonjee Nathjee, Hurry Kishen Doss, Lalla 
Auggur Shen, Nundram Bydenaut, Brijoabullub Doss Goculdoss, 
Hadjee Hyder Hadjee A Mud, Shaik Golanm Hussain, Meer 
Mahomed Sadick etc* See Milbum op.cit* p* 170.
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t1 )Calcutta was sending more foreign articles into the interior#
The mercantile class of Bengal felt a depression on the eve
of the Charter similar to that of the artisan class though it
had still the foreign articles to rely on# The result of
these tendencies was at once registered on the value of land
C2)
which began to rise from 1811# The pressure on land would 
relent no more and the class of artisans would gradually be 
transformed into landless labourers*
The end of the India monopoly did not salve all the 
private traders* problems# The China trade remained in the 
Company’s hands and the trade in the East Indies in those 
of the country traders - both of which fomed indispensable 
links in the chain of canmerce between Europe and Asia# The 
speculators* dream of quick riches wa3 to end in a glut#
The Indian market did not prove so responsive as they 
thought# The remittance trade of the Company, which 
increased with years, collided with their export trade from 
India# Their grievances would be heard once again - against
^  Internal trade of Bengal
Imports into Calcutta Exports from C
S.R* S.R#
1807 3,44,57,576 54,96,207
1808 2,44,82,596 63,52,401
1809 2,34,56,021 70,27,024
1810 2,65,37,467 65,08,407
1811 2,60,54,270 65,27,074
1812 2,79,12,927 72,12,547
Bengal Commercial Reports 1807-1812.
(2) G.Gr# in G# to Court (Revenue) 12 Febmary 1811 and 19 June 1813#
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the Company's strict control of silk, rivalry in indigp, 
financial policy and ultimately the China monopoly itself#
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CHAPTER IY 
Hastings and Private Trade
In this chapter I propose to deal with the effects 
of free trade on the commerce of Bengal and the finances of 
the Bengal Government• The Government came to help the 
agency houses, who; were in need of cash through the exodus 
of capital before and the excessive speculation after 1815# 
This speculation, encouraged by the new easterns regulations 
and the demand for Indian articles in Europe, resulted in 
the rise of exchange in favour of Bengal# The Wars of 
the Marquis of Hastings and the policy of accomodating the 
agency housew affected the Company’s investments* , The 
exchange declined with greater imports, particularly from 
Britain, while exports stagnated due to rise of prices of 
Bengal goods and fall of demand for her cotton and cotton 
manufactures# The private capitalists were forced to seek 
remittance in the Company’s interest bills which necessitated
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an increase of the Company's exports# The Government's policy 
of debt-funding- quickened this process further and Inevitably 
brought the Company into conflict with the free traders whfc 
now pressed before the parliament for the abolition of its 
remaining privileges in the India trade and for a share of its 
China monopoly#
The coincidence of the opening of the India trade 
and the improvenent of the British cotton manufacture seemed 
to inaugurate in 1813 a millenium for the free traders#
For over fifty years all the great technological inventions 
in Britain had been working towards the perfection of cotton 
manufacture and the reduction of its cost of production# This 
seemed to be achieved by 1813# The problem of securing the 
means where with to buy the returns from India appeared to 
be solved for ever# There would no longer be any need for 
sending bullion at a great cost or woollens at a loss# There 
was a speculative boom in Indian commodities for re-export 
based on the break up of the Continental System, Hapoleon's 
unsuccessful Russian campaign and an impatient anticipation 
of peace# The demand for Indian goods like indigp, silk 
and cotton was very high* the last particularly after the outbreak
-257
of the Anglo-American Far* The free traders hoped to effect 
their purchases more cheaply with the produce of Manchester 
and carry them more profitably in their own ships to the less 
expensive outports thrown open after 1813#
The agency houses at Calcutta in 1813: The prominent agency
houses in Bengal, however, were not so happy about It# They 
apprehended a veritable deluge of fortune-hunters and a 
diminution of profits so long shared among the big few# Already 
the total number of agency houses had risen from 16 in 1803 
to 25 in X81B and of insurance companies from 6 to 11# More 
remarkable had been the changes in different partnerships 
which show how fortunes, made in India, were being transferred 
with their owners to England and how the latter were replaced 
by a new band of adventurers out to make good in the same hard 
way* Increase of numbers without appreciable increase of 
capital presaged ruthless competition*
Usually the capital of the departing merchant would 
not be taken away all at once, perhaps it could not be# It 
might have been distributed among the Tirhoot indigo-planters, 
the Mirjapore cotton-dealers and theCCanton opium—agents; 
it might have been, in the form of a country ship, bringing
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horses frcm "the Gulf, salt from the coast of Coromandel or 
timber from Pegu.# He would keep a portion of his capital 
in India where interest, until recently, had been very high 
and investment, if more risky, was more remunerative than
a)
in England# Fairlie, Gilmore & Co* became Fairlie,
Fergus son & Co. in 1811 when the redoubtable William Fairlie
went home to London to found Fairlie, Bonham & Co. Cockerell,
Trail, Palmer & Co. of 1803 became Trail, Palmer & Co. in
1806 and Palmer & Co. in 1810 with the departure of the
senior partners but Trail and Cockerell kept a considerable
part of their funds with the Palmers. Alexander & Co evolved
out of Gardiner, Alexander & Co. in 1805 and Cruttenden,
Mackillop and Co. could trace their descent from Downie &
M  (2)
Maitland of 1803 - a metamorphis worthy of a chrysallis*
But these houses felt acutely any shortage of capital 
caused by transfer by their clients or withdrawal by their 
partners because they had never been content with mere agency 
business and had been engaged in enterprises of their own on 
borrowed capital. The Fairlies still owned the largest amount
(1) Thomas Bracken*s evidence before S.C.H.C. 183E. Q. 1801
(2) The East India Register and Directory for the years
1803-1813#
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of Calcutta shipping and controlled the Calcutta Insurance 
Office and the Calcutta Life Insurance Company, besides dealing 
in opium and indigo on a large scale. John Palmer was the 
indlgo-king, running concerns all over Bengal, but his firm 
also dealt heavily in government; securities, had six ships 
(one short of the Fairlies), controlled a bank and the Canton
CD
Insurance Company. The Alexanders ran the Bank of Hindustan,
the Asiatic Insurance Company, a number of indigo plantations
and were to start pioneer mining operations in Bengal coal 
(2)
at Burdwan. The last two were the most reliable houses 
in Calcutta in 1813 according to Henry Lee who, with P.T*
(3)
Jackson, was one of the first Americans to trade with India. 
Among the lesser luminaries Hogue, Davidson & Co. were 
principally ship-owners; Colvins, Bazett and Co specialised 
in piece goods; Johannes Saikies & Co. monopolised 
the Armenian business and Joseph Baretto & Co. the 
Portugese* Most of them dabbled in indigo and opium, which 
required constant inflow of fluid capital.
(1) Palmer Papers op.cit.
(2) Thomas Bracken*s evidence op.cit Q,. 1853 at seq.
(3) Henry Lee to F. Lee. 14 November 1813. op.cit Vol. IX
p. 1081.
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Scarcity of capital and speculations of free traders: Tlie European
agency horses, had been in great distress for some time from an
acute scarcity in the money market caused by the transfer of India
debt, heavy military expenditure on Mintors different expeditions
and the failure of bullion import from foreign Europe and -America#
On the top of that bullion had been sent from Bengal for several
years to meet the demand of bills on the Court* They began to
sell ait their stock of securities, the price of which naturally
fell and the Government had to come to their help with a cash
loan* Notwithstanding this help the discount on securities in
December 1812 was iXffo and the palliative of advance payment of
interest did not. appreciably lessen the demand for cash which
had been still further enhanced when private merchants began to
arrive with bills on the agency houses from their absentee partners
who wanted in this way to draw their capital to Englandvdnere interest
(2)
rate almost equalled the India rate* The rate of interest in the
(3)
private market rose to 12% in February 1813* However they might 
dislike it, the agency houses were now dependent on the native
(1) G r . G *  in C* to 1&9 Court (Financial) 19 December 1812*
(2) G.G* in C* to Court (Financial) 27 March 1813 also Henry
Lee to F* Lee 14 November 1813* The Jacksons and the Lees 
op lei t* Tol* U p *  1084*
(3) H* Lee to P*T* Jackson 14 February 1813 ibid p* 1079*
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■bankers or on their resources of the government securities*
Their fortunes by now had been so intertwined with the 
Company*s finance in India that their distress could not fail to 
have repercussions on the Bengal budget* It was impossible to 
obey the Secret Commit tee* s orders to send about £2^ millions in 
investment and £1 million in specie in 1813 without incurring any
a)
loan* It was equally absurd to raise the sum at the low rate
of interest which the government had paid in the last few years* Even
a new remittable loan at 6$, opened on 1 July 1813, failed as also
the plan of selling treasury notes for bills on England* The
Company*© bills at 2s 6d the sicca rupee were no longer sought for
as merchants got a higher exchange in private transaction* The
principal reason of the rise of exchange was the commencement of
a hectic speculation in the Bengal goods for the British nmrket*
In spite of larger imports of British goods during 1810-12 than
during 1807—1810, the net excess of exports frcm Bengal in 1813-14
was S.R* 2,37,84,386, the actual value of which came up to
S*R* 3,27,01,998 or S*R* 61,86,746 more than the average excess of
(2)
exp<srfcs between 1807 and 1812* This excess was being- paid for
(1) Secret Committee to G.G* in C* 4 Apiil 1812*
(2) As prices of the Indian articles rose higher and higher the
Customs House valuation of exports fell far short of their 
actual values* For example, indigo was always valued at the 
fixed rate of S*R* 100 per factory maund while it was selling 
for S*R* 160 in 1813 and shot beyond S*R* 300 between 1813 
and 1833* Similar adjustments should be made in the ease of 
raw silk, valued at a fixed rate of S*R* 6 or S.R* 7 per seer,
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Foot Note (2) continued.
while often selling for S.R* 12 or S.R* 13* Value of 
cotton should be adjusted at least after 1816* In the case 
of imports value of merchandise should be adjusted as the 
exchange was favourable or unfavourable* In the first 
years of free trade they were over-valued by 20$, in latter 
years undervalued by 5 or 6flo* Assuming, however, their 
invoice value never gave the highest value - little ccaGCection 
need be made* But imports of bullion, largely in dollars, 
had always been over valued at 100 dollars per 225 sicca 
rupees while their mint value was at most S.R* 206* 8 as* .
H. H. Wilson in **A Review of the External Commerce of Bengal 
from 1813-14 to 1827-28** (Calcutta, 1830) and G.A* Prinsep 
in "Remarks on the External Commerce and Exchanges of Bengal 
with appendixes of accounts and estimates** (London, 1823) had 
compiled correct valuations in view of the above and I ha vs 
accepted Wilson* s figures which are corroborated by Eur*
MSS* D* 281* Customs House valuations are taken frcm Bengal 
Commercial Reports as before*
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by merchants in bills on London* For every rupee (which had became
scarce) lent to them for speculation in the Indian articles they
(1)
had to promise a higher sterling value* Bills on London at
six months date rose frcm 2s 6d to 2s 7d in November 1813 and to
2s 8d in January 1814 and Henry Lee was afraid that the arrival of
the free trade ships would raise the exchange value of the rupee
(2)
still further* As trade with Lisbon was meagre, America had
not yet resumed commercial relations and country trade remained
fluctuating, the merchants were dependent on trade with Britain
(3)
with inevitable repercussions on the exchange*
Thus free trade aigjired ill for the Company* The sujpIns 
revenue might be large, the debt and interest charges might have 
decreased but competition would diminish the value of imports* The 
rate of interest, which had been lowered to 6$, would be too low to 
attract loans* Bills on the Court, either for cash or on the debt 
account, which had been a resource for the investment before, would 
no longer be demanded* How then to send an extended investment 
in indigo or bullion? How to send increased supplies to Java, 
China and Isle of France? And if another war brfjdcfc-out*....*These 
questions loaned large^ in the horizon when Lord Moira landed at
Calcutta on 4 October 1813* ________
(1) G*Cr* in C* to Court (Financial) 30 October 1813*
(2) Henry Lee to Frank Lee 24 January 1814* The Jacksons and the 
Lees op*dt* p* 1091. Henry Lee to W* Oliver 24 February 1814 
ibid p. 1095*
(3) (see fallowing page)
Fo
ot
 
No
t©
 
(3
) 
(c
en
t.
)
- £64—
0n0
COIs
0-p
>■H
I9o
w
I
Pi• oCO.ID 
IN
0
+»
3
ft
9
0
4»
O
£
*0ou0
©u
0
00 
00 <0 
4k
INa*T3 CO « 
ft* ID4t
to
<0• to « to
• ^
CO ID 
ID * IN 
ID
£ ^Co 0  ft IN£| W W *O T-t • ft*h 'O 03 to0 *
■ 8
£
0
0
£
0 
* . 
° a
s
©ferj
Pi
03 H
0
U0
0 fl
U fi
I i
H
3 • *© ftj O
n • H•H 03 *>0» o
ft
PI • H03
0
i
0> • GO 
0 PI ID 0 • *«H CQ «0 
»0 IN
H
IDO
ft**
8
4ft04
H4k
H
O
ID
IN*CMto
IDIN
IN*(0INA
toID
o H
8H««
O*
a0»0»
H
to
ft*to4k
CM
H
CMto
ftCO ID
<t*n o>
- * « *
I £ "raw wQ o»
l
s
ft CO CO
n
gf 04*, « ^ 
§ j?oi cf m in
• “
a
a
ftP5
CO IN ID 0 00 43 4k
S S o
B B’co
r
ra
CO
■ a4» ft O
P Pi * O • 6»ft CO to
^  o  
O H to
I
54o
* to
0 4k
0
4»
to0»
4k
ft*
I• ID CO Ed
a
•**
sPi
ti
$H4k
IDCM4k
ft*
§5 CMft 0 IN
ft jj • O
d O ^  10
3 f w **
»
<*{ o o
0»s4k
IDto4kto
+» * 
h «
11
0 a4« • CQ
U Pi ^O • ftft CO CM 
S <P M * H 
H
B H
15 p5 So • «CO tN CM
a HA» ft fc» H Pd 04O * fto Pita t>
fl «n ^
0
i r  * 1 1
IN
P°ID4k
CO
0
+* ♦ IDTt ra -O • ID ft CO oa
0
«o
a
04
$14k
o
ft*4k
CM
hH
T1
Hs
3
?toHa
3TaGO
4*
T1
3
3
aT
3COH
—£65—
Finances effects of free trade and war: There could not have been
two persons more different in character than Minto and Moira* Minto 
bad been educated in France under David Hume's guardianship and in 
Edinburgh in the heyday of Adam Smith* He had helped in the 
impeachment of Hastings and himself conducted the impeachment of 
Impey# Moira was known as a Regency rake, a stern martinet in the 
War of American Independence and now a boon companion of the Prince 
Regent who had secured him the governor generalship to bolster up
(1)
his sagging fortunes and to enable him to pay off his enormous debts# 
Yet this man had an energetic drive which Minto lacked# He seemed to 
blossom out on the Indian soil and, from the beginning^to realise the 
essential obligation of Imperial expansion which Wellesley was not 
allowed to fulfil, Barlow had to shelve in a patched up truce and 
Minto had neither the inclination nor the sanction to encounter*
“Within British territories,1* Moira wrote to his Princely patron,
“all is quiet and well, on their borders the spirit is not so placid#** 
In the north of the Gangetic valley, which formed the core of the 
Bengal Presidency, the Nepalese had been indulging in border raids; 
in the south of it the Pindari freebooters, with the connivance of 
the weak and sullen Maratha rulers, had been sowing murder and rapine# 
“Breaches, not formidable but likely to be troublesome, have been
(1) T * Metcalfe to C# Metcalfe* 1 April 1813 Home Misc* 738 p# 397#
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postponed by management till the palliative will serve no longer**^
We hear in these words the distant rumble of Ochterlony's and Hi slop* s 
guns#
What sort of resources had he for undertaking the completion
of the imperial edifice? “I have found the government, in a state
of great pecuniary embarrassment# The Directors were so urgent with
me to send home treasure that 1 overcame the reluctance of my
colleagues *..#»* we, however, in consequence have been on the brink
of great distress#1* — thus Moira summed up his position on taking 
(2)
over# The disbursements on account of Bombay, Madras, China, the
newly conquered islands and the embassy in Persia together with an
investment of about a crore had turned a Bengal surplus of
(3)
S.R* 2,05,41,215 into a deficit# The excess of supplies from India
to London - £1,867,500 in 1813-14 - exceeded the net Indian surplus
(4)
revenue, which was £1,816,648# Discount on the government securities
C5)
was 12$ in October 1813 and the rate of interest in the private market
A-fose -
about the same* In one year the former had risen to 13$ and the
(7)
latter to 18 to 21$. The first batch of free traders had brought
(1) Moira to Prince Regent 19 October 1813# A* Aspinall (Ed*) Letters
of George IY vol# I p# 314#
(2) The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings.The Marchioness of
Bute (Ed*) 2nd Edn* 1858.Vol* I pp* 39-40. See also Eastings -
“Operations in India, with their Results from the 30th April 
1814 to the 1 January 1823 etc*** Add* MSS* 38,411 f* 176*
(3) Bills drawn on Bengal : 1813-14 S.R* 1,77,39,272
1814-15 S.R* 1,77,58,253 
See also Hastings Private Journal op*eit* pp* 40-41*
(4) G*G* in C. to Court (Financial) 31 December 1814*
(5) Hastings, Operations etc. op*cit*
(6) G.G. in C. to Court 15 Octobdr 1814.
(7) Henry Lee to Sam# Williams 21 October 1814# The Jacksons and
the Lees op.dt* p. 1115*
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bills Instead of cash as Henry Lee had predicted* To meet these 
bills or to engage on commercial speculation on their own account, 
the agency houses borrowed money from the Shroffs at higher Interest 
or sold their stocks of securities or drew bills at higher 
exchange* “The high prices which indigo, cotton, sugar and other 
articles of Colonial produce are reported to have produced at the . 
period of our latest advices from England, would enable the 
manufacturer or the exporting merchant, to allow a high rate of 
interest on the capital *»»• and it cannot be doubted that many 
individuals have been induced to realize their government paper, 
either for the purpose of engaging in commercial adventure them­
selves, or of obtaining a high rate of interest from those who
a)
have embarked on such adventures*** The problem before the 
(government was how to reduce the discount on the securities, obtain 
funds for the Investment strictly according to the Court's Orders, 
and meet the deficiency caused by large disbursements without 
paying a hitter interest*
While ordering separation of the commercial and the 
territorial accounts and appropriation of funds according to the 
provisions of the Charter Aet of 18X3, the Court had assumed that 
there should be a sufficient surplus in India capable of defraying
(1) G.G* in G* to Court 15 October 1814*
268-
all territorial charges in India and England as well as of
CD
reducing debt* It noted the insufficiency of the average
surplus for several years (about £1 million) for such purposes
and urged reduction of expenses by at least £500,000 per year*
It also asked the government to draw bills in order to meet any
deficiency in the; funds for the investment which now consisted of
a sum equivalent to that spent on the heme charges and the returns
of imports* Against interest bills, which fell in a different
category, the government was to provide either by advances
towards the public service or by payment of bills drawn by the
Court* or by extended investment and, If all these media failed,
by exports of bullion* The insistence on a large surplus and on
the remittance against interest bills proceeded fran two
different considerations* The Company was unwilling to increase
its debt further and hoped to reduce the present one before any
emergency occurred* It was much more unwilling to incur any
default in the payment of interest bills - which might force it
(2)
again to appeal to* the Parliament for assistance* Moreover 
with success In the European war, it hoped to catch a rising 
market for Indian articles and wanted to be definite about its
Indian investment* It did not rest content with ordering bigger
■(Tj Court to G.G* in C* (Public) 6 September 1813* (Financial)
6 June 1814, and (UNANCLAL) 16 August 1814*
(2) Court to C.G. in C* (Comm ) 18 February 1814
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investments for 1814 and 18X5 but furnished resources in the 
shape of a large amount of British goods and stores, even though 
their market was glutted* The indent far Bengal silk amounted 
to S.R. 54,77,821 in 1814 and S.R* 42,CO,QOO in 1815 - for piece 
goods - to S.R* 43,28,536 and S.R* 30,00,000 respectively, besides
CD
sugar, cotton, hemp, sunn and lacklake*
The Bengal government was unable to comply* It pointed out
the many pores it was bleeding through, the unad vis ability of
retrenchment in the military department and appealed for the
Court's sanction for a regular debt transfer through the Company's
channel - about £500,000 per year -twhich alone would keep down
discount and furnish the (government with a source for full
(2)
investment* When no reply came and its salt and opium revenue
were affected, It advanced 6 lakhs to the agency houses, “to unloosen
(3)
native capital1*', and opened a 6$ remit table loan for those who had 
not availed themselves of the opportunity before* Later it
(4)
rendered further help with another advance payment of interest*
The government was, however, powerless to help itself for nobody
would lend at 6$ and the exchange value of sicca rupee had risen
(5)
in the private market to 2s 9d* Xt had to cut down the invest—
Cl) Coart to G.G. in C. CCqdhi1) 9 April 1815. 24 May 1814 and
5 June 1814*
(2) G-*Gr* in C* to Court (Territorial Financial) 18 December 1813*
(3) (LG* in C* to Court (Financial) 18 June 1814*
(4) Cr.Gr* in G* to Court I F 15 October 1814*
(5) G.G* in C* to Court (Financial) 31 December 1814*
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ment of 1814-15 to 60 lakhs*
In these circumstances the Nepal war began on 1 November 1814* 
The stiff resistance off the Cforkhas upset all hopes of early 
success* To produce a full investment in 1815 the government had to 
persuade the Nawab of Oudh to offer a loan of S.R. 1,04,00,000 at 
6$ — the interest covering allowances and pensions to the members of 
the Vizier*s family which had been guaranteed by the Company earlier# 
Surprisingly enough It was not wholly applied to the Investment 
but, according to the Accountant General's adyiee, the Vice President 
in Council, in absence of Lord Moira, applied 54 lakhs to the payment of
CD
8fo loans by way of relief to the agency houses* Discount on
6$ remittable paper, 16$ in November 1814, came down to 9$ in
(2) -
consequence and the opium and salt revenues improved but the invest­
ment was affected adversely#
(3)
Though the Court promised to send bullion in 1814, It did
(4)
not semi any be for. 1815 (ibleh reached Bengal In 1816) and It 
seoied unwilling to risk commercial funds in apprehension of their 
diversion to military advanture* At the same time it stopped tha 
remittable loan* The government reacted in a way which showed how 
deeply It was committed to the agency house Interest* In the absence
of the Governor General it again procured a loan of one crore frcm
(1) FLnaneial Consultations 19 November 1814* See also Hastings -
Operations etc* op*cit*
(2) G.G* in C* to Court (Financial) 31 December 1814.
(3) Court to G.G* in C* (Financial) 16 August 1814*
(4) Secret Commercial letter of the Court 7 October 1815 and 10
Novaaber 1815* £800,000 In all was sent, partly to be
applied to service of H*M*G*
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the Yisier - ostensibly to finance war*which was no time far
(1)
“over scrupulous regard to appearances** - but spent 48 lakhs
of It in payment of loans for further alleviation of scarcity
in the money-market♦ In a private letter to the Chairman Lord
Moira indignantly wrote - "At the time, the measure appeared to
me so strangely inapplicable to our circumstances as to make
me regard its adoption with wonder, *tho I imputed it to the
pleaded apprehension, however extravagant, of necessity* I do
now fear It was devised, without due sense of the inconvenience
it might entail, to lower the estimation of a success which had
(2)
been treated as a visionary hope*" Though he ascribed such
behaviour to an attanpt “to create a belief that our advantages
(in the Nepal Var) had been purchased by a disproportioned and
oppressive waste of money," while the Nepal war in his view cost .
(3)
only 34 lakhs, the real motive was amelioration of the mercantile 
distress for cash*
The Nepal War ended in success with the Treaty of Sagaull 
on 2 March 1816 which gave the British Garhttal and Kumaon with 
the greater part of the Taral but not before increasing the 
Bengal debt and reducing the investment* The Bengal surplus,
(1) G.G. in C* to Court (Financial) 18 February 1815 and 16 June 1815*
(2) Hastings to Chairman 26 January 1819 Private Letters of the
Marquess of Hastings 1818—19, India Office (now Commonwealth 
Relations Office)
(3) ibid#
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S.R* 1,84,03,853 in 1814-15, was further reduced to S.R* 1,47,78,775 ' 
in 1815-16 and the Indian surplus from £1,410,825 to £457,500.
A debt of S*K* 1,45,98,442 was Incurred even after the Vizier's 
second loan had been paid off with Eyraghur, a district wrested 
from Nepal* The Investment for 1815-16 had dwindled to
Cl)
S.R* 55,49,604, which, compared to the average of five years 
ending in 1813-14, was about 56$ less and inspite of the import of
bullion worth £800,000, the Government limited its amount to
(2)
60 lakhs in 1816*
Excess of Imports and fall of exchange; The situation improved
considerably in 1HL6 with greater imparts of bullion and
merchandise frcm England on private account- and resumption of
trade relations with foreign Europe and America* Fall in bullion
price after the Napoleonic tfers made it more worthwhile for
merchants to send dollars to India than procure in India money for
(3)
bills at an unfavourable exchange* Capital scarcity In Bengal 
was largely met from such supplies* In response to the appeals 
from their Bengal constituents the London agency houses began to 
remit capital in the shape of mere hand! 33— a tendency, conspicuous 
in the years between 1810 and 1812, when the effect of the exodus 
of capital frcm Bengal was first felt by the mercantile community,
(1) Total value of the Company's exports from Bengal in 1815 —
S.R* 64,22,719.
(2) G,G* in C. to Court (Terr* Fin*) 26 April 1816*
(5) This was predicted by Henry Lee* See Henry Lee to Francis Lee*
I and 2 February 1815* The Jacksons and the Lees op.clt. 
p* 1124*
-273-
bat absent in 1813 and 1814 when the private traders preferred
to bring bills instead of merchandise* The excess of exports from
Bengal on both the Company* s and the private accounts had been
S.R* 2,03,73,077 in 1814 according to the Customs House valuation
(actually - S.R* 2,99,66,077) and S.R. 2,02,31,492 in 1815
(actually - S.R* 3,22,13,566). But there was an excess of imports
to the extent of S.R* 7,55,091 in 1816 (actually still an excess
(1)
of exports amounting to S.R* 1,15,61,745).
(1)
Yr. Merchan­
dise
S.R*
The Company
Treasure
1814-15 41,45,339
1815-16 34,83,797
1816-17 19,77,071 87,53,178
S.R*
x
X
CALCUTTA. - WORLD
IMPORTS (Customs’ House)
Total
S.R*
41,45,339
34,83,797
1,07,30,249
1814-15 64,82,151 x
1815-16 64,22,719 x
1816-17 61,97,223 x
S  e^TL^cxX C o m  rncA^>o.(
64,82,151
64,22,719
61,97,223
The Private Traders
Merchan­
dise
S.R*
1,17,96,802
1,32*45,798
1,87,96,053
Treasure
S.R*
1,11,84,285 2 
1,94,49,746 3
3,25,82,140 5
EXPORTS (Customs House)
4,08,62,727
4,99,72,366
5,49,87,128
1,54,625 4 
15,750 4 
1,69,000 5
Total
S.R.
,29,81,087
,26,95,544
,13,78,193
,10,17,352
,99,88,116
,51,56,128
Eor actual values see H*H* Wilson A Review of the External 
Commerce of Bengal etc. op.cit* Tables 1 to 6.
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(1)
Trade between Bengal and Britain showed the same effects#
value of copper imported on private account rose from S.R# 78,581
in 1813 to S.R. 5,42,267 in 1816; of iron from S.R. 2,30,547 to
S.R. 5,83,610, of woollens from. S.R. 1,84,521 to S.B. 2,38,616 and
of cotton piece goods from S.R, 91,835 to S.R. 3,13,102. Almost
all items of imports (except wines) rose in value and still more
in quantity as their prices began to fall in England# The © i at cans
Fpgulations of 1815 spurred on the tendency still further#
Early in 1814 Canning and same other Parliamentary
represent&ives of the industrial towns of England had enquired
about a reform of the Customs Regulations of 1809 and 1810 which,
according to the private traders, had been injurious to their
interests. Robert Thornton, the Chairman of the Court, tried to
(2)
justify the Spoliations but the Board seemed to accept the other 
point of view# Ccurtenay in a report on the Customs in India 
categorically stated, *....the Company have hitherto, in executing 
the power of imposing taxes, blended their characters of sovereign 
and merchants, but they must in future lose sight of their 
mercantile interests in the execution of their political trust; 
their impositions will not henceforward spring from any factorial 
rights or commercial privileges but from the obligations to which 
all governments are subject - in the exercise of fiscal power,
(Footnotes on following page)
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and mst accordingly ba regarded by tlie general principles of political 
economy** The Committee of Correspondence bad to agree to the 
Board*s suggestions# The cardinal principle, as laid down in their 
recommendations for customs reform in Bengal, was encouragement of 
imports from the United Kingdom in the British or the India-built 
ships# Import duties on woollens, metals and marine stores frcm 
England were to be entirely abolished — while a duty of only 2^$ was 
to be retained on other produce of the same country ea:cepfc wines 
spirits on which the earlier duty of 10$ was to prevail# A duty 
of 5$ was to be levied on the produce of foreign Europe and America, 
if imported in the British or the India-built vessles, but was to be 
doubled if imported in other vessels# A similar differential treat­
ment was envisaged for exports according to their destination and the 
nationality of vessels that carried them# Indigo, the produce of the 
Company*s provinces, if sent to England, was to be allowed the whole 
as drawback - and this would also apply to hemp, sunn and cotton*"
Piece goods, silk and saltpetre, exported to England, were to be given 
such a drawback as would leave a net duty of 2^ $* Transit duties 
were to be retained, however, except in the case of cotton which were 
reduced frcm 10$ to 5$# The Bengal rate of duties was the maximum,
(1) Report by Mr# Courtenay relative to duties on edports, imports 
and transit of goods in India with reference to provisions of 
Sec# 25 and 98 of 55 Geo* III Cap* 155, 25 January 1814#
Horns Mi sc* 523 pp* 5-6*
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the other provinces were to follow her and duty, once paid, 
could not he charged again in the port to port trade# These 
recommendations were sent to Bengal and incorporated in Regulation 
Hr of 1815.
It redounds to the sense of justice of the Court that It 
advised the Bengal government to reduce the scale of transit duties 
which affected internal trade and tilted the balance in favour of
CD
the British cotton manufacture, the sole duty on which was now
the import duty of while aver and above the full transit duty
to Calcutta and the export duty of 2-|$, Bengal cotton manufacture
had to pay a prohibitive duty In London even after the reforms of
(2)
1815# The ideal of free trade presumably applied to raw materials
(1 ) Court to &G* in C* (Separate) 28 December 1814#
(2) Duties on articles imported from
the East Indies established by the reso­
lutions of the Parliament, of 18 November 1812#
Warehousing duty IXity payable on home
consumption
Article Penuanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
2# s# d# £• s# d# £• s# cU £►* s# d#
Muslins
plain per £ 1 0 0 , 4 - -  1 - -  2 6 - -  6#10# -
Plain white
Calicoes do# 4 — — 1 - - 50 — — 12.10 —
White Calicoes 
flowered and
stitched do#do#4 - - 1 - - 26 - - 6#10 -
Indigo per lb# - - 1 - - 1  - - 2
Bengal silk - - 4  - - 1  - 3 -  - - 9
per lb*
Sugar per cwt# - 1 -  - - 3  2 - -  - - -
Coffee per cwt - 4 — - 1 - 1*17# 4 - 9 4=
Cotton wool per 100 lbs
Cotton yarn per lb.
- 8 7 8 4
8 -  -  2
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alone* As a result of this Regulation, the private imports into
Bengal rose so rapidly after 1815 that the Company had to alter
Its import policy* Its imports had shown profits on all counts
up to 1815 inspite of enhanced private imports during 1810-13*
But average sale prices of Its goods had been falling regularly
(1)
since 1815 and, faced with the new spurt of competition, it had to
(2 )
reduce the scale from 1816*
Due to the combined operation of the government*s assistance
with cash loans and advance payment of interest and principal,
arrival of capital from England, resumption of trade with Foreign
Europe and America and decline of remittance from Bengal through
excessive exports (which took place in 1815 and 1814) - capital
became less scarce than before* Discount on the securities came
(3)
down to Rs* 1 - 3  as $ in December 1816 and the rate of exchange fell
to Zs 7d* The ^ vernment could breathe more freely as profits from
\
opium began to rise* Average price of opium in 1815 was S.R* 1427-10-5
(4)
per tfhest* It was S.R* 2178-7-5 in 1816* The agency houses were
(1) J* Phipps - A Glide to Commerce of Bengal, Calcutta, 1823 pp* 185-204*
(2) Import Warehousekeeper to President of the Bengal Board of Trade
10 February 1817* Sale of 1815-16 exceeded the average of past 
twelve years by S.R* 9,98,865 but it had fallen from the sale of
1814-15 and the rate of profit was dwindling - showing positive 
loss on Iron, cutlery, tin, Madeira and Claret* See also Court to
G.G* in C* CCcmm ,FLn*} 2 April 1817*
(3) G.G* in C* to Court (Territorial Financial) 16 Decsnber 1816*
(4) p*™* Misc* 762 p. 157* General result of opium ^speculation since
1797/98 to 1821/22 furnished by Swinton, Larkins and Lindsay
on 27 August 1822*
Export of Opium frcm Bengal C S/R)
Yr* Penang China Java
1813 12,47,655 55,71,277 2,33,225
1816 11,45,981 68,56,385 3,65,408
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having a windfall in indigo as well* As it provided a better 
remittance than tire bills on the Court its price rose sharply to
CD
S.R* 220 - 230 per factory maund in October 1814 and continued
high in 1815 - artificially rigged up by the agency houses# But
the tendency of over speculation in opium and indigo m s  producing
its own nemesis* The phenomenal profits in the foimer drew the
competition of Malwa and Turkish opium to the 6astem market and
(2) (3)
over production and excessive exports brought down the price of
(4)
indigo to 6s a lb* in London at the end of 1815* More than 
100,000 mannds of indigo were being produced each year when its 
exports were checked in 1816, unfortunately only for three years*
(1) H* Lee to Sam* Williams 21 October 1814* The Jacksons and the
Lees op#cit Vol* IX pp# 1112-1115#
(2) Indigo imported into Calcutta from the interior
1813 - 74,505 factory maunds
1814 - 108,000 *
1815 - 115,000 *
1816 - 83,000 *
J* Phipps - A Guide to Commerce of Bengal* op*cit* p* 258*
(3) Indigo exported to all parts of the
World and to U*K* (CUSTOMS HCUSB).
Yr# Total export Export to U*K#
S.R* S.R*
1813 97,79,194 91,32,531
1814 72,49,357 61,58,189
1815 1,28,91,953 1,01,93,934
1816 88,74,885 63,05,702
m Actual values Tmtch more than the Custcms House values*
(4) H* Lee to P* Lee 16 May 1815. The Jacksons and the Lees op*cit* 
pp* 1140 - 41#
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The arrival of the free traders had enhanced the prices of
almost all Indian articles besides these highly speculative drags#
The most in demand were cotton and raw silk# Cotton prices ruled
high in America after the Anglo-American War due to rise of the value
(1)
of land and slaves# This went on up to 1818 and the British manufac­
ture had to depend on the Indian product# Export of Bengal cotton
to Britain rose from. 19,157 bales in 1815 to 72,999 bales in 1816
(31
- to Ghina from 93,400 bales to 110,059 bales# As early as 1814
Bengal cotton sold for 15d to 17d per lb# in Britain and, under the
impetus of greater demand, exports rose, speculation ensued and the
price of cotton went up in Bengal from S.R# 15 to S.R# 15/8 per
maund in 1814 and to S.R# 17/8 in 1816# A similar tendency worked
itself out in sugar, the price of which rose with exports from S.R* 8/8
(3)
to S.R# 9/8 to S.R, 10 to S.R# 11/8# Silk was difficult to
procure due to the Company*s strict control# It was the only article
Cl) Henry L©& to Mills and Cabot 31 August 1817 ibid p# 1280#, 
Henry Lee to Messers Hottingue & Co# 13 February 1818, ibid, 
p. 1227#
(2) Bengal Commercial Reports 1818-19
Cotton exported to all parts of the World 
and to U#K# (CCJSTOMS HOJSE)
(3)
Yr# Total Exports Exports to U#K#
S.R# S.R#
1815-16 38,21,475 6,57,487
1816-17 76,89,368 51,84,791
1817-18 1,10,15,074 55,69,791
1818-19 89,76,861 37,82,030
jar exported to all parts of the World and to tT#K* (CUSTCMS
Yr# Total Exports Exports to U#K#
S.R# S.R*
1814-15 21,14,689 8,98,252
1815-16 23,23,927 8,17,357
1816-17 34,19,411 10,45,713
1817-18 38,81,597 12,49,012
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which gave it a sure remittance and the supply of the article 
beyond its investment, was mainly monopolised by its dammercial 
(Residents* Export of silk to U.K. on private account was meagr©
C2>
and, as we will see, that proved to be one of their chief grievances#
The private traders kept up a considerable export of piece goods to
America in the first two years of trade after resumption and to
the Eastern islands, Isle of France, Lisbon, Brazil and South America
for a longer period# But export to Britain wank lower and lower#
The duties were still too high there and when the policy of
protection was initiated by America in 1815, there was little hope
(3)
for a resuscitation#
^  Export of Raw Silk on the Company* a Account
Yr* Total cost and Remittance obtained
charges
S.R* £♦ 8# d*
1814-15 29,57,188 mm 2* 9*4
1815-16 21,59,178 - 3* 5*2
1816-17 24,28,030 - 4# 8*7
1817-18 51,03,414 - 3# 6
App# 22 to Report of S.C.H.C# 1851
(2) Private Export of Raw Silk# (COFSfOMS HOUSE)
Yr# Total Export Export to U.K*
S.R# S.R#
1814-15 33,12,709 8,50,370
1815-16 28,88,057 14,94,976
1816-17 17,72,525 4,67,493
1817-18 19,57,262 9,42,062
(3 ) Private Export of Piece goods (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
Yr# Total Export Export to U#K*
S.R* S.R*
1814-15 84,95,599 15,87,511
1815-16 1,31,56,587 12,97,061
1816-17 1,65,99,943 6,78,059
1817-18 1,32,34,725 4,37,107
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In estimating the effects of free trade on American 
cexnmerce with Bengal Henry lee in 1816-17 foresaw the fate soon 
to overtake the Bengal products in the world market# "We have 
lost our carrying trade which once was so profitable#♦*♦♦" he
a)
wailed# The war was over, the advantage of neutrality obtained
no longer and the private British ships had reduced the freight
(2)
to £6 - £8 per ton# Double duties in India and 60 to 70 % tariffs
on Bengal piece goods in America had struck at the root of direct
trade# Lee was now sending sugar and indigo to the Continent and
(3)
the piece goods to South America, West Indies, Italy and Holland#
He was uneasy about the future* H§ apprehended Java sugar would
beat Indian sugar and, on reduction of price, American cotton
would drive Indian cotton out of the London market# "I am convinced
while in Calcutta, that in all the fine sorts of cotton cloths, and
coarser kinds of muslins such are made in Scotland, British
manufacturers would undersell the India, and in time get in to use
(4)
among the natives.* Ha indicated also the potential* danger of
(5)
over speculation in indigo and ship-building# The cheaper British
(1) Henry Lee to Alexander & Co# SO September 1816# The Jacksons and
the Lees op#dt# p# 1207#
(2) Henry Lee to Sam# Williams# 12 October 1817 ibid p# 1298#
(5) Henry Lee to Fletcher, Alexander & Co# London, 25 February 1817
ibid# p# 1255#
(4) Henry Lee to Sam# Williams 12 October 1817 op#dt*
(5) Henry Lee to F# Lee# 8 May 1815# ibid p# 1155# Also J# Phipps#
History of Ship-building in Calcutta etc# pp• cit# pp# 126—127#
Yr# No# of ships built Tonnage
1813 21 10,576
1814 10 5,489
1815 14 6,199
1816 18 8,198
1817 13 4,303
1818 12 6,865
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ships and the operation of the Navigation Laws were sure to heat
the India—built vessels in the end as they had beaten the American
vessels# The India trade was new more profitably done through
England where prices were lower than In India and ultimately all
trade with India would be centred in England#
He was not far from light# By 1816, inspite of the full
competition of foreign Europe and America, England had engrossed
19#‘ 5/1 Qfi of the total private import trade and 25.1/6 fo of the
(1)
total private export trade of Bengal# Lee failed to notice
another remarkable trend which almost amounted to a revolution#
He deprecatingly mentioned the glut of British manufacture in
(2)
Calcutta and thought it would never pay# He overlooked the 
effect of continued sale at discount# The free traders, by their
(1) Percentage of import and export 
trade between Calcutta and different ports 
of the World In 1816
Place Import Export
London 1 9 .5/1 6$ 2 5 .1/6$
Lisbon 14.1/IS fo 8.7/16$
America 12.3/16$ ■ 10.14/16$
China 19.2/16$ 19.6/16$-
Brazil 4.4/16$ 3.1/16$
Gulfs 10.3/16$ 8.1/16$
Manilla 3.7/16$ 2.4/16$
Penang 2*6/16$ 2.11/16$
(2) Henry Lee to E# Lee# 13 May 1815 op.cit# p-1139.
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early sacrifice, bad brought into being a limitless market for the 
British goods* Demand for them had began to rise noticeably frcm 
1817*
The financial troubles of the Bengal {government were not
over with the end of eamnercial distress, improvement of the
securities and victory in the Uepal \ekr* The surplus revenue had
fallen lower in 1815 due to rise of military charges which the
(government hoped to put right at the end of the war, specially with
its excessive income from opium* But the supplies to Bombay, China
(1)
and the occupied islands taxed all its resources and forced it to
{2)float a &?o r suit table loan against the Court's orders* If
advances to H*M*Gv were to be maintained - all the money sent by
(3)
the Court in 1815 had been set apart for this purpose - and the 
European investment was to be restored to its pre-war level, some 
sort of assistance must be rendered frcm London* The harassed
government pleaded that..... **.**however valuable a possession
India would still remain to England, even in a pecuniary point of
(1} Military Charges in Bengal
1813 - S*R. 2,60,64,045
1815 - S.R* 3,47,40,267
Bills drawn on Bengal
1815 - S.R* 1,33,42,861
1816 - S.R. 72,00,632
Yr* Bombay Bencoolen Penang Java China Mauritius 
S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R*
1815 58,58,244 5,45,182 1,49,581 5,79,630 45,33,999 7,39,020
1816 20,65,320 5,29,744 6,28,448 7,93,649 22,99,396 5,03,502
(2) G.G* in C* to Court (Terr.ELn.) 9 August 1816.
(3) G.G* in C. to Court (Terr.Bln*) 28 June 1816*
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view, as the scarce of lucrative canmeree, and as paying, a vast
tribute in the returns of private fortunes, yet she demanded in
return, some aid from the Mother Country, to enable her revenues
(1)
to bear the expenses necessary to preserve her.* If the 
excess of supplies to London be set against the excess of heme 
charges, if any:, over the investment, England would still come out
(s)
as a debtor country# Moreover, home charges had been increasing
alarmingly and the aid became specially urgent when sale of imports
would no longer afford a reliable resource# It would becans
imperative If military action had to be tahen against the
Findarls who had begun creating trouble again#
In the Conrt’s view, however, the Bengal government could
not legally mix up the investment - home charge and the bill of
(3)
exchange accounts, that on both heads India was a debtor# Surplus 
revenue in these years had just been sufficient to meet the home 
charges with little left for the reduction of debt# Not only the 
military but the civil charges had gone up alarmingly* Opium 
revenue was threatened by exports of Malwa opium through the western
U)
ports and salt revenue had suffered from, the government’s confused
(1) Ci.G# in C. to Court (Terr.ELn#) 16 December 1816#
(2) G.G# in C# to Court (Terr.ELn#) 26 April 1816 and 21 January 1817#
(5) Court to G.G* in C# (Terr.ELn*) 2 April 1817.
In two years 1814-15 and 1815-6 India had become indebted 
on the In vestment-Home Charge account by £879,304 and on the; 
Bill of Exchange account by £325,402#
(4) Secret Commercial to G.G* in C# 10 May 1816#
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policy at a tin© when Liverpool salt was being imported# The
Court flatly refused to allow an annual transfer of £500,000
of India debt “to be applied in aid of your finances in India,
and not in furnishing supplies to enable us to discharge them*#
Nor was it feasible “because in the present circumstances of the
public finances of the British Empire, any application to the
Parliament for assistance, to enable our Indian governments to
defray the charges consequent upon the territorial administration
of India, is quite out of the qiestion#• ♦#“ The home government
was sending £1 million partly for defraying charges on its account
and partly as a contribution to the expenses of the Nepal War#
Eeyond that no more help could be sent# If debts had to be raised
to pay for the territorial charges in India or England they must
(2)
be raised and payable in India# This unhelpful attitude was to 
e certain extent due to Buckinghamshire’s bad relations with the 
Court but mainly to the latter’s wholesome fear of public criticism 
end what may be termed as its “Wellesley-complex#* Unfortunately 
it was adopted at a time when military action had started against
(3)
the Pindaris which would ultimately merge into the T h ird  Marat ha War#
CL) Court to Cr.Gr# in C# 9  November 1 8 1 4 .  The Bengal Government
increased remuneration of the molunghees for surplus produce but 
stopped it when that policy affected the import of coast salt# 
The change of policy was dictated by its solicitude for the 
country ships#
(2) Court to- G.G. in C# (Terr. Pin#) 23 September 1817#
3) The public securities again showed a discount of Es 2. 2 as$ in 
June 1817. G.G# in C* to Court (Terr. Hn*) 30 June 1817# -
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Bengal Finance and The Maratha War: Large bands of free boaters
under the name of Pindaris, bad established themselves In the 
dominions of Sindiah mho, unable to control, thought of using 
them to satisfy his predatory instincts as well as to further bis 
political game# The minor potentatesin Central India and Rajpootana 
kept them, as Sleeman said, “as poachers in England keep dogs#“
They repeatedly pillaged Central India and the Nizam’s territory 
and In 1812 even dared attack the Company’s possessions# Minho 
warned the home government without avail for Buckinghamshire 
scorned the Pindaris as an insignificant distraction* On the 
occurrence of further attacks in 1814 Moira decided it was time 
for a drastic revision of the Company’s political system with a 
view to root out this festering sore# “The British government,* 
in his opinion, “should become the acknowledged head of a 
confederacy, the whole strength of which we should have a right
by compact to w against any invader of the public repose#* 
Before Buckinghamshire’s obdurate order, prohibiting change in 
the political system, could reach India Moira sent another appeal 
to England for freedom of initiative* The non-interyentlonist 
Maratha policy of the home authorities, in view of the Maratha 
weakness which bred anarchy and the Maratha hostility which 
pre^saged a sudden threat to the Company’s possessions, seemed to
(1)
(1) Quoted in C*H# Philips The East India Company 1784-1834 
op.clt. p# 213#
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him highly unrealistic and even escapist* The system of
alliances he proposed would either neutralise them or, isolating,
annihilate them* George Canning, now the President of the India
Board, at first concurred with the Secret Committee’s preference
for “a more moderate and compact territory and leaving the other
states to themselves** Even when, on the arrival of news of
Pindari inroads into the Northern Ci rears, he gave Moira “an
assurance of approbation of any measures which may have been
authorised or undertaken not only for repelling invasion but for
(2)
pursuing or chastising the invaders®, he did not fail to advise 
Moira to abjure a ccanprehenstv© scheme of conquest* It seemed 
as If the home authorities saw in Moira the ghost of Wellesley’s 
Maratha policy and the same misunderstanding was going to be 
repeated*
Moira’s plans for “the destroying of the Pindari association
in its nest* started with a subsidiary alliance with Appa Sahib,
(3)
an aspirant to the Bhonebship, on 27 May 1816* It was followed
by expulsion of Bajirao II from the headship of the Maratha
(4)
confederacy (Treaty of Poona, 13 June 1817) and a forced treaty 
with Sindiah which obliged him to assist the Company against the
(1) ibid p* 215*
(2) ibid p* 216*
(3) Appa Sahib was regent for Parsaji, the imbecile successor of
Raghuji Bhonsle*
(4) The Peshwa also ceded the Konkan and certain other lands and
strongholds as well as the tribute of Kathiciwad to the British*
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Pindari s and released the latter from the obligation of
abstaining from political activity west of the ChambaX (5
(1)
November 1817)* A further series of treaties with the Rajpoot
states blocked the Pindari movements westwards* These operations,
however, brought to a head all the latent fear and hostility of
the Maratha chiefs* The localised clashes with the Pindaris
merged into a general war with the Marat has*
As no bullion came from England the Bengal government
felt the financial strain from the middle of 1817* Securities,
at par in March, were at a discount of Rs 2-2 as $ by the end of
June which rose, to Ra 4 4 as # at the end of the year* The
surplus revenue of Bengal fell to S.R* 1,08,85,282 in 1817-18 as
military charges rose to S.R. 5,87,35,875* The Indian surplus
went down still further as Madras and Bombay incurred heavy
deficits* The Bengal government took recourse to loans to
(2)
procure the supplies of the Deccan aimy, and Issued treasury notes
at 8$ later* When the Court appeared “absolutely to preclude
any discussion in regard to the sufficiency of our ordinary means
to meet the demands of the commercial department^ so long as a
rupee shall be due by the territorial branch of the Hon’ble
(3) (4)
Company’s Concerns* and wanted the bullion, It sent in 1817, to be
(1) This obligation followed from the Treaty of SarjiArjungaon.
(2) G.G. in G. to Court (Terr. Bin*) 10 October 1817
(3) G-.G. in G. to Gourt (Terr. Finl) 11 August 1819, referring to
the Court’s despatch 23 September 5817*
(4) Secret Commercial despatch of 13 March 1817#
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solely applied to the procurement of raw silk, the government 
floated another loan to meet an avalanche of bills from the 
western provinces, Hyderabad, Nagpur and Poona which amounted to 
more than 2 crores and 30 lakhs* This loan was opened at a 
discount of 3$ and was to bear 10$ interest till 30 june 18X9
CD
when It would be brought into the register of 6$ debts* Bengal 
was following the Court’s orders to raise resources in India 
with a vengeance* By stubbornly standing on the letter of the 
Charter Act, in order to protect its commercial profits, the 
Court had passed on the wbole burden of the Maratha War to 
Bengal* It was extremely lucky that It came so quickly to a 
victorious conclusion* As the Maratha chiefs offered battle one 
by one, they were very easily defeated - first the Peshwa d;
Khirki, (5 November 1817) then the Bhonsle at Sitabaldi (27 November 
1817) and Holkar at Mahidpur (21 December 1817)* When the desperate 
last stands of the Peshwa eb Ashti (20th February 1818) and of the 
Bhonsle at Nagpur (16 December 1818) were broken, the Marathas had 
ceased to exist as a political force* The Peshwa’s €lominions 
(except Satara where the titular raja was set up) were annexed as 
also the districts lying to the north and the south of the Narmada 
and the British, with a network of alliances with all the princely
(1) G.G* in C. to Court (Terr. Bin*) 4 April 1818.
states, had became the paramount power In India# "Henceforth," 
wrote Prinsep in his Political Review, "this epoch will be 
referred to as that whence each of the existing states will 
date the commencement of its peaceable settlement and the 
consolidation of its relations with the controlling power# The 
dark age of trouble and VibLence, which so long spread its 
malign influence over the fertile regions of Central India, 
has thus ceased from this time; and a new era has commenced, 
we trust, with bri^iter prospects, - an era of peace, prosperity 
and wealth at least, If not of political liberty and high moral
a)
improvement# "
The Marquis of Hastings later boasted that he had won the
Maratha war and "had bought absolute supremacy of the Company
in India at the cost of a debt of 98 lakhs • • • • #My sole pretension
is, that in wielding your strength I have not checked the pace
(3)
of your Increasing wealth#" He also promised a net increase
of £1 million frcm the newly conquered territories in three or
(3)
four years# The Court, however, did not view the achievement
in the same light# The Bengal debt had increased by S.R. 3^75,847 
in 1817-18, S.R# 1,48,89,122 in 1818-19 and S.R# 2,20^  78,237 in 
1819-20 as a direct or indirect result of the Maratha War# The Indian
(1) Quoted in Cambridge History of India vol# ,J# p# 382#
(2) Marquess of Hastings to Chairman 20 February 1813. The private
letters of the Marquess of Hastings etc# op#cit#
(3) Marquess of Hastings to Chairman 26 September 1813 ibid#
<9 4
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surplus had turned into a deficit in 1818-19 and the total debt
the territory bore to commerce was rising faster than it hqd
done between 1814—16* London was now sending for the first time
an excess of supplies of other than commercial nature* So long
as this debt remained unpaid, the surplus revenue could not be
applied to the reduction of India debt*
Two things were imperative if the vicious circle was to be
broken* Bengal should send full investment so as to wipe out its
balance with commerce and: should see to the production of an
Indian surplus big enough to defray all territorial charges at
home and abroad as well as to reduce a portion of India debt*
(2)
The Court again prohibited all remittable loans and by way of
assistance sent £1 million of its surplus commercial profits -
strictly to be applied to the reduction of India debt by way of
(3)
a sinking fund*
The rest of the history of the Marquis of Hastings*^  Governor 
Generalship is concerned with his measures to follow these three 
directives - increase of investments, reduction of debts and
improvement of revenue* We will deal with them in succession and
show how each measure brought the Company into conflict with either
the British private traders in India or the British creditors of
(1) INDIA
Yr* Surplus revenue Surplus Charge
1817-18 £505,741
1818-19 ... * £97,015
1819-20 .. • • £155,568
(2) Court to G.G-. in C* (Terr* Fin*) 1 September 1819
(3) Court to G.G* in C. (Terr* iin.) 30 September 1818, 20 April 1819
and 5 July 1820*
the Company or "the mercantile interest in England*
Increase of the Company* s remittance trade: In the Court *s indent
for 181?-18 muslins obtained only S.R* 2,06,093 out of 24 laTcha 
allotted to piece goods* Next year the piece g>ods indent was 
further reduced to 16 lakhs and there was no longer the familiar 
muslin among the assortments desired for the European mafkati The 
Dacca factory was to be closed down* It was not the freight nor 
the prat active duty ishich prompted the Court to abandon them in 
1818 but the astounding reduction in the price of British cottons
CD
of equal description* Fine piece goods of Bengal., with the
history and fortunes of which the history and fortunes of the 
Company were so indissolubly linked, had to admit defeat in so 
unequal a competition* The price of defeat was decay* India lost 
a great art and the artisans lost their employment* More, with the 
rapid decrease of trade in coarse calicoes, 'which limped on for a
(1) Court to G.G. in C* (Comm1) 5 September 1817*
Description of 
the Article.
Doreas 
20 yds*piece
Cossaes
VfriTrmTla
Rain so oks
Seerhaud-connaes 
(Chandrakonas?)
Made in England Made in Bengal
35 shillings Dacca - 135 shllings )
Keerpoy - 45 tt )
Hurripaul • 89 * )
60 " Malda and 95 « )
Dacca )
2Z to 35 * Santipore - 47 to 76 11 )
Keerpoy * 39 n )
33 * Keerpoy 61 it
5Q to 64 * Dacca and 80 to: 89 tt )
Santipore )
2c>,ft
(1)
while, India lost her only industry which had an international
market* Remittance from India could now be made in her raw materials#
Of cotton, sugar, isilk and indigo - sugar, far out distanced by
the West Indies produce, never had any steady demand* On cotton
and silk, therefore, the Company fastened their hopes as on cotton
and indigo the private traders#
As first cotton was on the ascendant* "We attach very
particular importance,* wrote the Court as early as 1815, "to the
object of improiring the quality and staple of Indian cotton, so as
(2)
to render it fit for the general consumption of Great Britain*.•”
The Court proposed experiments with a better variety and ordered
a supply of seeds from the Bourbon Island* In IB16 it sent a
cotton gin for better cleaning# But the military preoccupation
of the government prevented it frcm sending any cotton fit for the
European maxket in 1817 and 1818* The Company made a good profit
(3)
on Bengal, cotton in 181? and ordered a large consignment to
(4)
England (about 7000 bales) for the next three years. Cotton used
(5)
to be received in Bombay in lieu of revenue* Experiments were 
started there with new varieties under private European enterprise*
(1) About 22 lakhs in 1817-18, 16 lakhs in 1818-19 and 14 lakhs in
1819*20* See Court to G.G. in C. (Comm1) 12 June 1816, 3 
September 1817*
(2) Court to G.G. in C* (Comm1) 22 Deconber 1815*
(3) Court to G.G* in G* (Coarnt1) 17 June 1818*
(4) Court to G.G. in C* (Comnr') 18 May 1818, 10 ISuly 1818*
(5) G# in C* Bombay to Court 3Q May 1812* Elphinstone stopped this
In 1820#
2*rr
(i)
Dr. (Sldar was given rent free land in Ahmedabad for this purpose
(2)
as also one David Malcolm at Salsette# Madras too was exhorted
(3)
to increase the supply of the best Tinnevelly cotton# Silk was, 
however, the principal medium of the Company* s remittance# It 
returned 3s 6d per sicca rupee as late at 1817 and naturally the 
order went up from 45 lakhs to 66 lakhs in 1819* To ensure its
(4)
supply the Court sent £100,000 in each of the years 1817 and 1818.
Here too it was disappointed# When the silk: supplies, though much
extended, fell short of its expectations and the price of Indian
cotton began to decline in England, it was forced to go in for
(5)
indigo from 1819#
(1) G.Cdn G# Bombay to Court 11 April 1818.
(2) James Ritchies* evidence before S.C.H.C. 1832 Q# 1376 et seq#
(5) Secret Commercial despatch to Fort St. George 29 April
1818#
(4) Secret Commercial despatch to Bengal 13 March 1817 and 21
April 1818#
(5) Secret Commercial despatch to Bengal 7 May 1821#
Exports by the Company from Calcutta to London
Year Piece goods Silk Cotton Indigo Sugar
Pieces f#mds# f#mds# f#mds# f *mds
1816-17 5,50,103 5,010 13,428 X 1,987
1817-18 4,35,095 10,053 80 X 29,754
1818-19 3,89,902. 7,547 0 X 32,039
1819-20 3,06,995 10,815 5,597 1607 ,28,862
J# Phipps - A Guide to the Commerce of Bengal, op*cit#
p#205
It Taras private trade which, felt most the impact of free 
trade and the industrial Revolution during 1817 and 1818#
Compared to 1813-14 the import trade had quadrupled - merchandise 
rising by 2*2? times and treasure by 8#2# The British traders 
who could bring their own and, now, much cheapened manafactures 
had the upper hand# They imported three times in goods ani less 
than four times in treasure — well above the average# But the 
value of exports showed no improvement# It was stationary in 
1817 and declined next year# In 1817 surplus exports still 
amounted to S.R. 73,34,219 (actually - S.R# 1,96,19,313) the 
Company having S.R# 23,66,672 to Its credit and the private traders 
S.R# 49,67,547# In 1818, for the first time in the history of 
Indo^British ecmmerce, imports exceeded exports by S#R# 2,06,17",309 
(actually S.R# 52,33,975) - occasioned by default on private
a)
account alone, for the Company had a surplus export#
(1) CALCUTTA - WORLD . {CUSTOMS HOUSE)
(PRIVATE TRADE)
Imports Exports
Year Merchandise Treasure Total Merchandise Treasure Total
S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R#
1817-18 2,55,94,728 3,22,20,540 5,78,15,268 5,49,57,143 3,17,250 5,52,74,399
1818-19 2,84,55,615 4,75,14,948 7,59,70,563 5,04,88,362 2,88,55* 5,07,76,900
CALCUTTA - U.K. (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
(PRIVATE TRADE)
1817-18 1,35,62,962 61,57,981 1,97,20,943 1,69,12,905 X  1,69,12,905
1818-19 1,59,44,495 1,21,61,159 2,81,05,654 1,38,72,325 x 1,38,72,325
Cw'-Jai Ctinvmlw^ U- Ha.f>orTa - _ __
For correct valuation see Wilson# A Review of the External Canmeres 
of Bengal op#cit#
Footnote (1) continued from previous page.
The Company* s trade with World
Imports Exports
Merchandise Treasure Total Merchandise Treasure Total
S.R# S.R# S.R, S.R# S.R# S.R#
1817-18 42,84,838 9,51,130 52,35,968 1,01,43,515 r 1,01,43,515
1818-19 12,81,821 19,76,657 32,58,478 78,34,832 x 78,34,832
The Company* s Trade with U#K#
Imports Exports
Yr# Merchandise Treasure Total Merchandise Treasure Total
S.R, S.R. S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R#
1817-18 17,24,634 9,51,130 26,75,764 93,28,438 X  93,28,438
1818-19 12,81,821 19,76,651 32,58,472 69,99,443 X  69,99,443
£<•> m. mc/i/'x 01/ /2r j^-o rfe .
* >  t ' -■
Decline of exchange and its causes: The <"?hy»ng^ in the terms of
trade was revolutionary* Exchange value of the rupee, so long 
much higier than the official value of 2s 6d, hegan to fall with 
the decline of surplus exports* The pace was set by the eagerness 
of the merchants to get the returns of their imports to England# 
But cotton and indigo prices were too high to afford a remittance,' 
si IE was all but unprocurable and there was no demand for Bengal
CD
piece goods# Hence the demand"!*or mercantile bills increased 
which lowered the exchange further against India# Money was 
plentiful and seeking remittance or investment desperately and 
even a lower rate of interest was considered preferable to forced 
idleness# It was exactly the revere of what happened In 1814 
and 1815 when money was scarce and the extensive surplus exports . 
kept the exchange high* These difficulties were further enhanced 
when cotton prices began to sag in London in 1819 and collapsed 
in the China market#
There were several causes of this sudden plenty in 1818-19 
which is apparently inexplicable in the context of the scarcity of
(1) Export of Bengal Goods in Private Trade to World
Yr# Piece goods Indigo Sugar Silk Cotton
S.R* S.R* S.R,. S*R* S.H#
1817-18 1,32,34,725 80,31,855 38,81,397 19,57,262 1,10,13,074
1818-19 1,32,82,789 69,66,405 44,02,608 57,46,361 89,76,861
To TJ#K#
1817-18 4,37,107 63,79,779 12,49,012 9,42,062 53,69,791
1818-19 20,30,069 52,66,111 14,90,874 47,91,860 37,87,030
(The Company*s exports included from I818»19)
&&y\.<3c\L Corvx YYYl/f C,<- i i 17 . i gig -
*71fr 1 { /
of the previous year* The Marquis of Hastings refers to unloosening
of the native capital hoarded up during the Maratha war in the hope
(1)
of a higher interest* The more fundamental cause* however* was
abundance of private remit table capital which could not find a way to
England due to the stagnation of the Europe trade or secure invest-*
ment in India due to a recession in the country trade and depression
(2)
in the ship-building industry - increased further by excessive
import of bullion called in by the scarcity of 1B17#
The private remit table capital of Bengal had been calculated
by Bosanquet as half a million? the Court put it higher at two
(3)
mill ions, an<3H» St* Georgs Tucker, tbs financial adviser of Wellesley
(4)
and Barlow* put it at three millions* In the period under discussion 
remittable income arose from savings of the Civil and Military 
servants of the Company, European mercantile profits, profits from 
European industries and professions* and interest on the public debt 
held by the resident as well as the absentee creditors* There arose 
at least an annual private remittable income of 1 crore and 56 lakhs
(1) The Marquess of Hastings to Chairman 8 February 1819* Private 
, Letters of the Marquess of Hastings cp* dt*
(2' Bengal CcmnBrciaX Reports 1818-19. The difference between the
Indian and the British shipping was 5(% in the latter1 s favour; 
the rate of freight had been reduced by 2/3 or § of what 
prevailed in the last 20 years and the British ships carried 
on port to port trade against the letter of the law#
(3) Court to G*.G* in C* (FLn) 20 June 1810*
(4) "Remarks on the Plans of Fiaance lately promulgated by the Hobble
Court of Directors and by the Supreme Government of India*"
H* St* George Tucker, October 1821* p*3#
3 »:>
(i)
on these heads. When we add “to this sum the average amount 
remittable by the Company to England in repayment of the hcane 
charges - there was about two crores and a half to be remitted 
in each year from Bengal in the medium of her raw material resources* 
So long as the excess of exports over imports remained equal to 
this figure - the exchange would be at par but if it rose above, 
there would occur a favourable exchange for India and if it went 
below, an unfavourable exchange would set in* Up to 1816 actual 
excess of experts per annum was sufficient to eonvey the remittable 
private capital* In that year, due to resumption of trade with 
foreign Europe and America, import of bullion started in an 
ever-increasing crescendo and merchandise from Britain began to 
flood Bengal* This upset the applecart by further increasing, 
the extent of remittable capital* The private traders had two
(I) Private Remittable Capital of Bengal
(a) Savings of the Civil Service 
Total income - 82 lakhs 
and pension find
211 lakhs
(b) Savings of the military service 
Total income - 150 lakhs
19 «
C®) European mercantile profits 
Gross profits - 67 lakhs
33j tr
(a) Profits from industries, houses and 
professions (Profits from indigo 
manufacture calculated at 5% on a 
capital of 80 lakhs)
a £ ** or
(a) Interest payable to resident creditors 
on 4 crores at 6$
mm 24 «t
(f) Do payable to absentee creditors 
on 6 crores at 6fo
mm 36 *
155ijr or 156 lakhs
2> o t
alternatives — either to barter money for goods at high prices or
accept bills at a lower exchange# When goods, so dearly bought, reached
(1)
England they found a dull market# When they tried remittance by bills,
to avoid investment at 5$, their competition reduced the exchange#
The agency houses were affected by this inflationary tendency
as they had been before by the deflationary withdrawal of
(2)
capital and appealed to the Government to check it# The Government
very willingLy obliged them by floating a 6% loan which absorbed the
(3)
remittable funds at a higher interest than available in the na;ffcet#
But this temporary palliative was of no avail# The remittable
capital of 1819-20 was further swollen by a total bullion import of
S.R# 4,10,84,760 and merchandise import of S.R# 1,75,21,977# Exchange
fell from 2 s 6d in 1819 to 2 s 3d in 1820 as remittance through trade
(4)
became more hazardous with the fall of cotton price In England*
(5}
The stagnation of the country trade choked a great source of
(1} John Palmer to Henry Trail 31 October 1819# Palmer Papers op.cit Vol^ 8 8 .
(2) John Palmer to Henry Trail 20 June 1819 'B&g&sm ibid. £ 3 0 . '
(3) John Palmer to Henry Trail 31 October 1819 I&4&# of>*cib.
(4) Cotton prices fell very rapidly# Cotton sold from lOd to 13d per lb#
in the second sale of 1818 and from 5d to 7d in the first sale of 1819#
(5) CALCUTTA - CHINA (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
Year Imports ' Exports
S.R# S.R#
18X8-19 1,28,36,846 92,03,799
1819-20 71,29,026 54,27,736
CALCUTTA-FENANG CALCUTTA-MANILLA
Year ImportsCS.R#) Exports (S.R#) Imports (S.R#) Exports (S.R#)
1818-19 17,03,126 17,50,328 3,88,586 7,81,219
1819-20 13,43,119 8,86,612. 7,29,902 2,80,298
GALCU TTA-C 0R0MANDEL CALCUTTA-MALABAR
Year Imports (S.R#) Exports (S.R#) Imports (S.R.) Exports (S.R.)
1818-19 18,20,263 9,93,482 9,97,616 24,79,992
1819-20 9,28,529 11,28,232 15,43,603 41,48,874
Actual value - H#H*Wilson op.clt#
l o t
investment# Cash became more plentiful in 1820 and a large scale 
purchase of publie securities pushed their premium to S.R# 3-4 as 
The attention of the remitters was then drawn to the Company* s 
interest bills which, at 2s 6d, gave the best possible remittance 
under the circumstances# At once there was a great rush for those
bills# It seemed as if the Court would once more be deluged in bills#
The conflict between private trade and the Campanyrs remittance trade:
Eram 1819 onwards the CompanyTs trade was returning to its old 
standard# The Company's imports in merchandise frcm Great Britain 
fose from S.R# 12,81,821 in 1818 to S.R# 19,52,700 in 1819 and to 
S.R# 25,95,608 in 1821 till it fell to S.R# 15,00,529 in 1822# Its 
imports in bullion rose from S.R. 19,76,651 in 1818 to S.R# 91,47,961 
in 1819, when the Court sent funds to be used for the sinking fund, 
but fell to S.R# 15,25,404 In 1820-21# Its exports to the same country 
increased in a greater ratio - merchandise alone from S.R# 69,99,443 
in 1818 to S.R# 98,68,404 in 1819 and as much as S.R. 2,05,58,347 in
1821 before It declined to S.R. 1,15,18,555 next year# Part of this
(lj Bills drawn on the Court on 
account of Bengal debt#
CD
(2)
Year For interest
S.R#
1818-19 34,89,284
1819-2G 58,61,539
1820-21 1,26,97,973
1821-22 1,15,96,176
For principal 
S.R#
71,312
1,35,940
1,17,780
40,65,626
Ercm Financial Letters and Enclosures received 
from Bengal and India. I#0#
(2) (see next page)
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Footnote (2) continued from previous page
Bengal Commercial Reports 1818-19 to 1822-23 
Actual value of the Company* s imports from and
exports to World and U*KL#
Total imports and exports
Tear Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*
1818-19 32,58,478 78,34,832
1819-20 1,11,10,661 1,84,28,442
1820-21 41,88,998 1,35,34,972
1821-22 26,29,321 2,34,17,959
1822—23 13,68,381 1,81,12,755
Trade with U*K#
Tear Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*
1818-19 28,67,671 69,99,443
1819-20 1,11,10,661 1,00,76,031
1820-21 41,88,998 1,02,38,346
1821-22 26,29,321 2,08,74,757
1822-23 13,68,381 1,15,18,555
H.H* Wilson, op*cit* tables 13 and 14*
extended export was in payment of the territorial debt to commerce 
which the Court insisted on and part of it was sent to enable the 
Court to discharge the interest bills which were being drawn 
increasingly from 1820* The indent for cotton rose from 7000 bales 
in 1820 and 1821 to 9000 bales in 1822, though it sold for high prices 
iir India and the Company had enough stocks in hand; that for silk 
went up from 6 6 ^ lakhs in 1820 to 73 lakhs; investment in sugar 
was doubled* Only the piece goods were down to S.R* 8,06,970* w0ur 
warehouses in London are at this time, as you know, loaded with
CD
cotton piece goods, which are selling at a great loss** Cottony 
however, bought at Hs* 18 to Rs* 22 per factory mating sold so low 
that the Court decided it could come only as dead weight* The cotton 
speculation to China came to grief in 1821 due to the abundance of
U)
the local harvest# Silk could not- be procured to the extent of the
indent (7000 bales)* The Court, therefore, fell on indigo which
had yielded in 1819 from £14 to £19 $ snd an exchange of 2s 9*5d*
Its provision was limited before to £300,000* Now it was increased 
C3)
to £750,000*
The private traders took fright at this new burst of energy*
The greater the share of the Company in the export trade the less 
they felt would be their share* The Company’s remittance was in
direct conflict with private remittance, already reduced due to
(1) Evidence of the Chairman before S.C*H*L# 1820
(2) Secret Commercial despatch to China 24 April 1822* Bengal cotton-
sold for 5d to 6d a lb* in Novanber 1822* See The Asiatic
Journal Vol* 2XV* p* 627*
(3 ) secret Commercial despatch to Bengal 7 May 1821, 22 June 1821
and 16 Augxst 1821#
stagnation of trad©* Out of the actual excess of exports —
S.R. 2,18,48,745 in 1820 and S.R* 3,11,92,727 in 1821 the Company 
supplied about one erore and two crores respectively*
Trade depression in England: To this tangled trade, depression
in England added another strand in 1819* Professor Clapham once 
described the years between 1815 and 1820 as "economically probably 
the most wretched, difficult and dangerous in modem English 
history** These were years of transition from war to peace, fro© 
the first to the second and more productive phase of the Industrial 
involution* By 1816 the speculation in Indian commodities for the 
Continental and the American markets had come to grief, their prices 
had fallen* Meanwhile the British cotton and iron manufactures had
CD
been improved* But there was no cutlet* Cessation of war contracts 
and loan-financed government expenditure had hit cotton, iron and 
shipping industries very hard* This depression led to an artifically 
contrived drive for exports* There was some recovery in 1818* But
(a)
as the eauses still persisted there was a bad set back in 1819#
There was another outcry against the Company’s monopoly and another 
drive for the Indian market* Out of the total increase in merchandise
(1) Total export of British cotton manufactures and yarn*
Year declared value in £(miIlion3 )
1814 2 0
1815 2 0 * 6
1816 15.6
For iron industryJ&qq Ashton op.cit* pp* 153-54*
(2) Total export of British exports to East Indies and. China
Year Official value £(millions)
1816 2 * 2
1818 3*2
1819 2*4
Foot note (2) continued fran previous page*
Erport -of British, cottons Depression in ship-building
in Britain
Year declared value Year tons (in thousands)
£(miIlians)
1818 18*8 1816 84*7
1819 14*7 1819 89*1
1820 16*5 1820 66*7
1821 16*1 1821 58*1
A*D* Gayer* W*W* Rostow, and A*J* Schwartz* The Growth and
fluctuation of the British Economy 1790-1850* p* 149*
For depression in iron industry see Evidence of William Matthews 
in the Report of the Committee on Manufactures 1853*
import of 1820 - 50 lakhs - Britain alone contributed 27 lakhs* 
The condition® were now propitious# The prices of woollens and
a)
metals had largely fallen in the Bengal market and the cost of
C2)
production of cottons reduced beyond recognition# Impart of
cotton piece goods fran Britain exceeded 46 lakhs in 1821 and 65
(3)
lajdis in 1822.
1 n 1 1 - 11 1 ■ ■ ' '■ ■ - « ' ■ ■ ' ■ i ■' ' '■ ■ ■ i ■ ■ ■ ■■■' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■' ■
(1) Price of British Manufactures at Calcutta#
(from Price Currents in the Bengal Commercial 
Reports)#
Article 1813-14 1820-21
S.R# S.R.
Aurora per piece 108-115 90-103
Scarlet 8 - 0 7-8/4
Superfine per yard 
Iron per maund 9-10 5A0 - 6 / 8
Lead " * 1 2 -1 2 / 8 6 / 8  - 7/-
Copper Sheet per maund 53-56 41/8 - 45
Steel " " 30-34 6 / 1 2  - 8
They were being sold ataprofit now# See Phipps - A Glide to 
the Commerce of Bengal op#cit# p. 263#
(2) Quality price of yarn#
1818 1821
30 hanTra per lb# 2 s 9& Is 6 od
40 hanks n 2 s 6d Is 5^ d
E# Baines op#cit. p# 355#
(3) Bengal Commercial Reports 1821, 1822-
Bat exports still lagged behind* Nor did trade with foreign
(1)
Europe, America and Asia prosper as trade with Britain did*
The plima 1 7 cause was the decline of piece goods and high prices
(2)
of Indian articles. Freight and charges had become so low with 
keen competition among the free traders that there was little 
inducement to engage in circuitous trade* Moreover the preferential 
treatment of Britain and the British vessels encouraged Indo-British 
trade at the cost of others* They had little chance to employ 
British capital, their experiments with bills raised the exchange, 
they had to bring bullion where the British need not, and now, In 
1820, along with the British traders, they felt the channel of 
remittance gradually shrinking* They had lost the piece goods market
(I) CALCUTTA - WORLD (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
(The Company and the Private Trade)
Imparts V . ’ Esports
Tear Merchandise Tre^gure Tot|JL Merchandise Treasure
1820-21 2,24,45,163 2,40^71,335 4,65,16,498 5,68^03,248 12^ ,29,363 5,
1821-22 2,59,03,599 2,21',49,437 4,80,53,036 5,35,53,123 1,23,96,395 6 ,
1822-23 2,68,66,535 1,72;89,382 4,41,55,917 6,18,51,480 51,51,966 6 ,
C o .. (_ (jijifwS .
(2) Article Price in. Price in Price in
1813-14 1820-21 1822-23
Sdl, S.R. S. P.
Cotton 12/8 - 14 18-22 13/8 - 16
Benares Sugar 1st sort
per ml* 8 / 8  - 9 / 8 9/i - 11/8 8  - 9/lX
8/8-12 12-13 14 - 15/8
silk cossimbazar
per seer
Indigo per f* md* 120 l& Q   ^ "* 520
Rice Buckergange
per md*
_/l4 /- - 1/5 1/11 - 1/14 1/5 - 1/9
From Price currents in the Bengal Commercial Reports#
Total 
80,32,511 
59,49, KB 
70,03,446
A
$ Q CJ
in both Americas and South East Asia to the British cotton 
manufacture, the London cotton market to American cotton and the 
China cotton market to the mtive product*
Trade with Lisbon was considerable up to 1816-17 but it 
declined fran the next year with partial attempts at recovery In 
1818, 1820 and 1822* It depended on bullion and as it became 
less profitable to send bullion, the trade shrank* The constant 
struggle between Portugal and her American possessions disturbed 
the trade with Brazil* Trade with United States went on well up 
to 1818-19 and fell off for causes similar to those that operated 
in the case of Britain* Denmark and Holland had an insignificant 
share in the Bengal trade and that with France did not fare well 
after 1818» Trade with Gibraltar and Malta flourished for a while 
after the Malta Trade Act and trade with Scuth America was more .
'or less stable up to the last but one year in the series* Imports 
from China fell greatly after 1819 as Bengal opium came into 
competition with MaXwa and Turkish opium and as the cotton 
speculations of 1819 and I82Q came to grief* Trade with Penang and 
Sumatra showed a similar stress though the former began to. recover 
in 1820* Though Java had been in the Dutch hands since 1816, 
the country trade with her prospered with one or two breaks* But 
feeling oppressed by illiberal regulations of the Dutch, the 
British private merchants sought a vantage point in the China seas
which would protect their trade route to the Eastern islands 
as well as serve as a free emporium for the Tend of the British 
and the Chinese articles# Manilla’s trade declined as direct 
connection with Spanish America (now independent) was established# 
The exigencies of the Maratha war increased private trade 
between Calcutta and Malabar from 1817 f a  1819 but the end of 
war heralded a fall# There was some attempt to compensate for its 
decline through an increased trade with the Gulfs till their 
direct trade with Britain affected it in 1822# Though imports 
from Coromandel were more or less constant, exports suffered# The
a)
speculative trade with. Mauritius spent itself by 181?.
CD
CiLCUm * LISBOH 
Imparts Ezport-3
Year Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasure
SeR# S *R# S,R# S.R#
1817*18 1,93,402 16,69,305 15,88,637 X
1818-19 1,18,224 27,85,721 20,78,172 X
1819—20 48,601 17,18,618 9,99,504 X
1820-21 2,60,984 24,89,516 22,18,168 X
1821-22 63,455 13,43,229 4,58,356 X
1822-23 2,56,941 21,41,624 25,44,959 X
a&Lcirm - TJ.S#
Imports Exports
Year Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasure
S*B« S.R# SeR# SeR,
1817-18 11,49,890 57,99,449 48,91,053
1818—19 5,03,430 90,59,375 70,26,531
1819-20 1,32,278 45,96,510 45,86,438
1820-21 1,59,655 27,28,519 19,25,079
1821-22 2,90,477 50,51,178 38,53,916 49,500
1822-23 2,43,013 50,07,652 30,63,019
3/J
Footnote (1) continued from previous page
CALCUTTA - FRANCE
Imports Exports
Year Merchandise Treasure Merchandise
S.R* S.R* S*R,
1817-18 4,34,734 9,81,010 17,17,415
1818-19 5,27,182 17,90,841 20,53,159
1819-20 3,34,245 10,31,292 11,61,961
1820-21 2,33,183 10,42,070 15,11,637
1821-22 7,42,551 23,52,763 12,21,417
1822—23 7,20,248 12,28,744 21,78,423
QALCU TTA-BR AZIL CALCUTTA-SOUTH AMERICA
Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*. S.R* S.R*
1817-18 23,44,543 16,91,855 4,40,823 3,87,518
1818-19 24*10,896 9,87,037 14,46,266 6,60,107
1819-20 11,85,966 10,60,412 22,66,981 7,25,842
1820-21 13,93,157 6,47,928 16,38,898 19,55,002
1821-22 4,92,125 1,45,352 27,77,415 14,64,261
1822-23 4,07,940 2,01,226 10,82,548 2,88,315
CALCUTTA - CHI HA
Imports Exports
Year Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasure
S.R*. S.R# S.R* S.R*
1817-18 36,55,981 77,03,777 1,01,95,671 2,52,000
1818-19 36,28,994 92,07,852 92,03,799 2,36,250
1819-20 20,53,882 50,75,144 46,22,514 1,11,500
1820-21 30,47,431 45,38,564 1,02,48,426 2,96,150
1821-22 22,88,959 39,33,281 1,02,05,138 X
1822-23 12,30,310 26,19,046 1,30,74,663 X
Footnote (1) continued#
CALCOTTA-mtANG CALCUTTA - SUMATRA
Year Imports Exports
S.R# S.R*
1817-18 9,05,610 18,96,622
1818-19 17,03,126 17,50,328
1819-20 13,43,119 11,09,200
1820-21 14,91,677 26,39,218
1821-22 14,83,752 28,31,099
1822-23 13,63,473 28,25,408
Imports
S.R#
6,20,588
5,47,683
8,85,484
5,55,678
3,09,036
3,46,751
Exports
S.R#
9,61,294
4,31,774
5,85,465
2,66,140
8,77,291
4,45,968
CALGUTTA-4IALABAR C ALGUT1A-C ORQMAtTDEL
Year Imports Exports Imports. • Exports
S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R#
1817-18 8,94,373 45,01,687 7^ 96,883 15,65,812
1818-19 9,97,616 31,46,361 18,20,263 9,93,482
1819-20 15,43,605 41,48,874 9,28,529 46,76,816
1820-21 13,45,249 25,25,695 8,91,356 12,53,930
1821-22 22,46,106 18,82,161 8,87,221 12,35,015
1822-23 6,51,285 41,08,341 7,60,650 40,30,972
CALCUTTA - GULES CALCUTTA- JAVA
Year Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R. S*R# S.R# S.R#
1817-18 41,50,047 47,92,689 12,35,851 7,68,914
1818-19 55,98,358 46,58,887 18,82,380 2,20,148
1819-20 52,03,952 50,50,985 22,18,509 25,18,604
1820-21 54,09,962 36,71,131 9,20,293 32,98,982
1821-22 36,25,178 47,40,902 15,97,064 21,26,562
1822-23 38,54,718 34,64,404 18,85,463 ' 27,24,487
CALCTm^MXIA CALCOTTA^UEETIIJS
Year Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R* S.R# S.R# S#R*
1817-18 18,30,834 14,37,806 14,07,772 4,70,006
1818-19 3,88,586 7,81,219 8,37,065 5,47,041
1819-20 7,29,902 2,80,298 6,72,296 9,63,436
1820-21 13,05,801 3,44,461 11,91,111 10,85,907
1821-22 2,35,030 8,90,105 7,51,348 16,31,865
1822-23 4,13,962 2,62,910 7,73,011 10,73,843
5 /3
Footnote (1 ) continued*
CALCUTTA - GLBRALTAR - MAMA
Tear Imports Exports
S*R» S»R#
1817-18 1,26,629 18,90,628
1818-19 13,64,429 12,91,679
1819-20 17,55,757 4,14,702
1820-21 6,87,272 1,53,804
1821-22 x 7,84,682
1822-23 x 7,24,295
Bengal Commercial Reports 1817-1822*
By 1822 a reaction would have set in had not the Company
competed with, the private traders for remittance* Fall of bullion
import had lessened the amount of remittable capital and the
Company* s bills on account of India debt furnished an extra channel
of remittance in 182G and 1821 which provided for about 1 0 0 la|pis
more par annum than the average remitted in that medium before
(1)
1820* The financial operations of the government in 1822 
resulted in further exodus of capital* But paradox!cally enough 
the Company had to send increased investment to enable the Court 
to discharge the bills* There was a huge excess of export in 
1822 - mainly due to the rise of indigo prices to S*R* 260 per 
factory maund - amounting to S.R* 2,28,47,529 (actually no less 
than S.R* 4,41,05,186}* But though the share of the private 
remitters was Increased, it did not exhaust the remittable capital* 
Cash was abundant, interest was low, exchange at 2s*, and the 
dissatisfaction of the private traders with the Company*s remittance 
trade grew more acute and articulate* They viewed it as taking 
unfair advantage of its- command over the surplus revenue of Bengal
(1) On the average about 32 lakhs were remitted in interest bills 
before 1820*
Bills drawn on account of India debt after 1820.
Tear For interest For Principal
S.R* S.R.
1820 1,26,97,973 1,17,780
1821 1,15,96,176 40,65,626
1822 57,62,188 2,20,47,843
Collected from Financial Letters and Enclosures Received op.cit*
and the capital market, as cornering silk and allowing its 
Residents to raise its price still further, and as forcing up
CD
the price of indigo with reckless bids* Against this
juggernaut the private British merchant and remitter stood
helpless with plenty of idle money* When the Governor General,
in response to their appeal, proposed abolition of the Commercial
(2) (3)
Residents* trading privileges and the Court turned it down, the
private traders read in It the Court* s bid to introduce monopiy
by the back door* They were forced to invest money in the
public securities the premium on which rose to 1£$ in May 1822*
Finding of debt; If the Company’s commercial policy alienated
the mercantile community, its debt policy alienated the creditors
and caused an exodus of capital to England which again
necessitated an enlarged public Investment* It was a vicious
circle* The necessity of relieving the Court from the burden of
bills set both the home and the Indian authorities thinking
about a mode In which the abundance of capital in Calcutta could
be utilised for discharging the remittable debt or for funding
it* In order that "the overwhelming torrent (of bills) may be
arrested by July 1822,** the Court not only asked for a full
(1) The government bought indigo at S.R* 254 in 1821 and. S.R* 321
in 1822 to accommodate the agency houses, particularly Palmer
& Co*, which produced 2 s ljd in England* See Draft proposed by 
Secret Commercial Committee to Bengal 26 May 1824,qS©cret 
Commercial Drafts to India 18X5-31* I*C*
(2) G.G. in C* to Court 4 January 1821.
(3) Court to G.G* in C* (Comm ) 3 December 1823*
investment and bullion worth £ 1  million but wanted the government 
to buy up all optional papers (2 s 6d loan of 30 June 1811 and 
the optional loans Incurred between 1813 and 1820) at a premium 
of even 4$ and if that proved impossible, to pay the registered 
debt of 1811-12* In case this excited alam among the creditors, 
the ^pvsrnmant was to open a 6% loan, absolutely Irredeemable for 
ten years, principal and interest payable in India, to which 
interest bills and other outstanding loans would be subscribed at 
a bonus* To attract optional loans interest bills might be granted
a)
at 2s* the sicca rupee* Accordingly a loan was floated on
1 May 1821 - allowing the absentee creditors interest bills at
2s 6d up to 31 December 1821 which the Court further extended to
(2)
30 June 1822 to add to Its lure* The loan was successful in 
converting the registered debt* But the problem of interest 
bills was not solved* About a era re of rupees was sent In bullion 
to England to help the Court in 1821 to discharge the interest bills* 
On 18 February 1822, against the orders of the Court, a remittable 
loan was opened in order to facilitate transfer of the optional 
loans between 1813 and 1820* It granted to the absentee creditors 
interest bills at 2 s Id the sicca rupee and an option of transfer 
of the principal at the end of the Charter at 2s 6d at 12 months date*
(1) Court to G.G* in C. (Terf* Fin.) 29 June 1 8 2 1
(2) Court to G.G* in C* (Terr* Fin*) 7 November 1821*
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This was definitely more attractive then the loan of 1821 a
large portion of the &fo optional loans was subscribed# But the
(1)
rest was demanded in bills# The absentee creditors considered 
it unreraunarative to keep capital in India on such conditions#
In 1822 alone bills demanded on account of the principal amounted 
to S.R* 2,20,47,843* Later a similar indulgence was granted to 
the European proprietors of the loan of May 182X*
Hastings tried to justify his debt policy on political 
grounds - as based on "identifying the interest of a leading body 
of natives with ours by making such a proportion of their fortunes
CD
depend on our stability#" Ha supported the first Oudh loan
as supplying the native princes with "a motive the more for them
to abstain from intrigues against us*" But the revolution in the
exchange rate since 1819 cut off the ground under bis argument*
The Europeans, discovering the interest bills as the best mode of
remittance* had bought out the native holders* This not only
occasioned a loss of 22$ to the Company (the actual exchange rate
having ccrne down to 2s 3d or even lower) but made the heme
government prey to a sudden transfer of capital* Bastings was*
feewevaxi more considerate to the creditors than the Court would 
have him* As in the case of the private traders* grievance
(1) G*G* in C* (Terr* FLn*) 18 February 1822 and 20 June 1822#
(2) Hastings tfperations etc* Add* MSS* 58,411 f# 208#
3/S
about raw silk lie proposed the abolition of the trading privileges
of the Commercial Residents, in the case of debt he proposed a
higher remittance for interest than envisaged by the Court and
granted an option for the transfer of the principal at an
exchange rate higher than the intrinsic value of the rupee* He
explained that he did so wfor government feared to produce distress
by diminishing too much the means of remittance*" In short
Hastings was treading the path of Minto for very much the same
causes like stagnation of trade, funding of debt etc# But the
absentee proprietors had lost confidence meanwhile, the victory in
the Maratha War seemed to bring empire-building in India to an
end and the resumption of cash-payments in England made transfer of
capital more profitable# This had inevitable repercussions on the
money-market which Hastings had so deplored in 1814. and on the
Court which he so clumsily tried to avoid#
Hastings's revenue policy was no less muddled* Since he
was convinced that retrenchment would render defence vulnerable,
he set about augnenting the revenue resources so that a surplus
would emerge sufficient to cover all territorial charges* The
Bengal surplus had fallen to S.R* 1,06,59,012 in 1819 while Madras
(2)
and Bombay had run into a deficit of S.R* 1,25,10,252# Hastings's
(1) The Court criticised this policy, see Court to G.G* in C* (Terr#
iin*) 14 May 1823#
(2) G.G. in C. (Terr. ELn.) 13 January 1821#
first thought was improvement of land revenue through the 
extension of the Permanent Settlement to the newly eonouered
the Bengal Civil Servants as it had done when Minto had been 
eager to extend the Peimanent Settlement to the Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces* The Court was now as well as then opposed 
to the indiscriminate imposition of the Bengal system of 
justice and revenue assessment on all Indian provinces without 
considering their different history and customs and the Board, 
under Canning, concurred* Hastings was dissuaded by this 
determined stand but Regulation JJT&f 1822^  which introduced the
Mahalwari settlement^  put the Jumma very high* Worse even, 
Hastings had been persuaded by the zemindars, the Raja of Burdwan 
at their head, to approve a new system of tenure called the 
Patni tenure which was in a sense more harmful than the Permanent
falling since 1817 and amounted to S.R* 68,95,041 in 1819—20 - 
the lowest since 1813 - though the prices were about the same*
The reason for this decline Is not far to seek* With average price 
of opium rising up to 13.00 dollars in China, "the monopoly was now
(Ij See C.H*Philips. The East India Company 1784-1834 op*cit* p* 212#
(2) Holt Mackenzie*s Minute of 1 July 1819# Xu 1U
East h*dCoL y/ct.ffl.
£e3uioJ<W jc  of 18 oJL*Y*uJL cut of- *cnJt-frc4.(aMJ, 5-
te g u J U itu m , X L  o f -  f g U L  7 b i  d j i f - w u r y  n w r * -  a .L < u xA y  tk+ r l j h t *  p o M j u c t  ^
at r c V C fU O . *5cU*.7 kelfX-eL flu lAfict4xrr<Ls *
provinces* This, however, roused opposition in a section of
C3)
Settlement because It introduced sub-inf tion*
Malwa Opium: Hastings turned next to opium revenue which had been
32 'Q .
returning such huge profits as literally to beckon for
(1)
competition*** The provision of Ben^l, Behar and Benares
opium had' not been enlarged since 1801, when 4800 chests had
been decided upon^and even then the actual produce always
fell short by several hundred chests annually* When the Indian
output was being controlled for monopoly profits, the China
market was expanding and the vacuum had been filled by Malwa
and Turkish opium* This resulted in a fall in the price of
Behar opium from 1300 dollars in 1817 to 840 dollars in 1818*
The cheapness and high profit in Malwa opium attracted small
speculators at first but when large dealers like Magniac & Co*
and William Jardine became interested in this clandestine trade
through the Portugese ports of Goa and Daman in India and Macao
(2)
in China, it was time for the Bengal government to take a decision. 
It had asked the Court to intercede on its behalf with the
13)
Portugese government and made an attempt through the Poona
(4)
Residency to dose the Maratha ports* But Portugal would not 
listen and the Court advised increase of production without 
affecting quality so that it could be sold cheaper than Malwa or
(5)
Turkish opium. It emphasised the improvement of quality, for by
(1) David Edward Gwen, British Opium Policy in China and India*
New Haven: Yale University Press 1934 p* 8 6 *
(2) Michael Greenberg* British Trade and The Opening of China 1800—42.
t Cambridge University Press 1951 pp* 124-25*
(3) G.G. in C* to Court (Political) 4 January 1817*
(47 Court to G.G* in C* (Separate) 24 October 1817*
(5) Court to G.G* in C. (Separate) 27 January 1819*
1818 the quality of the Company opium had been greatly debased
(1)
and Malwa was equal to it*
After the ‘Third Maratha \&r the Central Indian and
Rajpootana states oame under the British sphere of influence# The
fljcnremment first considered calling upon the native princes to
prohibit export of Malwa opium through their territories as well as
imposing high duties on its transit to the West Coast* This
proved impossible due to the Portugese greed and the constant
interference with the native princes it involved* Hence the ®ovem-
ment tried to adopt the Court*a solution of augmentation of supply
not, however, by encouraging production in Bengal but by buying out
(2)
Malwa opium* Malwa was called upon to supplement Bengal production
by 4000 chests annually and all surplps cultivation was to be
(3)
suppressed* As a second line of defence it made treaties with
nfctive states which lay on the direct route to Daman and Ditt*
Unfortunately the former plan ended in outright swindling of the
government and the latter left, out some strategic states* The
special opium agent, Taylor (appointed in 1821), paid outrageous
(5)
prices, drew on Bengal for 100 lakhs In one year and promised
(1 ) H*B* Morse The International Relations of the Chinese Empire
1834—1911, gragflm Yol* III pp* 339-40*
(2) G.G. In 0. to Court (Terr* Salt.dp.) 30 July 18X9*
(3) Terr. Dept* Consult* 12 November 1819*
(4) G. in C* Bombay to G.G* in G* 29 December 1821*
(5) Misc* 762* p.9 * Swinton*s evidence before S.G.H.C* 1830*
unwarranted indemnities to the native princes while speculation
increased production which had been meant to be curtailed*. The
route of illegal transit was still profitable* Holt Mackenzie, the
(Jtilitarian Secretary to the Territorial Department, noted with
concern, "If some arrangement for shackling the trade in Malwa
opium be not adopted, I confess I see little chance of our being
able to prevent such a fall in price as will render the possession
(1)
of the monopoly in Behar and Benares of little value** Large
exports to China started in 1820 - 3377 chests in that year as
(2)
compared to 2435 chests in 1817* Prices rose to S*B* 4000 per 
chest in the Bengal sale of 1821* But it was all speculative in 
character - in want of better employment for abundant capital*
By 1823 the maiket could bear no more supply, the government no 
more loss* Going to help revenue and the opium traders Hastings had 
chosen a wrong path which ultimately led to a total collapse in 1823^
(1) Notes by Holt Mackenzie 10 July 1823, Abstract on Malwa opium 
Third Report 1831* App* XT*
U ) Evidence of H* Magniac, before S.C*H.C* 1830, 18 June 1830*
Second Report*
Export of opium to China etc*
Countries to 1819 1820 1821 1822
which exported S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R*
China 34,98,188 85,85,311 57,87,154 1,09,61,651
Java 15,08,739 17,22,249 11,54,630 15,70,225
Penang 6,77,352: 15,19,652 9,58,461 14,54,682
dl 0 OTn- Trr e r CRs> yb .
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Guided by bis imperial instinct and bis appreciation 
of the private traders* point of view* Hastings did one thing which, 
not only helped their cause far better than his opium policy but 
became the foundation of the British supremacy in the Par East#
He strongly supported Stamford Baffles*s purchase of Singapore 
frcm the Sultan of J oho re in 1819 against the pretensions of the 
Dutch and even the- avowed policy of Canning to avoid trouble with, 
them at all cost# In fact it was Hastings who diverted Raffles *s 
attention frcm Sumatra to the Malay *peninsula, to the control of 
the Malacca Strait by forming establishments at Achin and Rhio 
or, if that was not possible, frcm some station in Johore*
"It is expressly to be understood, and, it will be incumbent on you
t
always to keep in mind, ran the formal instruction of Hastings to 
Stamford Raffles, "that the object in fixing upon a Fort of this 
nature is not the extension of any territorial influence but 
strictly limited to the occupation of an advantageous position for
a)
the protection of our commerce#* Singapore was to be not only 
the free emporium for British and, Chinese articles In the East 
Indies, so necessary after the Dutch reoccupation of Java, but the 
Malta of the East and the springboard to further commercial 
exploration towards China and Japan#
Hastings* s management of salt monopoly aimed at helping the
(1) Sir Reginald Coupland Raffles, of Singapore 1946. pp# 92-105#
3coastal traders more than the producers or consumers of salt
ran counter to the Court* s policy of bringing down the price of
salt, without curtailing revenue, through larger production#
w**♦♦nothing is further from our iwish than that the population
of the country should be subjected to the alternative of paying
extravagantly for one of the essential necessaries of life, or for
(1)
procuring it by clandestine and illegal manner#1. The (government
first encouraged production by increasing remuneration of the
molunghees for surplus produce but when it found this conflicting
with the interest of the country traders, who earned freight for
their vessels in importing coast salt, the surplus plan was
(2)
abandoned# The average price of salt rose from S.R* 506* 11 as
per 100 maunds in 1814 to S.R* 341 in 1818 and S.R* 418*15 as in
1822# The Court roundly denounced this policy of securing freight
to the private traders at a loss of S*R# 54 per 100 maunds and at
(4)
a prohibitive cost to the people*
Hastings*s financial policy came under the criticism of the
Court like his foreign policy# No doubt he had left Bengal finances
in a better state of affluence# The increase of revenue* compared to
(5)
1813, had been by no less than S.R* 2,40,87,808* But the increase of
(1) Court to G.G* in C* (Separate) 24 October 1817#
(2 ) Court to G.G* in C* (Separate) 9 November 1814#
(3) Accountant General*s Reports in Financial Letters and Enclosures
Received etc* op*cit#
(4 ) Court to G.G* in C* 8 Augist 1821*
(5 ) Bengal Revenue Surplus Revenue
1813 - S.R* 9,64,45,285 S.R* 2,05,41,213
1822 - S.R* 12,05,33,093 S.R* 2,95,43,235
See G.G* in C* to Court (Terr* Fin*) 26 November 1823*
charges had been inordinate, the debt had risen by £2 millions 
even after a Large axncunt had been transferred to England^  and the 
finding operations had Lessened the resilience of the money market 
in case of a future emergency as it had brought in a flood of 
bills upon the Court* His government had spent the Company’s
A f?U-
commercial profits, sent for^  sinking fund, for general purposes 
and had caused a more than £2 millions increase in the territory’s
disavowed by Canning in the Parliament and by the Court through 
Charles Grant - though it was acclaimed by Hume and Randle 
Jackson in the General Court* His policy towards the Calcutta 
Press was considered unfortunatel Lastly his grave indiscretion
transactions at Hyderabad hr ought on him condemnation of both the
John Palmer made his the biggest agency house in Calcutta* He 
naturally wanted to cultivate personal relations with the new 
Governor General whose agency he sought through the Rear Admiral 
Sir Home Bopham* He was somewhat dismayed when Moira entrusted his
Hastings’s Maratha policy was almost
in patronising Palmer and Co* and! in supporting their sordid
Court and the Board and led to his resignation*
The Palmer episode: After William Bfcirlie had left Bengal in 1812
(1) Bengal debt bearing
interest
India debt bearing 
interest
30 April 1814 - £ 24,718,500 
30 April 1823 - £ 26,513,870
£ 27,002,439£ VVM|
£ 29,382,520
(2) Court to G.G* in C* (Terr* Bin*) 14 May 1823*
business to Alexander and Co# But, undeterred, Palmer soon
wormed himself into the confidence of the Governor General# One
of his many brothers, William Palmer, had been in Hyderabad for
some time# Under the patronage of the British Resident, Henry
he
Russell, even holding, his office in the Residency grounds,/had 
been conducting, clandestine monetary transactions with the Nizam 
for assignments on his revenue# He was renoved from the Residency 
after words got about the business and tried to sink in obscurity 
the original money transactions# At this apparent ebb of his 
fortune John Palmer took the control frcm Calcutta# He concerted 
the plan of securing for Sir William Rumbold, ,fa sprig of fashion, 
who has aided in the effort to dissipate the fruits of Sir Thos# 
Hhmbold*® avarice,” who had married Lord Moira*s ward and come out 
with him to India and far whom the Governor General had great 
affection, a position in William Palmers firm# ”If such a man 
might by rational possibility,” wrote John Palmer, ”find a corner 
in your establishment, I should venture to assert, that you would 
not, during the present administration of this government, require 
the good will, as a sine qua non, of any resident on earth# Lord 
Moira may be easily reconciled to Sir Wm# Rumbold*s holding some
(1) John Palmer to Henry Trail lb July 1813. Palmer Papers op.cit* 
val# 82. pp. 21-22# John Palmer might have met Popham during 
the latter*s visit with the Romney to Calcutta in the midst 
of his operations in the Red Sea and the Indian waters 
about 1800-1802#
official station at Hyderabad and which engenuity (sic) of Mr#
Hy# Po# (?) could scarcely fail to contrive and fabricate, on
(1)
such a gentle hint, as I could easily procure him#*.#* Meanwhile 
William Palmer had blossomed forth anew as a mercantile firm 
at Hyderabad, ostensibly speculating in timber, but really in 
monetary transactions with the Nizam through his corrupt minister 
ChundooLoll# When, in 1815, Sir William Rumbold joined him 
(through the machinations of John Palmer), he came out in the open 
and secured a special licence from the Supreme government which 
was necessary under sec# 28 of 37 Geo# III C# 142 whieh prohibited 
in general British subjects from entering into pecuniary transactions 
with the native princes but left the dispensing power to the 
Governor General in Council# The proviso in the licence that on 
demand the firm would furnish the Resident at Hyderabad full 
information of the nature and object of the transactions was never 
acted upon as the Resident himself and his associates were deeply 
involved# By the Spring of 1820 the firm had got the Aurangabad 
contract and lent the Nizam through ChundoaLoll 52 lakhs at 25$ 
and squandered much of the Nizamfs property in patronage (e*g# a 
moonshee of William Palmer was getting an allowance of Rs 700 from 
the Nizam)#
Reports on these unsavoury proceedings and the relations between
(1) John Palmer to William Palmer 1 April 1814# Palmar Papers op#cit# 
Yol# 84# pp# 43—44#
the firm and the Residency began to pour into Calcutta about
1818-19. The house itself was caught in an unenviable position# 
Most of its debts would not be approved by a British Court#
They knew that so long as Russell was at Hyderabad no direct 
interference of the British government in realization of their 
claims on the Nizam was necessary* But it was prudent to look 
to the future as Russell would be returning to England# In 
these circumstances the plan of the fictitious 60 lakh debt was 
devised* To set a false track all connection with the Residency 
was discarded* Then ChunduLoll, a tool in their hands, proposed 
a loan of 60 lakhs, stating that it was essential for payment of 
the Nizam*s creditors and other refomns of the State* The assumption 
was that the Palmers were prepared to lend the sum at a lower 
rate of interest than the Saukars (the Indian bankers)* The Resident 
recommended the loan without any scrutiny and the majority of the 
Council, contrived by Hastings*s own casting vote, sanctioned it In 
August 1830* ChunduLoll, in proposing the loan, did not specially 
mention Palmer & Co*s name as one of the creditors to be satisfied, 
nor did Palmer & Co. reply to ChunduLoll* s cursory mention of their 
nflTrrft in a pointed manner# No special mention was made fcp their 
old loans with the Nizam and no reference to the exorbitant 
interest charged on them while offering the new loan professedly at 
a lower rate of interest* As the new rate appeared to be 18$ which, 
with a bonus of 8 l^khs to the lenders, came up to 55*1/5$, it
could be only imagined how high the interest on the older loans 
was* Hastings did not enquire into any of these relevant 
matters and, as a result, the firm was enabled to carry out a 
fictitious and fraudulent transfer of their existing debt of 
52 lakhs at 25$ into a debt of 60 lakhs at 33*1/3$ - the payment 
of which was more or less now guaranteed by the Company. Hastings 
had no idea of what was going on at Hyderabad and how precarious 
the Nizam*s finance could be, otherwise he would not have taken 
from him a boon (in return of the financial help of the Palmers) 
in order to build a cathedral at Calcutta and to provide for 
other public works.
Before the new loan had been pushed through, the Court 
had sent orders cancelling the permission given by Eastings to 
Palmer and Company. The Governor General showed further indiscretion 
in challenging the Court*s right to cancel the special licence on the 
ground that 37 Geo. Ill C. 142 did not apply to the firm as 
William Palmer was not a British subject (he was an Eurasian) and 
even its right to eaneel any licence granted by the Governor General 
in Council. The Board very pertinently asked that, if Hastings* s 
interpretation was right, - w0ne native partner in a British House 
of Agency would take the house out of their operation and, a licence 
once granted, the governing authorities at home would be thenceforth# 
excluded from any control over measures which might be, in their 
view, dangerous to the character as well as to the interests, of 
their Snpire in India." The exception in the Act and the
dispensing authority of the Governor General in Council did not 
make the local government coordinate with the Court except in an
i1)
exigency when it was not possible to refer back home*
These strictures were sent through the Secret Committee
on 22 June 182G# Not satisfied still, Canning in a private letter
(2)
castigated Hastings for taking the boon from the Nizam* The
latter, however, remained obdurately prejudiced in favour of the
firm until September 1822 though Charles Metcalfe, the new Resident
at Hyderabad, had unearthed the fictitious nature of the new loan
in 1821 and sent him enough proof of perfidy and fraud committed
earlier# . The Court and the Board by then had made up their minds
and even Lord Liverpool had "no doubt upon the controversy as it
appears on the face of these papers that the argument, expediency
(3)
and even propriety are against Lord Hastings* s decision#1* The
(4)
home authorities even cast aspersions on hi3 integrity and considered 
his recall# But Hastings had already decided to resign# On the 
first day of 1823 he left India - his record of glorious triumph 
clouded by an act of tragic indiscretion, his services to the 
British Empire almost forgotten in the babble of hostile criticism# 
The Parliamentary Review: The edge of the Court*s hostility was
sharpened by the general attack on its remaining privileges that had
(1) Add# MSS# 38,411 - f# 49#
(2) Canning to Hastings 20 August 1821 ibidff# 54«*63#
(3) ibid f# 71 #fe) m ttc tm txL  ty  •
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started in 1819 and brought once again its affairs under the review
of the Parliament# The attack had begun even earlier in the General
Court where the representatives of the private traders had not
viewed favourably the recent increase of the Company*s trade#
Hume and Randle Jackson saw in it another revival of the shipping
interest against whose attempts to raise freight they had fought in 
(1)
1816 and 1817# On 18 March 1818 Hume accused the Court of
carrying trade at a great loss - the commercial charges it. incurred
(2)
being 25$ more than those of the private traders# On 17 June
Randle Jackson asked why shipping of the Company had been increased
from 40,000 to 100,000 tons# When Britain entered into a period
of trade depression in 1819, on the whole due to a reaction to the
over speculation of the war years, the shipping, manufacturing and
mercantile classes asked the same questions and claimed greater
privilege than envisaged in the Charter of 1813# The most affected
was British shipping, "left without employment, in consequence of the
peace, which the owners would rather onploy, even if they can save
(3)
the freight, getting nothing by the articles of trade#"
This sort of petition was not new and the Parliament had
relaxed the Charter regulations before. Thus 54 Geo# III Cap# 34,
known as the Circuitous Trade Act, permitted the private traders to
touch and trade on both voyages at foreign port3 in America, Cape 
“(Tj nahfltft 20 March 1816r 27 March 1816# The Asiatic Journal Vbl# I#
p# 380 and pp. 480-81. Debate of 13 February 1817 ibid Yol. Ill
p# 495#
(2) ibid Yol# Y. p# 395# ^
(5) Charles Grant’s evidence before S.C*H#L# 1820-21*
of Good Hope, St* Helena and on outward voyage at the Canaries,
Cape de Yerde Islands and Madeira; secondly^ to trade between 
all ports lying within the Charter (including Cape and St# Helena), 
directly or circuitously# 57 Geo# III Cap# 36, known as the 
Malta Trade Act, permitted them to touch at Malta and Gibraltar 
on both voyages to and from India and trade between these places 
and places within the limits of the Charter without touching at 
a British port# A cry was now raised for permission to trade 
between England, America, the Eastern Islands, China and foreign 
Europe and to trade in smaller ships, without the restrictions 
regarding licence, from port to port in India# The Americans 
again served as the villain of the piece and solicitude for the 
British manufactures was most vociferously expressed#
The Committee of the Society of Shipowners wanted relief 
to be afforded by relaxation of the regulations of East India 
trade "as to enable British ships in the private trade to enter 
into competition with foreigners, in those branches of commerce with
U)
India and China which are now carried on by means of foreign ships#w 
They wanted to take British manufactures to N#W# America, thence 
fur to China a-nfl bring Chinese articles, particularly tea, to 
foreign Europe# The merchants of London, Glasgow, Edinburgh,
(1) Committee of the Society of Ship-owners to the Lords of the 
Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations#
17 August 1819 App# XT. S.C*H.C* 1821*
A fi&k’
Leeds and Belfast considered^  trade with Canton would automatically 
open trade with America and the Eastern islands# The East India 
agents prayed for similar privileges for the India-built ships and 
the Liverpool merchants for the end of restrictions on tonnage 
and resort to India# The manufacturers of Manchester, in a letter 
to the Prime Minister, referred to the distress among the weavers 
caused by the end of war demand, prohibitive duties in America,
_  U)
and lack of proper returns from the feist# TOien the Committee
of the Privy Council requested Canning to take up the matter with
(3)
the Court,, Canning urged the latter to open coastal trade in
India and tea-trade to foreign Europe, to open a depot of Chinese
goods in an eastern port or at least to supply China tonnage to
(3)
the private traders# The Court replied in the negative# It 
ascribed the present distress to over speculation, rejected the 
proposal of a depot for Chinese goods on the plea of snuggling and 
agreed to allow China tonnage but not to take private supracargoes#
The whole affair was ultimately referred to Select Committeesof 
both Houses of the Parliament#
In analysing the evidence before the bar of the Parliament it
is amusing to find the Company and the owners of the India—built ships
make comnon cause against the British ship-owners# After 1813 the
(1) ibid#
(2) The Committee of the Privy Council to Canning 23 August 1819# ib fq  *
(3) Canning to Court 17 May 1820#
(4) Court to Canning 7 June 1820* .
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latter*s monopoly of coastal and country trade had been seriously
challenged by the British private traders and ship-owners, who
(1 )
engaged in port to port trade without any legal authority* Th*
country ships could not afford such low freight* Ships lay idle at
C2)
Calcutta and less keels were being laid than before* The
British ship-owners* open pretension to coastal trade and claim
(3)
to employ smaller vessels rang like death-knell in the ears of the
agency houses which had speculated in ship-building in Bengal*
Similarly it seemed to bring chaos to the Company’s well-knit
Chinannonopoly and ruin to opium-revenue by introducing Turkish
opium* Circumstances thus made the erstwhile antagonists
bedfellows* Robinson and Reid - Chairman and Deputy Chairman of
the Court, Charles Grant and William Pair lie (who had the largest
stake in country ships) valiantly fought for the India-built ships*
Charles Grant pertinently pointed out that the China monopoly was the
cornerstone of the Company’s present trade and the only way of p ro fita b le .
remittance of the Indian surplus revenue and that the country traders
C4)
had always been the medium of remittance from India to. China*
(1) J* Crawfurd’s evidence before S*C*H*L* 13 June 1820*
(2) Evidence of George Larpent before S.C*H*C* 1821 23 March 1821*
Ships built in Calcutta
Tear Tonnage Tear Tonnage Tear Tonnage
1818 6865 1820 3953 1822 217?
1819 3222 1821 3706
j# Phipps History of Shipbuilding in Calcutta op,cit*
(3) Evidence of Robert Richards before S«C*H*L* 3G June 182Q* Evidence
of John Forbes Mitchell 24 June 1820*
(4) Charles Grants’ evidence before S*C*H*L.* 6 July 1820*
Bat there was enough evidence on the other side to show that the 
Americans, trading in smaller vessels and catering to the demand 
for British manufacture in the Eastern islands and for tea in 
Europe, had almost monopolised the coastal trade, the trade in
(!)
tea with Europe and trade in general among the Eastern islands*
The demand for British goods in India had greatly increased through
(3)
fall of prices and might be more profitably met if returns were 
obtainable from China# The high price of Indian goods like indigo 
and cotton and the almost unprocurability of silk: lent special 
strength to this argument#
The First Report of the Select Committee of the House of 
Lords on Foreign Trade (11 April 1821) recommended abolition of the 
licence system, grant of permission to take smaller ships and to 
trade with minor ports on the Indian coast and maintenan'ce' of a 
free port in the East Indies# The Second Report (18 May 1821) 
focussed attention on another grievance of the private traders ~ 
duty on Bengal silk and regulations of the Company "by which the 
employment of capital, the price, and with the price the direction 
of labour, have been very unhappily controlled#" It recommended 
grant of permission to trade directly or circuitously between 
ports within the Charter limits (except China) and ports beyond them,
(1) James Goddard’s evidence 1 June 182C, A1 Robertson’s evidence
20 June 1820#
(2) J# Gladstone’s evidence 14 March 1821
belonging to states in amity with Britain#
X and 2 Geo# IY C# 65, which were based on these reports, 
could not satisfy the free traders and agitation went on against 
limitation on size and prohibition of port to port trade# The 
Third Report of the Select Committee of the Commons [10 July 1821) 
discussed such proposals# The sine qua non of trade with the East 
was sale of British manufacture In which the private traders had 
admirably succeeded# Reduction of prices bade fair to still 
greater success# Hence restriction on the size, which interfered 
with trade among the small islands of the East Indies, and ordinary 
licences should be repealed# The India-built ships had almost 
equal rights with ships under the British registry by virtue of 
53 Geo# III Cap# 155, 55 GeoJCIX7' Cap# 116 (which extended the 
Circuitous Trade Act to them), 57 Geo# III Cap# 95 (which exempted 
them from the Navigation Laws), and 1 and 2 Geo# IY Cap# 15 (which 
allowed them to trade with Europe)# It was better to provide 
them with the remaining privileges (like port to port trade in 
Britain or trade with the Colonies) than to deprive ships under the 
British registry of the coastal trade of India# The Charter Act, 
unfortunately, precluded the Parliament from interfering with the 
restrictiTeclauses regarding resort of persons to India but the 
Committee hoped the Company would be liberally disposed in these 
matters# So far as the China monopoly was concerned, it was
not convinced by Grant * s arguments that free trade would lead 
to increase of piice, debasement of quality or conflict, with the 
Chinese authorities* The China monopoly prevented further growth 
of commerce with India and the East Indies, by denying; proper 
returns to the Mother Country. Demand for British goods in 
Malay caild be met. only if Malayan goods (which had little demand 
in England) could be sold in China and the- proceeds brought 
to Europe in Chinese goods. The Committee confessed its inability 
to attach: Charter lights directly and suggested occupation of a 
convenient port in the East Indies, or establishment of a 
consulate in Java and arrangements with the Dutch government 
about fair and equal access of the British traders In that region#
The heme government proposed to give effect to these 
recommendations in the East India Trade Bill. As in 1814 the 
British shipping interest had prevailed on Lord Liverpool to
(i;
deny full privileges of British registry to the country ships, 
so in 1821-22 it prevailed on him again to propose legislation 
which was sure to affect the interest of the country ships. The 
Board watted to give It right to trade with the British colonies
(2)
and wanted the Court to waive its limitation on the size of vtsseLS*
(1) Ship-builders of the Port of London and outports to Liverpool
18 May 1813 and 13 December 1813. Add. MSS. 38,410 
f. 247 and ff. 304-331.
(2) Courtenay to Dart 3 May 1822. The Asiatic Journal Vol. XIV
p. 141.
The Court in return bargained for the same privileges for the
(1)
country ships and for moderation of the duty on Indian sugar#
When tbs Board declined, it referred to high tariffs on Indian
goods in the colonies and pressed for same countervailing 
(2)
advantages# The General Court on 19 June 1822 stoutly
opposed the Board’s proposals and the Chairman openly expressed
his helplessness in view of Lord Liverpool’s decision to protect
(3)
the West Indies sugar interest#
Though the bill was dropped in 1822 all the elements of a future 
conflict were there* The private traders, one of the causes of 
whose distress was certainly over speculation, laid their failure 
at the door of the remaining commercial privileges of the 
Company* The limited rights given by.the Charter of 1813 had 
only whetted their appetite for more# They had been able to 
acquire 38$ of Bengal’s import trade while the Company had 
another 3$# But while they had won about 19$ of Bengal’s 
export trade the Company controlled no less than 17$# In fact 
the Company’s growing -remittance trade from India had caused a 
decline of their share in the five years between 1817 and 1822 
from about 30^$ to 19$# Though the total trade with Britain ■ r
(1) Dart to Courtenay 23 May 1822 ibid pp# 141-143#
(2} Dart to Courtenay 27 May 1822 ibid. pp# 144-45.
(3) ibid p. 264#
far surpassed trade with any other part of the World, the
British traders’ difficulties were the foreign traders’
opportunities# What might not he done if the private traders
could maximise their returns by trade with China or the East
Indies, If they cculd dump their unsold goods and procure returns
(1)
much cheaper than the' rising pxice of Indian goods would allow#
Monopoly profited frcrn concentration but free trade would 
either cover the wl dest possible range of markets or die of 
atrophy# The dynamic of machine-production demanded a continuous 
expansion of the scope of trade# The abundance of capital in 
Bengal added to the pressure# It alternatively sought opportunities 
for trade or investment and found the former barred by the Company’s 
remittance trade and the latter by the law against European 
ownership of land# They were two aspects of the same question#
Only by long term investment in cash crops of India - particularly 
indigo at this juncturecould a profitable remittance of private
(1) Bengal Trade in 1822-25
Countries Impart Export
U#K# (Private &
Company) 41.6/16% 36.3/16%
Lisbon 5.7/16% 3.13/16%
France 4.6/16% 3.4/16%
America 11.14/16% 4.9/16%
Xatfa 4.4/16% 4.1/16%
Penang 3.1/16% 4.4/16%
China 8.12/16% 19.8/16%
Gulfs 8.12/16% 5.3/16%
Malabar 1.8/16% 6.2/16%
Coromandel 1.11/16% 6 %
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fortunes be insured* The Europeans bad so long evaded the 
letter of the law by bolding land in the name of their native 
gamasthas but it caused great inconvenience before the Law 
Courts, encouraged intransigence of the cultivators and made them 
a prey to demand for higher rents from the zsnindars. The 
transit and town duties in India and the excessive import duties 
in England came in for criticism also as they imposed intolerable 
burden on the private traders. The logic of free trade demanded 
not only the end of the China monopoly but free and unfettered 
investment of capital in Indian raw materials and free and 
unfettered transport from the place of production to the place 
of consumption.
The new philosophy of free trade was admirably summed 
up by Rickards when he said before the Select Committee of the 
House of Lords, n...it Is obvious that it will be far better for 
the Indian to raise cotton than to spin and weave it, when he 
can procure the manufactured article he wants cheaper than he 
can make it, by exchanging It for the raw material." Bengal’s 
system of production was now completely geared to the demand of 
industrialised Britain and her economy prospered or decayed 
according to the fluctuations of the London market. The returns 
of internal trade between Calcutta and other parts of India clearly
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a)
evince a growing trade but a trade in raw materials which increased the
(2)
value of land. This naturally explains the shnilarity of outlook of 
the Indian bourgeoisie like Rajah. Rammohan Ray and Bwarkanath 
Tagore and the British private traders. Both desired free movonent 
of capital and skill from England for further development of raw 
material resources. They received the sympathy of the utilitarian 
administrators of Bengal - at the head of them Lord William 
Bentinck himself. The abolition of the Company* s China monopoly and 
the Indian remittance trade was a consummation devoutly wished by the 
British as well as the Indian middle class. The latter had faimd 
out a more realistic and, in the circumstances, more progressive
* “TV
modus vivendi with foreign rule where the prices had failed so 
completely in 1818.
(1} Internal Trade of Bengal
Through the town of Calcutta (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
Year Import Export
From the Com- Frcm other To the Com­ To other
pan’s Dominions parts of India pany’s Domin­
ions
parts of !
S«R. S.R* S.R* S.R#
1813-14 2,18,24,710 37,33,430
33,73,673
70,95,371. 2,36,613
1814-15 2,86,67,379 81,46,661 1,93,751
1815-16 3,37,36,787 57,60,608 1,02,62,762 1,57,562
1816-17 4,36,13,466 51,86,781 1,30,07,821 1,57,562
1817-18 4,19,67,876 48,71,896 1,22,47,696 2,95,957
1818-19 4,41,58,722 37,79,202 1,54,53,515 6,74,946
1819-20 4,81,00,541 51,25,454 1,29,41,919 3,80,336
1820-21 4,16,36,180 44,81,004 1,51,97,981 6,26,138
1821-22 4,50,58,830 53,10,301 1,52,60,363 5,43,627
1822-23 4,25,08,692 52,36,253 1,57,73,761 4,29,129
(2) At revenue sale land realised 71 years’ purchase in 1813-14, 38-g-
years* purchase In 1815 (Nepal War) and 29 years’ purchase in 1818 
(Maratha War) but rose to 67 years’ purchase In 1821. See Court 
to G.G. in C. (Revenue) 21 March 1821. G.G. in C. to Court 
(Revenue)!August 1822 and 50 July 1823*
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CHAPTER V
The Collapse of the Agency Houses 
and the End of the Company’s 
Trade
In this Chapter I propose to deal with the currents of trade 
and of public finance which led to the wholesale failure of the 
Calcutta agency houses and the abolition of the Company’s India trade 
and the China monopoly# After Hastings’s departure the Government 
of Bengal followed a cheap money policy In the interests of the 
agency houses which led them to engage in large scale indigo 
speculation# The Burma War, however, by attracting funds to 
Government loans, reacted injuriously on the agency houses and 
caused the first indigo crisis and failures which prompted a liberal 
policy on the part of the Government towards the introduction of 
European capital in India# Inspite of this policy trade depression 
in England and withdrawal of capital from India led to the 
complete collapse of agency houses in the thirties# The same trade 
depression forced the British manufacturing class to demand the 
end of the Company’s remittance trade and the China monoply.
After lengthy Parliamentary investigations the Charter of 1833
—343—
deprived the Company of Commerce and opened India to the British 
Capitalist enterprise and with it a new era in her history.
The private remittal)le capital of Bengal, after years of 
accumulation caused by over speculation in Import and stagnation 
of export trade, found seme channel of remittance In 1822 through
a tfce.
the Company’s financial operations. The conversion ofAremittable 
debt in that year led to a transfer of capital to England which the 
Bengal Government tried to provide for by an enhanced investment 
and export of bullion. Paradoxically, this action came into 
conflict with private trade and capital was still abundant aind 
commercial prospects were gloomy when the Marquess of Hastings 
departed from India on 1 January 1823.
John Adam, "the. honest Adam", who supported Charles Metcalfe 
so bravely during the discussion on the Palmer Company’s 
Hyderabad transactions in the Bengal Cornell, became the acting 
Governor General pending Lord Amherst’s arrival, With the help of 
Holt Mackenzie, Secretary in the Territorial Department and an 
adherent of the utilitarian doctrines which had begun to percolate 
into India, Adam devised certain measures to meet the chronic 
demand of the agency houses for cheap capital and of the private 
.traders for profitable remittance.
Cheap money policy: For the former they adopted a cheap money
policy. It had two aspects - reduction of interest on the public
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debt which would automatically bring down the market rate and,
secondly, a new Charter for the Bengal Bank which would allow a
more liberal expansion of credit. A flourishing state of
revenues and large cash balances enabled than to liquidate a
punt of the non—remit table debt of 1821 and convert the remainder
(1)
into a Ujo loan. The Court would have rather liked the resources 
of Bengal applied to the reduction of the remittable debt or the 
reduction of the rate of exchange allowed in the case of such debt 
because thses affected the home finances. Non-remittable debt was 
innocuous in this sense and for political reasons, clearly expressed 
by the Marquess of Hastings, the home authorities did not want any 
interference with it. The Court would have further liked a repay­
ment of the debt which the territory owed to commerce - £2,787,575
(2)
by 1823-24, - either by larger investments or by export of bullion.
The Government sent. 42 lakhs in soecie and promised to send another
(3)
crore In 1824 but considered Itself rich enough to tackle the debt
(4)
simultaneously. The conversion operation was successful. Many 
creditors were forced by abundance of capital and high price of 
indigo to agree to the reduction of interest, particularly when 
the Government promised not to reduce the rate in the near future
(1) Adam to Chairman 17 January 1823. 1.0. Letters Received frcm
Bengal. Vol. 89.
(2) Court to G.G. in C. (Terr. In.) 4 June 1823.
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr. Fin.) 12 December 1823.
(4) G.G. in 0. to Court (Terr. Fin.) 28 November 1823.
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and held out the hope of remittance through interest bills at 2s.
(1)
subject to the Court’s approval. For the Bank of Ben^l the
Government proposed augmentation of capital, increase of note-
issue to fair times the capital and diminution of the proportion
of securities and gold to notes from one-third to one-fourth.
While the first would enable it to absorb some superficial wealth
seeking investment, the last two would enable it to pursue a more
flexible policy of accomodation to the agency houses and to relieve
(2)
pressure on the money-market when the Government borrowed heavily*
To facilitate private remittance through trade Adam decided to
reduce transit duties and even suggested their total abolition in
order to create a national market. The Court had desired as early
as 1814 that internal duties should not have the effect of diminishing
consumption or materially obstructing the free transport of articles
(3)
among the natives. Hastings who was hard pressed for revenue,
could not pay any attention to these noble sentiments which, congenial
to the utilitarian concepts of Adam, roused him to write a powerful
(4)
Minute. It not only asserted the necessity and justice of 
lowering the transit duties of T^fo on Bengal piece goods (while the 
British cotton manufacturer paid an import duty of only and even
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Fin.) 14 February 1823, 26 February 1823.
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (FLn.) 30 July 1823.
(3) Court to G.G. in C. (Separate Customs) 28 December 1814.
(4) Adam’s Minute 22 May 1823. First App. II Trade. Third Report
of the Select Committee of the House of Commons 1831.
-346-
the Oudh Cottons a transit duty of Z^fo) but advised the total
relinquishment of transit duties specially in the case of raw
materials* Town duties he was not prepared to forgo but preferred
applying such revenue to local improvement to the earlier policy
of application to general purposes* In this he only underlined the
new consciousness of the needs of a public works programme which,
by improving communication and facilitating transport, would help
internal trade* Adam was backed by Holt Mackenzie and Charles
Metcalfe* Transit duties on piece goods were reduced to 2-jf/o
and S *yi+ duties were abolished in the Delhi territory. Though
(1)
the measure left much to be desired, at least the first Step had 
been taken in the. direction of freedcan of internal trade#
The great indigo boom: The debt policy of the Government achieved
the aim of securing cheap capital to the agency houses. For the 
first time in their history they could get plenty and at less than 
8$. But ip this process it accentuated some old evils and created 
some new ones. The capitalists became nervous about the future 
intentions of the Government and the forced payments of about 
£4,640,000 added to the abundance of the capital market. Remittance 
through trade was more difficult In 1823. Exports declined by a crore
(l) As Charles Trevelyan points out in his report ".. .Indian piece 
goods were still liable to a heavier duty in the home market 
than those which were imported into England, by no less than 
15 per cent." A Report from the Inland Customs and Town 
Duties of the Bengal Presidency, op.cit. p.. 9.
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in official value - not so much to the United Kingdom as to Erance, 
America and China# There was no trade with Portugal at all though 
trade with Brazil and South America increased# To the factors 
already in operation - fall of demand for piece goods and raw cotton 
and the abnormal rise of indigo prices (Rs# 31E per factory md# in 
1822 and Rs# 277 In 1825) — the decline of opium trade was added#
The improvident Malwa opium policy of the Bengal and the Bombay 
Governments had led to over production in both Bengal and Malwa 
opium, an excess of supply to the China market and its ultimate 
collapse in 1825# Moreover, out of the actual surplus exports of 416 
lakhs the Company claimed as much as 200 - leaving' a large amount of 
remit table capital desperately searching for a profitable investment#
(1) CALCUTTA-WORLD (CUSTOMS HOUSE) 
The Company* s and Private Trade
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Total Merchandise Treasure Total
S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R#
1823-24 2,61,98,443 1,31,69,214 3,93,67,657 5,05,45,292 1,22,53,039 6,27,98,331
CALCUTTA - UNITED KINGDOM
1823-24
1823-24
IMPORTS
Merchandise
S.R#
20,95,499
IMPORTS
Merchandise
S.R#
1,37,67,035
The Company
Treasure
S.R#
x
EXPORTS 
Merchandise 
S.R#
92,75,945
Private Trade
Treasure
S.R#
5,24,032
EXPORTS
Merchandise
S.R#
1,35,64,851
Treasure
S.R#
41,90,573
Treasure
S.R#
2,23,767
(Continued) )
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Footnote (1) continued from previous page*
CALCUTTA - UNITED STATES
IM P O R T S  EXPORTS
S R# S .R #
*
1822-23 52,50,665 50,63,019
1823-24 14,66,155 12,25,000
CALCUTTA - TRANCE
IMPORTS EXPORTS
S.R# S.R.
1822-23 19,48,992 . 21,78,423
1823-24 3,17,560 3,00,506
CALCUTTA - CHINA
T M P 0 T 7 T S  E X P O R T S
1822-25 38,49,356 1,30,74,663
1823-24 60,22,427 1,00,55,130
Bengal Commercial Reports 1822-23,
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Exchange fell to Is lid as demand for bills grew. Land
Government securities rose in value - premium on remittable debt to/*-
Rs 39$ and on the new 5°[o debt to Rs.12 1G as% in December 1823#
The agency houses were pressed with deposits for a little more than 
what the Government gave and thought It opportune to utilise the 
cheap capital in expanding their indigo concerns beyond all reasonable 
bounds# They were tempted to start an indigo boom as indigo still 
commanded very high prices and remained almost the sole means of 
private commercial remittance# A study of official records shows 
that the largest number of licences were taken by individuals for 
joining indigo concerns during 1823 and 1825# The Europeans, going 
into indigo in a big way, demanded the right of ownership of land 
so that they could use their capital and skill with greater effect 
and to larger profit# The new Governor General, Lord Amherst> had 
to pass Regulation V I of 1823 which enabled the planters to recover 
advance with interest by a jSummary ;8uit from the indigo crop on 
which they could set a poliee watch till the Court made a decision#
In 1824 another concession was made to the European capitalists 
which was to; have an important bearing. By the resolution of 7 May 
1824 the Government allowed them to lease land for coffee 
cultivation, thou^i under adequate safeguards#
The Buima War: In its solicitude for the agency houses the Government
forgot to consider that whenever it would be forced in a future 
emergency to pay a higher interest, the reaction would affect the
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agency houses first and adversely# Such an emergency arose 
during the Burmese War which began on 24 February 1824 for causes 
similar to those of the Nepal war# The rapid expansion of the 
Burmese power over Manipur (1813) and Assam (1816) brought It 
into perilous contigiity with the Company*s possessions and when 
Amherst took Cachar under the British protection in 1823, a direct 
contact was established which soon degenerated into raids and 
counter raids across the border# Foiled in obtaining fugitives, the 
Buimese sent troops with orders for capturing Calcutta# They 
made an attack on the Ccmpanyts garrison which had occupied 
Shahpuri island near Chittagong# When the demands of redress were 
ignored, Amherst reluctantly declared war#
| Ignorant of the difficulties of military action In the
i
|
swampy terrain of Burma, indifferent at first to the complex 
problems of supply and commissariat which were the backbone of 
an overseas operation, the Government fondly hoped far a quick 
decision* Victory In Assam seemed to raise expectations high 
but Campbell*s expeditionary force ms soon bogged down after 
reaching Rangoon and suffered terrible privations during the 
Blonsoon# Nobody was prepared for a long Qam palgb nor contemplated 
its effects on public finance# To meet the fast Increasing 
military charges as well as the usual demands from China and 
Bombay, the Government was forced to suspend consignment of
Ii
i
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the promised bullion to England, to sell bills to private traders 
at Is lid, to stop all public works and then to open a loan at 
4#> with option of remittance of interest at 2s. during the Court’s
pleasure and irredeemable without the parties’ consent before
(1)
30 April 1830*
The sop of remittance did not hold much attraction, however,
and the capitalists in a body, restless for a higher return for
funds, showed a disposition to hazardous investments. Though there was
a spectacular inflationary movement in England and something like a
stock piling of raw materials, trade was slack. Increase of exports to
England was offset by a similar rise In imports - mostly cottons and
spelter - and country trade continued its decline as before. Though trade
with Eranee and the United States was a little better, Lisbon, Brazil and
South America took very little. Supplies to Burma artifically inflated
(2)
trade with the Coasts but trade with the Gulfs languished*
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr. Fin.) 31 Dec. 1824.
(2) CALCUTTA - WORLD
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Total Merchandise Treasure Total
S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R.
1824-251 2,86,55,916 1,21,42,271 4,07,98,187 5,26,16,355 34,91,676 5,61,08,031
CALCUTTA - UNITED KINGDOM 
The Company
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasure
1824-25 14,23,332 0 1,25,31,364 0
Private Trade 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasure
1824-25 1,61,84,454 13,250 1,39,30,093 2,69,466
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Footnote (2) Continued#
GAL CUTIA-ERANCE 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
CALCUTTA - U.S. CALCUTTA- CHINA
IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS
1824-25 11,55,195 12,24,445 21,10,307 22,89,719 39,91,176 1,00,59,322
CALOJTEA-PENANG 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1823-24 16,22,482 29,08,094
1824-25 18,99,064 23,81,588
CALCUTTA-JAVA 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
15,89,648
7,26,294
17,17,083
6,28,506
CALCUTTA-MANILLA 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
6,08,174
4,20,471
1,11,552
5,06,934
CALCUTTA-0 ORQMANDEL CALCUTTA-MALABAR CALCUTTA-GULES
IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS
1823-24 9,86,138 23,83,568 12,64,814 37,01,975 24,18,321 34,15,597
1824-25 33,97,643 18,53,201 12,98,444 13,20,376 18,19,883 27,13,344
CALCOTTA-BRAZIL 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
CALCUTTA-SOUTH AMERICA 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1823-24 11,02,426 6,00,137
1824-25 9,23,291 4,50,271
35,66,882
33,52,311
12,08,775
6,81,551
f e e ' T exX. fU ^ c r r fo  .
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Out of the actual surplus exports of 371 lakhs the Company claimed 
135. Xt had been, buying indigo on a large scale for some years, 
ordering about 40 lakhs on the average, as it seemed to be the 
only means of paying the interest hills and gave a remittance of 
2s I d^* It virtually prevented private speculation in silk by 
ordering as much as 7000 bales worth 73-g- lakhs* Bereft of remittance 
through trade and reluctant to remit in bills which went down to 
Is 10gd, the private British capitalists were caught by the agency 
Houses at their weakest moment. The latter could, dictate as low an 
interest as 6°jo and then invest everything in indigo. They lavished 
the marginal, concerns with advances and new concerns began to 
sprout like mushrocms all over the Presidency. This eventually led 
to bitter rivalry, constant squabbles and even aimed conflicts 
between the neighbouring planters. The full blast of the indigo 
boom fell on the peasantry of Bengal.
The end of the borrower’s market: The continuation of the Burmese War
in 1825 brought about a fall from this borrower’s paradise. As
military charges rose over five erores, surplus revenues of Bengal
fell in 1824-25 to S.R. 31,93,522 and the Indian revenue even showed
(1)
a deficit of S.R. 1,47,64,833. Over and above a full investment
of S.R. 1,45,47,372 Bengal had to supply China with S.R. 70,09,722, and 
to meet the needs of Bombay whose deficit passed a crore and of Madras
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr.FLn.) 13 April 1826.
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which showed a deficit of 50 lakhs. Desiring to avoid loans at a 
higher interest out of a solicitude for the agency houses, the 
Government asked the Court for bullion which was being rapidly
a)
drained away to Burma. The decline of bullion imports for some
years increased the scarcity of silver and the Government
securities exhibited an ominous downward trend, premium falling
to Rs. SSF/a on remittable debt and to Rs. 2/8$ on the 5fo loans.\
Ultimately on 19 May 1825 the Government resolved to float a 5$
loan to which 4% loans of 1824 could be subscribed if the creditors
(2)
also lent an equal amount in cash. The same rQuittance of 
interest at 2s. was granted. Though the loan promised to be 
successful the turn of the money market precluded any further 
borrowing by the Government without seriously harming the agency 
houses which had already been forced to pay 8 to 9^  again as their 
constituents opted wholesale for the Government loans, the tems of 
which were better than before. wIn truth however if the war shall 
unfortunately continue it may become impossible for us to raise the 
necessary supplies at anything like 6$, if at any legal rate, and 
to suspend civil allowances and curtail the provision of the 
investment may become measures of absolute necessity which however
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr.PLn.) 17 Februaiy 1825.
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr. Fin.) 4 August L825.
much we may deplore we may have no option of averting*w The
Government suggested borrowing in London where interest rate
was one third and *it mi girt be regarded as affording a desirable
opening for the employment of superabundant capital which appears
to be seeking channels the most remote and precarious**
Deteimined to oust Amherst and caring little for the agency
houses, the Court did not lend its ear to this proposal* On the
contrary it asked Bengal to make arrangements for payment to the
trustees of the Deccan prize money* The only concession it made
(1)
was an authority to draw bills on account of public service* The
Government, therefore, fell bade on its old ally in distress - the
Vizier of Oudh - for the much-needed Burma supplies* The Vizier
was persuaded to lend a crore at 5$ on the condition that the
Government would pay his stipends* “There appears? wrote Amherst,
*to be no difficulty in letting them (the native princes and
zemindars) know that the act must be entirely voluntary although
it will be received as an indication of attachment and as
constituting in a certain degree a title to consideration in
(2)
matters of pure grace and: favor** Sophistry could gp little 
further*
The Oudh loans, treasury notes at 6^$ and local levies saw
through the Burmese War which came to a victorious conclusion in
(1) Court to G.G. in G. (Terr* Sin.) 21 June 1825*
(2) Amherst to Chairman 25 August 1825. X.O.L©tters received from
Bengal vol* 95* AmJu/wt 15 AcUL.MSS.
3 f  f.fS'
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February 1826* Though, the hone Government had warned Amherst at the
’ U)
beginning that *No increase of territory is to be made*, it asked
him in 1825 to safeguard the Company’s eastern frontier by the
(2)
acquisition of Assam, Cachar, Manipur and Arracan* By the Treaty
of Yandabo Amherst exacted from the King of Burma all these
territories to which Tennasserim, Jaintia and an indemnity of one
million pounds were added* Victory in Burma almost coincided with
Lord Cambarmere’s successful reduction of the fortress of Bharatpur
in vindication of Sir David Ochterlony’s policy towards the state of
Bharatpur against the usurpation by the cousin of the minor ruler
wham Ochterlony had placed upon the throne*
But the end of military engagements brought no immediate respite*
Extra batta for the'troops, who served in Arracan and Ava, swelled
the military charges of 1826* Durbar charges went up as the mission
to Ava was added to the mission in Persia* Bombay was extravagant
as before* Bengal revenues were deficient by S.R* 1,12,85,416
(3)
and the Indian deficit rose alamingly to S.R. 2,90,78,680* Bengal
debt bearing interest, £23,620,967 on 30 April 1825 had increased to
£29,305,395 in one year and in order to continue European investment
on the old scale (S.R. 1,69,67,193 in 1825-26) the Government was
(4)
forced once more to borrow 50 lakhs from the Vizier* It had twice
(1) Quoted in C.H.Philip3 The East India Company 1784-1834 op.cit p* 254*
(2) ibid p* 260*
(3) G.G* in C* to Court. (Terr* Fin.) 19 April 1827.
(4) G.G* in C. to Court (Terr. Fin*) 4 August 1826*
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refrained from applying to the money-market to save the agency
houses from an inevitable rise of interest rate#
Its tender considerations for the agency houses could not
achieve this end, however, and they appealed to Holt Mackenzie for
(1)
assistance on 24 May 1826# They were now paying an interest from 
15 to 18$ and even 24$ in some cases# 12$ was the ordinary rate for 
loans on deposit of securities# Go£>ds in demand were unsaleable far 
want of cash* The immediate cause was the Government’s 5$ loan which 
was still open and attracted the capitalists who hoped for a high 
premium after peace* The agency houses had invested cheaply 
borrowed capital in permanent objects like indigo, cotton, screws 
v and docks* “These united resources have enabled them to promote 
the development of British industry elsewhere, to support establish­
ments in Penang, Malacca, Java, Sumatra, China, Manilla, New South 
Wales, the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius etc* and even to aid the 
financial difficulties of the Java Government *w Moreover they had
lent on a large scale to the Company’s servants* Such capital could 
not be readily realised in emergency* “Our means may be most extensive, 
our business solid grid productive •♦♦•yet the sudden demand of our
constituents excited by a particular impulse may far exceed the power to
(1) FinancialKBgSL Letters and Enclosures Received 1826# I.O^ Vol* 17*
pp# 461-65*
(2) In 1822, 119 civil servants applied to the Government for relief from
debt. 112 between them owed S.R* 8,566,371* The most prominent of 
the causes given were compound interest charged by the agency houses 
and ’public virtues’* See G.G. in C. to Court (Terr.FLn*) 18 Augist 
1825. They desired either a remittance through the Company or a United 
Service Bank to take up ageney and mercantile business on their 
behalf* The Military servants owed still more#
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answer them* They have already withdrawn frcm our circulation
k%
full a crore of rupees for ingestment in the loan, and we have 
indireetly been deprived, by the same cause of resources perhaps 
to the extent of another crore**.*#The Shroffs are themselves
crying cat for relief** As an evidence they produced a letter of
(1)
the Shroffs to John Palmer 22 May 1826 which complained of a
scarcity of specie caused by the 5$ loan, exportation in the last
three years, smaller imports particularly frcm America and China and
(2)
very inadequate aid frcm the Bank of Bengal* The six 
principal agency houses wranted as measures of relief the closure? 
of 5$ loan, issue of treasury notes upon competent securities at 
long dates and grant of a loan*
A greater facility of remittance through trade to England, 
consequent on a speculative purchase of raw materials by the British 
manufacturers, and continued stagnation of country trade in 1825 
contributed to this distress* The former added to the difficulty of
(1) FinancialBengsdL Letters and Enclosures Received op.cit# pp* 465-470* 
(g) Bank of Bengal’s Notes in Circulation
1 May 1822 S.R* 58,40,542 
1825 1,29,00,864
1824 85,81,148
1825 85,08,426
1826 84,52,042
Accountant General’s Report 31 May 1826* ilnancfaiinfillLetters 
and Enclosures Received op.cit* p* 471*
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obtaining capital and the latter led to a great loss in opium#
Holt Mackenzie understood this and proposed granting a loan of 
' 20 lakhs payable by 12 December 1826, suspension of cash subscriptions
_i   _ _
(1) C ALCUTTA-UQRLB (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
(The Company’s and private trade)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Total Merchandise Treasure Total
1825-26 S.R. S.R. S.R* S.R. S.R. S.R.
2,14,98,729 1,50,58,005 3,65,56,734 5,66,39,922 1,38,704 5,67,78,626
CALCUTTA - UJC.
The Company Private trade
IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORT'S EXPORTS
Merchan- trea- Merchan- trea- Merchan- trea- Merchan- Trea*
dise sure dise sure dise sure dise sure
1825-26. 3,74,648 x 1,26,78,980 x 1,24,93,958 1,56,978 1,71,31,915 48
Articles exported to World
Cotton Silk Piece Indigo Sugar Silk Cotton Opium
Piecegoods goods 5.*.
1823 58,72,729 23,79,827 87,38,205 22,68,433 66,59,385 23,47,568 1,05,39,345
1824 42,25,7X9 33,19,032 3,34,30,269 21,41,869 75,46,762 32,28,335 90,82,732
1825 34,13,454 35,81,543 *63,30,506 24,75,879 81,05,170 30,57,130 82,88,393
Articles exported to U.K.
1823 3,98,385 9,28,178 79,75,068 17,81,147 61,99,650 4,51,021
1824 6,55,942 13,75,069 1,13,24,768 14,86,000 70,99,203 5,01,779
1825 3,21,743 18,21,516 1,29,45,734 15,88,504 76,71,306 4,76,169
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£L)to the 5% loan and a greater accomodation by the Bank of Bengal*
Bit he could not rest content with such a superficial palliative#
The hey to the crisis he found in the various artificial obstructions
which impeded the internal and ©asternal trade of Bengal# In a
powerful Minute he wrote with the draft of Regulation XT of 1825
(Gustans) he condemned the transit duties as wa complex fl~nd burthenscme
system, which divides the different provinces of the country from
each other, exposes the merchants to numerous detentions, frequently
vexations and expensive, and subjects the Community in general to the
hateful requisition of a host of petty Tyrants#n The Minute
anticipated Charles Trevelyan*s famous report of 1835# It showed how
they prevented the formation of a national market "No interchange of
goods can take place between districts separated by a line of chokeys,
unless the difference of price shall cover not only the export of
transportation and the other charges of merchandise, but also the
JS)
duty of 5 or Tiffo levied by Government#" Contrary to current canons
of taxation the burden fell on those places where the consumers would
(1) Holt Mackenzie to merchants# 8 June 1825# Financial Bengal Letters
and Enclosures Received op#cit# pp# 482-83#
(2) There were fifteen chokeys between Patna and Calcutta independent
of the salt and opium chokeya and thirty one between Benares and 
Calcutta# See Bhsdrab Chunder Moteelal to the Editor of the 
ftflittfaftfrar ChCLndrika translated in the Calcutta Courier 8 August 
X832# rBands of custom-house of ficers are therefore let loose, 
without any regular allowances, upon the trade and communication 
of the country, to derive the best subsistence they can from 
extortion and collusion#" C#E# Trevelyan op#cit# p# 48#
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have most to pay# Production was checked by impossibility of 
division of labcur and narrowness of market# The gmgtT capitalists 
were driven out by the big ones who could pay duty as well as 
perquisites of the customs house officers# Holt Mackenzie was 
convinced that the transit duties could be abolished without any 
considerable sacrifice (say about 22 lakhs) and though this could not 
be immediately made good by an increase of Sea Customs, ”a considerable 
part may certainly be so, and in as much as the proposed arrangement 
will operate, as I hope, to extend trade, and will enable us to
(1)
reduce establishments, the balance cannot be reckoned as a net loss#** 
Huski sson* s tariff reforms: Another and a far greater statesman,
BiskLsson, was writing the principles of free trade into the laws of 
England at this time and we should consider their respective measures 
as complementary# Huskisson* s tariff reforms were based on the 
belief that unrestricted internal and international competition would 
best serve the interests of the British manufacturers and consumers#
If England* s lead in the industrial production was to be clinched and 
the new world of Canning was to redress the economic balance of the 
old, free trade was imperative# Under conditions of relatively full - 
employment and trade boom the manufacturers could afford to be liberal 
in trade policy# They were more anxious to secure raw materials like
cotton, silk and indigo than to prohibit Indian manufacture which had
(1) Holt Mackenzie*s Memorandum# Bengal Salt and Opium Consult#
23 June 1825. The Court handsomely approved it# See Court to 
G.G. (Caramr) 10 June 1829# See also Holt Mackenzie’s evidence 
before the S.C#H#C# 1832 II Fin. Q, 77 et seq#
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already been beaten in fineness and cost of production# They had
even carried the machine-made twist and yarn to India since 1824,
the rapid growth of which soon threatened the native hand-spinning
(1)
industry# As Halevy says the tariffs on Indian cottons were
tariffs tron the void, and protected England against a non-existent
(2)
competition#" Robinson and Huskisson were further encouraged
by the prospects of the past two years# By several acts in 1825 duty
on cotton manufacture including the prohibited goods was reduced to
£10$ ad valorem, on indigo to 3d per lb#, on silk to Id per lb# and
on cotton to 6 shillings per 100 lbs# Huskisson, however, failed to
persuade the Spitalfield silk manufacturers and West Indies sugar
interest to allow a reduction of duties on Indian silk manufactures and
(3)
sugar# The foimer, though allowed to be imported for home consumption, 
were subjected to a duty of £30$ and sugar still bore a duty of £1 17s# 
per ewt# - 10 shillings more than the produce of the West Indies#
(1) Impart of Cotton Twist
from U#K#
3.R#
1824 81,145
1825 1,41,305
1826 8,09,052
1827 18,42,110 
H#H#Wilson op, cit#
(2) Elie Halevy A History of the English People 1815-1830 T# Usher
Unwin ltd#, London 1926 p# 197#
(3) It was first allowed to be imported for home consumption in 1819
and the leading Directors c£ the E#I#Company like Wigram, 
Astell, Pattison and Marjoribanks were personally interested 
in the trade# The Parliament, however, prohibited its import 
in 1824# Lushington to Liverpool 27 March 1824 Add# MSS# 
38,411 ff. 233-36#
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(1)
The private trade interest, which now dominated the Court, 
had been trying since 1822 tobargain for a lower duty on sugar 
in return for their agreement to the proposed East India Trade Bill# 
Wigram, the Chairman, Sir Charles Forbes, a prominent private 
trader and Henry St# George Tucker, the famous financial adviser 
of YJellesley and Minto, fought for Indian sugar with great zeal#
In a memorial Tucker showed how the duty on Indian sugar amounted to 
200$ on prime cost and how the injustice of the additional ten 
shillings per cwt. to protect West Indies sugar was aggravated still 
further by indiscriminate levying of another 5 shillings payable 
on clayed sugar that India seldom produced# While the new colony 
of Demerara profited by this protection, the old Indian possessions
(2)
languished for return and the Company had to* remit bullion at a loss#
"We deliberately tell our Asiatic subjects", he feelingly wrote to
Huskisson, "that they must receive and consume whatever we are pleased
to send them, but that, with some few exceptions, we will receive
(3)
nothing from them in return#" More absurd, England expected a 
tribute and a remittance of private fortunes amounting to 4 millions 
annually which could only be paid in Indian produce which was thus 
excluded# It was unjust, impolitic and unprofitable "to place
(1) "By 1826, there were 8 representatives of the Private Trade
interest in the Direction; by 1831, of the 30 Directors (including 
the 6 out by rotation), 17 represented this interest#" C#H#
Philips, The East India Company 1784—1834 op.cit# p# 243#
(2) Henry St# George Tucker, Memorials of Indian Government, Ed# John
William Kaye op.cit# "Indian Sugar" (1823}#
(3) Tuckar to Huskisson 27 March 1823, Add MSS# 38,744, ff 180-81#
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restrictions on one colony or dependency, for the benefit of another*"
(2)
Charles Grant joined Tucker in this appeal and the piivate trade
interest tried to raise the question In the parliament without effect,
the Government supporting the West indies planter interest# But it
was due to this timely intervention that the protective additional duty
was not further Increased to I2s 6d, as had been determined in
negotiations between Lord Liverpool and the planters at Fife House on
3 April 1821, on the ground of reduction of freight from India#
When Charles Ellis complained that Huskisson was not proposing greater
protection against Benares White Sugar, the latter firmly pointed out
that he not only felt 10 shillings enough protection but that the
C3)
extra 5 shillings should be altogether dropped# "With my own 
conviction that the tendency of monopoly Is over production, which often 
made It a curse instead of an advantage to those for whose benefit 
it Is conferred###*% Huskisson refused to comply and even warned the 
West Indies sugar interest which had ,Ta most difficult game to play 
and I should fear, a losing one"# In 1826 Huskisson followed the 
same compromise# The duty was reduced from £3# 3s per ewt# to 
£1# 10s# but the discriminatory ten shilling difference remained#
Trade depression in England: Unfortunately for the free traders Britain fell
into the trough of an economic depression before the healthy effects 
Cl) ibid# f# 185#
(2} Charles Grant to Huskisson 4 April 1823#iifl 
(3) Huskisson to Charles Ellis 31 March 1823 ibid# ff# 195—96 in 
reply to Charles Ellis to Huskisson 9 March 1823
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of the new tariff laws could be felt# The industrial and commercial
bocans of 1824 and 1825 were based on cheap credit created by the
provincial banks and on hazardous investments caused by the
(1 )
Gov eminent* s policy of debt-conversion# Inflation raised the
price level and discouraged exports* The firious promotional 
activities in cotton manufacture at home and the South American 
projects ended in the stock exchange panic of September 1825# The 
price of cotton fell after a year-long attempt of Lancashire to corner 
the crop* The banks tried in haste to withdraw their advances 
to the marginal factories and, failing, stopped payments in 
October - November# The result was at once reflected In the fall of 
import indexes and a persistent and increasingly vehement demand for 
wider scope for exports# As Finlay testified before the Committee 
on Manufactures 1833, the cotton manufacture had greatly expanded 
during the boon years# Introduction of new technique, fall of price 
of machinery and competition with newly erected factories had effected 
large reduction of costs# Fall of prices necessitated an Increase In 
the volume of exports to obtain the same value as before# This was 
true of the iron and shipping industries between 1826 and 1832 as 
Samuel Walker testified before the same Committee# To yield a 
moderate amount of. profit required extraordinary demand for British
(D Note the striking similarity with the situation in Bengal 
described above and below*
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mnufactures abroad ihich was not forthcoming* The depression continued 
therefore for years after 1826 with temporary recovery in certain 
sectors in 1827 and 1830* It is no wonder that under these 
circumstances the Company's remittance trade with India and monopoly 
of trade with China would be bitterly attacked by the manufacturing 
and the shipping interests#
The first indigo crisis: The first effect of the depression was
(1)
the fall of the raw material prices# TJe have seen earlier that
by the twenties Bengal had the largest amount of trade with Britain
and the fall of the prices of Bengal produce in Britain severely
hit the Bengal economy# The blow came at a time when Bengal was
experiencing a scarcity of capital, a stagnation of the country trade
and a decline of trade with foreign Europe and -America# On top of the
difficulty of withdrawing capital from the marginal indigo factories to
O)
whom they had lent prodigally in 1824 and 1825, the agency houses now 
faced the impossibility of realising proper returns for the produce 
raised by that capital# Private exports to Britain had an ominous fall 
in 1826 which stood out in marked contrast with the speculative rise 
of the previous year# Official value of indigo exports to U#K# fell 
from S.R# 1,29,45,734 to S.R# 90,08,479# Imports from America fell 
by more than two thirds and exports by more than three fourths# Though
(1) Prices in the London Market
Articles November 1824 June 1825 June 1826
Indigo per lb# 13#6s# 16#2s. 12#6s#
Cotton per lb# 9d. I6*5d# 7#4d#
Sugar per cwt# 56s# 62s* 51s#
(?) 7 e k n , V o U w + t s  W. T rv a jJ L  t M . c o r U t r  U 2 .&  p < U m r  o f r . C *  ■ v *Z  lo i f
pp. 15H-SS--
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the China maricet looked up a little and opium exports showed an
increase of 26 lakhs, little bullion came in return* Bullion import
on private account was the lowest since 1815 - most of it was on
(1)
public account, the tribute frcm Burma* Scarcity of money in
(1) CALCUTTA - WCKLD (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
(The Company's and private trade)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchan Trea- Total Merc ban- Trea- Total
dise sure dise sure
S.R# S.R* S.R* S.R# S.R# S.R*
1826-27 2,17,60,679 1,26,00,153 3,43,60,832 5,12,26,319 11,15,032 5,23,41,351
CALCUTTA - U.K*
The Company* s Trcx^
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasure
S.R# S.R# S.R* S.R#
1826-27 2,32,201 x 1,47,83,540 x
Private Trade 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasipe
S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R#
1,26,26,147 20,180 99,61,591 3,78,032
1825-26
1826-27
CALCUTTA-ERANCE 
Imports Exports
S.R# S.R#
12,04,899 16,09,331 
13,86,949 15,39,656
CALCUT TA-U . S # 
Imports Exports
S.R* S.R#
36,92,871 26,14,785 
11,63,985 6,64,318
CALCUTTA-SOUTH AMERICA 
‘Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*
8,29,155 1,53,608
16,05,224 61,633
1825-26
1826-27
CALCUTIA-LISBOR 
Imports Exports
S.R* S.R#
44,612 5,21,299
2,33,339 2,73,012
CALCUTTA-BRAZIL 
Imports Exports
S.R# S.R#
1,64,765 1,14,142
1,06,386 3,72,912
CALCOTTA-MAKTLLA 
Imparts Exports
S.R. S.R#
77,064 2,79,834
72,090 x
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Footnote (1) continued from, previous page
GALCHJTTA-CHINA CALCtJTTA-FMANG OALOTTTA-JAVA
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R. S.R#
1825-26 60,87,908 1,01,90,582 6,20,548 13,22,340 9,34,325 7,47,640
1826-27 35,55,012 1,38,14,821 10,15,953 10,40,556 15,15,304 8,82,194
GALCUTTA-SUMATRA GALGDTTA-GULES CALCOTTA-MALABAR
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R# S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R# S.R#
1825-26 5,00,832 42,683 22,53,338 31,47,972 6,52,087 17,65,723
1826-27 1,55,419 1,84,386 11,56,276 21,86,501 9,90,505 19,77,815
C ALCTJTTA-C OROMANDEL CALCUTTA4-1AUKLTITIS CALdJTTA-PEGU
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R# S.R# S.R* S.R* S.R# S.R#
1825-26 53,04,873 16,76,158 3,10,902 4,12,332 2,56,686 12,80,211
1826-27 n9,57,127 8,95,823 5,66,180 5,49,029 62,52,771 14,44,125
I C^rvv .
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Calcutta was oppressive and the indigo bubble was about to burst# 
Impervious to the actual situation in Bengal, the Court
asked for a supply of two crores to meet obligations on the home
(1)
treasury - to be raised by loans payable in Bengal# The Government
declared its inability in the prevailing condition of the money-market#
nA million suddenly thrown in, or suddenly withdrawn by a loan
operation here, will make a difference more sansible and immediate
than many millions in London and the entire extent of capital that
can be made available is so small that although by raising our terms
we drive the merchants to offer much higher and depreciate all existing
securities by creating in the holders a strong desire to convert fixed
into available capital; an influence that acts with a pressure
ruinously elastic, we yet should not much extend the funds we could
(2)
by any means draw from the public#” The mercantile distress had
been further heightened by the failure of indigo, crops and canttaction
of note issue by the Bank# Palmer & Co# on behalf of the Calcutta
houses solicited not only for the postponement of repayment of the
(3)
earlier loan but for additional accomodation# The Government 
postponed the date# On 19 December some of the agency houses, who did 
not apply for relief last May, asked for a fresh issue of treasury notes#
(1) Court to G.G# in C. (Terr. ELn) 14 June 1826#
(2) G#G» in C# to Court (Terr. Sin.) 16 November 1826#
(3) Palmer & Co to H#T# Prinsep 6 December 1826# ELnaneWAsffiSS® Letters
and Enclosures Received 1826—27 I#0# Vol# 18# pp# 69—71#
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The Government again came to their help by purchasing 4Q TgVV of
(X)
indigo on treasury bills# Scarcity of cash began to affect the
value of Government securities and interest bills# Ufa loans showed
a discount of Rs# 2 to 2o$ and Interest bills taken at 2s were sold 
(2)
for ls#10d# Large balances plagued the Salt department and opium
sale had to be postponed#
In this financial crisis when all efforts should have been
made by the partners of the agency houses to keep up their credit,
the exactly opposite was done* They began to withdraw a large portion
of their capital to England* This had happened before# "No sooner
does capital accumulate from successful trade or agency than it is
carried hone by the possessors in the same manner as the accumulated
(3)
savings of ycur servants#" But the withdrawal was never sudden#
It was spread out and often followed by re-investment# The rapid 
changes in the money-market, particularly in terms of the late loans, 
and the decline of trade In general no longer produced such reactions 
on the part of the retiring partners# The Palmers fared the worst - 
four of their partners withdrew their capital almost simultaneously — 
one Brownrigg alone taking 8 lakhs with him# When the agency 
houses in their turn tried to realise their loans to the marginal 
concerns, the latter had to give up business for lack of funds# The
(1) Accountant General to H#J#Prinsep 26 December 1826. He opposed any
further aid in cash loans ibid pp# 80-85#
(2) G*G* in C. to Court (Terr.ELn*) 11 January 1827#
(3) G.G* in C* to Court (Terr* Pin#) 19 April 1827#
(4) Alexanders East India Magazine Tol# V# No# 31, pp# 581—592#
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(1)
failure of the indigo crop in 1826 and decline of indigo prices in
London led to the bankruptcy of scxne of the biggest planters in Bengal
like Davidson Sc. Co# and Mercer Sc Co# which caused a further fall of
price and a crisis of confidence among the native ccsnrunity to whom
(2) (3)
they owed heavily# Many native houses failed in chain reaction
(1) Average produce of Bengal Indigo
id#) Price (per fact# md#) (S.R#)
260 
280 
240 
220 
235
Halved produce meant loss of a crone of capital# See Note by T# Piinsep# 
Acting Secy# to Terr# Dept-# 9 March 1827# IlnancielSeng®! Letters and 
JSncisures Received# 1826-7# I#0#Vol# 18# p# 210#
(2) List of European Houses which failed
in 1826 and 1827
Yr# Produce
1822 113,223
1823 78,848
1824 110,700
1825 143,231
1826 86,000
Names Year Supposed to have failed 
S#R#
Davidson & Co# 1826 65 lakhs
Mercer & Co. 1827 55 *
Burnett & Co « 18 »
Mendeetta Unecarte
Sc Co# « 17 "
Brightman (Barreto
& Co#) w 2 *
ibid p# 215#
(3) List of native houses whichifailed
Name Year Supposed to have failed for
S.R#
Anundmohun Paul and
Soobulchunder Paul 1826 1,50,000
Radhamohun Sc Kissen
Mohun Dull (Paul?) n 1,00,000
Gfungagobind Seal and Bur Gobind
Seal * 2,50,000
Bisbmabur Pyn & Chunder Coomar Pyn n 60,000
Rammrain De and Madfcib Chum, De 1827 2,50,000
Muthooramohun Sein & Go n 13,00,000
Subulchunder Nundy tt 50,000
ibid
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and a panic started in the bazar about the solvency of the agency 
houses#
The failure of the planters reacted on the six principal 
houses who were their largest creditors# Out of a total of two 
crores annually invested in Bengal indigo they contributed no less 
than 160 lakhs# They found great difficulty in realising their loans 
by sale of the mortgaged property (mostly factories) which was neither 
easily saleable nor would fetch reasonable prices# Moreover if at 
least the good concerns were to be kept going - advances had to be 
made in proper time for which no capital was forthcoming unless the 
Government afforded aid# Their promissory notes were worthless - being 
at a discount of 15 to 20^ # They appealed, therefore, to the Board 
of Trade on 6 March 182? to revive the earlier plan of advances to the 
indigo manufacturers on contract or actual consignment. H.T.Prinsep, , 
in a Minute of 9 March 1827, noted with concern the possible effect 
of the failure of the agency houses on the savings of a large number
of the Company1 s servants and, apprehending one failure would upset
(1)
the applecart, recommended an anticipated payment of the Deccan and 
the Bhurtpore prize money and advances on bond repayable by indigo#
The Board of Trade in its Minute of 22 March referred to late French 
competition for Bengal indigo and advised monopolising the article on
(1) ibid pp# 220-21#
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behalf of tire Company which would help the agency houses at the same
time# Ultimately the Government resolved to afford assistance on
bonds but not as advances on contract for indigo which had been
forbidden by the Court. Indigo might be accepted as a security for
(1)
the loan which it granted to the extent of 20 lakhs. The evil
was, however, too deep-seated to be removed by such a temporary
palliative. The agency houses were financially very unsound arid
open to the blasts from all quarters - commercial or financial# We
would soon find Lord William Bentinek trying heroically to avert the
second phase of this indigo crisis - only a year and a half later#
Though it did not hesitate to pull others1 chestnuts out of
the fire, the Bengal Government had its own worries. The expenses of
the Burmese War went considerably beyond its dose. There was very
little surplus in Bengal in 1826-27 - S.R. 42,04,208 - and military
(2)
charges stood at S.R. 5,54,55,794. To supply an investment of
(3)
S.R. 1,90,78,671 and to meet the demands of Bombay, Madras and China 
the Government had to incur loan. Unwilling to compete with the 
distressed public the Government took recourse to political loans —
(1) Resolution of G.G. in C. (Territorial Dept.) 26 March 1827 ibid
pp. 285—300#
(2) India showed a deficit of S.R* 1,20,03,318. G.G. in G. to Court
(Terr.Ein.) 26 June 1828.
(3) Yr# Excess of Supplies Excess of Supplies Supplies to
to Bombay to Madras China
1825-26 S.R.1,25,36,430 S.R. 36,44,583 S.R. 14,89,860
1826-27 S.R. 84,97,956 S.R. 45,03,550 S.R. 11,26,088
ELnandftLEB#@fi- Letters and Enclosures Received. 1.0. Vols. 18 and 20 (X)
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CD
about 80 lakhs from Sindiah and 20 lakhs from Patiala* Not only no
CD
provision was made to supply tie Court with a crore in specie, its
restrictions on the proposed Charter of the Bengal Bank (despatch of
6 September 1826) were disobeyed as export of so much bullion and
imposition of limitation on the Bank*s note issue would aggravate
(3)
mercantile distress* It was only the Vizier*s request to make his
loans permanent that enabled the Government to send a meagre remittance
(4)
of 34. lakhs on the Deccan Prize and debt account#
Competition between the Company and private traders: The financial
situation steadied a bit towards the end of 1827, following a mild
recovery in England and China* Imports from the former reflected the
urge of the cotton manufacturers for greater sale even at low prices -
cotton twist and yarn alone rising to S.R. 18,42,110* Total exportsT©nt
(5)
up by 85 lakhs - 53 lakhs to England* But of the actual excess of
(1) G.G. in Cm to Court (Terr. ELn.) 19 July 1827*
(2) Court to G.G* in C* (Terr, ELn*) 14 June 1826*
(3) G.G* in C* to Court (Terr* ELn*) 18 October 1827* Holt Mackenzie
opposed the export of capital and restrictions on the Bank, very
strongly* See Note on the Bank* 26 February 1827* Financial Bee®*! 
Letters and Enclosures Received* 1827—28 1*0* Yol* 19 pp* 260—300 
Memorandum on export of specie* 27 June 1827 ibid pp* 29—67*
(4) G.G* in C* to Court (Terr. ELn.) 15 November 1827i
(5). • CALCUTTA-?/OHLD (CUSTCMS HOISE)
(The Company and private trade)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchan- Trea- Total Merchan- Trea- Total
^ Sr SW® S'R* T * . S“ L  S.H.
1827-28 *.*»>,W 7  ^,01,609 4,21,99,176 5,^5*27,104 44,80,987 6,40,08,091
(Continued)
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Footnote (5) continued from previous page#
IMPORTS
Merchandise
S.R*
2L827-28 3,48,312
CALCUTTA - U*K* 
The Company
Treasure
S.R*
x
EXPORTS
Merchandise
S.R*
1,75,37,150
Treasure
S.R#
34,58,720
IMPORTS
Merchandise
S.R*
3L827-28 1,86,43,444
Private Trade
Treasure
S.R,
73,620
EXPORTS
Merchandise
S.R*
1,28,83,130
Treasure
S.R#
7,06,979
CALCUTTA-ERAHCE CALCUTTA - U.S. CALCUTTA-BRAZIL
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R# S.R* S.R*
1827-28 23,12,466 26,99,804 21,75,829 16,87,548 11,55,576 4,37,668
ac Trade with Lisbon was below 2 lakhs, there were no exports to South 
America and it imported only S.R. 1,82,578. Trade with Hamburgh and 
Sweden were meagre*
CALCUTTA - CHINA CALCUTTA-PEN1MJ
Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R*
1827-28 85,88,695 1,46,90,342 5,34,803 11,38,076
CALCOTTA-JAVA 
Imports Exports 
S.R. S.R*
7,75,0239,92,709
s Trade with Manilla and Sumatra were meagre<
1827-28
CALCUTTA-GULES 
Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*
21,27,048 22,54,434
CALCUTTA-CORCMANDEL 
Imports Exports
S.R* S.R*
4,82,810 8,74,966
CALCUTTA-MALABAR 
Imports Exports
S.R.
4,34,801
S.R*
14,93,262
COTr*y'rryjL>xA*i R jLpcnrfc -
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escorts - 457 lakhs - the Company claimed about £20 lakhs, mostly In 
silk and indigo purchased from the agency houses by may of relief* 
Though it no longer* imported merchandise from England as, in the 
prevailing condition of trade, remittance of tribute itself had become 
difficult, the Court insisted on repayment of the territory^ debt to 
commerce* The Government was thus forced more and more to compete 
with the private traders for Bengal goods, some times at loss* Plain 
cotton piece goods were no longer indented for* About ten lakhs in 
Gossimbazar silk cloths and Santipore coloured cottons were an that
CDremained of its once famous trade in Indian fabrics* But the value
of raw silk indented for had risen from 75 lakhs (1825) to 84 lakhs
(2) (3)
(1827) though it fetched only a remittance of Is 9d in 1826*
Huskisson*s refomis had opened the British market to foreign silk
manufacture and the Spitalfield interest was now dependent on abundant
and cheap supply of Bengal silk* Sugar was increased from 2500 tons
(1825) to 4000 tons (1827) inspite of the preference to the West Indies
(4)
product, cotton from 42,000 bales (1825) to 54,000 bales (1827)* To
meet the demands on the home treasury indent for indigo was raised from
(5)
an average of 40 lakhs in 1825 and 1826 to 60 lakhs In 1827*
(14 In 1826-27 value of imported cotton goods first exceeded that of 
ezporfced cotton goods*
(2) Court to G.G* in C* (CaranrM 10 March 1824, 14 April 1824 15 February
1825, 30 Marcit 1825 and 17 May 1826*
(3) Court to G.G* in C* (Comm Separate) 7 February 1828*
(4) Court to G.G. in C. (Ccmm1) 20 June 1826*
(5) Secret Commercial Drafts 15 June 1825 and 14 February 1827*
Secret Commercial Drafts to India 1815—1831 I*Q*
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Larger investments in indigo helped the agency houses but
in silk did not* Their London correspondents under the leadership
of Fletcher, Alexander & Co* had appealed to the Court against
infringement of the spirit of the 1813 Charter Act and prayed for
annulment of Regulation X3QCL of 1793 which made a distinction in
favour of the advances to the pykars etc* made by the Company and
which was thoroughly exploited by the Commercial Residents to obtain
preference for their own silk business* The private traders could
make no headway against these odds* The Company1,s increasing demand 
in recent years had moreover raised the price of silk which had
been further affected by the keen competition between neighbouring
Commercial Residents to engross the produce of the locality at each
a)
other's cost* The Court itself was roused from indifference
by this extraordinary rise in costs and orders were sent, to keep
down prices to 1816 level and to remove the private traders'
(2)
grievances* The Government believed in free trade more than 
Its Commercial servants and, strengthened by tjais order, denied 
them unrestrained expansion because of Ttthe expediency of gradually
withdrawing from such a system, as individual skill and capital 
may be found adequate to absorb our dead stock, and to admit of our 
coming by degrees into the market to purchase the articles of
investment required by your Honourable Court in a fair and open
(1) The Company paid Rs* 10-7—7 per seer of silk in 1815, Rs*
14-11-6 in 1821 and Rs* 15-1-4 in 1825*
(2) Court to G.G* in G* (Ccanm ) 16 May 1827*
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(1 )
(competition with the private merchants*” The silk districts
Twere divided into three circles - one price was to rule in each* The
jResidents were strictly forbidden to- poach on one another and new
.rules were made providing for summary process of recovery of balances
(accruing consequent to actual advances to the producers* This was
:in line with the facilities already granted to the planters in 1823,
'though not so severe*
Bengal finances in 1828: The Bengal finances had not recovered from
the effects of war when Amherst left India in March 1828* The
revenues from the Burmese cessions, the Ava subsidy and the larger
opium sale of 1827-8 had provided seme fillip but the charges were
(2)
still very high* Military expenditure was aver 4 crores*
Bombay drew for about 1 crore and 44 lakhs and Madras for 53 lakhs*
The deficiency of these Presidencies converted the Bengal surplus
(3)
of S.R* 1,17,21,163 into an Indian deficit of S.R* 1,18,59,541.
To supply an investment of S.R* 2,14,26,811 and meet Its other 
commitments Bengal had to incur a debt of S.R* 3,31,84,254 in
1827-28* The situation was very grave* The Government was forced 
to stiffen rather than relax the monopolies and to postpone 
liberalisation of its customs policy as suggested by Holt Mackenzie*
(1) G.G* in C* to Court (Comm Separate) 7 February 1828.
(2 ) Bengal revenues (S.R*) Bengal Charges (S.R.)
1827-28 12,91,98,301 11,74,77,138*
(3) G.G. in C* to Court (Terr. Fin.) 22 September 1829*
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(1)
While the Court expatiated on the high price of salt and urged
reconsideration of the Government's policy of fixing a revenue and
then securing it irrespective of the rise of price, the Government
pottered with the idea of paying: a few annas more to the
molunghees for extra produce and did not dare reorientate its salt
(2)
monopoly in the consumer's interest* It clung to the Malwa
opium monopoly for a similar reason* It had taken the Malwa agency
in its own hands since 1823 and, under the new policy of Holt
(3)
Mackenzie, had given the native chiefs an interest in the venture*
High prices were given to the cultivators and heavy compensations to
the native chiefs of Udaipur, Kotah etc# under treaties stipulated
with them in 1824 for prohibiting cultivation of poppy in excess
of the Company's need* Malcoliji had protested against such a policy on
(4)
political grounds as early as 1821 and Metcalfe, then Resident of
Delhi, joined him in opposition to the treaties "procured by an
(5)
improper exertion of our irresistible influence**1
(1) Court to G.G* in C* (Separate) 11 July 1827*
Average price of Salt per 100 maunds. Revenue
Year S.R* (whole figure) raised (S.R*)
1822 418 2,04,75,412
1823 385 1,90,39,514
1824 352 1,81,91,501
1825 390 1,84,43,698
1826 419 1,87,35,735
1827 415 2,05,36,872
(2) G.G* in C. to Court (Separate) 31 May 1827*
(3) Holt Mackenzie's note 10 July 1823* Abstracts on Malwa opium, Third
Report 1851,, App* IT  p* 28*
(4) Malcolm to Secretary Warden* 26 April 1821 ibid# p* 19
(5) ibid p#p;:;30-31*
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Inspite of these wise Counsels, the necessity of the State during
the Burmese War dictated further treaties with Indore, Dhar etc*
Metcalfe was not to be deflected by this argiment which was enough
(1)
for Amherst and he, now a member of the Bengal Council in 1827,
proposed' an inquiry into the restrictive system in Rajpootana the 
urgency of which was increased by the news of disorders and even 
aimed fracas between the Company's giards and the smugglers*
Metcalfe boidly asserted that, if necessary, revenue should be
(2)
sacrificed for higher ends* The Court did not think the Malwa
(3)
experiment successful either* As Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gwalior
refused to enter the system of treaties, there were obvious gaps for 
illicit transit; the high prices paid by the Company's agent only 
encouraged the production and snuggling, as rampant as before, had
U)
become violent* The most telling 'argument against it, however,
was its decreasing value to the revenue* Gross receipts of
revenue from Malwa opium had risen from S.R* 44,80,486 in 1824-25
to S.R* 62,00,444 in 1827-28 but the general charges in the department
had risen in that period (on both Bengal and Malwa account) from
S.R* 33,83,582 to S.R* 56,74,606* By 1827 Malwa opium monopoly had lost
(1) Political Consultations 9 February 1827 Ho* 10*
(2) Political Consultations 21 March 1828 No* 75*
(3) Court tec G.G* In C* (Separate) 11 July 1827*
(4) Sir Edward Colebrooke's reply to the Circular sent at Metcalfe's
instance to the agents in Rajpoot ana and Malwa See G.G* in C* 
to Court (Separate) 7 July 1829*
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Its raison d'etre If it ever had any*
Lord William Bentinek: The need of the hour, therefore, was
retrenchment and reduction of charges which threatened to engulf 
the Bengal revenue* So long as the charges continued to pile 
on there eculd not be any appreciable surplus to be applied either 
to nation-building activities like public works and education or 
to the amelioration of trade through liberal measures like the 
abolitioh of transit duties or to the liquidation of the territory's 
debt to commerce which plagued the home finances* With such an 
object in view Lord William Bentinck was selected by the Court as 
Amherst's successor*
Bentinck had served the Company before as the Governor of 
Madras from 1803 to 1807 when he was held responsible for 
approving or acquiescing in his official capacity the course of 
action that led to the Yellore Mutiny* The attitude of the Madras 
Government seemed to have been influenced by the misguided zeal of 
the Christian missionaries to rescue the Indian people from their 
social and religious prejudices by the spread of Christianity and the 
pattern of individual moral conduct it symbolised* Thcugh Grant and 
Parry, the Evangelist group in the Court;, fought for him, the 
City interest considered the ?§licy bad for trade and political 
stability and Dundas put their case well in a laconic sentence -
—382<
"Ho man has the right to make another happy against his will#” 
Bentinek was recalled* After a fairly long services in the Napoleonic 
Wars he joined, the Whig party which might have instilled in him at 
this stage its free trade leanings* He offered himself as a 
candidate for the Governor Generalship at Hastings's resignation 
but Liverpool's opposition on party reasons baulked him of this 
opportunity* He had to wait till, on Liverpool's retirement,
Canning became the Prime Minister and Amherst was found wanting for 
the task ahead*
Indian public opinion of a later day has drawn an aura round 
the head of Bentinck who is assumed to have come to India as a great 
revolutionary reformer* Peace, reform, retrenchment, freedom of 
contract, freedom of expression, opportunities of education and 
public service - the demands of the kJfcrd a < y middle class - seemed 
to find in him the symbol of a promise subsequently belied and a 
hope deliberately frustrated* On the vhole, however, Bentinck was not 
a person to mould circumstances to his will* The ground had been 
thoroughly prepared before him* In social refoams and education a 
strong impulse came from the educated middle class of Bengal, led 
by Rammobun Ray, in employment of native ageney and liberalisation 
of customs - from the Court of Directors# I*1 one vital matter Bentinck 
took his own line* It was on the Europeans' right to own land and 
to enter into free contracts with the native producers like the 
weavers, the silk-reelers, the mulberry planters and indigo-growers -
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which was dictated by the exigencies of private British capital in 
India* He used the circumstances to the beast known interest of the 
private British capitalist which indirectly helped the economic 
development of India and created opportunities of education, 
employment and self-expression for the emergent Indian middle class. 
He could vindicate himself against the earlier disgrace of recall 
and establish his prestige not so much by observing zealous loyalty 
to the Company* s commercial interest but by abjuring it, not so much 
by continuing the Company*s neutralise in social and religious 
matters but by advocating reforms, not so much by maintaining the 
Company* s paternalistic attitude towards economic problems but by 
applying the utilitarian calculus#
ELnameial reforms: The first task of Bentinck was to put the Indian
finances on the basis of 1823-24 and it appeared to be a Herculean 
task# The average annual deficiency of the. Indian revenue, after 
defraying all charges abroad and at home, amounted to £2,878,031 in
U)
five years ending 1828«*29# The gross charges in four years 
between 1824 and 1827 constituted two-thirds of the total charges 
from 1814. Average expenditure had increased in these years by
£134,662 
£736,853
£27,531 
£2,878,031
(1) Average annual deficiency
in five years ending 1814-15
» 1818-19
(Nepal, Pindari, Mahratha 
Wars)
« 1823-24
n 1828—29
(Burma War, Bharat pur Campaign)
—3 8 4
£4,529,494 compared to 1823, by £2,695,749 in the military department 
alone. An analysis of the accounts between 1814 and 1828 showed 
that Bengal*s surplus of £28,374,534 had been wiped out, £4,923,021 
of surplus commercial profits consumed and £14.642.431 raised by
Cl)
loans.
Bentinck set up the Civil and Military finance Committees
within four months of taking up office to go through the Charges of the
12)
Government in detail and suggest reductions# In this he was not
only supported by the Court but. by the new President of the Board of
Control, Lord Ellenborough, who was even more impatient for reasons
of his own. "I have added a paragraph (to the despatch to India)1*
ha wrote in his diary, "which in effect tells the Governor General if
(3)
he will not make reduction some one else shall#" While the
Duke of Wellington planned in 1828-29 to renew the Charter to the
Company on the basis of 1813, for "The Duke Is much swayed by early
recollections" and "He is beside very desirous of having the City of
(4)
London ip his hands", Ellenborough wanted to relieve the Company
of the Indian administration and transfer it to the Crown# "We have
(5)
a moral duty to perform to the people of India" he wrote to Bentinck 
in 1829 and was sure that, In transferring India to the Crown,
(1) See Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons 1832#
(2) Bentinck to Astell 17 October 1828 Bentinck Papers, Nottingham
University* 1SE&
(3) Ellenborough*s Diary edited by Lord Colchester 26 November 1828,
Vol. I# p# 265#
(4) ibid. 19 November 1829, Vol. II# pp# 137-58#
(5) Ellenborough to Bentinck 19 May 1829, Bentinck Papers op.cit.
-385-
"I shall confer a great benefit- upon India and effect the measure
(1)
which is, most likely to retain for England the possession of India*"
Consideration of trade was not important as India trade had become
(2)
unprofitable and the China monopoly was "a mode of enabling; the 
Company to govern India by a taxlewi.ed on a necessary of life in
' U)
EngLand" by which it had evaded loss on direct remittance fmm
(5)
India* Important members in the Cabinet like Peel were opposed 
to the monopoly and the feeling in the mercantile community was
(a)
decidedly hostile* . With all this in mind and convinced as ever 
of his own rightness, Ellenborough tried to hasten the reduction
of the charges which alone could render India independent of direct
or indirect assistance from England* Ellenborough was an ambitious
vainglorious man who had some insight and great efficiency but he
kept in mind several alternatives for India* The first preference
was for the Crown Government, the second,for the Company*s
administration without the China monopiy, if self-sufficiency without
monopoly was possible and the last,for the renewal of the Charter
on the old basis but to impart to the Company*s rule "the efficiency,
Vigour and celerity of King*s government"* Though he fell between
(1) Ellenborough Diary op*cit 13 November 1829 Vol. II p* 131*
(2) Colchester Papers, Ellenborough Diary P*R.O* 30/9* Vol* 29,
9 August 1828* Loss on India trade in last 6 years - £245,761, 
profit on China trade in last 6 yrs* — £1,011,584*
(3) Ellenborough Diary op.cit* 1 August 1828 Vol* I p* 185.
(4) Colchester Papers, Ellenborough Diary op.cit 27 October 1829.
(5) Ellenborough Diary op*cit* 23 July 1829 Vol. II p* 74*
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these alternatives, he never forgot to prod the Indian Governments
to increase revenue by diminishing taxation wMch made India poor
(1 )
and a bad custcmer for British manufactures*
Before Bent inch: had the foretaste of his idea of efficiency,
vigour and celerity of the King's Government in ever-flowing
despatches on experiments in cotton culture, encouragement of
tannery, production of stores, introduction of steam-navigation etc*,
the Civil and Military Finance Committees had done good work*
By a resolution of the Commercial Department 16 June 1829 the system
of commission was abolished* Half batta measures were pushed
(2)
through against strong opposition of the military servants*
ELxed establishment charges were reduced by employment of natives
in subordinate ranks* The Court ordered further reduction by the
(3)
end of 1829* Pruning and paring went on up to 1830-31 and
the general progress was remaikable in five years between 1828-29
and 1852-53* Even though in the last two years the fall in land,
salt, customs and opium revenue had brought down the surplus and
the charges had begun to rise again, the public had benefited from
(4)
the reduction of taxes*
(1) Ellenborough to Bentinck 19 May 1829 and 2 January IS30* Bentinck
Papers op.cit*
(2) Ravenshaw to Bentinck 1 February 1830 Bentinck Papers op*cit*
(3) Court to G.G* in C. CTerr* FLn) 12 December 1829*
(4) Total Bengal Military Bengal Bengal Supplies to
Charges Charges Surplus Investment China
S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R*
1828-29 10,89,12,020 4,09,73,774 2,12,71,843 1,63,42,304 69,16,999
1829-30 9,65,93,972 3,65,93,272 2,43,05,360 1,89,06,902
1830-31 9,75,78,435 3,41,66,162 2,49,34,140 1,76,76,842.
1831-32 10,89,47,452 3,45,68,810 2,09,96,509 1,14,03,296
1832-33 11,21,46,990 3,63,24,900 1,75,57,517 1,51,47,143 7 , ,
(Continued)
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Footnote
1828-29
1829-30
4) continued from previous page*
INDIAN SURPLUS
S.R* S.R. S.R*
1,13,97,923 1830-31 1,51,10,497 1832-33 89,44,824
1,07,05,348 1831-32 1,44,89,443
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In such an atmosphere no revolutionary revenue policy could
(1)
emerge* Transit duties could not he abandoned and the Court*s
instructions regarding salt were not obeyed* On the contrary
(2)
Regulation XVI of 1829 enhanced the duty on Western salt# But
the Malwa opium policy underwent a complete change* The Company's
monopoly of Malwa opium was greatly resented by the private traders
of Bombay end Calcutta* The opening up of the east coast of China
and extensive snuggling at Lintin had increased the demand for
opium* Morse puts the imports of Malwa opium into China at an
average of 5 chests between 1824 and 1827* In 1828 the imports
(3)
suddenly leapt up to chests and in 1829 to 7,97a. The
Company's monopoly not only stood between the private traders and 
illicit profits but deprived the countryships of badly needed freight*
The Government, however, was not only persuaded by the economic
interests of the private traders* Metcalfe's arguments had been 
amply corroborated by reports from the political officers of Malwa 
and Rajpootana* On 19 June 1829 the Governor General in Council in 
the Political Department resolved on the political inexpediency of 
the Malwa monopoly* Treaties with the native princes were abrogated, 
attempts to restrict production of opium given up and free transit 
to Bombay was allowed under passes to be sold at Rs* 200 per chest#
(1) G.G* in C. to Court (Separate) 7 July 1829.
(2) G.G* in C. to Court (Terr* Fin*) 8 December 1829.
(3) JK&rS< SU. CM*rrvlc£t4 cf 0U
fe tSSLt Vrt. 7Z ff>• 3 5 3  > / 8 3  / 9 7 -  /
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For one year more the Government continued purchase in the open
market but purchase, being contradictory to the pass system*
(1)
was given up in 1830* To compensate for the loss of revenue, 
opium production of Bengal was increased by an advance of price
Cs)
to the poppy-growers (of &Lght annas only) and extended cultivation.
ISmplcoyment of native agency: Retrenchment, employment of native
agency and introduction of Western education hang together* The
Court had begun to consider wider employment of native agency
ever since an education policy was forced an it by the Charter of
1813* The problem of education became closely knit with the
problem of providing trained Indians for Government service - made
acute by the prodigious increase of charges during Amherst's
Governor Generalship* In March 1825 the Court asked the Bengal
Government to give preference to Indians possessing suitable
(5)
educational certificates for appointment in law-courts* A year
later It declared "the first object of improved education should be
(4)
to prepare a body of individuals for discharging public duties*n 
By the time Bentinck arrived in India, it had become imperative 
that Slower cadres of the civil service should be filled by Indians* 
Astell asserted that towards the desirable object of solvency
"nothing can more conduce than the employment of native agency in
(1) G.G* in C. to Court (Separate) 3 August 1830*
(2) G.G* in C. to Court (Separate) 5 February 1831*
(3) Court to G.G* in C. (Public) 9 March 1825*
(4) Court to G.G. in C. (Public) 5 September 1825*
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U)preference to the expensive services of Europeans." Ellenboiough 
belittled the risk of failure as the natives "without being really 
responsible....do practically a great deal now through the weak or 
corrupt or indolent Europeans they serve"... and was convinced
(2 j
"we cannot govern India financially without the change of system." '
Bentinck reciprocated the feeling.we cannot govern the country
without them. The most we can attempt is controul, and this I
(31-
lament to remade is very inefficient." Once the home and the
Indian Governments were united on the policy, they could not but take
the next step of selecting English as the medium of higher education
for which there was already an articulate demand in the country
led by Rammohun Ray, Radhakanta Deb, Ramkamal S£n and the Tagores anr?
symbolised in the Hindu College established in 1816, the Calcutta
School Book Society established in 1817 and the Calcutta School Society
(4)
established in 1818. The orientalists were fighting a lost battle 
frcm the beginning. Hope of prefements in the Government service, if 
not the intellectual aspiration for higher liberal education, won the 
day. The scope of service, however, was very limited. The higtest 
rank an educated Indian could attain was that of the Principal Sudder 
Aumeen which carried a salary of less than 500 rupees a month.
(1) Astell to Bentinck. 2Q January 1829 Bentinck Papers op.cit.
(2) Ellenborough Political Diary op.cit. 16 December 1829 Vol. IX p. 148*
(3) Bentinck to Astell 8 June 1829, Bentinck Papers op.cit*
(4) The Samachar Darpan 11 July 1818 (28 Asarh 1225), 21 October
1820 (6 Kartick 1227), 8 March 1825 (26 Falgun 1229). See 
"Rammohun Ray as an Educational Pioneer" Brajendranath Bandyopadhyaya, 
Journal of Bihar & Orissa Research Society Vi>l. X7X Part II*
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Yet Bentinck had reversed the policy of Cornwallis, reflecting
the prejudices of an earlier period and now incompatible with the
financial stability of the Government* By recognising the Indians'
need for economic opportunities and no less legitimate need for
self-respect Bentinck forged the second link to the chain of loyalty
white Cornwallis had forged the first by the Peimanent Settlement*
The middle class of Bengal had three wings from the thirties - the
first based on land, the second on professions and the third on public
service* As the opportunities in the first were dminishing and those
in the second were hardly developed, with trade and industry in
foreign hands, the Bengalee middle class turned more and more to
public service* It did not possess or rather lost its root in
indigenous commerce and industry which made the middle class in the 
West so powerful and progressive* While one half of it looked back
to a mythical India - an India of orthodox traditions and static
outlook, of serried social stratification and inhibited individual
action, the other half could not look hopefully to a creative future*
It could not make a free and healthy response to the challenge of
Western thought and life* It was weak and vacillating* It was
romantic and escapist* It was torn between the old and the new —
moved sometimes into agressive self-assertion and sometimes into
abject self-pity*
Rammohun Roy: Only a giant like Rammohun Roy could accept what
was best in the West and still be his own dignified self* He fully 
realised the implications of the challenge and cahnly prepared for a
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rat ion al response* He did not scamper hysterically Into the 
comfortable assurance of the old shell, nor did he surrender the 
ancestral values for the superficial glamour of the new* Their 
pristine verity had been encrusted with the prejudice of centuries 
and once he made sure what they really were, he manfully want out 
to meet the West as an equal*
It was not for all to soar like him into the thin air of 
metaphysics and still remember the material basis which supported 
the ethereal flight* That metaphysics Christianity could not 
provide, though it could help to clarify, but that material, basis 
Western technology and science alone offered* Yet appalling 
ignorance, religious and social abuses (like the caste-system) and 
adverse economic conditions hampered their operation* Having 
laid down the premises, Rammohun did not hesitate to espouse the 
cause of reforms through the Brahmo Samaj and the cause of 
education in natural science through the medium of English* A 
zemindar himself, he did not falter in dencuncing the Pemanent 
Settlement before the Select Committee of the House of Commons* Happy 
over Bentinck* s policy to widen the scope of native employment, 
he did not want the Indian middle class to be lost to the world of 
enterprise* He welcomed Western education because It held the key 
to power over naturep similarly he welcomed the introduction of 
European skill and capital which could apply that power to the benefit
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of India and, more, to teach the Indians to apply it* He dreamt 
of a new middle class emerging out of that milieu, ready to take 
its share in the creation and fulfilment of a progressiva 
economy, Unfortunately he could not foresee that natural science 
might one day destroy his Absolute Brahma without putting anything 
in. His place and that foreign capital, if not restrained by a
national Government, might take more than it gave* But no man
(
could claim the omniscience of the gods and even today his synthesis, 
less sure and more vulnerable than before, has not been superseded 
by a better one*
Bentinck appreciated the utilitarian part of this synthesis 
of the Yedanta and Bent ham, and when the Rajah declared his war 
against the custom of the Suttee, Bentinck did not refrain from 
lending the whole weight of his Government on the reformers' side* 
Though It was abominable and inhuman, the Suttee could not have 
roused such a passionate controversy and protracted struggle unless 
something more importnat was involved - which was the Company's 
traditional policy of neutralism in social and religious matters* It 
was one of many abuses - some even mueh more deep-rooted and hamfUi - 
but it was spectacular* The image of the burning widow was the most 
persuasive argument for its abolition* It could be most tellingly 
used to focus the attention of the Government on the crying need far 
a positive approach towards social refoims and the very apprehension
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of its ability to do so made the other side fight bitterly* The 
orthodox defended an apparently inhuman practice not because of 
any natural perversity but because defeat might open the floodgate 
of further positive actions on the parrfc of the State which would 
shake the whole social fabric and endanger the vested interests* 
Bentinck decided for social reform because such a decision was 
implicit in the situation* The Government could not interfere with 
the internal administration of the native states or with trade and 
industry vSiile refraining from interference with flagrant social 
abuses, specially when the initiative came from an influential 
section of the subjects which it considered as a political ally* The 
principle of interference, long recognised in the economic and lately 
recognised In the political field, logically claimed extension to 
the social sphere as well*
The seecond indigo crisis: In fact Bentinck lad to interfere in economic
matters before he had finished the retrenchment business and almost 
simultaneously with the abolition of the Suttee* The second indigo— 
crisis began in 1830 and threatened to ruin not only the large amount 
of private British capital engaged in Its production but the trade 
and industry of Bengal which were now dependent on that capital*
For five years ending 1828-29 indigo was being exported on an annual 
average of 1,15,846 factory maunds - which was much above the level 
of European consumption* About thirty to forty lakhs of bighas of
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a)
land had been put under indigo* Prices were very high, averaging
(S)
S.R* 264 per factory mannd, because both the Company and the free
traders, specially the latter, sent their remittance chiefly in indigo*
As the supply was not based on real demand, any marked change in
the London prices was bound to affect production disproportionately —
which happened in 1826 causing failure of many indigo concerns in
that and the next year*
The Company's growing silk investments prevented any
(3)
diversion of private capital to that line; cotton trade with Britain
was gone, though its price in the Indian market had come down from
Bs* 21 in 1821 to Rs* 12-8* per bazar maund; and the application of
capital to sugar could not appreciably increase in view of the
discrimination against it. So indigo would have to be relied on*
But who were to supply the circulating capital to the planters and
manufacturers? The agency houses, hard hit by the crisis of 1826-27,
had little capital to spare and had stopped advances to the factories
(4)
which could not make indigo under Rs. 120* The only htope lay in
(1) Return of the Judicial Department 1 June 1830* App* Y* S.C.H.C*
1832 No* 60 and No. 73* James Mill gave a return on 6 Augist 
1832 which puts the total number of indigo factories in the Bengal 
Presidency at 899, of European owners at 119 and of European 
assistants at 354* ibid No* 75*
(2) Alexander's East India Magazine Yol* YE p* 275*
(3) The Company's exports of raw silk -
Year* Bales
1826 6141
1827 6264
1828 7014
(4) Alexander' 3 East India Magazine Yol* III p* 209*
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the introduction of fresh European capital the conditions for which, 
however, were wanting*
lEurcopean landowner ship: The Government as well as the private
capitalists were thus confronted with the necessity of facilitating 
the introduction of European capital in the indigo business - not 
only in the interest of private but of public remittance. At one 
end of the chain of interest stood the Company's servants - at the
other end the ryots. The servants lent to the agency houses who lent
* •* 
to the planters who again used the capital in advances to the ryots*
The impecunious ryot was the base of the indigo pyramid and the
(')
capitalists blamed him for all the troubles. His "intrigue, chicanery 
and fraud" (words used by Bentinck himself) had worked on the legal 
incapacity of the planter to own land and, therefore, to enforce his 
Hen on the article produced with his capital. The planter saw 
indigo, sown with his advances, sold to a rival who staked a similar 
claim on it* He was confronted in the Court with the ryot's assertion 
that the land was not sown with his advances or that he had forced the 
ryot to sow indigo on land traditionally nsed for staple crops* He 
was prevented from expanding his concerns by the zemindars who had 
entered Into indigo speculation on a large scale* Sometimes the 
servant, in whose tm-me he had been forced to take the lease, stood 
out as the real owner. His capital was unsafe till he secured the 
right of ownership and the right of enforcing his contractual claim 
on the ryot against the zemindar on his scheming European rival* Law
(0 Au. Jb/Uv ( C u t t e r } fiyirry^ ^  ronr
of hx.dJL.cL. I&3/-
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gave little and never any speedy redress and though a regulation of 
1823 enabled him to set police on the crop and realise its value after 
a summary suit - it gave him no right to claim specific performance#
He did not deny that in such trying circumstances he took law into 
Ms  own hands, sometimes in a violent manner. But he was not 
satisfied with such a precarious method when rise of land values Imd 
called for a larger investment of capital than before#
At the beginning of 1829 the principal agency houses had 
appealed to the Government for an extension of its Resolution of 
7 May 1824 to all cash crops. That would enable the indigo plahters 
to take long leases in their own names (like the planters of coffee to 
•whom this Resolution applied) and thus avoid a loss of 25$ occasioned
CD
by the constant troubles and expenses over enforcing indigo contracts.
By a resolution in the Revenue Department 17 February 1829 the
Government agreed to do so on the ground of failure of all
restrictions on the occupancy of land by the Europeans through na
recourse to fiction and concealment" as also on the ground of
facilitating production and reducing the costs of Indian exports*
Metcalfe considered withdrawal of these restrictions necessary for the
prosperity of the Enpire and progressive increase of revenue, "I am
further convinced that our possessions of India must always be
(2)
precarious, unless we take root.” The Governor General, was more
(1) Memorial from Principal Merchants at Calcutta to G.G. in C# 28
January 1829 App. Y S.C.H.C. 1832 No.43, See Bangaduta. 13 June 
1829 (1 Asarh, 1226).
(2) Minute of Metcalfe 19 February 1829, App. Y. S.C.H.C* 1832, No. 45*
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elaborate In his Minute of 30 May 1829. He justified the
resolution on economic as well as moral ground^ . The annihilation
of the cotton manufacture had been "productive of so much present
suffering to numerous classes in India, and hardly to be paralleled
in the history of commerce#" To compensate for that loss the
vast productive powers of India should be encouraged. Poverty,
ignorance, demoralization, corrupt ion of the native officers,
oppression of the zemindars and heavy rural indebtedness had
prevented this and forced agriculture to remain primitive and
commerce spiritless. Not a single article, excepting those
handled by the Europeans, was fit for the international raaiket.
Of these again indigo alone remained as the means of effecting
returns to England and it invited more European skill and capital.
It would be helpful to both Britain and India* British capital
would obtain cheap labour Tdiile presence of the British capitalist
in the country side would save the poor ryot from the usurious
interest of the native money-lenders and the whimsical oppression
of the native zemindars who were often the same. The rural folk
would borrow in the arts and knowledge of England as well as in
the moral integrity of the Englishman. He not only denied
oppression by the planters but asserted that "...every factory Is
(1}
in its degree the centre of a circle of improvement."
(1) Minute of Governor General 30 May 1829. App. Y S.C.H.C. 1832, No. 46.
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He did not forget to clinch his argument with the utilitarian
doctrine of enlightened self interest which would be enough
safegiard against all possible abuses.
Bentinck's measure roused a host of hostile critics in the
Court who were supported by Ellenborough. The old guards were
against any innovation at a time of general retrenchment and amny
disaffection, particularly when it smacked of colonization. "Your
colonization minute", wrote Bavenshaw, "created much at first
- and even now many regret that you should have adopted a course of
argument so much in accordance with the feeling of the free merchants
(1)
in India and the advocates for annihilating the Company here...."
"We must abrogate the Regulation without loss of time "wrote
Ellenborough and the Duke, when informed, said "Lord Bentinck was
(2)
not to be trusted and we should be obliged to recall him." There
was opposition from the manufacturing interest who saw in colonization
the spectre of a second Lancashire on the bank of the Ganges which
(3)
could beat the original with cheap Indian labour and raw material.
The Court reprimanded Bentinck for deciding such an important 
matter without previous reference, considered the 1824 Resolution on 
coffee as no precedent and criticised the omission in the new
(1) Ravenshaw to Bentinck, 8 August 1829. Bentinck Papers op.cit.
(2) Ellenborough's Political Diary op.cit. 27 June 1829 Yol. H
p. 59, 4 Dec emb er 1829, ibid p. 14L.
(3) AMber to Bentinck 6 June 1829, Bentinck Papers op.cit.
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regulations of those sections which enabled the Government to 
cancel leases for an undesirable abuse of privilege. Length of 
leases was to be regulated according to the nature of cultivation, 
leases were never to be granted beyond 21 years without the Court's 
approval and the security abuses were to be reinserted. The Court 
referred to a series of letters on oppression and violence 
canmitted by the planters which were not yet repressed and ordered
a fill review of the conduct of the Bengal planters by the
(1)
Collectors and the Commis si oners.
Bentinck recorded another Minute in reply on 8 December 1829*
If the Court desired the development of the raw material resources
of India for the use of the British manufacture, which It repeatedly
(2)
did in respect of silk and cotton, he saw no other way than 
according ownership of land to the Europeans. The Resolution of 
1824 had been extended to cotton and sugar cane before Bentinck'a
C3)
arrival and had not produced any evil effects. Important safeguards 
had been retained but If the clauses referred to by the Court be 
included, they would nullify the the spirit of the privilege by 
requiring harsh and unnecessary penal measures. The Court need not 
apprehend any great extension of the European zemindary system - 
there were only five applicants for the privilege — nor any clash
(1) Court to G.G. in C. (Revenue) 8 July 1829 See also Court to G.G.
in C. (Judicial) 6 Augist 1828.
(2) Court to G.G. in C. (Camnr) 18 February 1829.
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Revenue) 26 June 1828.
-401-
with the native interests which, followed before from the planters' 
dubious title, specially when "...many indeed of the wealthiest and 
most influential, are of our own creation" and, as the Revenue 
letter of 1 January 1830 explained, "who or whose families acquired 
wealth, in close communication with the Europeans, or in the 
service of the Government under European Supervisors." Charles 
Metcalfe and W.B. Bayley fully concurred with the Governor General 
on the great moral, political and economic benefits of European 
ownership of land.
EaU of the Palmers: Almost simultaneously with the despatch of
(1 )
these sentiments to England a stonn burst over the Calcutta agency 
houses. The redoubtable Palmer & Co. failed on 4 January, 1830.
It had been tottering for some time under heavy withdrawals by Its 
retiring partners and forced to close its private bank. When the 
house of Cockerell and Trail, once Its London head office and now 
Its biggest creditor, demanded immediate liquidation of half of the 
debt and security for the rest - an open manifestation of distrust - 
a run began. It had little fluid capital - most; of Its funds 
having been locked in indigo factories or improvident loans to 
junior civil and military servants. When John Palmer's appeal for 
30 lakhs from the other five houses failed to bring response except 
from Alexander & Co. and Fergusson & Co., the Palmers closed their
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Revenue) 1 January 1830.
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(X)
doors. Circumstances were too much for them thougi they obtained,
according to the Court, more than 2/5ths of the total sums advanced
(2)
by the Government for relief of the agency houses since 1SL2-15.
The consequent distress was universal and panic unparalleled# Th*
remaining houses foolishly abstained from closing up ranks and giving
up the losing concerns or taking their constituents into confidence*
"The intelligence of Palmer*s failure, with all its direful consequences,
was suffered to wo3k: its way on the public mind, accompanied by a
(3)
train of unfounded rumours and c o n j e c t u r e s # E v e n  the
Europeans creditors began to withdraw in haste. After four months
of unequal struggle the agency houses appealed again to the
Government for help on securities of lands and houses, factories
(4) 
and crops*
The Government, took the responsibility for relief against
(5)
the positive orders of the Court* On Holt Mackenzie's review of
C5)
their cases, which showed unprecedented withdrawals, Bentinck 
justified his measures in an able Minute. The trade of Bengal was 
largely concentrated in the hands of six agency houses* In 1829
(1) Net asset X crore 53 lakhs.
Net debt 2^ crores* See Alexanders East India Magazine.
September 1831. pp. 312-14.
(2) Court, to G.G. in C. (Terr. Jin.) 20 July 1831.
(3) Alexanders East India Magazine Vol. V, No. 31, p. 583.
(4) Letter of merchants to Holt Mackenzie 11 May 1830. Slnancjel
Letters etc. Reed. 1829—30. 1.0. Vol. 23 pp. 583—589 also see
G.G. in C. to Court (Terr. Ein* ] 14 May. 1830.
(5) Court to G.G. in C* (Revenue) 2 April 1828.
(6) Report of 14 May 1830. ELnanqai Itaegea. Letters and Enclosures
Received 1829-30 1.0* Vol. 23 pp. 590-598.
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1,08,603 maunds of indigo oat; of a total produce o f 1,49,285 
maujids were consigned to them* They controlled lack. and rum trade 
entirely, owned 59 out of 91 fvessels in Calcutta, several steamers, 
Chief docks, the only textile mill at Port Glocester, Collieries at 
Burdwan and agricultural and salt projects in Sartgor Island. With 
the exception of the Strand Mills (flour and riee} and the Govern­
ment concerns all schemes of manufacture and agriculture were 
financed by these six houses. They got their funds from the 
Company* s servants. Their fall would thus not only cause the 
disruption of public revenue and dislocation of trade and industry 
of Bengal but spell ruin to the Company*s servants. Bentinck treated 
it as a national emergency - "an overwhelming necessity which in 
my judgment cculd not have been disregarded without the sacrifice of
CD
the best interest of India.” He laid the blame squarely on the
Company*s monopoly which denied free access to the British subjects,
debarred them from purchasing land, excluded them from public
employment and restricted the Company* s servants in investing their
capital...It could not have been expected,” he wrote in the
Minute, "that British capital should abound, or that British capital
not enjoying any share of authority or power should remain in the
country an': hour longer than was necessary to accumulate a fortune
(2)
proportioned to their (real or fancied) i n t e r e s t s . T h e  eanmerce
(1) Bentinck to Astell 4 June 1850.Bentinck Papers op.cit.
(2) Minute of Governor General 14 May 1830. PLnandalBSSgSl letters
and Enclosures Received 1829. 1.0. Vol. 23 pp. 599-610.
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of India should rest on real capital specially In those branches 
which needed fixed stock and such capital would not be forthcoming 
unless Its security be guaranteed by a grant of ownership of land 
to the European investors. The favourable returns of the Collectors 
proved Bentinck right about the indigo-planters and took away the 
only possible argument against such a policy. As an immediate 
relief the Government resolved to lend 50 lakhs in treasury notes at 
6fo an house property and indigo-crop and to purchase private bills 
on England. The Court's orders restricting the Bank of Bengal*s 
note-iseue and note-bullion ratio were not carried out.
Tratde depression: Bad trade continued prosperous the scarcity of
capital would not have been so deeply felt. Imports and e±ports
fell in 1828-29 and though there was a small improvement next .
year, further depression in England Intervened and trade with 
Britain, France and China declined largely. Cotton goods import 
from Britain was over done in 1828, rising frcm S.R. 49,25,479 in
j
1826-27 to S.R. 72,64,668. Twist, and yarn from Britain almost 
doubled - rising from S.R. 18,42,110 to S.R. 32,88,509. There was as
usual a considerable increase in wines. But the export trade was the
crux of the situation. Cotton pieee goods continued on the downward 
grade - the South East Asian market was now lost to the Indian 
manufacture and even the newly added Burma market was flooded 
with the re-exported British cottons. Indigo registered the largest
(1) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr. lin.) 18 May 1830.
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fall - frcm S.R* 1,91,71,606 in 1827-28 to S.R* 1,21,92,642*
Sugar and si Ik fared better but they were in the Company's hands*
In 1829-30 import of British piece goods shrank to S.R* 49,57,095, 
of British twist and yarn to S.R* 14,37,121 and the'British
CD
metal import was stagnant. Though America tried hard to push 
her coarse cottons, trade with France declined* Indigo eaports 
were higher but silk exports were down* Very little of cotton 
was now went to Britain. The whole country trade was suffering 
from the crisis of the agency houses and fall of demand for China 
goods in India. China sugar and tutenague had been replaced 
by Java sugar and German Spelter. Decline of freigjit-rate on the 
return voyage frcm China effected shipping. Only opium improved a 
little. Trade with Java was trifling and with the Coasts and the 
Gulfs stagnant since 1826. Penang and Malacca only prospered due 
to the growing importance of Singapore. The Company was not getting 
much from its lately Increased trade* In 1827 it had bought
(2)
S.H. 71,67,534 of indigo which, gave a remittance of Is,9.53., in
(3) C4)
1828 indigo gave only Is 2^ d. Silk fetched Is lid in 1829.
(1) British imports into Calcutta
(Quantity)
Tear Cotton Cotton Mile Iron Lead Copper Spelter 
Yam twist twist
(md) (i^d) (md) (md) (md) (md) (md)
1826-27 1794 8626 12,725 1,21,835 19,623 43,146 1,62,319
1828-29 5175 17,704 19,120 1,71,221 28,241 44,076 89,947
1829-30 1799 11,636 8,488 1,18,530 11,527 59,196 81,866
Ben^pl Commercial Reports 1826-29*
(2) Secret Commercial Drafts - 9 June 1829*
(3) Secret Commercial Drafts - 13 July 1830.
(4) App* X. ^hird Report* S.C.H.C. 1831.
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The Court was forced to ask Bengal to prefer private bills to 
remittance through trade but the indigo crisis had persuaded the
CD
Government to try both means in 1829. Unless there was a revival
of trade and the Company gave up remittance in goods, the ageney
(»)
houses seemed doomed.
Relief of the indigo planters: One of the ways to help the private
traders was to take off the weight of the Company's trade as far
(3)
as possible - another was to throw cash into the market*
(1) It bought S.R. 71,48,754 worth of indigo besides Private bills*
See G.G. in C* to Court (Terr. Fin.) 5 June 1830.
(2) CALCUTTA. - WORLD (CUSTOMS HOUSE)
(Company and Private Trade)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Total Merchandise Treasure Total
S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R* S.R* S.R.
1828-29 3,01,92,732 69,02,374 3,70,95,106 5,02,81,959 17,63,195 5,20,45,152
1829-30 2,37,67,512 1,09,18,622- 3,46,86,134 5,50,46,563 16,40,322 5,66,86,885
CALCUTTA - U.K.
The Company
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Merchandise Treasure
S.R. S.R* S.R. S.R.
1828-29 3,98,830 x 1,41,26,165 X
1829-30 1,17,260 X 1,74,53,697 x
Private Trade 
IMPORTS EXPORTS
Merchandise Treasure - Merchandise Treasure
S.R. S.R. S.R. S.R.
182©-29^S,17,82,877 2,48,101 1,16,40,299 12,41,443
18219-30 1,59,77,037 X 1,10,62,436 12,26,294
CALCUTTA-FRANCE CALCUTTA-U.S. . CALCUTTA-CHHIA
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R. S.R* S.R* S.R. S.R. S.R*
1828-2:9 22,04,250 23,87,107 20,21,096 16,01,632 30,43,828 97,69,876
1829-30 14,66,573 23,97,986 18,37,155 17,61,787 66,37,763 1,17,18,274
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1827-28 
11828-29 
1829-30
1827-28
1828-29
1829-30
1827-28
1828-29
1829-30
Footnote (2) continued from previous page.
CALCUTTA-PEEAH G 
Imports Expo rt s
S.R.
5,34,803
16,48,760
23,63,568
S.R.
11,38,076
21,68,333
33,21,634
CALCUTTA-GULFS 
Imports Exports
S.R.
21,27,048
7,78,281
15,07,273
S .R.
22,54,434
17,98,927
21,26,905
C ALCUTTA-C QRQMANDEL 
Imports Exports
S.R.
4,82,810
5,31,130
13,12,874
S.R.
8,74,966
6,51,227
8,18,135
CALCUTTA-MAURITIUS 
Imports Exports
S.R.
3,75,735
1,21,798
3,09,605
CALCUTTA-SOJTH AMERICA
S.R.
13.66.050
16.04.050 
15,04,333
CALCUTTA-JAVA
.Import s 
S.R.
1,82,578
4,98,770
5,17,910
Exports
S.R.
x
99,605
1,54,446
Imports
S.R.'
9,92,709
1,40,945
96,792
Exports
S.R.
7,75,023
1,74,299
2,51,120
CALCUTTA-MALARAR 
Imports Exports
S.R.
4,34,801
7,98,641
6,64,585
S.R.
14,93,262
17,09,272
15,95,002
CALCUTTA-PEGU 
Import s Export s 
S.R.
9,89,152 
9,35,162 
8,95,335
S.R.
24,75,145
22,25,291
14,24,811
s Import, trade with Brazil ceased in 1827-28 and export trade In 
1828-29.
t QcJf>tnfc
(3) Bentinck was for buying investment in the open market. Bentinck 
to Anber 11 September 1830, Bentinck Papers op.cit.
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Ellenbo rough's insistent orders for encouragement of cotton
a)
cultivation on the Company's account were ignored. As the private
ships needed freight, badly the Government began to send cotton to
(2)
China on private ships at a loss. Regulation XXXI of 1793 was
modified by Regulation IX of 1829 to put the private and the
(3)
Company's si lie investments on an equal footing* The Government
not only decided to commute the Commissions of the Commercial
Residents into salaries fran 17 February 1829 but deprived all
Residents, appointed after that date, of private trade* The growth
of industry in Bengal was encouraged by reduction of duties on
(4)
export of mill-made flour and permission was given to Messers Scott
(5)
and Co* to erect a foundry in their Fort Glocester twist mill*
Lastly Reg* 71 of 1823 was modified to ensure specific performance
(6)
of indigo contracts at the request of Alexander & Co*
There was one dissentient voice among the Judges of the 
Sudder Dewanny Adawlut to which the question was referred* U. Layeester 
considered legislation in favour of the planters as class legislation
(1) G.G* in C* (Terr* Rev.) 18 May 1830* For Ellenborough's orders
see Ellenborough to Bentinck 19 May 1829, 15 May 1830. Bentinck 
Papers op.cit. Court to G.G. in C. (Public) 18 February and 
8 July 1829. Papers No. 34 before S.C.H.C. 1830-31. Import 
duties on cotton were lowered by 9 Geo 1Y Gap. 76.
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Comm1) 7 September 1830*
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Consul) 27 July 1830.
(4) G.G. in C. to Court (Sep. Gem) 31 August 1830.
(5) G.G. in C. to Court (Pub* Gen.) 22 September 1830. The first
foundry was set up by Jessop & Co*
(6) G.G. in C. to Court (Judicial) 9 November 1830*
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and preferred sale of indigo plants in the open market. Others
admitted the dubious nature of the contract — "Insufficiently
defined, and generally extremely unfair to the ryot, rendering
him in fact a slave to the establishment with which he was once
engaged"- *and the inaccessibility of Judicial remedy against
oppression. But still they proposed that, if European ownership
of land was not to be obtained on the planters’ terms, specific
(1 )
performance should be. Regulation V of 1830 protected the 
planters against wilful evasion of cultivation by the ryots by 
applying Sec. 5 of Regulation Y U  of 1819 which ijiade the latter 
liable to the criminal charge of misdemeanour and the penalty 
of imprisonment, oa? rejigging) ta» ced&isvabe
besides forcing them to cultivate. There was a provision for 
release of the ryots frcm contracts when no balance accrued but 
it imposed on them the burden of a civil suit when the planters 
refused to agree to this, judgnent. In the name of a fair and open 
competition the Regulation made the ryot a prey to the perpetual 
fear of criminal prosecution and more amenable o to the harsh conditions 
of the contract*
The planters, It must be admitted, succeeded in getting the 
support of the enlightened middle class opinion represented by as 
great names, as Rammohun Roy and Dwarkanath Tagore. Tagore, once
(1) Judicial Consultations 9 June 1830 No. 1 to No. 32#
"the Head Dewan of the Opima and Salt Department, was now a big;
a)
zemindar, himself owning several indigo factories* He testified
to the benefits conferred by the European planters on the country
in a public meeting. "....I have found”, said Tagore,"that the
cultivation of indigo, and the residence of Europeans, have
considerably benefited the community at large: the zemindars
becoming wealthy and prosperous; the ryots materially improved in
their condition, and possessing many more comforts than the
generality of my country men, where indigo cultivation and manufacture
are not carried on....” Rammohun added that in his travels
through Bengal he had found "the natives residing in the neighbourhood
of indigo plantations evidently better clothed and better
conditioned than those who lived at a distance from such stations.**
on the whole, they have performed more good to the generality of
the natives of this country than by other class of Europeans,
(2)
whether in or out of the service. The reports of the
magistrates in answer to the Circular of the Government also spohe 
highly of 119 European proprietors and 354 European assistants in
(3)
899 factories in the Bengal Presidency except in one or two cases*
Most of the evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Lords 
1830 and the Select Committee of the House of Commons 1830-31 were
/v  >jo\JT
(1) Alexanders East India Magazine, February 1831. pp. 211-12*
(2) Quoted in "Conduct of Europeans in India" - App. Y to Report of
S.C.H.C* 1832 No. 77 See Samaehardarpan 19 December 1829 
(6 Pans 12364*
(3) Return of Judicial Department 1 June 1830 op.cit*
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special pleas for the planters*
The Board and the Court, however, were far from convinced*
Xn the paper on "Conduct of Europeans in India", drawn up by the 
Board, we find none of these assurances. Wages of labour had not 
increased much* The conditions of the ryots had specially
(2)
deteriorated after the commencement of the indigo bocan in 1824*
So far as the benefit derived from a large investment of capital
was concerned, it must be decided first whether such capital was
imported into the country or raised from the land thereby
suppressing investment of native capital* Against the opinions of
(3)
Rammohun and Dwarkanath it pitted the objections of other Indians 
and even challenged the certificates of the magistrates as prejudiced.
All the benefit was reaped by the agency houses which lent planters 
money at 10 to 12%, besides exacting a commission of 2^% on advances 
and 2% on sale, and the gomasthas of the planters who, in most cases, 
were the actual oppressors. The zemindars often enjoyed higher 
rents from the lands sown with indigo - a fact which might have
brought Rammohun and Dwarkanath to the defence*______________________
(1) Evidence before S.C.H.C. 1813 put it at 3s to 6s per month. The
petition of the planters from Jessore 16 March 1829 put it at 
5s to 8s* per month. Also Langford Kennedy’s evidence before 
S.C.H.C. 1832 Q. 1203*
(2) Evidence of Andrew Ramsay before S.C.H.L* 1830. Q. 3520 et seq*
(3) A great controversy over this question was feoing on between the
Samacher Chundrika of Bhabani Charan Bandyopadhyayn on the one
hand and the Calcutta Journal, the Asiatic Magazine, the Calcutta
Monthly Journal, the Sambad Kaumndi, and the Banga Duta. The
last two papers supported introduction of European capital. The
Sama chctrdarpon of the Seram pore mission kept alodf from the controversy.
(4) Bracken’s evidence before S.C.H.C. 1830-31 Q* 178*
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Moved by these considerations the Court strongly criticised
the Bengal Government for passing Regulation Y of 1830 which gave
protection to one side and amounted to dispensing with the ordinary
course of law in favour of the planters. "Yfe cannot," the Court
observed, "sanction any legislative measure which appears ••♦•♦not
to extend equal protection to all" and, rescinded the offensive
clauses. In reply to Bentinch’s apologia for relief measures the
Court asserted that these bad created in the nerchants "a habit of
dependence on the Government." Questioning the propriety of
lending so much to the Palmers and thns being "instrumental In
propping up an insolvent House", it strongly enjoined upon the
Government to let the agency houses know that It would not allow
further interferences on the Government’s part for the relief of
(X)
commercial embaras sment.
While the controversy over the Regulation Y was going on the
Government found it necessary to help the free traders in several ways.
Though it was not prepared like Metcalfe to abolish transit duties
altogether and to end the discrimination in favour of Britain and
(2)
the British flag, It exempted coal from duty, reduced tariff on
A Ytvtw C3)
Bengaleend remitted the inland duty on cotton yam. Secondly, / 
it proposed to close the 5% and 4% loans and pay off the first
instalment debt of 1823 (Ig erores) and the Political loans.
(1)n Court to C.G. in C. (Terr. Sin.) 20 July 1831. '
(2) Separate Consultation 16 March 1830 No. 1, Separate Consultation
4 May 1830 No. 1 and No. 3 to No. 5.
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Sep. Customs} 1 October 1830.
(4) G.G-. in C. to Court (Terr, f i n.) 18 February 1831 and 17 May 1331.
Gwalior loans - 50 lakhs, other Political Loans - S.R. 1,02,54,475 
and the first instalment of 5% loan — S*R. 1,50,00,000, waild throw
three crores of cash in the market.
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Bent incic wanted to send bullion to the Court instead of using; finds
for debt-redemption* Since 1829 the borne authorities were in a
dilemma over the interest bills* The Court wanted to stop private
remittance in that medium but the Board apprehended it would throw
the creditors into the arms of the agency houses* Hie Court
accepted Ellenboroughfs suggestion to reduce the exchange rate on
(2)
interest bills to Is lid and still continue the option — further 
reduction being discountenanced as injurious to the Indian loans*
The best thing the home authorities could do was to divert the loans 
to the native capitalists who held about 3^- million sterling in 1823*
A power was given to the Government to stop remittance of interest
on 5cp loans of 1823/24 and 25 and to open a loan which would provide
(3)
£1 million badly needed at heme and, if possihle, convert the 
troublesome remittance loans* When Metcalfe insisted on payment of
w
debts he had the idea of throwing cash into a depleted market*
The opening of a 4$  loan* as the Court desired, would defeat this
purpose by attracting all funds* Metcalfe opposed such a loan before
the conversion or redemption of the 3fo debt* But Bentinck was
(5)
determined that the Court must have the remittance* The loan was
(1) Colchester Papers Elleriborough Diary F*R*0* 30/9 Yol* 29, 9 July
1829*
(2) ibid Yol* 30* 18 December 1829, 7 January 1830*
(3) The Court had been suffering from the fall of exchange. Where 2
crores 40 lakhs sufficed in 1813 to meet the home charges, 3 
crores 50.lakhs were needed in 1829* The Board, rate of exchange 
added to this difficulty* ibid Yol* 29, 27 October 1829*
(4) Metcalfe to Bentinck 17 February 183X, 19 February 1831* Bentinck
Papers op.eit*
C5) G.G. in C* to Court (Terr* Fin) 20 June & 30 August 1831*
9
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opened and abort a crore was sent in 1830-31 to satisfy the
(1)
paramount needs of the Court*
The agency houses were now dependent on the Governments
purchase of indigo and private bills. Alexander 8c Co. paid off part
of their debt (S.R. 19,25,900) in bills and others availed them-
(2)
selves of this opportunity for cash* When, with the appreciation 
of indigo in the London market, the Court asked Bengal to stop
buying private bills, the latter interceded on behalf of the
(3)
Alexanders and the Court ultimately withdrew the order at the Board*s 
insistence on trying this method of ranittanee in view of the 
eventual loss of the China monopoly.
The payment of loans and purchase of bills, however, could not 
keep the agency houses on an even keel* Trade was a little better 
in 1830-31 due to a slight recovery of textiles in England* Import 
of piece goods from Britain rose and of twist and yam almost doubled* 
'Copper and iron showed the next marked improvement* But imports 
from France were halved, though there was a slight increase in exports* 
Increase of trade with America was insignificant* Imports from China 
fell by as much as 37 takha and recovery of opium caused all the rise 
in exports* Exports to Penang and Singapore declined and trade 
with Coasts and Gulfs stood still* A depression overtook England in
(1) G.G. in C* to Court (Terr* ELn.) 1 May 1832*
(2) In all S.R* 32,43,193 was advanced for private bills*
G.G* in G. to Court (Terr. ELn) 15 February 1831*
(3) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr. Hn.) 17 May 1831*
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1831 which continued until tlie Reform Bill was passed and
affected Bengal trade in 1831 and 1832* £
(1)
again* Trade with France steadied a bit but with America
feice goods and twist fell
declined a good deal# Trade with China could not maintain in 1832
the recoveiy of the earlier year, the price of opium was falling,
and trade with the Gulfs continued on the downward grade# There
was a rise in exports to the Coasts, Penang and the French islands
(2)
but trade with Burma was languishing# The decline of ship-building 
at Calcutta evidenced this marked fall of country trade#
CD Import of British cottons and metals,
Tear Cotton Cotton Cotton Mule Iron Copper Lead
piecegoods Yarn twist twist
(S.R*) (md#) (md#) (md) (md.) (md*) (md#)
L830-31 58,66,096 145? 23,958 19,715 1,73,811 94,955 19,017
L831-32 42,72,336 1952 33,031 29,002 1,53,766 85,730 23,872
1832-33 39,72,259 878 17,297 12,480 1,37,162 68,483 22,607
Bengal Commercial Reports 1830-32*
(2)
183031
1831-32
183033
CALCUTTA-WQELD (CUSTOMS HOUSE) 
(The Company and Private Trade) 
IMPORTS
Merchandise Treasure Total
S.R*
3,33,86,653 
2,80,08,155
S.R#
2,72,89,23?
2,25,61,566
1,97,30,422
S.R#
60,97,416
54,46,589
53,62,596
Merchandise
S.R*
5,08,66,033
4,67,40,502
EXPORTS 
Tre a sure Tot al
S.R* S.R*
33,11,135 5,41,77,168
1,14,46jtU  5,81,86,928
2,50,93,018 4,88,49,237 fsj4&}535 5,66,94,772
IMPOSTS
CALctrm- r^.K. 
The Company
EXPORTS
Merchandi se Treasure Merchandise Treasure
S.R# S.R* . S.R* S.R#
1830-31 59,683 1,23,28,954 X
1831-32 X X 97,20,971 73,89,815
1832-33 38,210 98,88^155
Private Trade
19,48,972
1830-21 1,97,84,811 7602 1,19,28,867 30,21,184
1831-32 1,72,27,91? X 1,18,40,413 36,42,784
1832-53 1,41,37,376 X 1,27,55,285 51,63,684
(Continued)
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Footnote (2) continued from previous page*
CALCUTTA -FRAHCE CALCUTTA-U.S. CALCUTTA-CHINA
Imports Exports Imports Exports Impcr ts Exports
S.R. S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R* S.R*
1830-31 8,73,950 27,67,076 20,26,294 22,80,344 30,21,838 1,11,91,404
1831-32 3,19,838 17,72,003 16,56,985 34,70,363 13,86,59? 1,25,60,454
1832-33 7,99,390 30,86,077 5,84,849 20,17,646 31,51,871 1,18,40,296
CALCUTTA-PENANG CALCUTTA*-GULFS CALCUTTA-C 0R0MAKDEL
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R, S.R. S.R. S.R* S.R. S.R.
1830-31 31,29,12? 27,70,189 8,36,859 21,01,011 5,98,682 9,40,489
1831-30 20,83,007 21,11,013 9,56,733 16,18,855 24,97,637 6,58,367
1833^33 23,45,069 30,92,705 3,65,469 9,32,632 10,03,89? 13,42,428
CALCUTTA-MALABAR C ALCUT TA-PEGCT CALCUTTA-J1AURITIUS
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
S.R* S .R. S.R* S.R* S.R. S.R*
1830-31 ' 6,48,989 16,53,066 13,87,454 13,85,348 1,65,919 11,08,992
1831-30 6,30,137 13,39,529 6,98,904 8,11,097 1,16,826 9,68,960
1832-30 8,08,193 18,53,823 14,08,732 8,65,06? 1,54,440 15,13,152
(& C^ rT’Yv*rnj2/x-<M-cut OY kj
The Canton price of Patna opium had fallen in June 1830 to 860-800 
dollars per chest;, of Benares opium to 920 - 750 dollars and of 
Malwa opium to 535 - 520 dollars* Sep. Consult* 23 October 1830 Eo* 8*
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Only 136 tons of shipping were buijt in 1852 when an average of
CD
5000 tons were built between 1814-22. The private traders were
once more thrown on indigo as the Company outbid them in sugar,
(2)
cotton and silk#
The fall of the agency houses: This produced the final crisis of
the agency houses in 1832# Fall of indigo production in 1830 had 
caused a speculative rise of prices in 1831# But. abundant harvests 
were gathered in the next two years and prices declined# Scott 
& Co* stopped payment* Alexander & Co., already affected by the 
failure of the Palmers, were hard hit* They had received a loan
(1) DECLINE OF SHIP-BUILDING IN CALCUTTA
Year Tonnage built Year Tonnage built Year Tonnage built
1823 1167 1827 820 1831 1605
1824 2375 1828 1195 1832 136
1825 1818 1829 727
1826 2172 1830 929
John Phipps History of Ship-building in Calcutta op*cit*
(2) COMPARISON OF IIXPORTS 
by Company and Private Traders
Year
1829
1830
1831
1832
INDIGO '{Fact, mds*) 
Camp* Ft.
36,093 96,162
18,018 1,08,538
23,933- 95,118
24,044 1,06,972
SUGAR
Comp*
1,56,672
1,37,939
85,041
1,19,778
[Baz* mds*) 
P*t*
2,45,815
1,29,233
1,23,287
1,09,569
6
COTTON (Baz*mds*) SILK (tAaz*mds*)
Comp* P*t* Camp# P*t.
1829 1,39,487 1,029 12,447 4,108
1830 1,28,026 57,797 14,517 2,923
1831 1,01,117 44,786 8,703 4,234
1832 1,20,559 6,384 8,924 3,516
aX CoryxmtAsCioU. .
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frcm the Government in 1830 on mortgaging 27 of* their 56 indigo concerns,
(I)
sugar and saltpetre factories and- collieries# As their loans 
were not yet paid off they could not lay hands on these properties#
They began to withdraw their baht notes and tried to sell the 
remaining houses and factories# But the continuous fall of indigo 
prices overtook them, bringing down the value of these concerns
C2)
and making realization of assets all but ruinous# The Governments
policy of debt redemption afforded sane help and the Bank of Bengal
(3)
some accomodation* This proved unequal to the demands# The
Alexanders failed on 12 December 1832. inspite of an excess of assets
over liabilities* The turn of Mackintosh & Go* came next on
(5)
5 January 1833 after they tried to stem a run for a fortnight*
The Alexanders and the Mackintoshes had a large clientele among the
Company’s civil and military servants and when their head offices
in London stopped payment, the distress spread to England* The
Court was appealed to for an order on the Bengal Government
withdrawing its earlier prohibition on advances to th® msrc&atile
(6) I
community but the Court, turned a deaf ear* Colvins closed their
(1} See Financ»lSa3®Bft Letters and Enclosures Received 1833* I#0.Vol*36jfi^ HM3
(2) G#G# in C* to Court (Terr* Jin,) 27'March 1832*
(3) G.G* in C* to Court (Terr. Fin*) 31 July 1832*
(4) Assets - 494 lakhs after a deduction of 60^ fo due to fall of
prices 
Debts - 344 lakhs*
See Alexander’s East India Magazine Yol* Y, pp* 1-16.
(5) Assets - 250 lakhs
Debts - 237 lakhs. ibid Yol. VI* p* 76*
(6) AUber to Bentinck 12 January, 20 April and 11 May 1833. Bentinck
Papers op.cit*
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(1)
doors in. April# Of the big six only the Fergussons and the 
Cruttendens remained - t ottering under increasing- pressure of with­
drawals#
Bentinck came forward once more as the ^ Saviour of the agency
houses# They had appealed t.o him on IQ April for financial
assistance so that the present concerns could be carried on# It was
idle, they said, to expect capital frcm England# PalmerTs assignees
had abandoned 17 concerns for lack of capital and Alexander*s assignees
had been unable to dispose of a single factory# The scarcity of
capital was felt even by the native zemindars who dabbled in indigo
and by those who plied internal trade# \7hile the Company exported
bullion, the 4'■$ loans were reabsorbing the cash paid for 5fo loans#
The decline of the export trade had seriously affected internal trade
and the native capital, invested in internal trade, was being diverted
(2)
to the Government loans# Bentinck resolved ♦ ♦.#*. *to. avert if 
possible, and next to stay and thereby to moderate the dreadful
(1) Net assets - 47,15,000
Net debts - 1,02,90,000* Alexander*s East India Magazine
Yol# VI, p# 485#
(2) CALCUTTA - INTERIOR
IMPORTS EXPORTS
by land by land
Co*s# Danihions Beyond Co*s# dominions Beyond
S.R# S.R# S.R# S.R#
1825 5,64,74,023 16,20,189 1,89,37,742 7,948
1826 4,93,19,756 20,34,687 1,28,51,008 39,152
1827 5,25,33,594 14,56,640 1,60,03,265 6,37,087
1828 5,18,40,909 14,89,037 1,36,56,972 4,25,845
1829 5,04,62,181 14,32,961 1,26,34,239 3,00,507
1830 5,19,20,084 4,13,386 1,15,52,072 4,28,174
1831 4,76,91,571 1,39,795 1,08,93,391 3,93,356
1832 4,94,49,317 4,19,720 1,17,16,678 4,42,411
Bengal Commercial Reports I825-I832#
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calamity of sudden ruin to all tlie great private and public interests
still remaining," knowing full well that ha incurred a heavy
(1)
responsibility* True it was that "the difficulty is created by
the system of combining in the same persons, the operations of agency
(2)
and trading," but more responsibility belonged to the Company’s
monopoly# "Erom this great parent monopoly have succeeded others -
first, that of the military and civil services, whose savings made a
large disposeable capital# This large disposeable capital begot
the agency houses, and gave them, with the aid of the restrictive
system, as complete a monopoly of the floating money of the country
as that possessed of the Revenues by the East India Company itself*"
Now that a monstrous fabric had been built on it, it should not be
allowed to fall suddenly and sweep away in its vast destructive
course the fortunes of thousands of individuals# Its doom was
already sealed# "There is an end to the system and in giving
them our present support, there is no fear that any of the evils
aimed at in the prohibitory orders of the Court will be perpetuated##•
The only thing at present was to gain time for the old houses to
save themselves and the new houses to cane with fresh capital
(3)
from England and build anew on a surer foundation*" Despite the 
opposition of Metcalfe and Ross the Government resolved to give
(1) Bentinck to Auber 7 May 1833. Bentinck Papers op.cit*
(2) Court to G.G# in C* (Terr* Bln#} 20 July 1851#
(3) Bentinck’s Minute 15 April 1833. Bentinck P^ers op.cit.
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CD
thirty lakhs in loans# Private hills were bought to the extent
of S.R# 57,04,975, by way of remittance to the Court as payment
(2)
of territory’s debt to commerce# But the evil could not be
averted. Failure of the Fergussons in December 1833 and the
Crittendens in Ternary 1834 rang down the curtain on the chequered
history of the old agency system in Bengal* "The failure of the
(3)
Fairlie’s House in London finished the catastrophe#”
The Charter negotiations and the manufacturing interest: Out of the
ruins of these agency houses a new Organization of European Capitalist 
enterprise arose - the managing agency system - which ushered in 
the industrial development, of India and with it a new age# This was 
made possible by the Charter Act of 1833, negotiations on which began 
as early as 1828# In the background of these discussions was the 
opposition of the free traders and the manufacturers to the
(1) G.G# in C* to Court (Terr# Bin#) 23 April 1833# 15 lakhs to
Fergusson & Co# and 9 lakhs to Cruttenden & Mackillop. The
Colvins failed before the decision to lend them 6 lakh3.
(2) G.G. in C. to Court (Terr# Fin*} 17 June and 30 December 1833#
(3) Bentinck to Attber - 7 December 1833 and 17 January 1834# Bentinck
Papers op.cit* The London Times computed the list of debts in 
the following way:
Palmer & Co* Calcutta - £ 5 millions
Alexander & Co* ” - £ si millions
Mackintosh & Co. " - £ 2f millions
Colvin & Co* a — £ I yruiUms,
£6. London — £ 1,800,000.
& Ferguson & Co. ”
Richard Mackintosh
& Co# London - £ 950,000.
Michael Greenberg# op#cit# p# 165# .
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remittance trade from India and the China monopoly* focussed in 
the evidence before the Parliamentary Select Committees of 1830,
1831 and 1833, and further in the background was the continuous 
trade-depression since 1826.
In this public agitation against the Company the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce took the lead. In 1827 a Committee of the.
Chamber expressed its concern about the future of textile manufacture 
in view of the rapid development of rival manufactures in Europe 
and the U.S: n...we are now beginning to find out great capital
and means of production of goods cramped for want of more extensive 
markets. The vast fields for commercial enterprise which the East 
Indies offer to us...would assuredly make up for the falling 
away from all our former customers and give full employment to
CD
our redundant capital and dense population.” The Act of 1823
(4 Geo IT C. 80), which allowed trade with the East Indies, was not
enough. The expansion of textile industry in 1824-25 had increased
production beyond the limited capacity of consumption of these
islands and with China closed as before, there was little likelihood:
of a profitable return. Moreover for the same capital and labour
much greater quantity was being produced and at far less cost#
(2)
By 1830 the English yam had gone far to beat the Indian yam._________
(1) Proceedings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. Vol. II. 25
April 1827. Quoted in Michael Greenberg op.cit. p. 181. See also 
Arthur Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade 1794-1858, 
Manchester University Press 1934.
(2) No. of Yam Cost of English Yam per lb. Cost of Indian Yam per lb.
1812 1830 1830
40 2s 6d 13 2gd 3s 7d
80 4s 4d 2s 6§ct 9s 3d
120 6s 4s 16s. 5d.
200 20s. 14s.6d. 45s. Id.
See E. Baines The History of the Cotton Manufacture,' op.cit.
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For a moderate profit larger exports were neessary and consequently 
extended markets.
The Hike of Wellington, we have seen, was in favour of the 
status quo though Ellenborough contemplated the end of^China 
monopoly and taking over the Indian administration by the Crown.
There were two great problems to be solved before a final decision 
could be made - to balance the Indian budget and to ensure a 
regular remittance from surplus Indian revenue of an annual sum of 
£3 millions for payment of the home charges. In reply to tha 
prevailing contention that the Company did not secure a profitable 
remittance through trade, the Court pointed out its difficulties
a rk
consisting ofAfall of exchange, imposition t f  the Board rate and
private competition since 1813. It referred to the effects of vu
speculative growth of private imports on the limited resources of
India, unable to return annually £3 million on account of tha
Government, £1 million on account of private fortunes and £4 millions
(1)
on account of the free traders. Monopoly of China trade was its only
guarantee for dividend and the source of meeting the chronic deficit
(2)
of Indian revenue. Ellenborou^L showed that the private traders 
or remitters could not be blamed as the former had been suffering frcm 
depression and the latter had invested largely in India debt and 
inspite of the Company getting the major share of trade in recent
(1) Chairs to Ellenborough. 4 September 1829. Bentinck Papers op.cit.
(2) Memorandum of an interview with the Duke of Wellington and
Ellenborough, 12 October 1830,see I.O.Charters Vol. 19. p. ii.
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years neither the exchange had risen nor any appreciable profit had
(1) 
emerged.
The manufacturing class was not prepared to let the controversy
rest. On 27 April 1829 a permanent East India Trade Committee
was set up at Manchester and it decided to collaborate with the-
Liverpool East India and China Trade Association. In freeing China
trade the Liverpool importers of tea were more directly interested.
Deputies of other manufacturing towns like Glasgow, Bristol,
Birmingham and Leeds were invited to a meeting on 15 May 1829 where
it was decided to send a United Deputation to the Government and to
(2)
lobby the IJarli ament. As a result Select Gammittees of both Houses
of Parliament were set up in 1830. The time for the enquiry
approached and a steady pressure of petitions, memorials, deputations
and pamphlets was built up by the manufacturing class while the
United Deputation became active in producing evidence before the
(3)
Select Committees.
Though the Company*s statement of the price of teas somewhat
(4)
injured its case, the Select Committees of 1830 came out with
(5)
favourable reports. JUrther depressioh, however, galvinised the
(1) Ellenborough to Chairs 13 October 1829. Bentinck Papers op.cit.
(2) Proceedings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce Vol. IX,
8 February 1830. See Michael Greenberg, op.cit. p. 182.
(3) ibid. 13 and 26 liarch 1830. Of the prominent witnesses J.
Crawfurd was the London publicity manager of the Calcutta agents, 
T .  Rickards belonged to Rickards, Mackintosh 8c Co., the London 
office of Mackintosh 8c Co. of Calcutta and Bracken was a partner 
of Alexander 8c Co.
(4) Ellenborough*s Political Diary op.cit. Vol. II p. 219 3 April 1830.
(5) Auber to Bentinck 17 June 1830. Bentinck Papers op.cit.
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agitation of the manufacturing class in 1831 and 1832 and the 
evidence produced before the Select Coimnittees of the House of 
Commons in those years was more hostile. Some caaplained of the
.a)
Company's trade in indigo and cotton which raised the price
(2)
without heing profitable. Some attacked the Company*s silk
(3)
policy which made private investment impossible but brought little
(4)
remittance and even charged the Residents with violent destruction
(5)
of private filatures. Holt Mackenzie testified to the feasibility
(6)
of remittance through private bills, and the private traders
(7)
pressed for it. One witness condemned the whole financial policy 
(8)
of the Company, particularly its opposition to commercial banking
which cramped credit and its debt management which caused
unseasonable abundance and scarcity of capital. The customs policy
(9)
was criticised by Holt Mackenzie and salt monopoly was declared
(1) G.G. Larpent's evidence before S.G.H.C. 1832, II Fin. Q.1976 et seq
(2) Walter Simons's evidence before S.C.H.C. 1832, II Fin. Q, 1027
and Q. 1038.
(3) Bracken*s evidence before S.C.H.C. 1830-31. Q. 65, Q. 74,
Matthew Gisborne Q. 1147.
(4) First Appendix to Third Report S.C.H.C. 1831 No. 23.
(5) Joshua Saunders's evidence before S.C.H.C. 1830-31. Q. 1998 et set
Q. 2022—23. a n Fin •
(6) Holt Mackenzie's evidence before S.C.H.C. 1832AQ, 233-301, 306 & 309
(7) Robert Rickards*s evidence before S.C.H.C. 1831. Q. 2855-60; John
Crawfurd*s evidence before S.C.H.C. 1830-31 - Q,. 1850-52;
Peter Gordon ibid. 0v 2212-2350; Horsley Palmer*s evidence 
before S.C.H.C.,1832aqV 1282 - 1447 and Rothschild's evidence 
ibid. Q. 2488 - 2498.
(8) Peter Gordon's evidence before S.C.H.C. 1830-31 Q. 2142, 2160,
2180 et seq.
(9) Holt Mackenzie's evidence before S.C.H.C. IH Rev. Q,. 938 et seq.
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inimical to trade of Liverpool and Bristol besides being- productive
CD
of inhuman oppression of the molunghees and heavy taxation on the 
(2}
natives# Thomas Langfcon, a Liverpool merchant, challenged the
whole basis of the Company's claim to repayment of the territory's
(3)
debt to commerce# Commerce, according to him, was responsible
for the origin of the India debt which the Company was fraudulently
trying to foist on Indian revenues# Rajah Rammohun Roy's evidence
before the Select Committee of the House of Commons 1831 added
(4)
considerable weight to the sentiments of these witnesses while the
failure of the Calcutta houses brought a note of tragic urgency for
reorganisation of the whole commercial and financial basis of the
Indo-British trade#
Besides manipulating evidence before the parliament, the
manufacturing class tried to influence the opinion of the Board of
(5)
Control# The Manchester Chamber of Commerce anphasized the import of 
large cotton supplies from India which was possible only through the 
introduction of European skill and capital# The Glasgow Chamber of
(1) H# St# G# Tucker's evidence before S.C*H#C# 1832 III Rev# Q# 517,
Alex Reid's evidence ibid# Q# 652 et seq#
(2) Sir Charles Forbes's evidence ibid Q# 2425#
(3} Thomas Langton's evidence before S.C.H.C# 1831* Q# 2863-2970,
Q# 4796 - 4822, Q,. 4855-4912#
(4) Rammohun Roy's evidence before S.C.H.C* 1831 Q. 48-49, Auber
in a letter to Bentinck says that Raimnohun fell under the 
influence of *F. Crawfurd#
(5) Answers to Queries proposed by the Board of Control, upon
subjects relating to trade with India.App* to Report of 
S.C.H.C. 1832, II Fin. Com# No# 4#
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Cammsrce wanted reduction of duty on salt# The Liverpool East 
India Committee required better communication in India to facilitate 
movement of raw materials* Langton demanded introduction of a 
uniform currency, Rickards — substantial banking houses and most 
interesting of all, Dr. Wallich tried to rouse the Board t o  the
CD
possibility of cultivation of tea in the foothills of the Himalayas.
With the assumption of office by the Whigs in November 1830
the second stage of the negotiations over the Charter began. Charles
Grant, the new President of the Board of ControlJ. proposed that the
Company should retain administration of India on the conditions that
its China monopoly should cease, that it gave up all commercial
interests and assets, that an annuity of £630,000 be granted to the
proprietors, chargeable on the territorial revenue and not
redeemable before a certain year and then, at the option of the
parliament, redeemable by payment of £100 for every £5 5s. of
(2)
annuity# When the Chairman replied that the China monopoly
was not only a channel of Indian remittance but afforded direct aid to
the territory and that there was little hope of Indian revenue paying
(3)
the annuity, Grant spoke against "the exclusion...of the nation at 
large from a particular mart of trade, and especially from one so 
situated as China.” This was specially true when the country trade
(1) App. to Report of S.C.H.C. 1832 II Fin. Com. Ho. 21#
(2) Paper of Hints shown by Grant at a meeting of Chaiman, Lord
Grey and Charles Grant. 10 December 1832. 1*0.Charters. 19 pp. 3-4. 
£3) Committee of Correspondence 2 January 1833 ibid pp. 6-7.
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had superseded the Company* s trade and the Americans were beating
(1)
them* Surplus commercial profits might help meet the Indian
deficiency but they arose from a tax on home consumption of tea
and the Company's claims on the territory were at best doubtful#
Grant even indirectly threatened to hold an enquiry into the origin,
nature and growth of the territorial debt and commercial capital in
£2 )
order to force the Company to a compromise# 
a rfut
Convinced their trade would go,,the Chairs were still afraid that 
^ ,
the plan tried "to convert the Court into a Government Board" and they 
wanted a collateral security for payment of dividend in the shape of 
a sinking fund based on investment of a portion of the Company*s
(3)
commercial. ^ sets in Consols# The President assured status quo in 
all material points but declined a right of appeal t o a third party 
or inclusion of an express provision of reference to the parliament 
in case of dispute# For collateral security of canmercial capital 
he proposed that £1,200,000 be taken out of the commercial assets 
and invested in Consols to form with interest a guarantee fund until 
it reached £12 millions*
Ravenshaw, the outgoing Chairman, and the private trade 
interest in the Court never put up any show of struggle with the 
Government or answered vigorously to the campaign of calumny going 
qh in the public or before the Select Committees# They prayed instead
(1) Charles Grant to Chairs 12 February 1833 J 4^ # f * MarSt,
(2) ibid pp# 3&-4G*
(3) Chairs to Charles Grant 27 February 1835 ibid pp* 77 et seq#
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for a longer term for payment of annuity and a higher rate of 
(1)redemption* Henry St. George Tucker dissented frcm this
pusillanimous attitude before rtMr* Grant*s menace of confiscation*
A {^rL
and asked forAContinuation of trade esssl silk and control of the
A £2)
conduct of the private traders in Canton* The election of a new
Chairman, Campbell Mar j crib ahks, in Apiil 1833 set a new tone to
the negotiations* The General Court demanded that the sum set
apart for the guarantee fund should be sufficient in 40 years to equal
the aim able to redeem “the annuity, that the Company should have the
administration of India for not less than 20 yearp, that all measures
involving direct or contingent expenses should originate with the
Court and the Company should have powers of check by a system of
(3)
publicity to the parliament#
SurprisingLy enough Cla ries Grant reacted more meekly than 
before* He agreed to increase the guarantee fund to 2 millions, to 
apply it as security for dividend as well as capital, to give the 
foimer a legal priority to all territorial payments in England, to. 
empower the Court to borrow for that purpose, if necessary and to 
withdraw the Board*s proposed veto on recall of the Governor General, 
the Governors of the Commander in Chief* He was also prepared to 
discuss any practicable expedient- about publicity to the parliament*
On 7 June the Secret Court surrendered, and on 10 June the General
(1) Chairman to President of India Board 18 March 1833 ibid p. 96*
(2) HI St. George Tuckers dissent* 30 March 1833* ibid pp* 114, 117
et seq* „
(3) Resolution of the General Court 25 April 1833 ibid pp* 178-79.
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Courfc concurred* In July Grant ordered the Court to send no more 
ships to India and China, nor proceed with any more contracts 
except silk: up to 1834* The East India Company had came to an 
end as the mightiest trading organisation of history*
Tha Charter of 1833: The Charter Act of 1835 was more a confirmation
of the political and economic tendencies in operation than an 
innovation of jtrinciple or policy* As Macaulay, who played a 
dominant role in drafting and piloting the bill, pointed out - it 
was a compromise: ”1 will not in a case in which I have neither
principle nor precedents to guide me, pull down the existing system*••
CD
which is sanctioned by experience*” Once the parliaments supreme 
authority was announced and the Board’s control made conclusive, the 
Company could go on with administration of India for which it had 
been justly praised by the Select Committees. The Board had 
assumed a firmer control of the Court before the Charter Act 
formalised it* The nomination of the Governors General^  had virtually 
passed to the Board. The Directors were in danger of losing even 
their privilege of exercising a veto on the Government’s nominations* 
This was an anomaly and the Charter Act retained it. Either it 
should have openly reduced the Court to the status of an advisory 
Committee or given it the character of a constitutional check on 
the actions of the Board, generally ignorant of Indian affairs and 
liable to be swept away by party and political expediency* Moreover,
(1) Pari* Hist. Third Series Vol. XIX p* 504*
-451-
as Wynn very sensibly showed, the Court, now more amendble to* the 
City interest, would loose its roots in Indian experience and be 
unfit to impart impartial advice to the Board on what would be
(D
beneficial or practical in the actual circumstances in India*
The powers of the Governor General were increased as the men on 
the spot wanted them to be but it was a great blunder to encumber 
him, as before, with the Governorship of the vast and unwieldy 
Bengal Presidency. The Court made only one gain and.that by the 
back door. Though the principle of open competitive examination 
was recognised as the basis of appointment of civil servants, the 
Court inveighed the Board into allowing it to retain patronage as 
before*
So far as trade was concerned the Charter of 1853 took
away what the Company would have soon lost* It was conducting
a fast-losing trade for the sake of remittance* Profit on Indian
trade had ceased since 1819 and the growing loss on it reduced the
total turnover from India and China from an average of £1,525,799
between 1814 to 1818 to £625,910 between 1824 and 1828* The
Company had ceased to export merchandise to India since 1824—25 and the
amount of investment, considerable even during the Burma Wars, was
(2 )
unable by 1830 to meet the home charges* Piece goods now 
consisted of silk bandannoes, precarious in the face of the Prench
(1) Pari. Hist* Third Series Vol. XVIII, p* 741.
(2) Court to G.G. in C. (Terr. PLn.J 19 August 1829;.
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competition; cotton trade with China was fluctuating; sug^ ir had 
been discontinued since 1832, and indigo, for some years one of 
the two chief modes of public remittance, was left to the private 
traders* By 1833 Bengal silk alone remained in the Company’s 
hands* Pram. China too tea was the only article exported on the 
Company’s account, nankins having been discontinued since 1822 and 
silk since 1824* The Act of 1833 thus consummated the process 
of gradual decline by taking away the exclusive tea trade, already 
seriously challenged by the Americans, and the semi-exclusive silk 
trade, which in view of the new liberal regulation would not have 
with-stood private competition for long*
The Company got on the whole a fair deal by the financial 
provisions of the Charter. By the Act of 1813 the Company was 
required to apply its surplus commercial profits to the reduction of 
debt and had done so to the extent of about £5 millions by 1828-29.
The provision for repayment in India of advances made in England 
from commerce to territory had not succeeded in its object* By 
30 April 1829 the territory, in the Court’s view, owed a net balance 
of £3,036,578 to comnerce which would be further increased by a 
dormant claim of £53,616,113 (without interest) on account of wars, 
which preceded the acquisition of the Diwani* Further, the Court 
wanted to count the home bond debt of £3,600,000 as a territorial 
charge. No doubt these claims were hotly disputed by the pro-free trade 
witnesses before the. Select Committee of the House of Commnns 1831*
—4 3 5 -
Even an extreme yiew had been taken which made commerce responsible
(1)
for the whole of the Indian territorial debt* Like its predecessor 
of 1810-12 the Select Committee of the House of Commons 1832 was unable 
to judge between the parties because of lack of evidence# It was 
almost impossible to establish these doubtful and dormant claims
against the opposition of the free traders and even of the Board* The
Charter of 1833 cut through them# It recognised the territorial debts
(2)
and charged them on the Indian revenues* It provided for a dividend 
of secured on the same revenues and a guarantee fund of £2
millions, rising to £12 millions, which had precedence over all territorial 
charges* It also provided for redemption of capital at 2 to 1 not before 
the end of 40 years, which was similarly secured by the guarantee fund# 
There was no longer the uncertainty of remittance from India, nor the 
anxiety over fluctuations in the home and foreign markets - the Court 
could borrow frcm the guarantee fund to make good the dividend and the 
India Government had to send a remittance for repayment at the earliest*
The Company did not know whether it would have at the end of its 
commercial career any assets left to divide* The commercial property 
was valued at £21,668,510 on 1 May 1829 but more than 54/j of it 
consisted of goods aid merchandise, which might have realised far less
A CerpvSUteet
if sold all at once, and the rest o^f debt due by the territorial branch,
which was disputed, or floating and dead stock - recoverable with loss
(1) Thomas Langton’s evidence before S.C*H#C* 1851 op*cit*
(2) The quest ion'eSfe India debt was very important to the Europeans#
The S.C.H.C/1832 states in its Report that, of the Registered 
India Debt amounting on 23 May 1831 to £30,774,092, the natives 
held £7,860,102 and the Europeans £22,913,990#
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if at all# It was far wiser to close with a prospect of £200 for 
every £100 after enjoying for 40 long years an absolutely sure 
dividend of I0|$ and a relatively untrammeled pat rone, ge* Moreover, 
the salt and the opium monopolies were intact* The best of the
A
utilitarians - Mill and Mackenzie - fought hard for them and Tucker, 
a vehement opponent, could not suggest a,substitute*
There were two important innovations in the Act, one granting 
the Europeans right to own land and the other asserting that no.; 
native should by any reason of religion, place of birth, descent, 
colour etc* be disabled from holding any place, office or employment 
under the Company* The former was accompanied with relaxation of 
the licence laws* No licence was required to get into the Company’s 
territory or to proceed into its interior provided people, arriving 
from outside, made known their names to the responsible officers* 
Licence would be required for residing in c ertain parts of the 
territory, not mentioned before, but could not be revoked except in 
accordance with its terms and the Governor General in Council with 
the Court’s consent might open other parts of India* These two
A UJVtL ^ 14
clauses, however,^more declaratory In character than^often assumed#
European ownership of land had already been allowedby Amherst and
liberally extended by Bentinck. In fact this clause came^under the
(i)
attack of the free traders as falling short of expectations* The
employment of natives a&ain was an accomplished fact to which the
(1) Comments on the E.I* Company’s Bill. Alexander’s East India 
Magazine Vol* VI pp* 209-218*
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the Charter gave the parliamentary blessing#
The Charter of 1833, therefore, is not. important for its 
direct but its indirect consequences* By ending the remittance trade 
and the China monopoly of the Company it opened India to the full 
impact of the Industrial Revolution* The free traders, now more 
assured of obtaining profitable returns either from India or 
circuitously through China, could import more and more of British 
manufactures* The Indian piece goods were now driven out of the native 
market and the rapid increase of British twist and yarn carried the 
war into every village home where from time immemorial cotton was 
spun as a subsidiary employment and a protection against the
u)
vagaries of the season* Recognition of the Europeans’ right to
own land led to the introduction of the plantation system, when the
tea plant was discovered in Assam and the Himalayan foothills by
(2)
Lt* Charlton and Captain Jenkins in 1833* The mining of Bengal 
coal, already started by Alexander & Co*, could be further extended 
with the development of industry and transport* The establishment 
of cotton, twist, rice and flour mills near Calcutta had led to the 
establishment of foundries which could be enlarged into a 
metallurgical industry* Industrial development necessitated a new
system of communication* Steam navigation, introduced under the
(3)
Government auspices in the mid-twenties, was put on a sound basis
(1) The Samachardarpan 5 January 1828 ( 22 Paus 1234) A letter from a
Spinner (Santipore) to the Editor*
(2) Dr* Wallich to Bentinck 4 January 1834* Bentinck Papers op*cit*
(3) G.A* Prinsep, Account of Steam vessels in India, Govt* Gazette
Press, Calcutta 1830* The Diana, the first, steam vessel built 
in Calcutta left KydTs Yard in 1823.
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by the creation of the Hew Bengal Steam SUncL on 22 June 1833 and the 
River Indus Steain Navigation Company* Though, the first railway 
would be laid in the time of Dalhousie, the Government was deliberating
CD
as early as 1828 on its comparative advantages over inland navigation* 
Creation of a national market was assured when transit duties were
(2)
abolished in 1835, as a result of Charles Trevelyan’s famous report*
The agency house whieh had played such a checkered role in the growth
of early British capitalism in India, gave way to a new type of
organization - the managing agency system* It depended no more on the
savings of the Company’s servants or on loans from the native shroffs,
on the limited accomodation offered by a single Chartered bank or on
occasional charity of a sympathetic Government* It could rely on
free import of surplus capital of England and larger and cheaper
banking facilities symbolised in the Union Bank which got a Charter
(3)
In 1835* It was as^culmination of this process that the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce was founded on 31 March 1834 - Tlto receive and
A  Of
collect information on all matters^mercantile interest, bearing upon 
the removal of evils, the redress of grievances, and the promotion of 
common good* To communicate with authorities and with individual parties
(1) H.T. Pripsep»s note of 31 July
(2 ) Charles Trevelyan submitted his first Report on the ’obstructions
that exist frcm our present system of Custom House Chokees to 
the navigation of the Jumna and the Ganges etc*’ as early as 
1 September 1832* See Bengal Separate Consultations, 6 November 
1832* No* 5 No* 9*
(3) It was founded in 1829* The Samachardarpan 22 August 1829*
(7 Bhadra 1236)*
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(1)
therefor ***" The Chamber would be the symbol and spearhead of 
European capital in India in the coming age of enterprise#
Among the subscribers of the Chamber were the names of three 
Indians - Dwarkanath Jagore, Prasanna Kumar Tagore and Rustamjee 
Cowasjee* Dwarkanath was also a director of the Union Bank, the 
founder of Carr, Tagore & Co and a director of the Calcutta Steam 
Tug Association* He was the first Bengalee entrepreneur in the strict 
sense of the term and one of the earliest examples of the native 
bourgeoisie breaking out of their circumscribed origin in the 
Permanent Settlement and public service. He was a zemindar and before 
that, the Head Dewan of the Company’s Salt and Opium Department*
Not content with his provincial pasture or his peaceful pension he 
held out for the new spirit of enterprize* With, justifiable pride 
he wrote about the Carr and Tagore Company to Lord Bentinck,. **nIt 
is so far a remarkable one in the ccmmercial history of Bengal, as 
it is the first instance in which an open and avowed partnership 
has been established between the European and the Bengal merchant 
with the capital of the latter ....instead of being left dependent 
upon those resources, which the melancholy experience of late years
(1) Bengal Pin* Consult. 19 May 1834* Mr* Geoffrey W* Tyson in his 
centenary survey of "The Bengal Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
1853-1953n (Calcutta, 1953) calls it the Calcutta Chamber of 
Commerce, though he admits that there Is "no absolutely 
indisputable proof that the parent body (of the Bengal Chamber 
of Commerce which he thinks was established in 1853) was brought 
into being as the Calcutta Chamber*, ."(p* 12) But the Financial 
Consultation, which discussed the newly founded Chamber’s 
petition, refers to it as the Bengal Chamber of Commerce#
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has proved but too precarious.” He seemed to be conscious of the
role of his kind and to articulate the first positive assertion of
the Indian capitalist that ”it will be our endeavour to merit the
most extended confidence and to take up that position in supporting:
or unfolding the productive energies of the country which may hereafter
connect our'establishment and name, in some degfee 7/ith the general
prosperity of India and encourage others to base themselves upon
the same principle of combining, as much as possible, the advantages,
at present too seldom attained, of European and native integrity,
(1)
wealth and experience*” Tagore, in fact, was responding to the 
challenge of the Industrial Revolution by way of an economic 
synthesis while his friend and fellow-reformer, Rammohptn Roy was 
responding to the challenge of Western thought and ethics by a 
cultural synthesis* While the medium of the former was partnership 
of European and native capital and enterprize, the medium of the 
latter was partnership of European and native thought (throigh 
education) and administration (through public service)* More,
Dwarkanath was interested in education and Rammohun in the introduction
(2)
of European skill and capital# Like Bentham and Ricardo in England 
Tagore and Rammohun were the precursors of a new age* One of the most 
important effects of the Charterof 1833 and its associated events was
(1) Dwarkanath Tagore to Bentinck 20 August 1834. Bentinck Papers
op.eit*
(2) See Remaifcs of Rammohun Roy on Settlement in India by Europeans#
14 July 1832* App. V. S,C*H.C* 1832, No* 76.
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the emergence not only of a middleclass but of a constructive 
middleclass ideology In India on the fulfilment or. frustration of 
which the future of the Indo-Briti sh relations depended*
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Chapter 71 
Seme Conclusions
British political and economic expansion in India, which had been
going: on since 1757, completed its formative phase by, 1833* Britain
had not only won the paramount political power in India but more
than half of Bengal*s external commerce. Taking the Customs House
valuation, she sent 56.8/16$ of Bengal*s total, imports in 1832
and received 52.8/16$ of her total exports. To this the private
British capitalist and the private British trader (often the same
person) had no doubt contributed the principal share. On 23 May
1831, the Europeans held £22,913,990 of the total India debt —
£30,’774,092 - which had grown up mainly on account of the territorial 
(1)
expansion. In 1832 private trade with the United Kingdom accounted 
for 56$ of imports and 31g$ of exports, when the Company still plied 
its remittance trade. The private trade with foreign Europe and 
America had a corresponding decline. Erom 13.9/16$ of imports and
(1) Report, S.C.H.C. 1832. Montgomery Martin gives an account for
1835 according to which out of a total debt of S.R. 27,21,68,000 
in that year the Europeans owned S.R. 20,47,95,600 and the 
natives S.R. 6,73,72,400. History of th$ Possessions of the 
Honourable East India Company Tol. II p. 145.
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15.15/16$ of exports in 1812 their share had fellen to 6$ of imports
(1)
and 9$ of exports in 1832. While in the three years ending 
1832—33 bullion worth only S.R. 1000 was imported from Britain, the 
Americans alone imported bullion worth S.R. 19,74,287. If to the 
amaint of direct trade with the United Kingdom, the amount of the 
country and coastal trade be added, the private British trader’s 
share increased greatly. The advantages of the Industrial Revolution, 
now reinforced by free trade, seemed to invest him with absolute 
control, of India*s economic destiny.
To deny that the improvement of trade between 1793 and 1833, 
mainly with Britain, beaefitted Bengal is to fly in the face of 
facts. Indian economic historians are too often obsessed with the 
decay of Indian cotton manufactures to appreciate the remarkable 
growth of trade in raw materials. Dirfct's criticism of a heavy land
tax holding up the productivity of land is not true of the
permanently settled part of the Bengal Presidency. With the growth 
of trade the value and volume of the produce of the land had increased. 
In 1795 S.R. 1,12,93,453 worth of goods were imported by land into 
Calcutta mainly for export to the foreign countries. In 1812—13 the 
imports by land had gone up to S.R. 2,79,12,927 or by 247$. Free trade
(1) Proportion of Private British and Foreign Trade
in 1832
"Value (S.R.)
IMPORTS British 2,27,18,5 £2
Foreign 16,70,264
EXPORTS British 3,52,05,734
Foreign 76,65,306
Bengal Commercial Reports 1832-33.
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wrought a further revolutionary change. In 1828 Calcutta was 
importing S.R. 5,93,29,946 worth of goods from the interior which 
fell to S.R. 4,98,69,037 in 1832 under the impact of a trade 
depression in Britain. Compared to 1795, even the lower imports 
of 1832 registered an improvement of 440$. It will not be an over­
statement to say that Bengal*s production of cash-crops had gone 
up at least twice during the span of forty years under review* 
Scarcity of specie and the consequent deflationary tendency were a 
check to. production up to: 1798. But the years between 1798 and 
1822 experienced inflation caused by foreign demand, wars and free 
trade speculation. The rise of prices naturally added a stimulus 
to production which the zemindars of the permanently settled Bengal 
were not slow to exploit*
Absolute dependence on raw materials, particularly indigo and 
silk (and opium), had its obvious, weaknesses. The decline of 
Bengal*s indigenous cotton manufacture left, the primary producers a 
helpless prey to international economic forces, unarmed before the
CD
vagaries of industrial capitalism. The depression of 1826-27 and
(1) The dependence on raw materials became most marked after 1819.
Goods imported by land into Calcutta
1819 1827 1832
S.R. S.R. S.R.
Cotton piece goods 1,26,52,685 44,14,731 18,42,532
Silk piece goods 16,86,596 4,54,828 35,94,520
Indigo 1,05,92,614 1,51,69,900 1,33,25,500
Silk 78,72,123 77,82,210 61,14,935
Cotton 40,14,883 37,41,040 28,55,097
Sugar 48,69,956 21,37,972 16,99,648
Saltpetre 29,25,089 13,14,830 23,22,106
Bengal Commercial Reports 1819,1827, 1832*
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(1)
the consequent fall of raw material prices were the first indication 
of the extreme vulnerability of her unbalanced economy* It showed 
the shape of things to come if India was not qiiekly industrialised 
and was relegated to play the subordinate and complementary role 
of a raw material producer*
Though Dutt is right in denouncing the British manufacturer 
for denying Indian cotton industry free trade and for depriving it 
of protection, he does the East India Company an injustice by making 
It a party to that policy* The Company tried its best to save the art 
of Indian cotton manufacture with whatever patronage it could 
afford* It fought with no less zeal than the free trader for the 
reduction of tariff In England* The policy of imposing transit 
and town duties was neither laid down nor retained at the behest of 
the Court and, after 1815, it often dwelt on the injustice of 
continuing them on piece goods and cotton* Indeed this was more 
haimful to India than the high tariffs in England as It facilitated 
capture of the home market by the British cotton manufacture and 
precipitated the inevitable decline of producing centres like Dacca, 
so feelingly described by Charles Trevelyan before the Select Committee 
of the House of Commons in 1840 and by Bishop Heber in Ms Indian
(I) Articles Prices
1826 1828 1832
S.R* S.R* S*R*
Indigo per fact* md* 270-530 235-310 140-158
Sugar n Baz. md* 9/4-10/4 10/6-11/12 5/4 - 10/-
Silk n seer 14/8 - 16/— 12/12 - 13/4 9/4 - 11/8
Cotton n Baz* md* 13/4 - 16/— 12/8 - 14/- 12/8 — 13/-
Bengal Commercial Reports 1826, 1828, 1832*
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Journal# Nothing short of mechanisation of the Indian cotton 
industry could have prevented the disaster# So far as raw materials 
were concerned, the Court*s correspondence with the Indian Governments, 
amply quoted in this thesis, illustrate the solicitude It felt for 
their improvement# If cotton and silk were so developed by 1832 that 
one could supply the China market and the other the British - the 
Company should get its due meed of praise* Indigo owed its origin 
to the Company* s favour and the Court never forgot to tarn the 
planters against over-production nor the Bengal Government to 
rescue them fran Its effects# The only limitation before the Company 
regarding investment in cotton and sugar, besides finance, was the 
incubus of the shipping interest which demanded a freight too high 
for gruff goods but, within that limitation, it proved helpful# The 
YYest Indies Sugar interest deserves greater blame than the Shipping 
Tnterest for the apathy towards Indian sugar; the Liverpool importers
A  tiCXX.1T
and the shortness of staple of Indian cofcton tv more responsibility for 
its exlusion from the British market# The Company*s monopoly was no 
doubt an insuperable obstacle before the import of capital for the 
development of Indian raw materials but it is at least debatable 
how much could have been imported during the Revolutionary and the 
Ifeipoleonic Y/ars which created an insatiable demand for capital nearer
i  .
home and were not propitious for a large scale sea-borne trade'with 
India#
One of the trickiest problems, that has plagued Indian
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historians, Is the problem of the ’drain*. It was first stated
systematically in the Ninth Report of the Select Committee in 1783,
which was definitely biased against the Company, and thereafter
taken up by Brocks Adams, Bigby, Romesh Dutt and a host of
historians following, than* Dutt gave it a qiantitative definiteness
which tempts an easy acceptance# Holden iUrber has warned us against
considering it solely in tems of Bengal# The nature of this study
precludes us from an analysis of trade of the other Presidencies
which alone can give us some clue to the truth and though we possess
the full statistics of Bengal trade, the unreal method of valuation
at the Calcutta Customs House makes all statistics no more than
a tentative illustration of tendencies. It is true that, so far as
Bengal was concerned, there was always a ’drain* in the sense of an
(1)
excess of exports over imports except in 1818-19# The more
important question, however, Is neither the fact of ’drain* nor its
(2 )
actual amount but its mture and whether it was taken away, as is 
proclaimed, without any ’direct equivalent#*
Dutt failed to differentiate between trade on private and 
public account, nor has he differentiated between ’drain* before 
1813 and after 1813 - the fonaer arising from an application of
(1) Sir Theodore Morrison in TThe Economic Transition of India* has
warned us against equating the ’drain* with excess of exports over 
imports#
(2) Dr# J#C*Sinha in his Economic Annals of Bengal calculates ’drain*
between 1757 and 1780 as £38,400,000, p#52.
Sir P#J*Griffiths calculates drain between 1780 and 1813 as 
£30,000,000 or less than £1 million per year but does not provide 
us with the basis of his calculation# The British Impact on India 
p* 400* Even Holden Eurber’s calculation of ’drain* between 
1783-92 is not complete*
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territorial revenue to the provision of the Investment and the 
latter freon remittance of an equivalent of the home charges*
Secondly, If the drain by the Company was mostly In the foun of 
goods - not surely in geld, as bullion imported on public account often 
exceeded vhat was exported - these goods were bought in the Bengal 
market for seme value* Was it not then returning some direct 
equivalent to the land in the shape of prices? Was it not assisting 
to that extent in the development of, or at least in maintaining the 
quantum of, industry and agriculture with a part of the State 
revenue? Does it really matter whether muslin was worn by a Mughal 
princess or a Versailles belle? In the case of ’drain* on private 
account - this indirect encouragement of production must also be
acknowledged* Much of this ’drain’ took place in the medium of
(I) (2)
indigo and Buchanan Hamilton in 1807, U, Ihirlie in 1813 and Rammohun Roy
(3)
and Dwarkanath Tagore about 1829 spoke of the benefits It conferred 
on the country side* But for the Company’s remittance trade after 
1813, much more private capital would have been invested in Bengal 
in raw materials* As It was, about £2 millions worth of Bengal 
goods were purchased by the private traders each year - a fact to 
be reckoned with when we cast up the balance sheet of the so-called
drainage*
One Important reservation may be made* Has there a surplus
(1) Eur. MSS, D 72, p. 120*
(2) See Chapt* III*
(3) See Chapt* V*
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revenue to buy goods with for the investment or for the remittance 
of the home charges after meeting the expenses of the imperial 
expansion, or was the purchase or remittance by trade made from 
loans? If the Government did the latter, then, it was surely 
cancelling much of the benefit- by adding to the general burden 
of interest* Except in so far as such loans provided for the
investment of native capital, the burden was real and, even In that
case, the benefit was not equally distributed* The Government’s 
demand always tended to raise the interest rate in the domestic 
money-market to the detriment of the producers and the middlemen 
who depended on borrowed capital* When, to pay annual interest,*, 
on debt incurred for Investment, salt monopoly or transit duties 
were kept up, the system of loan-financed trade impeded production* 
The Company never admitted that it borrowed for trade* It Is 
impossible to say as its commerce and Government were hopelessly
mixed up* If they were for war - the loans partly increased
productivity by increasing the demand for amy and cammissariat 
supplies and, what is infinitely more important, purchased peace and 
order and unity - the basic necessity for any progressive economic 
development* It is not easy to sed bow It could have taken place 
without a national market and how a national market could have come 
about without wars of consolidation or expansion* If the loans 
were incurred for meeting the home charges, it must be admitted that 
some of these charges were debitable against India*
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It would have been In the interest ot  India and of the Indian 
capitalists to monopolise the public debt* The rapidly mounting 
income from empire—building would, then, have remained in India#
The opposition of Dutt and many other economists of his generation 
was not so imich to the growth of a British Empire in India as to 
investment by the private British capitalists in that enterprize* But 
it is doubtful whether so much capital wculd have been available from 
native resairces alone or the Indian capitalists would have agreed 
to accept the gradually diminishing rate of interest on public loans 
so long as land or rural money-lending remained more remunerative#
It was stagnation of trade which persuaded the Europeans to accept less 
and less for their superfluous money provided they obtained remittance 
in bills for the principal and interest* Had trade been free from 
1793 and had there been no war - It Is doubtful whether the private 
British capitalist would have cared so much for building the British 
political Empire* As such the opening of India trade in 1813 had some 
effect on the ratio of the holdings of public securities by the 
Europeans and the natives* By 1832 the latter had increased their 
share of the Company*s paper and, had trade not been dull since 1826, 
would have had a still greater share*
Same of the financial muddles followed from lack of knowledge 
and experience* Disraeli once said, "**.India that has produced so 
many great men, seans never to have produced a Chancellor of the 
Exchequer". War finance, an art still wrapped in mystery, was unknown 
in the Company* s India which had been called upon to fight a series
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of wars since the days of Warren Hastings* There was no finance 
department till 1844 and no finance member till 1859. The Governor 
General in Council had to manage Indian finance as best as it could 
along with hundreds of other pressing problems* It had to fall 
back on the native business instinct of the Englishman and the 
financial policy It adopted was more often a product of expediency 
than of an under standing of the full significance of the economic 
forces at play* The close connection between trade and finance 
added to the complexity and the home charges- to the difficulties 
already inherent in a dual system of financial management# Leadenhall 
Street and Fort William were often at cross purposes* The prodigality 
of the provincial authorities plagued the peace of the Bengal 
Government. The Board of Control would order expenditure over the 
head of the Court. There might have been same respite had the 
employnent of native agency been decided earlier. But the Cornwallis 
prejudice died hard* The prevailing dogma of laissez faire cramped 
expenditure on nation-building activities, and even if there were 
will, the Indian Government found it hard enough to keep above water# 
It is as idle to anticipate a welfare state at the beginning of 
the nineteenth Century as it is unjust, to impute a premeditated 
plan of exploitation* Bengal did not befein to go down hill frcm a 
certain date In 1757* The causes of disintegration lay in her 
political, economic and social system before the British assumed the 
sovereignity of Bengal* Lack of foreiga trade (as distinct from, 
coastal trade), shipping (as distinct freon the miserable native
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dhonies), banking, credit and joint stock organization (not permitted 
to develop by the monoply of Juggut Seths), peace, order and national 
cohesion (impossible after the dissolution of the Mughal Unpire), 
variety and free scope of large scale production (dependent on peace 
and order), adequate protection for private property (necessary for 
the growth of capital) and a strong middle class (to supply leadership) 
contributed to the inertia of economic life in Bengal* Caste stood 
against initiative, chaos against enterprize, localised markets 
against advanced technique, economic fragmentation against formation 
of capital* Over a society divorced from the State hang the whim 
of gods and local lords which confined thought by fatalism and action 
by the simple needs of the day* The impact of a complex alien 
administration and a superior economic technique naturally proved 
ruinous to this rotten edifice*
But how far did this impact contain the seeds of a new 
economic life? Had the imposition of an alien economy a positive,: 
creative role? Fe must analyse its consequences for each social class 
to answer this question*
First of all the zemindars in whose favour the Permanent 
Settlement was enacted# In Duttfs opinion that was the only beneficial 
act performed by the Company* A review of the period compells us 
to modify this attitude of our Victorian forbears* Apart frcan the
-451-
injustice to the peasantry who were the real owners of the soil,
Cornwallis alienated in advance the main source from which an
increase in the income of the State eould in future he expected*
This had incalculable repercussions on Bengal finance* The State
was forced to borrow to meet the increasing cost of administration
consequent on an inflationary tendency in the early nineteenth
century* Hhat the people saved in taxation, idiich was fixed for nil
time, they paid in the shape of interest which was remitted to London*
More, while one class in the society received the unearned increment,
the loss was spread over all classes* Debarred from a larger
revenue from land, the State had perforce to keep up the injurious
inland duties and the monopolies and had little to spare for
nation-building activities#
Every institution depends on the character of the people who
work it* The Permanent Settlement was meant to give the zemindars
a hereditary ownership of the soil so that they would have a stake
In the improvement of tillage and would plough back their profits into
(2)
land# This did not happen# Over-assessment led to revenue sale
(1) The tpattahs* were neither claimed nor given* The peasants did
not want adjustment of rents on definite terms as they were 
unwilling to relinquish the future gain from vague tenures* The 
landlords were willing to take advantage of the same through their 
powers of distraint and eviction# Though imposition of abwabs or 
illegal taxes were unauthorised by the Government, a few leading 
ryots, gained by indulgences, easily led the multitude* The under­
tenants, who had to pay excessive rents in kind, suffered most#
See Colebrooke op.cit* pp* 48-64*
(2) The question of over^assessment is debatable* See the controversies
between Sir John Shore and James Grant in 51rminger*s Fifth Report* 
and Ascolifs Early Revenue History of Bengal# Mismanagement, ex­
travagance and even deliberate defalcation to purchase the same land
in another*s name played their part* The zemindars tried in.this 
way to persuade the Government to abolish revenue sale. Lack of 
cheap credit worked on the introduction of money economy#
-452-
and revenue sale to a transfer of ownership to the hands of speculators 
who had no hereditary link with the soil or the people who tilled It* 
Fragmentation of estates and rise of land value helped this process#
The new owners were mostly of the middle class, created by the 
expansion of British administration and ccmmeree, who made their 
piles as banians of Englishmen or. benami farmers of revenue (the 
Collector being the real farmer) or clerks in the Commercial Residencies 
and in the Revenue and Judicial Departments who were in a special 
position to manipulate the revenue sale in their own interest# These 
people were mostly absentees towham land was one of several alternative
11)
fields of investment* They bought and sold according to the returns
(2)
land gave but* quashing in that way* all dependent rights* The 
State, now hopelessly dependent on land revenue, was blackmailed by 
them topart with extensive rights of distraint which put the peasantry 
entirely in their hands* Introduction of the Patni tenure increased 
the number of middlemen between the ryot and the State* All this took 
place In a period of englarged demand for Indian raw materials and the
rise of raw material prices* The increased profit frcrn land, therefore,
(1) It is striking how during Wellesley's Mysore and Hastings's Marat ha
Wars the revenue sales realised far less than during the years 
of peace which followed# Wars made public securities more attrac­
tive# See G*G* in G* to Court (Revenue) 23 September 1798* Court to 
G*G* in C* (Revenue) 21 March 1821* G#G* in C* to Court (Revenue)
1 August 1822*, G.G* in C. to Court (Revenue) 30 July 1823#
(2) "Of the increased value of estates, the increase of cultivation Is
not the only possible cause# The sacrifice of all the rights of 
the ryots may^possibly be another***" Court to G*G* in C* (Revenue) 
21 March 1821#
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was absorbed In unrestrained enhancement of rents* The peasantry 
lost the margin of profit which was rightfully theirs* Worse still,1 
the zemindars, talookdars and the middling fanners now turned money­
lenders as the introduction of a money'-economy and increase of 
production raised the need for rural credit* The union of the zemindar 
and the money-lender in the same person was an unmitigated disaster 
for the country's economic development* It deprived industry and 
trade of capital and it shackled agricultural improvement by taking
CD
away the only incentive before the peasantry* Production no doubt 
rose but cultivation was more extensive than intensive in character#
So many more acres were brought under the plough without any enrich­
ment of the qiality or the reduction of the cost of production* The 
only other class that gained from this system was the officials 
attached to the zemindars and the intermediate tenure-holders#
(1) Dr* Buchanan Hamilton refers to the combination of the landlords 
and the larger farmers in fleecing the peasantry* "A 
clamour however, as usual, has gone abroad against the wealthy 
farmers, who are considered as mere flayers of the poor, and no 
people privately join more earnestly in the cry than the landlords. 
In public, however, they court the wealthy faimers, and it is 
alleged often purchase their assistance to enable them to fleece 
the poor tenantry*** He refers to the numerous perquisites and 
exactions and particularly to the rate of interest charged on 
advances to the ryots* "He (the ryot) receives the rice, that 
is necessary for seed, or for his maintenance, at the higjL 
rate, which p re valla for 6 months before harvest, and he must 
pay It back at the low rate, which is put upon it, when the 
market Is glutted by every necessitous creature bringing 
his com for sale#** Eur* MSS D* 71, pp. 212—216#
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In 1793 Bengal scarcely had a class engaged in whht could "be 
called foreign trade. The Coasts were the limit. It could not 
have survived the cut-throat competition of the British country—traders 
and its decay was only delayed for a while by the development of 
the foreign European and American trade during the Revolutionary 
and the Napoleonic Wars# The loss of this patronage after 1813 was 
considerable and the fall of freight-rate after the arrival of the 
free traders made further over-sea adventures unprofitable* What 
was lost, however, was largely compensated by the rapid development 
of internal trade. Though the inland traders still struggled under 
transit and town duties and the thousand and one harassments 
incidental to an antiquated customs system, they had bene fit ted as 
a class like the zemindars* The benefit, no doubt, could have been
greater, had not the British agency houses claimed the lion's share
(1)
of the Indo-British trade and monopolised the indigo business and had
not the indigenous cotton manufacture succumbed before the British
cotton manufacture* The sale of European manufacture in the interior
furnished some fillip and the names of natives like Ramrutton Mullick,
Radha Hadhnb Bonarjee, Brajamohen Mukherjee etc* figure among its
biggest purchasers* The salt business was entirely in the hands of
the natives* Some of the small contracts^  like the ,Sloop contract,
fell to them. Here, as in the case of land, the bigger dealers
(1) The introduction of the agency system by Cornwallis had deprived 
the native traders of the Company's contracts but this loss was 
more nominal than real*
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turned money lenders and soon had a stranglehold on Bengal's internal 
trade* What was worse, the rise of land value tempted them to 
invest in land which in its turn raised the land value further*
The primary producers were pressed between the millstone of the 
zemindar and the netherstone of the capitalist who advanced the 
expenses of production* The advance system was not the cause but 
the consequence of poverty and lack of capital# The Company did 
not originate it* It only took up an age-old practice to secure 
its European investment* Given free competition, there was a 
greater likelihood of the primary producers getting a fair 
remuneration for their labour at the loom or at the filature*
The evils of the advance system would have been eliminated to a large 
extent by competition among people eager to make the advances* The 
Company's monopoly prevented this* The weight of its capital was 
enormous* More responsible than monopoly, and often injurious to 
it, was the right of private trade given to the Commercial Residents* 
They often abused the Regulation 31 of 1795 to force the weavers 
or the winders and the reelers of silk to accept what price they chose 
to give for their own private investment* The Board of Trade 
proceedings are full of complaints of exaction, fraud and chicanery 
for which the native officers were usually more to blame but in
cu
which the Europeans always acquiesced* The primary producers
(1) 'Dustooiie* (Commission) taken from weavers of the Luckipore
Residency amounted in 1815 to S.R* 4501* See Bengal B* of T* 
Proceedings 31 January 1817*
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fa red no better when there were middlemen between them and the
Residents# The pykars and dalals, who got silk woms- from the 
breeders or mulberiy plants from the cultivators, defrauded them of 
their proper share of profits# More harmful, was the uncertainty
that hung over all transactions# The weavers were never sure whether
a part af their cloths would be rejected as below the Company’s
prizing and the price of silk bunds was settled after reeling#
This inevitably ended in the evil system of perquisites which pur­
chased the good will of the officers concerned# Throughout the period
the Committee of Warehouses went on complaining of the foulness of silk
and unevenness of cloth of certain factories which is explainable in the
light of these nefarious practices# A new class was emerging in society
■ based on grafts and illegal exactions while the producers went round
a)
the vicious circle of the advance system#
(1) The scale of salaries of native officials in
three of the Company’s factories:-
Benares Cocmercolly Sardah
(18X3) S.B. (1814) S.R. (1821) S.R.
Dewan 100 —
Naib 50 - —
Gomastah 40 50 50
Head Writer • 45 60
Sherestadar - 15 16
Jachendar 25 15 15
Pod&ar 10 - 10
Head Weaver 15 - —
Moonshie 15 - 20
Mohurrer 8 - 8
Jemadar 10 IQ
Peon
00 — *
Proceedings of Bengal Board of Trade 23 April 1813, 6 April 1821
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In the case of private Investment, which, consisted mainly
of sugar and indigo, the profits were largely shared between the
agency houses and the European planters and manufacturers* Whatever
was left was claimed by the gomastah, who charged the inevitable
Tdustoorief, the zemindar who raised the rent and the moneylender
who raised the rate of interest* The evils of advance system were
most conspicuous in indigo-culture* But here again the native
gomasthas should get their share of blame and the zemindarsr pose
as the champion of the oppressed should be disallowed, for, in their
own plantations they behaved no more tenderly*
It is idle to expect the weaver, the winder or the indigo-
grower to save capital out of his remuneration to free himself from
this cash-nexus* Dr* Buchanan Hamilton in his sample survey of
the Bengal districts put the average remuneration of
the mulberry cultivators - Rs 5 - 12 as per month
the cocoon rearers - Rs 3 - 8 as per md* of cocoons
the winders of silk - Rs 7 per month
the weavers of mixed and silfc
goods, (man and wife working) - Rs 5 per loom per month
the weavers of cotton piece goods 
(man and wife and often another
working) - Rs 7 per loom per month
the hired weavers — Rs 2 - 4  as to Rs 3 — 8 as
pe r month
the cotton-spinners - Rs 3 per year
(1)
The Company paid no better wages to its workers*________________ ,
J ± ] Silk filature at Silk filature at
Coomercolly (S.R*) Radnagore (S.R*)
Spinner 4 to 5 per month 4 per month
Reeler 3 to 3/8 " 2/8 tr "
Head Winder 18/- !* -
Turner - 2/8 ” n
Blacksmith 3 to 5 n 4/13 to 6 n
Carpenter 3 to 5 - 4/8 to 4/lS »
(Continued)
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Footnote (1) continued from previous page*
Remuneration was higher at Hurripaul (Proceed* ®. B*T* 17 September 
1813) but lower at Rungpore (ibid 24 January 1814) and was calculated 
per seer of silk at Bauleah (ibid 21 April 1819).
Remuneration for Sundry work
Bri delayer 
Mistry 
Cooly (man) 
Cooly (boy)
Cossimbazar
2 as per day 
Rs 5 per month 
I a 6 pies per day 
1 a per day
Colagore
Rs 5 per month 
• • •
Rs 3 per month 
Rs 2 per month
Proceed* B*B.T* 19 March 1813, 27 November 1815.*
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Indigo gave nearly Rs 3 to Rs 5 per month, poppy - Rs 5 to Rs 3/8 
per seer of juice, salt-manufacture - Rs 50 per ICO maunds in 1790
CD
but Rs 80 or more in 1832 and saltpetre about 14 as. per maund when
(2 ]
the Company gave up Its saltpetre monopoly. The landless labourer 
hired himself out for domestic work at Re 1 or 8 as per month, besides 
food and cloth and usually a piece of land on sharecrop basis. The 
scales of remuneration must have increased with the free trade specula­
tions after 1813 but the rise of prices of food and the basic necessaries
of life must have kept down real wages and the depression of 1826
(3)
arrested them for the time being. The primary produc-ers were caught
(U Rs 87/8 to the nolungjhees of 24 Parganas. See Sep. Consult. 11 
December 1832 No. 15A.
(2) Proceed. Bengal Board of Trade* 23 September 1814.
(3) Article Price Price Price
1797 1811 1832
Rs as pies Rs as pies Rs as pies Rs as pies Rs as
Patna rice per md. 1 7 1 8 - to 1 12 - 2 6 - to 3 m
Rice middling tr — 12 m X X X X
Rice common if - - 12 - to 1 - - 1 12 — — —
Wheat ft - 11 - 1 - - to 1 4 - 1 9 - to 1 10
Auror dholl n 1 12 - 1 12. - to 2 - - 2 8. - to 2 12
Ghee n 13 - - 13 - - to 16 - mm 18 - - to 24 -
Cocoanut oil n 12 - - X X 12 - - to 12 8
Tobacco n 3 8 mm X X 5 — - to 10 —
Beatel nut n 4 8 - 3 12 - to 4 - mm 4 mm — to 4 4
Sugar n 9 - mm 8 - - to 8 8 - 9 12 - to 10 mm
Prices of 1797 taken from Calcutta Monthly Journal Yol. III.
Prices of 1811 taken from Milbum Yol. II, p. 157.
Prices of 1832 taken from Bengal Commercial Reports 1832-33.
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in the whirlpool of world prices and were in arrears with the planters,
the zemindars and the village money-lenders. In trying to satisfy
one with money ho mowed from another they enmeshed themselves more
hopelessly in debt and lost more of their economic freedom*
Another factor, neglected by the historians, is the rise of
population* The famine of 1770 had destroyed about a third of Bengal1 s
population and Cornwall!s refers to jungles all over Bengal in his
ML nut e on the Peimanent Settlement* An estimate of population of
Bengal, Behar, Orissa and Benares in 1789, compiled by the Collectors,
(1)
puts the total at 2,39,48,653* In 1822 Henry Shakespeare, Superin­
tendent of Police in the Lower Provinces, made another estimate
(2)
which puts it at 3,75,03,265* The increase was not as rapid as it 
would be in the latter half of the century and the censuses were none 
too reliable but, when coupled with the destruction of cotton 
manufacture, the rise of population must have increased same 
pressure on land*
This tentative survey of different classes leaves much to be 
desired* But the present study is not concerned with these problems* 
Its purpose will be served if it can clarify the obvious effects of the 
development of Indo—British commercial and financial relations between 
1793 and 1833 on Bengalee society* These had directly led to the
(1) R* Montgomery Martin, History of the Possessions of the Honourable
East India Company 1837 Yol* I, pp* 250-51* Colebrooke estimates 
the population in 1804 at 27 millions* op*cit* pp* 14—15*
(2) App* 42* Report of S.C.H.C* 1831*
An estimate in 1824 puts It as 3,99,57,561*
See Alexander1 s East India Magazine Yol* I* p* 227*
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creation of a middle class, dependent on land, the holding of 
public securities and inferior public office, and indirectly to 
the fonnation of a middle class, based on legal and commercial 
professions, though the lines of demarcation between them are 
not clear as the latter usually invested their earnings in land*
The British rule had assured a fonnation of capital by establishing 
peace and order* The Charter of 1833 had opened the way for 
import of capital from England so necessary for economic development* 
Destruction of native manufacture and the effects of the Permanent 
Settlement had combined to produce a sizeable body of landless 
labourers* Apparently the time seemed ripe for an Industrial 
Revolution in Bengal under British management and with the- joint 
resources of the British and the native capitalists which would open 
avenues of employment to the middle classes, divert capital from 
land to industry and take off the increasing pressure on land* 
Apparently again, the time seemed ripe for a more protectionist 
policy of the State which would guard the Interest of that Industrial 
Revolution from foreign competition and the Interest of the peasantry 
from the planter, the rentier and the money-lender* This, however, 
did not happen* The next Chapter of India1 s economic history is 
concerned with the sacrifice of the Indian industrial potentiality, 
the frustration of the middle class and the deterioration of the
-462-
peasants1 conditions* The causes lie Implicit in the history 
narrated above - they lie mainly in the character of the middle 
class which evolved between 1793 and 1833 and the character of 
the economic control wielded by the British manufacturing class 
who, after 1833, got hold of the real power of the State*
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Appendix 1*
C U R R E N C Y
100 Current Rupees 
100 Sicca Rupees 
100 Arcot Rupees 
100 Bombay Rupees
86-3-4 Sicca Rupees 
116 Current Rupees
108 Current Rupees
110 Current Rupees
WEIGHTS M )  MEASURES
I Factory maund
1 Bazar maund
74 lb* 10 oz* 10drs*666 dec* 
avoir dupois.
82 lb* 2oz* 2 drs. 133 dec* 
avoir dupois
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